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THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS.

(*Introductory Chapters.*)

By JOHN MATHIAS WILSON, B.D., late President of Corpus Christi College, and Whyte's Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Oxford; and THOMAS FOWLER, D.D., President of Corpus Christi College, and Wykeham Professor of Logic in the University of Oxford, Honorary Doctor of Laws in the University of Edinburgh.

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THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS. PART II.

(*Being the body of the work.*)

By THOMAS FOWLER, D.D., President of Corpus Christi College, &c.

THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS

FOWLER

ADVERTISEMENT.

AS Professor Wilson is not responsible for any portion of the present Volume in its final shape, it has been thought unadvisable to insert his name in the Title Page. But it should here be stated that not only was the general plan of the work settled with him, but that the following specific passages (besides, probably, a few others of minor importance) are either based on written or oral communications from him or were jointly composed by him and myself: pp. 1–66 *jointly (it is now almost impossible to discriminate our respective contributions to this chapter)*; 67–69 *(down to 'moral world')*; 91, 92 *('It is almost . . . dried up')*; 104 *(last paragraph)*; 105 *(first paragraph)*; 136 *('And here . . . principles')*; 170, 171 *partially;* 204–208 *('It would seem . . . limits') partially;* 217–219 *('The life . . . cost of others') partially;* 222–224 *('It stimulates . . . inoperative') mainly;* 225–229 *('Some moralists . . . frequently do')*; 236–238 *('But it may be . . . comparison')*; 240–244 *('In the more advanced . . . to make') partially;* 259–260 *('It may be . . . exists') partially;* 274, 275; 283, 284 *('It should . . . equable development')*; 288–290 *('We hear much . . . application'), partially;* 297 *('Hitherto . . . sexes')*; 312–315 *('The most acute . . . on them')*; 317–326 *('We now proceed . . . distinction'), mainly;* 331–334 *('It may . . . of action'), mainly;* 341–354 *('In the earlier . . . Science of Ethics'), mainly. In those passages which either embody notes or oral communications of Professor Wilson, or were written in conjunction with him, I have employed the term 'We' as distinguished from 'I.'*

T. F.

THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS

PART II

(BEING THE BODY OF THE WORK)

59962

BY

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PREFACE.

In the Preface to the Introductory Chapters of this work, which were published in the spring of 1886, though the sheets had actually been struck off in 1875, I said: 'The printing of the rest of the work was suddenly suspended in consequence of the declining health of my colleague. The remaining chapters or the materials for them exist in MS., in a more or less imperfect form; but a natural reluctance to recur to the work immediately after my colleague's death together with subsequent engagements has hitherto prevented me from devoting to them the attention necessary to their completion. Pending the question of undertaking this task, I think the publication of the following' (that is, the Introductory) 'chapters may be of some service to students as affording an introduction to Moral Philosophy and containing a brief sketch of the leading English Moralists. There is the additional reason for publishing these chapters in a separate form, that they alone received Professor Wilson's final *imprimatur*. Should the remaining chapters ever appear, though they will contain many of Mr. Wilson's ideas, expressed, at times, in

his own language, the responsibility for the opinions adopted in them will rest mainly with me.'

The leisure afforded by a Long Vacation, singularly free from interruptions, has given me the opportunity of completing and revising the chapters which now appear, and which contain the main body of the work. But my own share in this portion of the book has now become so preponderant, and, in the course of revision and completion, so many new questions have arisen which I never had the opportunity of discussing with Professor Wilson, that, though I should myself have been content simply to reverse the order of the names, it has seemed to others better that this Part should appear in my name alone. A detailed account of Professor Wilson's share in it will be found in the Advertisement, which is printed opposite to the Title Page. The detached and fragmentary character of the passages there enumerated is due to the circumstance that Professor Wilson's habits, especially after his health began to decline, were averse to continuous composition, and that, while I was engaged in writing the chapters, he, from time to time, sent me short paragraphs for insertion, or communicated to me orally points which he thought worthy of mention or consideration.

I may here take the opportunity of saying that the authorship of Part I was about equally distributed. Professor Wilson's share in it is mainly represented by Chapter 1, pp. 6–14, Chapter 3, and,

in the historical portion, about half the notice of Hobbes, and the greater part of the notices of Clarke, Kant, Hartley, and Bentham.

It may excite some surprise that I have made so few allusions to the numerous, and, in some cases, valuable, works on Ethics which have appeared in England during the last few years. It is not that I am blind to their merits, or that I have not derived advantage from them in the way of either confirming, modifying, or correcting my own opinions; but the result of my experience is that the constant reference to other authors is a source of considerable difficulty and embarrassment to the reader. Many writers do not seem sufficiently to discriminate between the functions of an author and a reviewer; and this is especially the case in philosophical works, where the large proportion of contested matter offers a constant temptation to an author to digress into a discussion of other theories, either as coinciding with or conflicting with his own. To so great an extent is this the case that I often find persons who have great difficulty in distinguishing between the expository and the critical parts of a modern book, and indeed we must all have experienced the sense of fatigue occasioned by the attempt to extricate from a mass of matter, half critical, half expository, any clear conception of the leading outlines of an author's own system. On this subject I am glad to be able to quote from the Preface to Mr. Leslie Stephen's 'Science of Ethics' (by no means one of

the least interesting or instructive of the recent works on Morals) the following pertinent passage:

'Any book which aims at scientific method should contain within itself all that is necessary to the immediate issues, and should avoid the appearance of anything like an appeal to authority; and I have observed that, as a matter of fact, any such references [namely, to other authors] are apt to introduce digressions, and to lead one aside into disputes as to the rightful interpretation or correct affiliation of the principles of other writers, which, however interesting, really involve irrelevant issues.'

The main idea which inspired my colleague and myself in attempting this work (first planned by us some fifteen or sixteen years ago) was that morality is the result of a constant growth, and is still ever growing; that, consequently, the most effective, though, of course, not the only way of approaching it is the historical method. From this point of view it seems to follow that our moral sentiments and moral ideas, as they exist at present, are not incapable of analysis or explanation, but that they are the result of the constant interaction of the primary feelings of our nature, co-ordinated and directed by the reason, and moulded by the peculiar circumstances, physical and social, in which each individual man, each race of men, and mankind at large have been placed. This theory, I trust it will be found, while it attempts to assign the origin of morality, does not impair the obligation to it; and, while it

traces its development in human history, does not deny its title to be regarded as divine.

What has just been said will serve as a justification for the large proportion of this work which has been devoted to the discussion of the self-regarding, sympathetic, resentful, and semi-social feelings, and of the various forms which, in the development of human nature, they have assumed.

In a book composed under such circumstances as the present, it is almost unavoidable that there should be a certain amount of inconsistency, if not of views at least of expressions, between the two Parts[1], and possibly even between the different chapters of the Second Part. It is doubtless the duty of an Author to attempt himself to detect and remedy such inconsistencies, and I have spared no pains to save my readers this source of perplexity; but, at the same time, I feel that, in a book written at such widely removed periods, blemishes of this kind may have escaped my notice. I can only hope, if this be so, that they may be of minor importance, and that the theories maintained in this treatise may, in all their essential points, be plain, unambiguous, and intelligible.

I have freely made use, throughout this work, of the Essay entitled Progressive Morality, published

[1] An ambiguous use of the word 'absolute' on p. 55 of Part I has been pointed out and corrected in Part II, p. 206.

for me, in 1884, by Messrs. Macmillan and Co. But I have not by any means incorporated it. The main characteristics of the two works remain distinct: the theory of Ethics being discussed in the smaller treatise simply as subsidiary to the suggestion and consideration of practical questions; while, in the present work, the problems of practical morality, though, I trust, never lost sight of, are only introduced incidentally and by way of illustration.

C. C. C.,
February 8, 1887.

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PART II.—CHAPTER I.

On the Self-Regarding Feelings.

WE shall consider, in the present chapter, the class of principles called Self-Regarding, which constitute the least characteristic, though the most indispensable, part of our nature. This class comprehends all those principles which have Self for their more immediate object, rising gradually from those primitive desires which regard the preservation and convenience of life to such as have their sphere in the cultivation of the higher faculties and more especially the formation of the moral character. The lower or more animal forms of this class of principles, namely, the appetites, are the most urgent and imperious parts of our nature. While man lives from hand to mouth, the want of the necessaries of life, the hard struggle for existence, leaves neither leisure nor inclination for the development of the higher faculties. At a later period of society, these necessary wants supply occasion for the exercise of our higher powers. They stimulate the intellectual faculties, give aim and regularity to the bodily activities, and are the occasions of the appearance of many important moral qualities, such as industry, frugality, and, generally, the habits of a prudential character. Moreover, it is often through their instrumentality that the social feelings themselves are directed to their appropriate ends; for others have the same wants, and are exposed, in consequence, to the same hardships and sufferings as ourselves. It is partly in

order to supply these necessary wants that families are led to form themselves into larger societies and to enter into relations with each other, the regulation and adjustment of which evoke the highest intellectual effort directed by the largest and most generous sympathies. In short, these wants are the origin and condition of all our endeavours to improve, first, our lives and surroundings, and, finally, ourselves.

It has been remarked by Bentham that 'there is no such thing as any sort of motive that is in itself a bad one[1];' and again, that 'from one and the same motive, and from every kind of motive, may proceed actions that are good, others that are bad, and others that are indifferent[2].' His meaning would have been plainer, and these assertions less open to exception, if, instead of the word 'motives,' he had employed the expression 'original principles of our nature.' For there is no principle of our nature which does not admit of being employed in moderation or excess, in subordination to reason or in defiance of it, for good or for evil purposes, and which does not thereby acquire a good or evil complexion. Thus, the self-regarding feelings, if unduly predominant, lead to selfishness, indifference to the feelings or welfare of others, capricious and arbitrary conduct; on the other hand, if duly regulated, they may be developed into industry, frugality, patience, self-control, self-respect. Similarly, resentment is, in itself, neither a good nor an evil feeling, but it may lead to actions of all degrees of moral excellence or turpitude, admitting of being developed, on one side, into a sense of justice, on the other, into envy, cruelty, and revenge. Again, the semi-social feelings may lead to a slavish deference to

[1] Principles of Morals and Legislation, ch. x. sect. 10.

[2] Sect. 12.

the opinions of others, or to that sense of shame and fear of public reprobation which are amongst the most valuable guarantees of right conduct. Even sympathy itself, admirable as, for the most part, it is, and excellent as are, generally speaking, its effects, sometimes leads to rash and inconsiderate actions, the tendency of which is to injure rather than to benefit mankind.

It is, on account of these considerations, that it is so important to employ, if possible, neutral terms[1] for the purpose of designating the original principles of human nature. Sympathy, unless qualified by some depreciatory epithet, always has a good meaning; and yet it seems impossible to replace it by any other term. The terms

[1] On the importance and difficulty of finding neutral terms in Ethics, see Bentham's Principles of Morals and Legislation, ch. 10. sect. 13. Speaking of an analysis of motives, he says: 'Such an analysis, useful as it is, will be found to be a matter of no small difficulty; owing, in great measure, to a certain perversity of structure which prevails more or less throughout all languages. To speak of motives, as of any thing else, one must call them by their names. But the misfortune is, that it is rare to meet with a motive of which the name expresses that and nothing more. Commonly along with the very name of the motive, is tacitly involved a proposition imputing to it a certain quality; a quality which, in many cases, will appear to include that very goodness or badness, concerning which we are here inquiring whether, properly speaking, it be or be not imputable to motives.' Bentham suggests an interesting speculation as to the causes of the want of neutral terms in regard to all the motives, and of the prevalence of bad terms for the semi-social and self-regarding motives in particular. 'Partly to the same spirit of detraction, the natural consequence of the sensibility of men to the force of the moral sanction, partly to the influence of the principle of asceticism, may, perhaps, be imputed the great abundance of bad names of motives, in comparison of such as are good or neutral: and, in particular, the total want of neutral names for the motives of sexual desire, physical desire in general, and pecuniary interest.' Ch. 11. sect. 17, note. It is obvious that the self-regarding motives being all of a self-asserting character cannot be so pleasing to others as those which have for their object the good of mankind at large, or of large sections of mankind, their own included. Bentham, it will be seen, specifies as one cause of the prevalence of bad, or the absence of good or neutral terms, the spirit of detraction which is common to mankind. He refers it also to the predominance at one period of the ascetic view of morals, which caused men to regard every principle of their nature as intrinsically bad.

'self-regarding,' 'semi-social,' and 'resentful,' however, as now commonly employed by moralists, approach sufficiently near to a neutral sense, and hence serve sufficiently well to designate the other great classes of feelings.

Guided by these considerations, we have selected the expression 'Self-Regarding' rather than 'Selfish' for the purpose of designating that large class of feelings of which we ourselves are the more immediate objects. That some such term is requisite will be plain on the slightest reflexion, for feelings of which we ourselves are the objects are so absolutely necessary even to self-preservation that without them human life would be impossible, and what is essential to our very existence cannot, in itself, be an object of blame.

However blameworthy these feelings may be, when gratified in excess or to the exclusion of others, they are not only an essential part of our nature, but the very root and condition of those sympathetic feelings, which are often so thoughtlessly exalted at their expense. A man cannot feel for another as himself, love another as himself, respect another as himself, in one word, sympathise with him, unless he feels for himself, loves himself, respects himself. To maintain the contrary, would be a mere absurdity and a contradiction in terms. But still the language of some writers, as, for instance, of Hutcheson, if interpreted strictly, would seem to lead to this absurdity. Men, undoubtedly, are to be found who care very much for themselves and very little for others, but, on the other hand, it is rarely, if ever, that a man is jealous of his neighbour's honour, of his neighbour's reputation, of his neighbour's true good, unless he is jealous of these things for himself. To do unto others as we would that they should do unto us, is all that the most perfect law of morality requires of us.

The self-regarding feelings are not only essential to the welfare and preservation of the individual, but, as a rule, the material interests of society are best promoted by each man looking well after his own affairs. It is, as a rule, by each man trying to do the best for himself, that the land is tilled, commodities produced, intercommunication facilitated, in one word, that national prosperity is created. There are, of course, exceptions, as, for instance, in carrying out gigantic works requiring much combination, but experience seems to shew that, in advanced states of society, many even of these are better executed by private enterprise than by the intervention of government. And even government itself may be regarded as merely an instrument by means of which a number of persons agree to work, in order the better to promote their individual interests. The same might be said of co-operative societies, though, in working both for them and the state, it must be acknowledged that there is introduced, if only to a slight extent, a new element of mutual trust and mutual sacrifice which is entirely wanting in working by and for oneself. A man joins these societies, however, primarily, not for the sake of doing good to others, but for the sake of doing good to himself. The utter failure of all thorough-going schemes of communism is a sufficient proof of the futility of the attempt to substitute in an industrial organisation any other motive power for that which must always be the main, though it need not be the only one, namely a man's regard for himself, or, at least, for himself and his family. And even suppose that regard for others could, in this respect, be made to take the place of regard for oneself; what would be the consequence? A would do a certain amount of work for the sake of B, and B a certain amount of work for the sake of A. If the amounts of work were unequal, the loser would have a right to complain, and

if they were equal, exactly the same result would ensue as at present. But that men would ever work entirely for the sake of others with the same vigour, the same heartiness, and the same untiring industry with which they now work for themselves, is a supposition which could never be realised, while human nature remains what it is. The sympathetic feelings are an essential part of human nature, and in a well-ordered life there is ample scope for their exercise, but we do not really exalt them by insisting on intruding them into an alien province.

The obvious necessity of the self-regarding feelings, and the enormous importance of their due regulation in the conduct of life, together with the beneficial effects which plainly result therefrom, have led some authors to suppose that they are alone sufficient to account for all our actions and for all the phenomena of our moral nature. The most celebrated of these authors, and the one who expresses the view most unequivocally, is Hobbes, whose opinions I shall discuss at length in the chapter on Sympathy. Great, however, as is the ability with which he works out this paradox, I conceive that it is untrue to facts, and that, were it possible for a man to divest himself entirely of the sympathetic feelings, even though the self-regarding feelings were developed to their utmost perfection, both he and society would be infinitely the losers. This supposition I shall now proceed briefly to consider.

Suppose, what is indeed impossible in actual life, the case of a man actuated solely by self-regarding feelings, and let these feelings be so co-ordinated as to compass, on each occasion, his highest individual good. What will be the result? It is plain that the man will be sober, temperate, provident, and that, under ordinarily favourable circumstances, he will secure for himself a large amount

of material prosperity. He will, according to this supposition, be entirely free from the personal miseries and misfortunes which the majority of men entail upon themselves by their misconduct and improvidence. But, though he will be saved from much misery, will he enjoy any large amount of positive happiness? He is, according to the supposition, cut off from all the pleasures of companionship, friendship, the domestic affections, and the manifold forms of sympathy. He has no one with whom he can share his joys or his sorrows. The exquisite and various charms which result from the reciprocation of acts of kindness and courtesy must be to him unknown. Moreover, many of the enjoyments which are derived from nature and art depend on a subtle association with the sympathetic feelings, and, if these did not exist, would be impossible. It may be questioned, then, whether the misery from which a man would be saved, even on the extreme supposition of a perfect regulation and co-ordination of the self-regarding feelings, would at all compensate him for the happiness of which he would be deprived by the extinction of sympathy. But we must recollect that, as a matter of fact, the absence of the sympathetic feelings would, by no means, necessarily be attended by the development of perfect prudence, while, if we had no regard for others, some of the most effective checks on the violence of our passions would be removed.

Let us now make a similar supposition with respect to society. Suppose a society to consist exclusively of men, each having an intelligent regard for his own interests but entirely devoid of any concern for the good of others. What again, in this case, would be the result? As in the case of the individual, there would undoubtedly be a great diminution of misery. The members of the society, or, at least, a large majority of them, would

see that it was for their individual interest to take as effective measures as possible for the prevention of crime and disease, and such measures would, on this supposition, probably be so effective as almost totally to eradicate the one and considerably to diminish the other. By the exercise of prudence and foresight, moreover, almost every member of this society would be able to preserve himself from the evils of poverty. There would, in fact, if this supposition were realised, be absolutely no material misery, except what arose from unavoidable calamity. But, on the other hand, there could be no mutual confidence, except such as was guaranteed by mutual interest; there could be no common action, except such as resulted in some advantage to each individual engaged in it; there could be no love, friendship, or charity, no loyalty, admiration, or respect. Life would lose most of its charms, and even the prosperous majority would lead but a cheerless existence, while the few who were the victims of inevitable misfortune would have no one to pity or succour them. And if this would be the case in the world as we are conceiving it, where every man's actions are supposed to be dictated by the most perfect prudence, what would be the case in the world as it is, where the self-regarding feelings are so far from being under the complete control of reason, that they often bring even to the individual himself almost as much misery as they avert? Eradicate the sympathetic feelings, and leave mankind in all other respects as they are; there would certainly not be less misery in the world, while, as certainly, the main springs of our happiness would be dried up.

We see, then, that, under the most favourable supposition, the eradication of the sympathetic feelings would leave to mankind a much smaller balance of pleasure over pain than at present falls to their lot, while, all other

circumstances remaining as they are, the ratio would be enormously diminished, even if society, in anything like its present form, could prolong its existence. But, indispensable as are the social feelings to the enjoyment and conduct of life, we must beware of insisting too exclusively on their value at the expense of those which more directly regard our personal interests. A man entirely devoid of the social feelings might continue to live, and even to enjoy material prosperity, but a man, if such we can conceive, with no regard to his own preservation or comfort could hardly sustain life for a day. Nor is it desirable to diminish a man's regard for himself. In most men there is rather a defect of rational regard to their own interests than an excess of it. It is the perversion or the disproportionate development of the self-regarding feelings, and not their absolute strength, which constitutes a man unamiable, selfish, or vicious.

One reason, perhaps, why the self-regarding feelings have been so much depreciated or neglected by moralists is the very fact that they are of so fundamental a character, and are so essential to the conduct of human life. Men are apt to be attracted by what is rare in comparison of what is common, and hence a stern sense of justice or a tender feeling of compassion extorts our admiration or excites our sympathy, while there is little to arrest our attention in the more homely virtues of industry, frugality, or resignation.

I shall now proceed to consider the various forms assumed by the self-regarding feelings, their regulation and co-ordination, their use and abuse, and the several habits which result from their exercise or control.

In this class of principles I comprehend all those, whether original or acquired, which have self for their more immediate

object. These principles it is exceedingly difficult to arrange according to any order of development; for, with the exception of the love of wealth, which is undoubtedly derived, all of them appear, in some form or other, to exist even in the most primitive conditions of human life. Equally difficult is it to propose a complete enumeration of them. But it will be sufficient, for my purpose, if I draw attention to those which are important in the moral constitution of human nature and arrange them in, what so far as I can conjecture, is the most probable order of their development.

The most patent to observation of the primary instincts, feelings, or whatever we may call them, in man, as in all other animals, are that of *self-preservation* or the *love of life* and the desire to relieve the wants or gratify the appetites of the animal nature. In this class must be included the desire to assuage hunger or thirst, to relieve extreme warmth or cold, undue pressure, and the like disagreeable sensations, as well as the desire for what is agreeable to the palate, the sexual appetite, and other positive impulses. All these feelings may be classified under three heads, namely, the negative desire of relieving such wants as are attended with bodily discomfort, the positive desire of gratifying such appetites as are followed by bodily pleasure, and the instinct, as it is generally called, of self-preservation. The question as to which, or whether any, of these desires is prior to, or a condition of, the others, is one which it does not concern us to discuss. It is sufficient to point out that the desires or impulses to relieve wants, to gratify appetites, and to avoid destruction are such simple facts of our nature that not only human, but even animal life cannot be conceived of as existing without them. Moreover, if we carry our analysis sufficiently far, they will be found to have furnished the

motives, through the continued action of which on the mind, many of the other desires, to be discussed presently, as, notably, the love of wealth, and, perhaps, the love of power, have originally come into being. Many authors have, in fact, supposed that either in the history of the individual or in that of the race, there was a time when the primary desires alone existed, so that, according to this theory, all other desires originated in the way of suggesting means for their satisfaction.

Among these primary desires should be specified the *love of ease* and the *love of occupation.* Every animal with a muscular organisation delights in exercising it, and, after exercising it for a time, becomes fatigued and seeks repose. Exertion and rest alternate throughout life, fatigue invariably inducing the desire to rest, and ennui, so to speak, stimulating to exertion. It is indifferent to the present purpose whether the exertion be that of a high or of a low type of organisation, whether it be corporeal or mental, the principle in all these cases being the same.

Less simple than the feelings hitherto described, though possibly, in their origin, closely connected with them, and growing out of them, are the *love of distinction* and the *love of knowledge.* The lower animals, so far as we may venture to make any assertions with respect to their mental constitution, appear, in many instances, to be without these desires, except in their most rudimentary form. At the same time, if we take the words significant of these feelings in a sufficiently wide sense, some of the more intelligent of the lower animals appear to exhibit them after much the same fashion as ourselves. Horses, dogs, cats, and monkeys often display considerable curiosity, and to witness rivalry amongst the lower animals is by no means an uncommon occurrence. In man, however, especially when he attains to civilisation, these passions become so much

more intense, admit of so many more applications, and exert so much more powerful an influence over life than in the case of any of the lower animals, that they appear to occupy a wholly different place in the economy of his constitution, and, on the supposition that they have originally grown out of the primary desires, to have become entirely dissociated from the parent stem. Of these two, the love of distinction or pre-eminence (which must be carefully distinguished from the love of power, to be noticed presently, as well as from the love of approbation which is a semi-social rather than a self-regarding feeling) seems, in the great majority of men, to operate far more constantly and with far greater force than the love of knowledge. Analyse almost any action of our lives—our conduct of business, our conversations, our amusements—and we shall find that the desire of distinguishing ourselves or of outstripping our companions has often, when we have ourselves been least conscious of it, inspired our acts or words. Even in intellectual study itself, it is familiar to every teacher how much more the average pupil is actuated by the love of distinction than by the desire of knowledge. In some professions, as, for instance, in that of the soldier, this desire not only is, but is acknowledged to be, the governing principle of life. To 'make oneself a name' is always regarded as a laudable and honourable ambition. Few men ever seem, under any circumstances, to question the perfect propriety of the love of distinction as a motive of conduct. Probably society has stamped this feeling with too emphatic and too indiscriminate a mark of approbation, though it must be granted that few feelings have been a more frequent source of noble and useful actions. On the other hand, the love of knowledge, perhaps, from having been confined, in its higher manifestations, to so small a number of persons, has never met with sufficient recogni-

tion from the world. Yet surely to know the secrets of nature, the history of man, and the workings of the human heart and intellect, is a more worthy ambition than to outstrip others in the race of life or in the contest of the moment, or even to leave a name behind one. Before dismissing these two feelings, it may be well to recall the attention of the reader to the fact that they present themselves in the most various forms and exist within the widest ranges, from the curiosity of the mollusc that peeps outside its shell to the speculations of the philosopher who attempts to weigh the stars or to fathom the secret springs of human conduct, and from the hardly conscious pride of the bird which exhibits its plumage to the far-seeing anticipations of the statesman, the warrior, or the poet who hopes for everlasting fame.

The *love of reputation* and the *love of fame* (which will be further considered under the head of the semi-social feelings) may be regarded as higher developments of the love of distinction. Both imply a considerable amount of imagination and foresight, and both aim at a distinction which should be more or less widely recognised, and more or less durable. They may, perhaps, be distinguished from each other, the one as being content with local and contemporary, the other as endeavouring to compass more widely extended or even posthumous distinction as well.

In the next group of self-regarding propensions may be placed the *love of power*, the *love of liberty*, and the *love of wealth*. The love of power and the love of wealth are, in their ruder forms, to some extent exemplified in the lower animals, and it need hardly be said that, wherever the power, whether of man or beast, produces involuntary constraint, the love of liberty is certain to be aroused. The conscious effort, however, to gratify these desires implies, perhaps, more foresight than does the

effort, often only half conscious, to gratify the desires previously noticed, and hence they may appropriately be considered together.

The love of power seems to have its roots in the primary desires and in the love of distinction. In primitive states of society, power, where it exists at all, is, for the most part, absolute, and is exercised rather over the persons than over the minds of those who are subject to it. Hence the power of commanding or influencing a number of persons becomes necessarily associated with the good things which they are able to procure by their labour or aggressions, or, when procured, to defend from the aggressions of others. The distinction, moreover, of a chieftain or other powerful person is almost exactly proportional to the number of followers whose attendance he can command, and in feudal, and even in comparatively recent, times, large retinues of dependants have frequently been maintained solely for purposes of ostentation and display. As civilisation advances, however, power is often coveted for far purer objects than mere personal aggrandisement or distinction; it is sought as a means of carrying out great projects or reforms, of advancing local or national interests, of ameliorating the condition, physical, moral, or intellectual, of large sections of mankind. And, as this becomes more and more the case, the power coveted is less of a physical and more of a moral character, less over the persons and more over the minds of men. In our own times there are probably few men of any education or refinement who would care to possess absolute power over the persons of any of their fellow-citizens; there are probably equally few who would not put forth their utmost exertions, if they thought such exertions would secure them a moral power over the minds, the aims and aspirations, of any large section of their neighbours. The social and political

aims, for which the most enlightened men among our contemporaries covet influence over others, would be absolutely unintelligible to a savage. So complete is the transformation which civilisation works in the character of our desires! And yet even the desire to exercise moral power over the minds of others may become directly opposed to what properly constitutes respect for others, namely, a regard to the attributes of humanity in their persons. The love of domination, the desire to make the mind and will of others bend to our own is often an irrational and inhuman propensity, and, if long indulged in, becomes in some natures an overpowering passion. The intolerance which seeks to force our own opinions on other men is less brutal, perhaps, than the desire to control their actions, but it is more inquisitorial and, therefore, more tyrannical. On the other hand, to aim at determining the will of men through their understanding, at convincing them by argument and persuasion, is a perfectly legitimate and often a highly praiseworthy object.

The love of liberty may be regarded as the counterpart of the love of power. As the superior desires power, so the inferior desires liberty, that is to say, emancipation from the power of his superior. This is especially the case in early times and in backward states of society, where power is often tyrannical and not infrequently cruel. The one passion of a slave, as soon as he obtains a glimmer of intelligence, is to become a freeman. Even where the relation is far less stringent than that between master and slave, the love of liberty may be the 'ruling passion,' as it is termed, and especially where the power against which it rebels is conceived of as unjust or usurped; a fact of which we have numerous instances amongst whole peoples and classes, as, for example, the Plebs of Rome, the Burghers of the Middle Ages, and the 'nationalities' which, rightly

or wrongly, have regarded themselves as oppressed, within our own generation. It must be borne in mind, however, that, as there is a rational and regulated, so there is an irrational and unregulated, love of liberty. All real and permanent liberty is the creation of law, and, therefore, in a truly civilised state of society, the love of liberty takes the form of attachment to the laws, while it secures justice in the laws which create this liberty. Thus regulated, the love of liberty is wholly distinct from a disposition to licence, a propensity which always indicates imperfection and instability of character, demanding the imposition of restraints from without.

It should be noticed that the phrase 'love of liberty' is employed solely in those case. where the power whose exertion is resented is physical, or where, by the ultimate consequences which rebellion entails, it is equivalent to physical power. Where the power of which the exertion is resented is moral and not physical, the appropriate phrase is not 'love of liberty' but 'love of independence.' Thus, a man is said to have an 'independent' mind when he attempts to think for himself on questions settled by authority, or an 'independent' spirit when he votes or acts contrary to some predominant influence. This independence of mind or spirit is always a praiseworthy quality, so long as it respects, for what they are worth, the reasons on which authority is founded and the beneficial results of which any particular influence may be productive. Though these feelings are undoubtedly liable to abuse, it is by the love of liberty and the love of independence, combined with the love of truth, that all great advances in civilisation have been accomplished, and, unless, from time to time, they flashed forth with some intensity, the life of mankind would become a dreary and monotonous bondage to authority, custom, and force.

A feeling of a wholly different character from the love

of exerting power over others is that sense of power which accompanies the free use of vigorous faculties, and is evinced in overcoming difficulties material and moral. This feeling may be distinguished as the *love of excellence.* The pleasures of power in this sense are the encouragement and reward of active exertion, and they contribute largely to produce love of freedom, both in thought and action. Sometimes these pleasures are known as *the pleasures of skill.* They constitute an appreciable element in the happiness of all men, and a preponderating element in the happiness of some. The pleasure of doing work well, and specially of surmounting difficulties, is a satisfaction to ourselves by which others profit, and is therefore doubly praiseworthy; but, if the consciousness of skill and the desire to display it be perceptible in the work of the artist, it is a certain obstacle to his success, more particularly in high art. It indicates weakness of mind or character, and is incompatible with that concentration of feeling on the object which seems necessary to produce work of transcendent excellence.

The love of excellence for its own sake, the feeling just noticed, it need hardly be pointed out, is essentially different from the love of distinction or superiority, though the common forms of expression have a tendency to conceal the difference.

The *love of wealth,* as distinct from the desire for objects of immediate gratification, in which it undoubtedly takes its rise, has always afforded a favourite example in illustrating the force and nature of Association. From the objects of immediate gratification, our desires, modified by foresight, fasten on the objects of future gratification, and, as the vista of the future constantly enlarges, and new contingencies are continually being taken into account, we come to think less of our immediate and more of our remote

wants. We make plans too for providing for the remote wants of those connected with us as well as for our own. There is a still further stage when the desire is transferred from the end to the means, from the gratification of our wants or those of others to the money by which the gratification is to be procured, and so complete frequently is this transference that men amass money without any regard whatever to its future uses either for their own purposes or those of their friends and dependants. Frequently as the development of this desire has been discussed, it has perhaps never been put in a clearer light than by Hartley, whose words we may quote:

'The love of money may be considered as the chief species of gross self-interest, and will help us, in an eminent manner, to unfold the mutual influences of our pleasures and pains, with the factitious nature of the intellectual ones, and the doctrine of association in general, as well as the particular progress, windings, and endless redoublings of self-love. For it is evident, at first sight, that money cannot naturally and originally be the object of our faculties; no child can be supposed born with the love of it. Yet we see that some small degrees of this love rise early in infancy; that it generally increases during youth and manhood; and that at last, in some old persons, it so engrosses and absorbs all their passions and pursuits, as that, from being considered as the representative, standard, common measure and means of obtaining the commodities which occur in common life, it shall be esteemed the adequate exponent and means of happiness in general, and the thing itself, the sum total of all that is desirable in life. Now the monstrous and gigantic size of this passion, in such cases, supported evidently by association alone, will render its progress and growth more conspicuous and striking; and consequently greatly contribute to explain the corre-

sponding particulars in other passions, where they are less obvious.

'Let us inquire, therefore, for what reason it is that children first begin to love money. Now they observe that money procures for them the pleasures of sensation, with such of imagination as they have acquired a relish for. They see that it is highly valued by others; that those who possess it are much regarded and caressed; that the possession of it is generally attended by fine clothes, titles, magnificent buildings, &c.; imitation, and the common contagion of human life, having great power here, as in other cases. Since therefore ideas exciting desire are thus heaped upon money by successive associations perpetually recurring, the desire of it in certain sums and manners, viz. such as have often recurred with the concomitant pleasures, must at last grow stronger than the fainter sensible and intellectual pleasures; so that a child shall prefer a piece of money to many actual gratifications to be enjoyed immediately.

'And as all the fore-mentioned associations, or such as are analogous to them, continue during life, it seems probable that the love of money would at last devour all the particular desires, upon which it is grounded, was it not restrained by counter-associations; just as it was observed above that the pleasure of gratifying the will would devour all the particular pleasures, to which it is a constant associate, did not repeated disappointments preserve us from this enormous increase of wilfulness.' . . . .

'We may see also why the love of money must, in general, grow stronger with age; and especially if the particular gratifications, to which the person was most inclined, become insipid or unattainable—Why frequent reflections upon money in possession, and the actual viewing large sums, strengthen the associations by which

covetousness is generated—Why children, persons in private and low life, and indeed most others, are differently affected towards the same sum of money, in different forms, gold, silver, notes, &c.[1].'

This explanation would have been more complete had it taken account of the fear of poverty and the desire of making a sufficient provision for others as additional elements in the formation of the association.

It may be remarked that private property is the invariable concomitant of the desire of accumulating wealth. No man, without the desire of storing up supplies for future emergencies, would care to possess property peculiar to himself. The origin of private property, and the steps by which private ownership became legalised, it does not fall within our province to discuss, but we may remark that the ethical effects of this institution have usually been passed over by moralists without sufficient recognition. Its ill effects, indeed—a tendency to stimulate selfishness and to create a grasping and covetous disposition—are obvious enough, and are almost common-places of ethics. But its good effects—its tendency to lead men to take an interest in all around them, its tendency to stimulate frugality, to foster concentration of purpose, to quicken industry, and thereby to advance all material improvements—have, comparatively speaking, been seldom pointed out. And yet, as no society ever has made, so it may be questioned whether any society ever could make, any real progress in civilisation, till this institution had become, at least, widely prevalent in it. Tribal ownership is consistent enough with pastoral pursuits, but as soon as a people begins to till the land, to practise manufactures on any extensive scale, or to carry on any important commercial dealings with other nations, it seems as if a private interest

[1] Hartley's Observations on Man, Part I. ch. 4. sect. 3.

in his gains were necessary to stimulate the industry of each individual engaged in furthering these ends. There are few savage tribes in which private property exists to any great extent[1], and there is certainly no civilised nation in which it does not lie at the very basis of legislation.

There is no desire, perhaps, which, when it has once acquired a hold on a man, is more intense or more constantly operative than the desire of accumulation. This fact is partly to be accounted for from the facility for the exercise of the desire, there being daily, and almost hourly, opportunities either of saving or acquiring, partly from the exactness with which the results of its gratification can be calculated, and partly from the comparative permanence of those results when acquired.

I do not pretend to enumerate the whole of the self-regarding propensions, but I may now sum up the principal varieties as (1) the *primary desires*, that is, the instinct of *self-preservation* or the *love of life*, and the desire to *relieve our bodily wants or satisfy our bodily impulses*, including, as special forms of the latter division, the desires to assuage hunger and thirst, the sexual appetite, the love of ease, and the love of exertion or occupation; (2) the *love of distinction* and the *love of knowledge;* (3) the *love of power* and *love of liberty;* (4) the *pleasures of skill* and the *love of excellence;* (5) the *love of wealth.* It must be recollected that these groups are arranged according to what appears, so far as we can form any

[1] On the growth of private property, and especially in land, see Maine's Ancient Law, ch. 8; and for an illustration of the statement in the text, as well as some exceptions to it, see Lubbock's Origin of Civilization, ch. 9. There is a curious chapter in the De Republica Lacedaemoniorum attributed to Xenophon (sect. 8), shewing the extent to which Community of Property still existed at Sparta in historical times. Any Spartan citizen might use the slaves, horses, dogs, or even, when out hunting, the food of the other citizens.

conjecture on the subject, to be the probable order of development, not according to any supposed order of excellence.

Connected with the desires just enumerated are several words expressive of habits of a praise-worthy or blame-worthy nature. *Greediness* and *Gluttony* are appropriated to the habit of over-indulgence in food, *Intemperance* to that of excess in intoxicating drinks. While Intemperance is employed in this restricted sense, *Temperance* is used in a wider signification, as opposed not only to Intemperance but to Gluttony or Greediness, the word *Sobriety* being the more exact counterpart of Intemperance. *Chastity*, *Unchastity*, *Self-control*, *Lust*, are all words connected with the indulgence or restraint of the sexual appetite, though the third is often employed in a much wider sense, with reference to our appetites and passions in general.

Chastity, like Temperance, is pre-eminently one of those virtues which, though originating in self-regard, affect the welfare of others as well as of ourselves[1]. If the mass of any society were habitually intemperate, that sustained labour and cheerful co-operation, which are essential to the successful prosecution of any industrial undertaking, would evidently be impossible. And, in like manner, unless fidelity to conjugal engagements were the prevailing rule, the family bond would soon be so impaired, as not only to loosen, or even obliterate, the domestic affections,

[1] It, perhaps, hardly needs to be expressly stated that there is no one of the habits, originating in the self-regarding feelings, which may not affect the welfare of others than the person himself. And sometimes these secondary effects, as they may be called, are more important than the primary ones. The miseries entailed by a drunkard upon his family and remote descendants are, for instance, often far greater than any injury which he inflicts upon himself. And the effects of Prudence are often far more conspicuous in future generations or amongst fellow-townsmen or fellow-countrymen than in the fortunes or happiness of the man who has himself exercised the virtue.

but to undermine all those specific enactments or tacit understandings on which the devolution of property and the organisation of society now depend. Without trenching on any vexed question, it may safely be said that purity before marriage, fidelity to the conjugal tie, when once formed, and the restriction of monogamy seem, as a general rule, to be essential to the creation of any high standard either of individual or of national excellence. Nor, unless marriage, in some form or other, had come to exist, can we well see how society could ever have emerged out of barbarism.

It may be remarked, in passing, that Chastity, if not mainly, is at least very largely enforced by the semi-social feelings of love of approbation and fear of disapprobation, to be discussed in a subsequent chapter.

It is curious that there exists no term, significant of praise or blame, in connexion with the desire or feeling which we have called the Love of Life or the instinct of Self-preservation. This fact seems to afford the best evidence of the common opinion that the love of life not only ought to be intense in every man but that it actually is so. We cannot praise or blame a man for the possession of a feeling in an intense form, when every other man possesses it equally intensely. It is true that this opinion is not exactly borne out by facts, there being some men less tenacious of life than others, but the exceptions may be regarded as inconsiderable. Though, however, the love of life is and ought to be intense, when regarded in itself, it may come into collision with other feelings, such as one of the other primary desires, the love of wealth, the love of honour, self-respect, or sympathy, and so become wholly or partially inoperative. There are several terms which express the relative intensity of the feeling under such circumstances as these. *Cowardice, Pusillanimity,*

Faintheartedness express an excessive unwillingness to face danger, where it is implied that there is an adequate cause for so doing. On the other hand, *Rashness* and *Foolhardiness* express an undue contempt for danger or a readiness to face it on inadequate occasions. *Bravery*, *Fortitude*, or *Courage* lies between both these extremes, and, while it never acts irrationally, never flinches from danger when the motives are adequate and the expectation of success is reasonable. Primarily, the word Courage appears to have been applied exclusively to the readiness to face physical dangers. But in more settled times, when dangers to the person and property are less constantly present to the imagination, when society by its laws affords the protection which men once owed to their individual prowess, and regular armies are employed against external enemies, this quality naturally takes a new form and is directed to different objects. The dangers and the difficulties which men have now to encounter are not exclusively or even chiefly those which are occasioned by war or violence, and the word Courage is now used in a much more extended meaning, as when we speak of a man's courage in undertaking some financial, literary, or political enterprise, or in sustaining some misfortune, or in braving public opinion where he believes himself to be in the right. In this application the term is often qualified as *Moral Courage*. This is one of the highest qualities which a man can possess, and is often indispensable to the reparation of acts of injustice or to the accomplishment of great moral or social reforms. The men who have accomplished most good for mankind are those who have united this quality with a strong intellect and beneficent intentions.

The term Fortitude, though used generically as the equivalent of Courage, is also sometimes appropriated

specially to those who shew fearlessness in facing pain rather than danger. In this sense, its meaning approaches to that of Patience, a habit which will be noticed below.

It may be noticed that when men brave the opinions of their fellows on insufficient grounds, the quality which leads them to do so is no longer called Courage but *Indifference to Public Opinion;* while, if their acts are regarded as manifestly wrong or shameful, it assumes the name of *Audacity* or *Shamelessness.* I am here, however, beginning to intrude on another province, that of the semi-social feelings.

Courage in the original sense of the term, that is, Physical Courage, though it never ceases to be indispensable in a community which values its independence, was naturally regarded as of more relative importance at a time when neighbouring tribes were always at war with one another, than it is now, when society is, for the most part, organised on an industrial basis. Hence, in the languages of Greece and Rome, it usurps to itself the name of the quality which is distinctive of man, 'Manliness,' 'Virtue,' 'Virtus,' 'Ἀνδρεία.' It is thus to the military period of society, through which all races have at some time passed, that Courage owes much of the estimation with which we now regard it. The necessity for it was then continually present to the minds of men, and the circumstances under which it was displayed were such as to impress the general imagination in the most forcible manner. Even still, as we might expect, this quality seems to be held in estimation, much in proportion to the military character and military exigencies of a state. But, wherever there exists a standing army of professional soldiers, deficiency in this respect is usually tolerated in persons not belonging to the military profession. Thus, in our own country, it would be an unpardonable

insult to call a soldier a coward, but there are probably many peaceable civilians who would accept such an imputation with equanimity.

The love of ease and the love of occupation are, from one point of view, opposed, though, from another, they are the necessary complement of each other. When the love of ease is in excess, the state resulting is called *indolence*, *laziness*, or *idleness*, the last term, perhaps, denoting a more permanent state than the two former. And, as a man's time cannot be wholly unoccupied, the love of ease, or the disposition to shrink from the serious business of life, often assumes the form of *love of amusement*, a feeling, it may be remarked, which threatens to become a passion in modern society, especially in our own country, and most injuriously to interfere with the performance of the proper functions of the leisured classes. In moderation, amusement is one of the adornments of life; in excess, it thwarts the very purposes for which life exists. There are no equally definite terms to express an excess of the love of occupation, but we sometimes speak, in language slightly disparaging, of *excessive energy* or of a plodding or slaving disposition, and, when this excessive energy is employed on the affairs of others, in terms decidedly disparaging, of *fussiness* or *meddlesomeness*. In English there is no term to express weariness of ease, or rather of the lack of occupation, but the French have the term *ennui*. *Energy*, *industry*, *patience*, *and perseverance* are all terms connected with the love of occupation or employment, which is itself usually stimulated or intensified by other desires, and especially by the need of satisfying the more pressing wants of our nature. Energy implies a capacity and readiness for intense or active employment, at least for a time, but does not necessarily imply, though it does not exclude, either a capacity or

a readiness for continuous effort. Both capacity and readiness for continuous effort are, however, implied in the term Industry. The distinction between what we might call spasmodic and habitual energy, or industry, is well drawn out by Mr. Mill in the following passage of his Political Economy, in which he is speaking of the Causes of Productiveness:

'As the second, therefore, of the causes of superior productiveness, we may rank the greater energy of labour. By this is not to be understood occasional, but regular and habitual energy. No one undergoes, without murmuring, a greater amount of occasional fatigue and hardship, or has his bodily powers, and such faculties of mind as he possesses, kept longer at their utmost stretch, than the North American Indian; yet his indolence is proverbial, whenever he has a brief respite from the pressure of present wants. Individuals, or nations, do not differ so much in the efforts they are able and willing to make under strong immediate incentives, as in their capacity of present exertion for a distant object, and in the thoroughness of their application to work on ordinary occasions. Some amount of these qualities is a necessary condition of any great improvement among mankind. To civilize a savage, he must be inspired with new wants and desires, even if not of a very elevated kind, provided that their gratification can be a motive to steady and regular bodily and mental exertion. If the negroes of Jamaica and Demerara, after their emancipation, had contented themselves, as it was predicted they would do, with the necessaries of life, and abandoned all labour beyond the little which in a tropical climate, with a thin population and abundance of the richest land, is sufficient to support existence, they would have sunk into a condition more barbarous, though less unhappy, than their previous state of slavery. The motive

which was most relied on for inducing them to work was their love of fine clothes and personal ornaments. No one will stand up for this taste as worthy of being cultivated, and in most societies its indulgence tends to impoverish rather than to enrich; but in the state of mind of the negroes it might have been the only incentive that could make them voluntarily undergo systematic labour, and so acquire or maintain habits of voluntary industry which may be converted to more valuable ends[1].'

The habit of *perseverance* or of continuous effort is that which, added to energy, constitutes industry. When used alone, the term is often taken to imply a lack of that capacity for extraordinary efforts which is often so useful on sudden emergencies, but there is no reason why the two qualities should exclude each other. The men most capable of extraordinary exertion are often those who can also maintain a very high level of continuous effort.

Patience is a term often used in combination with Perseverance. When thus employed, it denotes that habit of passive endurance in labour without which the habit of continuous effort would often be impossible. But its sphere is frequently extended from endurance under fatigue to suffering in general. In this sense it may be called passive courage. When compared with that virtue, it may be regarded as the habit of submission to the inevitable, as Courage is the habit of struggling with the evitable. To learn what evils he cannot prevent or avoid is one of man's most difficult lessons, and to submit to these evils, when he has learnt them, with resignation and cheerfulness is one of the most admirable qualities of which he is capable. Impatience and restlessness under sufferings which we

[1] Mill's Political Economy, Book i. ch. 7. § 3.

cannot remove have no other effect than that of doubling their intensity.

'Levius fit patientiâ,
Quidquid corrigere est nefas.'

The virtue of Patience is enjoined with great force and beauty in the writings of the New Testament, and especially in the precepts of Christ himself. It grew up under the influence of the religious sentiment at a time when active courage seemed powerless to deal with the wrongs and oppressions which everywhere prevailed. It was under circumstances of almost hopeless suffering that the teaching of Christ on this head found a ready response in the breast of mankind, impressing the imagination in a manner which has never since been obliterated. It is interesting to observe how the general suffering of the time resulted in the development of a new moral life, compensating in some degree for the suffering which occasioned it. The depths of his own nature are a revelation to man, gradually completing the idea of his humanity and intensifying the sentiment with which it is regarded.

Patience in the true sense of the word should be carefully distinguished from those spurious forms which bear a certain resemblance to it: from Stoical apathy on the one hand, which is founded on pride, and from the monastic virtues, on the other, which affect to promote a higher life by the endurance of unnecessary suffering. True Patience does not court suffering, but accepts it with resignation and fortitude, as that which is the inevitable lot of humanity.

This, perhaps, may be an appropriate place in which to speak briefly of Suicide. Suicide has been condemned by a variety of considerations: by some of the ancient philosophers as an act of ingratitude to the state, and as

displaying an unwillingness to take part in its burdens ; by Christian theologians as an act of presumption in cutting short the period of probation to which God has appointed us ; by some modern writers, like Paley, on account of the mischief which, were it a common occurrence, it would produce by spreading distress and alarm throughout society, and specially amongst those who are dependant on the exertions of others. It seems to be especially condemned by considerations such as those on which we have just been dwelling. Having an appearance of heroism, though in reality cowardice, it has a peculiar attraction for a weak and morbid imagination. But it is plainly inconsistent with those principles of patience and resignation, regard for the sacredness and indefinite value of human life, which, growing up mainly under the influences of Christianity, though fostered in no small degree by their own vitality, the moralist must, on reflexion, regard as being as conducive to the interests of society as they are engaging and attractive. Suicide was tolerated and even applauded by a philosophy which, however noble, was yet founded in pride. It cannot consist with those softer and gentler feelings of humanity which we have just described.

Closely connected with Patience is the habit of *Obedience.* This habit may be utterly unreasoning, and degenerate into Slavishness, but, when in a healthy condition, it may be defined as the habit of submission to competent guidance, for the purpose of attaining some common good. That the existence of this habit in the great mass of the community is absolutely necessary to any co-operation for common purposes or even to the very continuance of society hardly needs to be pointed out. Co-operation implies guidance, and guidance is impossible without submission. But the moral effects of the habit on the general character are, perhaps, less obvious. And yet, on reflexion,

it will be seen that a habit of ready and cheerful submission to law, imposed on rational and intelligible grounds, must act beneficially on the character in various ways, as, for instance, by producing a fixed habit of self-control, by imparting to our actions a conscious dignity and sense of moral worth, and by fostering and strengthening the sympathetic feelings which bind us to our fellow-men. Nor is this habit, at least in any high degree, a very common one. Except as the effect of fear, it is rarely found in the lower types of men, individual or national. All Law or rule, being imposed from without, is a restraint, and habitual or consistent obedience to it, even though the Law be manifestly conducive to our own advantage, implies the sacrifice of inclinations very difficult to overcome. Men are by nature averse to discipline and restraint, capricious, wilful, impatient of control from without, wanting in foresight, disposed to catch at any present gratification or momentary advantage. The deliberate self-control and self-denial, which are implied in a loving, cheerful, and intelligent obedience to Law, are a slow product of civilisation, and the individual who possesses them, or shews a capacity for acquiring them, has attained to an excellence of moral character which distinguishes him from the great mass of mankind.

It will be found, on examination, that obedience of the kind we have been describing implies the growth and development, and that to a considerable extent, of some of the very highest attributes of our nature. The understanding must be highly cultivated, in order to perceive the reasons on which the Law is founded and the advantages resulting from submission to it. Again, the imagination must be vigorous, in order to give to future pains and pleasures the force necessary to make them operate on the will and outweigh present allurements

and distractions. Further, the character or permanent moral element in the man must be sufficiently strong to withstand the action of the various temporary desires and feelings which, if they met with no barrier, would make him, like many of the lower animals, the slave of every passing inclination. Lastly, the advantages of obedience to rule in particular cases are frequently so remote that this obedience can only be secured by self-regarding considerations of a very refined description, such as a consideration of the ultimate effects on our character and conscience. In such cases, a willing submission to restraint implies a generosity of disposition and an abnegation of self, that is, a readiness to sacrifice oneself to the rule, which are truly elevating and noble, and which may even be called disinterested in the true sense of the term.

Though Industry and the kindred virtues are most naturally discussed in connexion with the Love of Occupation and the other primary desires, there is no one of the feelings we are discussing, nor indeed of the feelings of human nature in general, which is not capable of giving occasion for their exercise. Men will exhibit energy, perseverance, industry, patience, in order to avenge themselves on their enemies, to requite their benefactors, to do good to their friends or dependants, as well as to acquire power, wealth, or distinction for themselves. But, in the great majority of the actions of the great mass of mankind, there can be no question that the cause which mainly prompts to industry is the desire to obtain food, shelter, and raiment. These homely wants are thus the root out of which some of our most ennobling qualities originally spring. With few exceptions, every man of mature age has to provide himself, and often his family or other dependants, with food, warmth, shelter, and clothing

by the labour of his own hands. This task is often performed amid great difficulties and entails many privations. Nature often yields even the barest sustenance with but a niggard hand. To wring this sustenance from her often requires the most patient toil and the most sustained energy. It is in this struggle that man learns to distinguish between what he can and what he can not do, to submit with patient resignation to the insuperable limits which nature imposes upon him, and to strive to accomplish the task which is within his power with all the skill, the energy, and the perseverance which are at ihs command. Having once acquired these habits by the effort to satisfy his organic needs, he can apply them to a variety of new uses, often very remote from those by which they were originally formed; to the accumulation of wealth far exceeding what he can ever consume, to the acquisition of influence or dominion over his fellow-men, to the accomplishment of great public works, the foundation or reformation of public institutions, the diffusion and extension of knowledge, the quickening of the spiritual instincts which are invariably latent in mankind.

It is, moreover, through the action of what may be called the *industrial virtues*, that man chiefly and, perhaps, most naturally learns to practise cheerful obedience to law. The inflexible limits which nature imposes upon him are, perhaps, the best preparation for those more flexible rules with which society is frequently content. To learn that there are barriers, and often irreversible barriers, to the action of his own will, is an useful and necessary lesson for man to learn, and, when once learnt, it is capable of indefinite extension and application.

So important are the functions of industry and the kindred

virtues both in building up the individual character and in the organisation of society, that it will hardly, perhaps, be regarded as an impertinent digression, if we here consider briefly one or two of the questions connected with labour which have recently excited most interest both amongst those who watch from a distance the phenomena of society and amongst those who are themselves engaged in the work of practical life.

In an advanced state of society, isolated labour is usually of little service, and applicable only within a narrow range. Men must work together, i. e. assist each other or labour in common, either in the attempt to produce the same thing, if the quantity to be produced is large, or in the attempt to produce different parts of it, if the article to be produced is at all complex, or in the attempt to perform different processes, if the processes are at all numerous or various [1]. This necessity for *Co-operation* at once creates a Community of Interest, and this community of interest at once evokes a number of moral qualities, such as mutual sympathy, mutual trust, mutual respect, and the like. Nor is Co-operation confined to a single occupation, or a single district, or a single period of time. If we take a wide survey of human work and human interests, we shall find that it is by each man devoting himself to his own occupation that other men are enabled to pursue theirs ; that it is by one country or district cultivating or manufacturing its peculiar set of products that other countries or districts are enabled with greater efficiency to cultivate or manufacture theirs ; that it is from the accumulated treasures of wealth, skill, and knowledge bequeathed to it by former generations that any given

[1] It has not seemed necessary to illustrate the different cases contemplated in this sentence. The student will find this work fully done in Mr. Mill's chapter on Co-operation (Political Economy, bk. i. ch. 8). 'Division of Labour,' it will be there seen, is only a special case of Co-operation.

generation is able to carry on its enterprises or to contribute its share to the general stock of human capabilities. Co-operation may thus be regarded as the very bond which holds society together, and mankind, however separated by time or distance, may be looked on as one great co-operative body. We need not, indeed, suppose that men or families were originally brought together simply by the conscious desire of co-operation, but, being brought together, wholly or partially, by other causes, they have learnt to act together. Even in the family and the clan, which are mainly held together by the ties of affection and mutual sympathy, co-operation is by no means ineffective in cementing the union; for, in the well-regulated family or clan, each member or each group of members does different work for the common advantage. But political society, whatever may be its origin, is, in its organised form, mainly held together by the tie of utility rather than that of affection. Men who have never seen or heard of each other will work or fight for common objects, and the common feeling which prompts them to do so is almost invariably based on common interests. The minute subdivision of employments, too, which exists in any large and well-organised state is due to the fact that different men find it to their account to pursue different, though complementary, avocations. It is, thus, by the repeated action of the principle of co-operation that mere aggregations of families are, at length, converted into organised society. The tie of affection then becomes subordinate, while that of co-operation for common interests becomes predominant, the family being, in fact, a natural, while political society is an artificial product, having, indeed, its roots in the family, but far transcending it in complexity, importance, and value. We need not, therefore, be surprised if those who approach economical questions

from an ethical point of view dwell with much emphasis on the moral advantages of Co-operation.

On the other hand, it is also an effect of advancing civilisation to create, or rather to intensify, competition. Wherever gain is to be made in sufficient quantity, and with sufficient ease, there will be a number of competitors for it, and this number will increase as population advances and other avenues to employment become closed. Now the effect of competition, whether it be for employment, for labour, or for custom, is to divide interests, as that of co-operation is to unite them. Hence *Competition* is usually as unpopular with moralists as Co-operation is popular. But, great, undoubtedly, as are the evils of exaggerated competition, it would seem as if some amount of competition were necessary to maintain the energy and efficacy of labour. For, if any men or bodies of men had nothing to fear from indolence or inferior workmanship, universal experience shews that, in the long run, their work would degenerate, and they would themselves lose the industrial qualities which, so to speak, moralise and dignify labour.

Before leaving the subject of Co-operation, it ought to be noticed that, in the earlier stages of society, co-operation in the arts of war is at least as common as co-operation in the arts of peace, while it is still more essential to the maintenance and furtherance of social union. It was in the stern school of War that men then most effectively learned the lessons of self-mastery, loyalty, obedience, and of working together for common ends. The penalty, if they failed to learn the lessons aright, was not mere discomfort or privation, as it might be in the primitive household, but the loss of life or liberty, or, even possibly, disgrace or mutilation. Thus, in the economy of primitive society, War is not always a disintegrating, but, at least as

frequently, a binding force. It may prevent the blending of distinct aggregates, but it renders each aggregate more compact and united within itself.

Another question which is, to some extent, common to ethics and political economy is the supposed antagonism between labour and capital. These two agents, capital and labour, if we take a just view of their functions, really co-operate in the work of production. Capital is simply the accumulations of past labour stored up for the purpose of reproducing labour in the future. It is, in fact, as is so completely demonstrated by Mr. Mill [1], a reserve fund for the payment of wages. So far, then, from there being any necessary antagonism between labour and capital, they are the necessary complement of each other ; labour is necessary for the employment of capital, and capital is necessary for the payment of labour. At the same time, it cannot be denied that there may be exceptional cases, in which the labour of the present is underpaid or overtaxed for the benefit of the labour of the future, or in which the interests of the operatives are sacrificed to the selfish enjoyments of the capitalist. At least as frequently, however, unfounded complaints are made of the rapacity of the capitalist, when he is really taking no more than is sufficient to compensate him for his risk, his trouble of superintendence, and the loan of his capital.

Several remedies have been proposed for these evils. The best and most far-reaching are what may be called ethical and intellectual—namely, an exact knowledge, on either side, of the nature and true functions of labour and capital, with a determination, on the part of the capitalist, after deducting what is sufficient for his private uses, to employ his profits for the best interests of the undertaking,

[1] See Political Economy, bk. i. chs. 4 and 5.

which, in the long run, must be also the best interests of the workman, and a cheerful acquiescence, on the part of the workman, in at least so much of his condition as is determined for him by the inexorable laws of Economics. To maintain that the workman should not better his condition, if he can, would be as absurd as it would be insolent, but there can be no impropriety in urging that he is only damaging the prospects of himself or his successors by attempting to struggle with the inevitable. It has been suggested too, and, as it appears to us, with considerable justice, that the relations of the labourer and the capitalist might also be vastly improved both by law and by custom—by custom, as, for instance, by giving the labourer, as part of his wages, a share in the profits, thus identifying him more closely and obviously with the interests of the concern, and converting him, to a certain extent, into a capitalist[1]—by law, as, for instance, by limiting the amount to which property may be acquired by inheritance or bequest, and thus preventing, to some extent, the gross abuses both of power and wealth to which inordinately large possessions often lead[2].

Another subject, intimately connected with these enquiries, is the division of society into classes—a division which we shall here regard rather from the industrial than the social point of view. Co-operation of the kind we have described tends inevitably, by the division of labour and multiplicity of industrial relations which it implies, to substitute for the original aggregates of families and tribes, often very loosely held together, new aggregates of classes

[1] See Professor Fawcett's Political Economy, bk. ii. ch. 10; also Pauperism, its Causes and Remedies, by the same author, ch. 5. The Metayer system, of which Mr. Mill treats at considerable length (Political Economy, bk. ii. ch. 8), is an application of this principle to agricultural produce.

[2] See Mill's Political Economy, bk. ii. ch. 2. § 4.

based upon differences of employment. When society becomes industrial, a man's employment is of far more importance to his neighbours than his lineage, and hence, instead of the old tribal distinctions, we have distinctions of landlords, tenants, and labourers, capitalists and workmen. If we take a wide view of these relations, we shall find that all these classes, as well as the individuals composing them, are really, even if unintentionally, working together for the common advantage, for the support and well-being of the community at large. Still each class, as well as each individual, is interested in procuring for itself as large a share as possible of the produce of the common labour, and hence, in the present imperfect state of intellectual and moral education, it is naturally led to regard its own interest to the exclusion of all others. To such an extent is this the case, that society, at not infrequent intervals, seems threatened with disruption, and nothing but the paramount necessity of co-operation, as seen on reflexion, enables it to bear the strain put upon it by this apparent conflict of interests.

We need hardly refer to the constant feuds between the moneyed and unmoneyed classes in ancient societies, or to the combinations of masters or workmen in modern times, as familiar examples of the phenomena under consideration.

In these wider and more far-reaching feuds between classes, as in the narrower ones between workmen and capitalists in particular trades, the true remedies seem to be ethical and intellectual: ethical, by the co-ordination and further enlightenment of the self-regarding, and the development of the sympathetic feelings; intellectual, by the direction of education to the specific end of throwing light on the social relations of men, on their mutual dependence, and on the best means by which society at

large can attain its maximum of well-being. The causes of the evils we have been describing lie in the ignorance, and consequent selfishness, of mankind, and hence those evils may best be removed by shewing that the mutual advantages of co-operation are permanent and invariable, while it is only through the action of causes which are essentially variable and temporary that any particular class can appropriate to itself an undue share of the common produce. There are, no doubt, certain social inequalities, and, consequently, certain social evils, which can never altogether disappear, and these evils, doubtless, bear hardly upon the individuals who are exposed to them; but many of them, like certain evils arising from the constitution of the material universe, are simply inevitable, and, hence, with the spread of education and enlightenment, men may reasonably be expected to acquiesce in the one as they do in the other. We again, therefore, arrive at the conclusion that it is by the co-ordination and development of the moral feelings, and by a positive and specific education in the laws of man and society, rather than by legislative enactments, that the future condition of mankind may best be advanced. Legislation may remove obstacles by the abolition of pernicious laws and customs, and it may administer palliatives which may have a temporary effect on the condition of some particular class, but it is the spread of general enlightenment alone which can permanently regenerate society. The necessary effect of such an enlightenment would be to widen the sympathies of men, and consequently to weld society together. At present, each class seldom looks beyond its class-interests, let alone the concentration of each individual on his own particular interests, while, owing to imperfect education, one class is seldom acquainted with the ideas or feelings or manners of other classes. No wonder, then, that sympathy between

men of different classes is so rare, and that society so frequently seems in danger of being torn to pieces. But, as increased sympathy would be the inevitable result of increased enlightenment, we may fairly look forward to a time when, within such limits as our own organisation and the constitution of the material universe admit, the happiness of men and the stability of nations will be secured.

There can be no doubt that, favourable, in general, as are co-operation and the organisation of labour to the development of society and the formation of individual character, there are certain disadvantages which, at our present stage of progress, are commonly found to attend on them. The conflict of classes has already been noticed. Moreover, excessive and ill-remunerated labour degrades instead of invigorating the character, and co-operation, by facilitating the production of commodities, is apt to stimulate population to a point at which any declension in trade is sure to produce bitter distress and ruinous competition. These evils, often re-inforced by wide-spread pauperism and the loss of self-respect which that condition invariably entails, have caused some moralists to look back with regret on the more primitive condition of man as less cruel and oppressive, while others have proposed remedies which are founded on an entire misconception of man's nature and motives and of those spontaneous processes of development and re-adjustment in society which are properly regarded as social laws. The evils, to which we have alluded, are mainly the result of an excessive desire to multiply riches, without any corresponding effort to improve the moral and intellectual condition of the industrial classes, whether employers or employed. It is to such an effort, in which all classes must co-operate, with the increase in practical intelligence, mutual toleration, forethought, and prudence,

which may naturally be expected to result from it, that those who are hopeful of the future of modern society look forward with most confidence for the realisation of their ideals. The realisation of these ideals may possibly be preceded by many disastrous experiments in social reorganisation, seriously affecting, for a time, the happiness of mankind and the stability of society. But they who have faith in the progress of humanity do not necessarily believe that the process is uniform or continuous. It is sufficient for them, if it be ultimately assured.

Before quitting the subject of the industrial virtues, it should be noticed that they have a tendency to increase in relative importance as society advances, as population grows and employments multiply, while Courage, Hospitality, and some of the other virtues, at least under their old forms, seem, under the same circumstances, to become of diminishing value as well as of diminishing repute.

From the love of distinction, the desire next in order, arise the qualities of Vanity, Pride, and (in one of its forms) Ambition. *Vanity* always implies a certain weakness of nature, an eager disposition to plume oneself on any petty, accidental, or temporary cause of superiority to one's fellow-men. Thus, a man who values himself on his good-looks, on his dress, his gait, his agility, on small honours, or the like, is said to be vain. But, though this quality always betokens weakness, it is, at the same time, indicative of amiability, and hence is rather popular than the reverse. The vain man pays a homage to society by courting its admiration, and in this, as well as in another respect, to be pointed out presently, differs from the *proud* man. The latter, like the vain man, prides himself upon his superiority, but he is indifferent whether

society recognises it or not. The consciousness of his own superiority is sufficient for him, and hence, unlike the vain man, he does not care to attract the attention of others. Moreover, the points of superiority on which the proud man values himself are usually of a more important or permanent character than those which give satisfaction to the vain man. A man is said to be proud of his birth, of his country, of his abilities, of his acquirements, of his achievements, but hardly of his dress, his looks, or his equipage. It must be acknowledged, however, that the two terms are often, in common parlance, used without any nice discrimination as to their meaning. Both vanity and *pride* are usually employed as terms of blame, but, as the former rather implies than excludes amiability, so the latter seems almost always to indicate a certain strength of character. A man who values himself on some great and permanent source of superiority to his fellows is sure to acquire a kind of personal dignity, and gives, in fact, a guarantee to society that he will do nothing to degrade himself either in their eyes or his own. At the same time, this quality is always unamiable, and is often an occasion of intense irritation and real pain to those who are brought into contact with it. The good, apart from the bad, characteristics of pride are to be found in Self-respect, a quality, however, which may be more appropriately treated in another department of this chapter.

The term *Ambition* more frequently denotes a quality originating in the love of power than one originating in the love of distinction. We undoubtedly, however, often speak of a man as ambitious of distinction, without any reference whatever to power. When employed in this sense, the term Ambition appears to be entirely devoid of any bad connotation, and expresses nothing more

than the habit of aiming at distinction, as being *per se* a desirable object. It supplies, in fact, a good neutral term, expressing, to speak roughly, Pride or Vanity divested of the self-consciousness which makes the one unamiable and the other foolish.

The *Love of Knowledge*, in its higher forms, is confined to so small a proportion of mankind, that we need feel little surprise in finding only one word which expresses the habit of desiring to know, independently of the character of the knowledge sought. That word is *Curiosity*. Though sometimes undoubtedly used in a wide and good sense, as when we blame a man for 'having no curiosity,' it is usually employed to denote the habit of inquisitiveness as to trifles, and especially as to the private affairs of one's neighbours. There seems no reason, however, why the word should be degraded in this manner, and it would be well if *Inquisitiveness* could be employed in this sense, and Curiosity confined to a desire for the more liberal kinds of knowledge. *Indifference* might then be used as its opposite, and might denote the mental habit of the man who cares to know nothing about the world or the society in which he moves.

There is no source of more exquisite enjoyment than the love of knowledge in its higher forms. It supplies constant occupation, excites, in turn, almost all the other pleasurable feelings, and, though it is a source of the liveliest satisfaction while it is in operation, leaves no regrets behind it. It tends, moreover, to dissipate those prejudices which foster passion and to create a love of truth for its own sake, which gradually pervades, while it ennobles, the character, making the whole mind sincere and honest and impatient alike of falsehood and of error. In these higher forms, however, the love of knowledge demands capacities which few men in the present state

of education possess, and hence its powerlessness, in the case of the mass of mankind, to compete with the grosser and more sensual kinds of pleasure[1].

It has already been noticed that Ambition, besides connoting one of the habits which originate in the Love of Distinction, expresses the habit of seeking to gain power over others. Like the Greek term *φιλοτιμία*[2], this word, when unqualified by any epithet, seems to imply some, though it may be but a very slight, degree of blame, a curious testimony, perhaps, to the fact that men resent the attempt of a fellow-man to gain power over them. It is frequently, however, qualified with the epithet 'laudable,' which indicates that the object for which the power is sought is a beneficent one. Ambition, indeed, takes its ethical colour entirely from the object at which it aims. If the object be beneficent, the ambition is 'laudable;' if the object be maleficent, the ambition is 'culpable;' if the object be purely self-regarding, even though no harm be done or intended to others, the habit, possibly for the reason above suggested, receives blame rather than praise. But, though a man is blamed for being ambitious, it is also, curiously enough, to a man's discredit to say that he is unambitious, or 'without ambition[3].' These apparently contradictory modes of

[1] It will be noticed in a subsequent chapter (ch. 5) that, while Veracity has become a more important and more highly-esteemed virtue in modern than it was in ancient times, the intellectual virtue of the Love of Truth, that is, the pure, simple desire to find out what is true, merely for the sake of knowing the truth, and without any regard to ulterior consequences, was far commoner in ancient times, and especially amongst the Greeks, than it is amongst ourselves. Indeed, the absence, or attenuated condition, of this virtue is a serious defect in the current morality of modern nations.

[2] See Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, bk. iv. ch. 4.

[3] Thus, in the chapter of the Ethics quoted above, Aristotle says that we blame the *ἀφιλότιμος* as well as the *φιλότιμος*, though there are circumstances under which we praise both.

expression may be reconciled by the explanation that, while we blame a man for seeking power simply as such, we conceive, and conceive justly, that every man ought to be sufficiently interested in some public object or other, to desire influence for the sake of promoting that object. A man who feels no such interest seems to be an abject and spiritless creature, and accordingly inspires contempt in the minds of all those who are generous enough to feel such interests themselves.

Cruelty, though, probably, it is frequently due to excessive resentment, seems frequently also to arise from a perversion of the love of power. A man supplies himself with an irrefragable proof of his power by the miseries to which he subjects others. The tortures which children often inflict on the lower animals, and especially on insects, in whose case there is no sympathetic feeling evoked to counteract the delight experienced in the exertion of power, affords an excellent illustration of this position. The same feeling also sometimes leads to capricious acts of beneficence. Thus, it is no uncommon phenomenon in history, to find that a cruel prince has one or more favourites, on whom he lavishes extraordinary kindnesses. It would be too great a stretch of charity to put down these kindnesses to pure benevolence; it seems more natural to account for them, wholly or in part, by the pleasure which many men undoubtedly take in seeing the fate of others, for good or for evil, determined by their own caprice.

The same principle often dictates acts, which, though the source of considerable annoyance, can hardly be called cruel. There are many men who take an inordinate delight in exercising power, even on the slightest occasions, and especially in making others feel that they exercise it. This disposition, which is peculiarly unsocial and unamiable,

may appropriately be called *Arbitrariness* or *Capriciousness.*

It should be noticed that sometimes Cruelty seems to originate, either wholly or partially, in a morbid curiosity or even in the mere unreflecting wish to see how a creature will conduct itself under novel circumstances. This appears sometimes to be the case with children, though the thoughtless exhibition of curiosity is likely soon to ally itself with the conscious delight experienced in the arbitrary exercise of power, and requires to be very sternly checked.

The expression '*Love of Liberty*' seems to stand both for the passion and for the habit of mind which is created by its constant exercise[1]. *Independence* is the mental habit which leads a man to resent any attack on his freedom, and especially on his social, political, or intellectual freedom, while, on the other hand, *Servility* or *Slavishness* is the habit which makes him apt to yield to such attacks or even to court them.

Similarly, the '*Sense of Power*' appears to express both the momentary feeling and the habitual experience of it. Nor does there seem to be any distinctive name for the man who is habitually conscious of *the pleasures of skill* or *the love of excellence.* The man, however, who is always asserting his sense of his own superiority is very appropriately designated as *overbearing.*

The love of money has occasioned the employment of a number of terms, laudatory or condemnatory. When the desire for the accumulation of money has become a man's ruling principle, and he exhibits it on all occasions, he is called covetous or avaricious, and the corresponding habit *covetousness* or *avarice.* That this is an unamiable

[1] See pp. 15, 16 above.

quality admits of no question, but its unpopularity far exceeds its deserts,—a circumstance which is probably due, at least in part, to the mistaken notion that a man who saves money is depriving other people of it, whereas the man who spends it is distributing it amongst his neighbours. The former part of this supposition, though true, temporarily, of money hoarded, is not true of money invested; the truth, on the other hand, being that money invested becomes a permanent fund constantly available for the payment of wages and the employment of labour, while money spent on consumable articles, such as wine, equipages, and the like, does its work once only and then disappears[1]. But, though the man who saves and invests

[1] The common misapprehension on this point is very briefly and lucidly exposed in Mill's Logic, bk. v. ch. 4. § 4: 'The economical workings of society afford numerous cases in which the effects of a cause consist of two sets of phenomena: the one immediate, concentrated, obvious to all eyes, and passing, in common apprehension, for the whole effect; the other widely diffused, or lying deeper under the surface, and which is exactly contrary to the former. Take, for instance, the common notion, so plausible at the first glance, of the encouragement given to industry by lavish expenditure. A, who spends his whole income, and even his capital, in expensive living, is supposed to give great employment to labour. B, who lives on a small portion, and invests the remainder in the funds, is thought to give little or no employment. For everybody sees the gains which are made by A's tradesmen, servants, and others, while his money is spending. B's savings, on the contrary, pass into the hands of the person whose stock he purchased, who with it pays a debt he owed to some banker, who lends it again to some merchant or manufacturer; and the capital being laid out in hiring spinners and weavers, or carriers and the crews of merchant ships, not only gives immediate employment to at least as much industry as A employs during the whole of his career, but, coming back with increase by the sale of the goods which have been manufactured or imported, forms a fund for the employment of the same and perhaps a greater quantity of labour in perpetuity. But the observer does not see, and therefore does not consider, what becomes of B's money; he does see what is done with A's: he observes the amount of industry which A's profusion feeds; he observes not the far greater quantity which it prevents from being fed: and thence the prejudice, universal to the time of Adam Smith, that prodigality encourages industry, and parsimony is a discouragement to it.'

See also Mill's Political Economy, bk. i. ch. 5. § 3.

his money is doing a public good, the harm which he does by withholding his assistance from those who have a claim upon him, or by depriving of legitimate enjoyment himself, his family, his dependants, or his neighbours, may undoubtedly be more than counterbalancing. No one, probably, would deny that the desire of saving may exist in excess. It has a tendency, moreover, to produce a churlish and unsociable disposition. At the same time, in the present condition of society, and especially of the labouring classes, it requires to be encouraged rather than restrained. When this desire exists in moderation, the resulting habit is called *Economy*, or, if it exhibit itself especially in small acts of thrift and self-denial, *Frugality*[1]. The least reflexion will shew that, had it not been for the existence of these habits in some members of the species, mankind would never have been able to make any effective advances in civilisation. To store up some portion of its produce for future use was a necessary condition of any society entering even on the agricultural stage, to say nothing of the foundation of towns, the appropriation of wealth to public uses, or the previous accumulation of capital essential to embarking in any commercial or manufacturing enterprise. Economy implies forethought, and is, to some extent or other, the necessary consequence of forethought. As a rule, therefore, the more capable men are of forecasting the future, the more economical do they become (it may, perhaps, be noticed in passing that avarice seems to originate, in the first instance, in exaggerating the future wants or risks of ourselves or others); and the more potent the desire of accumulation in any given society, the more rapidly does that society pass through

[1] *Penuriousness*, which has also a special reference to small savings, might be defined as Frugality in excess. *Meanness* seems to be a synonym of Penuriousness.

the earlier stages o civilisation. These points, with others, are so well brought out by Mr. Mill, either in his own remarks or in those of Dr. Rae, from whose New Principles of Political Economy he quotes at length, that, at the risk of making a long extract, I subjoin the following paragraphs taken from his Political Economy:

'All accumulation involves the sacrifice of a present, for the sake of a future good. But the expediency of such a sacrifice varies very much in different states of circumstances; and the willingness to make it varies still more.

'In weighing the future against the present, the uncertainty of all things future is a leading element; and that uncertainty is of very different degrees. "All circumstances," therefore, "increasing the probability of the provision we make for futurity being enjoyed by ourselves or others, tend" justly and reasonably "to give strength to the effective desire of accumulation. Thus a healthy climate or occupation, by increasing the probability of life, has a tendency to add to this desire. When engaged in safe occupations, and living in healthy countries, men are much more apt to be frugal than in unhealthy or hazardous occupations, and in climates pernicious to human life. Sailors and soldiers are prodigals. In the West Indies, New Orleans, the East Indies, the expenditure of the inhabitants is profuse. The same people, coming to reside in the healthy parts of Europe, and not getting into the vortex of extravagant fashion, live economically. War and pestilence have always waste and luxury among the other evils that follow in their train. For similar reasons, whatever gives security to the affairs of the community is favourable to the strength of this principle. In this respect the general prevalence of law and order, and the prospect of the continuance of peace and tranquillity, have con-

siderable influence[1]." The more perfect the security, the greater will be the effective strength of the desire of accumulation. Where property is less safe, or the vicissitudes ruinous to fortunes are more frequent and severe, fewer persons will save at all, and of those who do, many will require the inducement of a higher rate of profit on capital, to make them prefer a doubtful future to the temptation of present enjoyment.

'These are considerations which affect the expediency, in the eye of reason, of consulting future interests at the expense of present. But the inclination to make this sacrifice does not solely depend upon its expediency. The disposition to save is often far short of what reason would dictate: and at other times is liable to be in excess of it.

'Deficient strength of the desire of accumulation may arise from improvidence, or from want of interest in others. Improvidence may be connected with intellectual as well as moral causes. Individuals and communities of a very low state of intelligence are always improvident. A certain measure of intellectual development seems necessary to enable absent things, and especially things future, to act with any force on the imagination and will. The effect of want of interest in others in diminishing accumulation will be admitted, if we consider how much saving at present takes place, which has for its object the interest of others rather than of ourselves; the education of children, their advancement in life, the future interests of other personal connexions, the power of promoting, by the bestowal of money or time, objects of public or private usefulness. If mankind were generally in the state of mind to which some approach was seen in the declining period of the Roman empire—caring nothing for their heirs, as well as nothing for friends, the public, or any object which sur-

[1] [Rae, p. 123.]

vived them—they would seldom deny themselves any indulgence for the sake of saving, beyond what was necessary for their own future years; which they would place in life annuities, or in some other form which would make its existence and their lives terminate together.

'From these various causes, intellectual and moral, there is, in different portions of the human race, a greater diversity than is usually adverted to, in the strength of the effective desire of accumulation. A backward state of general civilization is often more the effect of deficiency in this particular than in many others which attract more attention. In the circumstances, for example, of a hunting tribe, "man may be said to be necessarily improvident, and regardless of futurity, because, in this state, the future presents nothing which can be with certainty either foreseen or governed..... Besides a want of the motives exciting to provide for the needs of futurity through means of the abilities of the present, there is a want of the habits of perception and action, leading to a constant connexion in the mind of those distant points and of the series of events serving to unite them. Even, therefore, if motives be awakened capable of producing the exertion necessary to effect this connexion, there remains the task of training the mind to think and act so as to establish it."

'For instance: "Upon the banks of the St. Lawrence there are several little Indian villages. They are surrounded, in general, by a good deal of land, from which the wood seems to have been long extirpated, and have, besides, attached to them, extensive tracts of forest. The cleared land is rarely, I may almost say never, cultivated, nor are any inroads made in the forest for such a purpose. The soil is, nevertheless, fertile, and were it not, manure lies in heaps by their houses. Were every family to inclose half an acre of ground, till it, and plant it in potatoes and maize, it

would yield a sufficiency to support them one-half the year. They suffer, too, every now and then, extreme want, insomuch that, joined to occasional intemperance, it is rapidly reducing their numbers. This, to us, so strange apathy proceeds not, in any great degree, from repugnance to labour; on the contrary, they apply very diligently to it when its reward is immediate. Thus, besides their peculiar occupations of hunting and fishing, in which they are ever ready to engage, they are much employed in the navigation of the St. Lawrence, and may be seen labouring at the oar, or setting with the pole, in the large boats used for the purpose, and always furnish the greater part of the additional hands necessary to conduct rafts through some of the rapids. Nor is the obstacle aversion to agricultural labour. This is no doubt a prejudice of theirs; but mere prejudices always yield, principles of action cannot be created. When the returns from agricultural labour are speedy and great, they are also agriculturists. Thus, some of the little islands on Lake St. Francis, near the Indian village of St. Regis, are favourable to the growth of maize, a plant yielding a return of a hundredfold, and forming, even when half ripe, a pleasant and substantial repast. Patches of the best land on these islands are, therefore, every year cultivated by them for this purpose. As their situation renders them inaccessible to cattle, no fence is required; were this additional outlay necessary, I suspect they would be neglected, like the commons adjoining their village. These had apparently, at one time, been under crop. The cattle of the neighbouring settlers would now, however, destroy any crop not securely fenced, and this additional necessary outlay consequently bars their culture. It removes them to an order of instruments of slower return than that which corresponds to the strength of the effective desire of accumulation in this little society.

'"It is here deserving of notice, that what instruments of this kind they do form are completely formed. The small spots of corn they cultivate are thoroughly weeded and hoed. A little neglect in this part would indeed reduce the crop very much; of this experience has made them perfectly aware, and they act accordingly. It is evidently not the necessary labour that is the obstacle to more extended culture, but the distant return from that labour. I am assured, indeed, that, among some of the more remote tribes, the labour thus expended much exceeds that given by the whites. The same portions of ground being cropped without remission, and manure not being used, they would scarcely yield any return, were not the soil most carefully broken and pulverised, both with the hoe and the hand. In such a situation a white man would clear a fresh piece of ground. It would perhaps scarce repay his labour the first year, and he would have to look for his reward in succeeding years. On the Indian succeeding years are too distant to make sufficient impression; though, to obtain what labour may bring about in the course of a few months, he toils even more assiduously than the white man[1]."

'This view of things is confirmed by the experience of the Jesuits, in their interesting efforts to civilize the Indians of Paraguay. They gained the confidence of these savages in a most extraordinary degree. They acquired influence over them sufficient to make them change their whole manner of life. They obtained their absolute submission and obedience. They established peace. They taught them all the operations of European agriculture, and many of the more difficult arts. There were everywhere to be seen, according to Charlevoix, "workshops of gilders, painters, sculptors, goldsmiths, watchmakers, carpenters,

[1] [Rae, p. 136.]

joiners, dyers," &c. These occupations were not practised for the personal gain of the artificers: the produce was at the absolute disposal of the missionaries, who ruled the people by a voluntary despotism. The obstacles arising from aversion to labour were therefore very completely overcome. The real difficulty was the improvidence of the people; their inability to think for the future; and the necessity accordingly of the most unremitting and minute superintendence on the part of their instructors. "Thus at first, if these gave up to them the care of the oxen with which they ploughed, their indolent thoughtlessness would probably leave them at evening still yoked to the implement. Worse than this, instances occurred where they cut them up for supper, thinking, when reprehended, that they sufficiently excused themselves by saying they were hungry..... These fathers, says Ulloa, have to visit the houses, to examine what is really wanted: for, without this care, the Indians would never look after anything. They must be present, too, when animals are slaughtered, not only that the meat may be equally divided, but that nothing may be lost." "But notwithstanding all this care and superintendence," says Charlevoix, "and all the precautions which are taken to prevent any want of the necessaries of life, the missionaries are sometimes much embarrassed. It often happens that they" (the Indians) "do not reserve to themselves a sufficiency of grain, even for seed. As for their other provisions, were they not well looked after, they would soon be without wherewithal to support life[1]."

'As an example intermediate, in the strength of the effective desire of accumulation, between the state of things thus depicted and that of modern Europe, the case of the Chinese deserves attention. From various circumstances in their personal habits and social condition, it might be

[1] [Rae, p. 140.]

anticipated that they would possess a degree of prudence and self-control greater than other Asiatics, but inferior to most European nations; and the following evidence is adduced of the fact.

'"Durability is one of the chief qualities marking a high degree of the effective desire of accumulation. The testimony of travellers ascribes to the instruments formed by the Chinese a very inferior durability to similar instruments constructed by Europeans. The houses, we are told, unless of the higher ranks, are in general of unburnt bricks, of clay, or of hurdles plastered with earth; the roofs, of reeds fastened to laths. We can scarcely conceive more unsubstantial or temporary fabrics. Their partitions are of paper, requiring to be renewed every year. A similar observation may be made concerning their implements of husbandry and other utensils. 'They are almost entirely of wood, the metals entering but very sparingly into their construction; consequently they soon wear out, and require frequent renewals. A greater degree of strength in the effective desire of accumulation would cause them to be constructed of materials requiring a greater present expenditure, but being far more durable. From the same cause, much land, that in other countries would be cultivated, lies waste. All travellers take notice of large tracts of lands, chiefly swamps, which continue in a state of nature. To bring a swamp into tillage is generally a process, to complete which requires several years. It must be previously drained, the surface long exposed to the sun, and many operations performed, before it can be made capable of bearing a crop. Though yielding, probably, a very considerable return for the labour bestowed on it, that return is not made until a long time has elapsed. The cultivation of such land implies a greater strength of the effective desire of accumulation than exists in the empire.

'"The produce of the harvest is, as we have remarked, always an instrument of some order or another; it is a provision for future want, and regulated by the same laws as those to which other means of attaining a similar end conform. It is there chiefly rice, of which there are two harvests, the one in June, the other in October. The period then of eight months between October and June is that for which provision is made each year, and the different estimate they make of to-day and this day eight months will appear in the self-denial they practise now, in order to guard against want then. The amount of this self-denial would seem to be small. The father Parennin, indeed, (who seems to have been one of the most intelligent of the Jesuits, and spent a long life among the Chinese of all classes) asserts that it is their great deficiency in forethought and frugality in this respect, which is the cause of the scarcities and famines that frequently occur."

'That it is defect of providence, not defect of industry, that limits production among the Chinese, is still more obvious than in the case of the semi-agriculturalised Indians. "Where the returns are quick, where the instruments formed require but little time to bring the events for which they were formed to an issue," it is well known that "the great progress which has been made in the knowledge of the arts suited to the nature of the country and the wants of its inhabitants" makes industry energetic and effective. "The warmth of the climate, the natural fertility of the country, the knowledge which the inhabitants have acquired of the arts of agriculture, and the discovery and gradual adaptation to every soil of the most useful vegetable productions, enable them very speedily to draw, from almost any part of the surface, what is there esteemed an equivalent to much more than the labour bestowed in tilling and cropping it. They have commonly double,

sometimes treble harvests. These, when they consist of a grain so productive as rice, the usual crop, can scarce fail to yield to their skill, from almost any portion of soil that can be at once brought into culture, very ample returns. Accordingly there is no spot that labour can immediately bring under cultivation that is not made to yield to it. Hills, even mountains, are ascended and formed into terraces; and water, in that country the great productive agent, is led to every part by drains, or carried up to it by the ingenious and simple hydraulic machines which have been in use from time immemorial among this singular people. They effect this the more easily, from the soil, even in these situations, being very deep and covered with much vegetable mould. But what yet more than this marks the readiness with which labour is forced to form the most difficult materials into instruments, where these instruments soon bring to an issue the events for which they are formed, is the frequent occurrence, on many of their lakes and rivers, of structures resembling the floating gardens of the Peruvians, rafts covered with vegetable soil and cultivated. Labour in this way draws from the materials on which it acts very speedy returns. Nothing can exceed the luxuriance of vegetation when the quickening powers of a genial sun are ministered to by a rich soil and abundant moisture. It is otherwise, as we have seen, in cases where the return, though copious, is distant. European travellers are surprised at meeting these little floating farms by the side of swamps which only require draining to render them tillable. It seems to them strange that labour should not rather be bestowed on the solid earth, where its fruits might endure, than on structures that must decay and perish in a few years. The people they are among think not so much of future years, as of the present time. The effective desire of accumulation is of

very different strength in the one, from what it is in the other. The views of the European extend to a distant futurity, and he is surprised at the Chinese, condemned, through improvidence and want of sufficient prospective care, to incessant toil, and, as he thinks, insufferable wretchedness. The views of the Chinese are confined to narrower bounds; he is content to live from day to day, and has learnt to conceive even a life of toil a blessing[1]."'

Prodigality or *Extravagance* is the opposite of *Covetousness* or *Avarice*, and, though the more popular, is, as already seen, the more pernicious extreme of the two.

It is from their tendency to encourage thoughtlessness, improvidence, and prodigality, that indiscriminate charity, and even general measures of public relief, like our Poor Laws, have been supposed, and, as we conceive, supposed justly, to inflict so much damage on the labouring population of a country. Nor is it their tendency merely to impair the industrial virtues. They tend also to diminish that self-reliance and self-respect which ought to be amongst the proudest possessions of every man, even the poorest.

Many familiar words, expressive of an over-eager desire to acquire or save money, will occur to the reader. But enough has already been said to illustrate the great variety of forms which this desire may assume.

The consequences which result from the exercise of these and the other[2] self-regarding habits of mind, and

[1] [Rae, pp. 151–5.] Mill's Political Economy, bk. i. ch. 11. §§ 2, 3.

[2] It is not pretended that the enumeration here given is complete. Thus, nothing has been said of the *love of health*, and its correlative, the *fear of disease*, which may, perhaps, be best regarded as originating in the desire of self-preservation; or of *cleanliness*, a habit of late, and unfortunately of somewhat partial, formation. This last habit is, probably, of very complex

from the gratification of the desires in which they originate, admit of being compared and estimated by the Reason, which rapidly discovers that one desire can, in many cases, only be gratified at the expense of another. Thus, the love of power, the love of wealth, or the love of knowledge can often only be gratified by foregoing the gratification of the senses, and the gratification of one sense is often found to be incompatible with the full gratification of the others. Hardly any enjoyment, in fact, can be had without some measure of self-denial, and, thus, from the very first, nature forces upon us the salutary task of self-education. In this manner, each man, according to the extent of his experience, is led to form a conception of his general welfare, or what is most for his personal good on the whole, and this conception becomes the object of a new feeling, or rather aggregate of feelings, adjusted and co-ordinated by reason, which may be called *Self-Love.* It is plain that this feeling may be developed in various proportions, and that, according to the bent of a man's character and the nature of his surroundings, it may incline more to this or that form of gratification. The extent to which the co-ordination may be carried will depend partly on the strength of particular desires, partly on the power of calculating consequences or foreseeing the future, or, in other words, on the strength and efficacy of the Reason. But, the more reason preponderates over passion, the more decidedly will the feeling of Self-Love incline to the remote

origin, arising partly from the discomfort of dirt, partly from the desire to set off one's personal appearance to the best advantage (love of distinction), partly from love of health or fear of disease, and partly also, in more cultivated men, from self-respect and a kind of homage to the human body. Those who have decried and reviled the body, like the Cynics and some of the mediaeval saints, have generally been notorious for their personal uncleanliness.

as distinct from the immediate, the durable as distinct from the transient, and the higher as distinct from the more sensual enjoyments. Reason forecasts the future, compares intensity with duration, and quality with quantity, and thus arrives at an approximate estimate of the relative values of the pains to be avoided and the pleasures to be attained. This is the process, conducted sometimes consciously, sometimes almost unconsciously, by which alike society passes from a state of lawlessness to one of security and order, and the individual from that condition in which he gratifies each momentary caprice to the staid and dignified demeanour of the intelligent and cultivated man.

That this co-ordination of the passions and desires by the reason is a gradual process, requiring much time for its accomplishment, hardly, perhaps, needs to be remarked. Even in men of the most matured wisdom, it always admits of further improvement. There is always some fresh lesson to learn, by which we may fashion our lives so as to secure more enjoyments or to be harassed by fewer troubles. And, as our experience of life increases, and we are able to penetrate with deeper insight into the causes of our joys and sorrows, we learn that they depend far less than we originally supposed on material comforts or on the gratification of any particular desire, and far more on the harmony and adjustment of the various parts of our nature.

Just as in the next chapter we shall find that there are a higher and a lower form of sympathy, a lower form which indulges its kindly feelings towards others, with little or no reflexion on the consequences which may result to the object of its affections, and a higher form which, balancing all considerations, and looking far forward into the future, aims at securing to its object

the highest good of which it is capable; so there are a higher and a lower form of self-love. A man's feelings may be entirely concentrated on himself, and still he may pursue only a shadow of happiness. He may even have instituted a comparison amongst the various lower or sensual pleasures, systematically preferring the greater to the less, and postponing a smaller present to a greater future enjoyment, and still be utterly insensible to all the higher and finer feelings, the satisfaction of which constitutes man's supreme welfare. If the feeling attendant on any conception, however inadequate, of our welfare as a whole may appropriately be called Self-Love, inasmuch as it is the result of a comparison of various pleasures and pains, it is only the higher form, that which takes into account all the sources of our happiness, mental, moral, and aesthetic as well as corporeal, which truly deserves to be called *Rational Self-Love.*

The habit which results from the lower form of Self-Love, when it exists in an intense degree, is called *Selfishness.* That which results from the higher form, or Rational Self-Love, is called *Prudence.* This word is usually and rightly employed in a good sense; for a man, who has no due regard for himself, has rarely a proper or discriminating regard for others. But, sometimes, it is used in a disparaging sense, as in the saying of Wesley that 'there can be no fitter subject for a Christian man's prayers than that he may be delivered from what the world calls Prudence.' It is here opposed to sympathy, generosity, and those nobler feelings of our nature which impel us, even at the cost of our own comfort or prospects, to afford assistance to others, or to sacrifice ourselves to what we believe to be right or true. When employed in this sense, a sense which does not properly belong to the term, the ideas of coldness, of indifferency to the welfare of others,

and of a habit of over-calculation are associated with the character of the prudent man.

It is not surprising that Rational Self-love in the sense just attached to it is spoken of by some moralists as if it comprised the whole of virtue, and were alone sufficient to serve as a guide of conduct[1]. But it should be remembered that rational self-love, though it may lead us

[1] Thus even Bishop Butler (Sermon XI) employs the following language: 'To all these things may be added, that religion, from whence arises our strongest obligation to benevolence, is so far from disowning the principle of self-love, that it often addresses itself to that very principle, and always to the mind in that state when reason presides; and there can no access be had to the understanding, but by convincing men that the course of life we would persuade them to is not contrary to their interest. It may be allowed, without any prejudice to the cause of virtue and religion, that our ideas of happiness and misery are, of all our ideas, the nearest and most important to us; that they will, nay, if you please, that they ought to prevail over those of order, and beauty, and harmony, and proportion, if there should ever be, as it is impossible there ever should be, any inconsistency between them; though these last, too, as expressing the fitness of actions, are real as truth itself. Let it be allowed, though virtue or moral rectitude does indeed consist in affection to and pursuit of what is right and good, as such: yet that, when we sit down in a cool hour, we can neither justify to ourselves this or any other pursuit, till we are convinced that it will be for our happiness, or at least not contrary to it.' This passage, which places self-love on even a higher level than conscience, appears to me to be plainly inconsistent with Butler's predominant conception of benevolence and self-love as co-ordinate principles of our nature, both alike being regarded as under the supreme governance of conscience or reflexion.

[The above note was written many years before the appearance of Professor Sidgwick's 'History of Ethics.' He regards Butler as having recognised 'a duality of the regulative principles in Human Nature,' namely, 'Reasonable Self-Love and Conscience,' according to the statement towards the end of Sermon III: 'Reasonable self-love and conscience are the chief or superior principles in the nature of man; because an action may be suitable to this nature, though all other principles be violated; but becomes unsuitable, if either of those are.' I have left this note (with which compare the account of Butler in Part I, Chapter II) without alteration, because, though I fully recognise the difficulty of determining which of Butler's three systems of human nature (namely, that implying the supremacy of conscience, the supremacy of self-love, or a duality of these principles) expressed his most matured views, I still think the first to be the predominant conception.]

to regulate our lives after an orderly fashion, to obey all the dictates of justice, and even to gratify the instincts of benevolence and the nobler aspirations of our nature, is, all the while, actuated simply by a self-regarding motive. It promotes the happiness of others, because such happiness contributes to our own. It checks the lower, and fosters the higher impulses of our being, simply because it thus secures to us a larger balance of personal pleasure. And, for this reason, it appears to us to constitute a part only, and not the whole, of man's moral nature.

When a man, however, is led to relieve misery, to soothe sorrow, and to assist the efforts of others, because he finds that it affords him an exquisite pleasure to do so, this course of conduct affords sure evidence that he possesses those sympathetic feelings which I proceed to describe in the next chapter, and hence the discussion of Rational Self-Love forms a natural transition to that of Sympathy.

When Self-Love, losing sight of all individual pleasures and even of all conscious sources of happiness, takes the form of a regard to the perfection of character for its own sake, it becomes one of the highest and purest of the moral qualities. It now assumes the title of *Self-Respect.* To the man in whom this feeling is predominant, character ranks above all other considerations. He will refrain from doing anything which will render him mean, degraded, ungenerous, or unmanly in his own eyes. He has, in the strictest sense of the words, the truest regard for himself; for it is the permanent part of himself, the character and dispositions from which his actions flow, that constitutes the object of his solicitude. This regard for the formation and maintenance of character, above all things, gives dignity to our lives, rendering us less and less dependant for our

happiness on the gratification of the moment or on the opinion of others, and enabling us to bear the ills of life with comparative indifference. It is, moreover, one of the surest guarantees of right conduct, both to ourselves and others. When we say that a man has too much self-respect to commit a base or dishonourable action, it is almost equivalent to saying that he stands in awe of his own conscience, that his sense of morality is too keen or his moral tone too high to allow of his doing anything which he suspects to be wrong. Thus, though this feeling has its roots in self-love, and is, undoubtedly, allied with pride, on one side, and with the love of praise and fear of censure, on the other, its results are coincident with those of the moral feeling, strictly so called, and it seems as if, in the perfect man, the two feelings would be indistinguishable. 'Reverence thyself' is thus, in a sense, the beginning and the crown of morality [1].

Moreover, this regard for self, which assumes the form of self-respect, is, in some degree, a reflex of our regard for others, and, in the highest types of character, the two probably grow up simultaneously. For a man can hardly respect human nature in himself, without being simultaneously led to respect it in others. Indeed, Self-Respect, in its most developed and intelligent form, implies a sense

[1] Self-respect, like all other feelings, admits of perversion. When this perversion exists to only a comparatively slight degree, it is called *Self-Esteem*. But, when it assumes the form of a constant and inordinate reference of everything to Self, it is called, sometimes, *Egotism*, sometimes, *Self-Consciousness*: Egotism, when this reference to self has a tendency to produce self-exaltation; Self-Consciousness, when it has a tendency to produce self-depreciation. Both these qualities render a man less acceptable to his companions, but, while the former is often an unconscious source of delight, the latter is often a peculiar occasion of torment, to a man's self. There are, indeed, few states of mind more pitiable than self-consciousness, and few more productive of real pain to the unfortunate sufferer. The remedy is to divert the mind to objects outside of itself—to nature, to art, to literature, to the interests of others, or to public affairs.

of Humanity as such, and an appreciation of the dignity of man, which must, in part at least, have had its origin in a knowledge of our fellow-men, a sympathy with their characters and pursuits, and a recognition of the capabilities of human nature. It would seem as if to the purely selfish man the feeling of self-respect were an impossible acquirement.

Thus, the higher developments of any one part of our nature appear to be intimately blended with the higher developments of the other parts, and, alike in Rational Self-Love and in Self-Respect, we seem already to detect the presence of that sympathetic element in human nature, the character and importance of which I now proceed to consider.

CHAPTER II.

On the Sympathetic Feelings.

Sympathy or *Fellow-Feeling* is the most general term we can employ in order to designate that emotion of pleasure or pain which is reflected, as it were, from the pleasures or pains of others. 'Rejoicing with them that rejoice and weeping with them that weep,' or the disposition to feel for others as we feel for ourselves, is, perhaps, the simplest account that we can give of it.

By virtue of this affection of our nature, another person, wholly distinct from ourselves, becomes, as it were, another self; his pleasures, his pains and interests become temporarily, sometimes they remain even permanently, ours. A feeling which thus tends to bring men together, to combine them for common objects, and to advance the great ends of life, is one of the highest, because it is one of the most characteristic, elements in Human Nature. The common sentiment has distinguished it as the special attribute of *Humanity*. It is impossible to study its effects without being struck with admiration at its wonderful adaptation to the needs both of the individual and of society. While, at first sight, it seems mainly to promote the interests of others, it is, at the same time, to ourselves the source of some of the purest and most durable pleasures of which we are capable. According to a well-known metaphor, it doubles our joys and halves our sorrows. It imposes an additional obligation on the performance of the personal virtues. It

lends a charm to those relations of life which are necessary to our existence or our personal wants, but which, without sympathy, would often be intolerable. Moreover, when combined with other principles of our nature, it gives them a dignity and a grace of which, in themselves, they would be incapable. He who resents a wrong done to others, for the sake of others or of society at large, shews a sentiment of moral indignation wholly different from that of personal revenge. He who practises industry and frugality in the interests of others is actuated by a spirit wholly different from that of the man who practises these virtues with reference to the furtherance of his own ends. He who regards his personal property or personal advantages as a solemn trust with which he is invested for the good of others bears about with him a sentiment which ennobles every action of his life. His ambition is a pure and lofty one, who seeks fame by efforts directed to social improvements. Lastly, religion itself assumes a wholly different aspect when, instead of being the slavish flattery of an imaginary creature seeking benefits for itself, it is the free outpouring of an unselfish spirit, which neither serves God for a reward nor fails to see that the true service of the Creator consists in ministering to the necessities of the creatures whom it has pleased Him to make so dependent for their happiness on the assistance of each other.

Though weak in the earlier stages of human existence, and confined within narrow circles, Sympathy is capable, under favourable circumstances, of indefinite expansion, comprehending at last the whole human race, all sentient existence and even all animated nature. As it expands, it loses in intensity but it gains in dignity; it becomes less instinctive and more rational: founded on reason, it loses the character of caprice and impulse and becomes

a settled principle of action. Thus actuated by Reason, it shews a tendency to become the principle of obedience to all Law whatsoever, natural as well as human. Forced and reluctant in the first stage, its obedience becomes hearty and willing in the next, and the prompt and ready sacrifice of inclination to inevitable Law assumes the nature of love. Patience, resignation, labour itself, contentment, duty, obedience to the whole Moral Law become loving and disinterested, and love, the highest form of Sympathy, becomes the spirit and animating principle in the moral world.

Sympathy assumes various forms according to the intensity of the feeling, the peculiarities of individual temperament, and the relations in which the person entertaining the sympathy stands to the persons towards whom the sympathy is entertained. To enumerate these forms, to note the uses and abuses of the feeling, to trace its extension and enlightenment by means as well of the other feelings as of the reason, and to give some account of the controversies with respect to its nature and origin, will be the object of the following chapter.

It will be most convenient, perhaps, to consider these questions in the following order: 1st, the disputes as to the nature and origin of sympathy, two enquiries which cannot well be separated; 2nd, the gradual extension of the feeling, the necessity of educating it, and the manner in which this education or enlightenment proceeds; 3rd, the various forms which the feeling assumes, an enquiry which will naturally lead to the consideration of its uses and abuses.

I. Are the sympathetic feelings an original part of our nature? Is there, in the present condition of human nature, such a thing as pure or disinterested sympathy, admitting of no explanation by reference to our own

interests? These questions, though plainly distinct, have not infrequently been confounded, and have almost always been considered in close connexion with each other. The first relates to the origin, the second to the nature of sympathy.

The most common answer to these questions, not only amongst persons of ordinary cultivation but amongst those philosophers who have devoted special attention to them, is that Sympathy is incapable of analysis into self-love and that it was, from the very first, an independent part of human nature. But, with reference to the second of these assertions, a curious and very important question is suggested by recent speculations. Granting that the sympathetic feelings are an original part of our individual constitution, as it now exists, that is to say, that they are not acquired but inherited, it may still be asked whether there may not have been a time in the history of the human race when they were gradually developed out of our selfish propensities.

It appears, then, that the possible answers to the questions proposed are these: that sympathy, even in the matured man, is only an indirect form of self-love; that, though it eventually assumes an independent form, it was originally developed, in each individual, by means of association, from the purely self-regarding feelings; that, though an original part of our individual nature, and now inherited by each man from his ancestors, it was evolved from the self-regarding feelings in the early history of our race; lastly, that, as far as we can go back, not only in our individual history but in the history of the race, the sympathetic feelings are coeval and co-ordinate with those which exclusively respect ourselves.

The first opinion is that which was so paradoxically, yet so ably, propounded by Hobbes. With him, all sympathy

is but thinly-disguised selfishness. Thus, '*Sudden dejection* is the passion that causeth *Weeping*; and is caused by such accidents as suddenly take away some vehement hope, or some prop of their power.' Again, '*Grief*, for the calamity of another, is *Pity*; and ariseth from the imagination that the like calamity may befall himself[1].' Against this theory it is only possible to appeal to facts, and to ask if we are never conscious within ourselves, or never imagine that we observe in others, feelings which are wholly disinterested, and which are inexplicable by reference to these selfish joys and sorrows, hopes and fears. Is a mother thinking of herself, when she is sitting by the bedside of a dying child, or, when a friend rushes into the water to save his drowning companion, is he acting simply on a calculation of the praise which he will secure, or the blame which he will avoid? Do we never pity calamities which it is impossible, or at least very improbable, we should ever suffer ourselves? Does a cripple, for instance, who is confined to his house for life, feel no compassion for the sufferers in a railway-accident or for a friend who has been killed by a fall from his horse? Or are our sympathies at all proportional to the chance to which we are exposed of ourselves incurring the same misfortunes? Or, if, in some cases, we do detect such a proportion, is it not fully explicable by the intellectual difficulty which men find in realising an event totally or widely different from anything which they have ever either experienced or perceived? And again, why, according to this theory, should we pity a friend more than a person who is indifferent to us, or a good man rather than a bad one, or a man who is himself compassionate rather than one who is hard-hearted and cruel? When tested

[1] Leviathan, Part I, ch. 6. Other definitions of a similar character will be found in the account of Hobbes given in Part I, ch. 2. See pp. 31, 32.

by such questions as these, there seem to be innumerable cases of every-day life which Hobbes' theory is utterly inadequate to meet. That in all our extra-regarding acts and feelings, or, at least, in all such acts and feelings as are commonly reputed and spoken of as extra-regarding, there is a conscious reference to self, is a position which psychological observation does not appear to verify.

Of the second opinion the best representative that I can take is, perhaps, Hartley. He does not deny the existence of purely disinterested actions or feelings, but he maintains that they have, in the progress of the individual's life, been transmuted, by means of association, out of acts and feelings which were at first purely self-regarding. The sympathetic affections are perfectly real and now rest in their object, just as the love of money does, though both the one and the other have been acquired in our progress through life, and may be traced back to their source in simpler feelings. But just as the miser comes at last to hoard money for its own sake, and without any reference to its uses, so may sympathy come to be so completely detached from its parent root, that the sympathetic man may eventually take an interest in the joys or sorrows of his fellow-men without any regard whatever to their effects upon himself[1].

It is plain how wide an interval separates this theory from the theory of Hobbes. The one denies that there is any such thing as disinterested benevolence, while the other, though it attempts to trace its origin to other sources, allows that, as a fact, it exists. To quote Hartley's own words, when speaking of our moral judgments, 'some associations are formed so early, repeated so often, rivetted so strong, and have so close a connexion with

[1] See Hartley's Observations on Man, Part I, ch. iv. sect. 4, and, for the comparison of the sympathetic affections with the love of money, section 3 of the same chapter.

the common nature of man, and the events of life which happen to all, as, in a popular way of speaking, to claim the appellation of original and natural dispositions, and to appear like instincts when compared with dispositions evidently factitious[1].' At the same time, the author adds that 'all reasoning, as well as affection, is the mere result of association.'

That the love of money, or, more generally, of property, is the result of association cannot be denied, for we can distinctly retrace the steps to its ultimate origin, nor in the child does there seem to be any feeling which can properly be so denominated. But the infant, as soon as it is capable of exhibiting any feelings at all, seems to betray signs of love and affection. Moreover, it may be questioned whether the love of money ever becomes so completely dissociated from a regard to its uses, as, even on this hypothesis, it is acknowledged that sympathy becomes dissociated from a respect to our own interests. Even the most confirmed miser probably retains some lingering idea of the uses to which his money might be put, or of the difficulties from which, under certain eventualities, it might enable him to rescue himself. Does any case exist, it may be asked, clearly traceable to association, in which the separation between the associated ideas is so complete as it is in the case of our sympathy for the welfare of others and our regard for our own?

But the third hypothesis, it might be said, completely disposes of these objections. If the association, instead of having been formed in a single life-time, has been in gradual process of formation throughout innumerable generations, if, in other words, it has, in the proportions which it has now assumed, been inherited rather than acquired, we have, it may be said, a sufficient account of its strength, of its

[1] Part I, ch. 4. sect. 6.

operation in the earliest period of infancy, and of the complete apparent separation which now exists between the sympathetic affections and the personal pleasures and pains out of which they are supposed originally to have grown. It cannot be denied that this theory seems perfectly adequate to explain the phenomena. All that can be said against it is that it carries us back to so distant a period in the history of our race as to admit of no direct verification, and that it transports us from the region of ethics properly so called into that of speculative psychology[1].

Even on this hypothesis, the sympathetic affections are coeval with the social form of human life. 'Sympathy,' says Mr. Herbert Spencer, 'may be proved, both inductively and deductively, to be the concomitant of gregariousness, the two having all along increased by reciprocal aid[2].' Now, as the oldest records of our race, and all the intimations that are to be gathered from the most archaic forms of language and institutions, present man as existing, from the first, in the family, or, at least, in the tribal[3], group, we seem warranted in assuming that the

[1] It is hoped that this remark will not be taken, as it certainly is not meant, in disparagement of the eminent writer (Mr. Herbert Spencer) to whom reference is made. An enquiry, which may be perfectly legitimate, and even necessary, in a general system of philosophy, would be out of place in a philosophy of ethics which attempts to base itself on the known facts of human nature, and to confine itself within the known limits of human history.

[2] Essay on Morals and Moral Sentiments in Fortnightly Review, April, 1871, p. 430. This idea is further expanded in the 'Data of Ethics.' That sympathy is manifested in many of the lower animals, as well as in man, is abundantly shewn by Mr. Darwin in chapters 3, 4 of the 'Descent of Man.'

[3] I add the words 'or, at least, in the tribal group' in order to cover the theory propounded by Mr. McLennan in his 'Primitive Marriage.' As the result of an elaborate argument, in opposition to the patriarchal theory of the Origin of Society adopted by Sir Henry Maine and others, he there states his own conclusions as follows: 'The order of social development, in our view, is, then, that the tribe stands first; the gens or house next; and, last of all, the family.' It is not necessary for me to state any opinion on the relative merits of this controversy. It is sufficient for my purpose, if it be admitted that man

sympathetic affections are coeval with the human race, or, at all events, with the time when man first deserved to be called by his present name.

'The Ethnologist,' says Dr. Tylor[1], 'finds the family affections established as the initial fact at the very entrance of his researches. It is shown by every observant traveller in savage regions, that the basis of society is the family. Even among the rudest tribes the family ties are distinct and strong; the patient tenderness of the mother's love, the desperate valour of the father fighting for home, the toil and care of both for the little ones, the affection of brothers and sisters, may be often masked or defaced by indifference or harshness, but they are always present, and often rise to poetic beauty and heroic passion. All through the human race, from savagery to civilization, the family has been the very source and school of moral life.'

That the existence of the family or tribal group implies the existence of the sympathetic affections seems plain

is a 'gregarious' animal, and that the primitive aggregates of men were bound together by feelings of kindred. These facts Mr. McLennan does not dispute. 'All the evidence we have goes to shew that men were from the beginning gregarious. The geological record distinctly exhibits them in groups .... naked hunters or feeders upon shell-fish leading a precarious life of squalid misery. This testimony is confirmed by all history. We hear nothing in the most ancient times of individuals except as being members of groups.' Primitive Marriage, ch. 8, 1st ed. p. 162. And, even when asserting that 'the earliest human groups can have had no idea of kinship,' he adds: 'We do not mean to say that there ever was a time when men were not bound together by a feeling of kindred. The filial and fraternal affections may be instinctive. They are obviously independent of any theory of kinship, its origin or consequences.' Ch. 8, 1st ed. p. 151.

Though he maintains that marriage, in our sense of the term, and the family relation are comparatively recent developments of human society, Mr. McLennan would, of course, not deny that, in all civilised societies, these institutions had their origin in a remote antiquity and go back far beyond the record of history.

[1] Contemporary Review, April, 1873, pp. 711–2.

on a little reflexion. It could hardly hold together without them. Without some reverence for its head, without some bond of sympathy between its different members, without the love which would impel the warrior or hunter to defend and to provide for his wife and children, we can hardly imagine such a society, surrounded by hostile tribes and earning a precarious subsistence, existing for a single day. So far as our means of information carry us back, we cannot detect the origin of sympathy. We can only trace its extension, note the obstacles which it has surmounted, and suggest the further ramifications or limitations of its course which may render it a still more potent instrument in promoting the well-being of mankind.

From what has been said, I conclude that Sympathy is a purely disinterested feeling, and that, so far as our means of information extend, it must be accepted, both in the history of the individual and in that of the race, as an ultimate fact of human nature.

Sympathy, strictly speaking, is fellow-feeling, sharing in the joys or sorrows of others. But this fellow-feeling implies the power of imagining, or setting before the mind, the circumstances which excite those joys or sorrows in the person with whom the sympathy is felt[1]. Hence, every act of sympathy implies a certain amount of intelligence, and, cæteris paribus, the more vivid the power of imagination, the more keen is the feeling of sympathy, a proposition the great importance of which will be ap-

[1] I speak advisedly of the exciting circumstances rather than of the joys or sorrows themselves. For, even where the circumstances are not apparent, it would seem that we imagine possible or probable circumstances as the cause of the joys or sorrows with which we sympathise. Thus, if a friend suddenly shrieks from pain, we imagine that it is due to a sudden attack of illness; but, if we supposed that the pain arose from some foolish act of his own, the feeling of sympathy would probably not be excited.

parent when I come to treat of the education of Sympathy, under the second head of this enquiry. This intellectual representation instantaneously excites what is called Sympathy proper, namely the feeling which we should ourselves experience, if we were ourselves placed in the same circumstances as those imagined[1]. The

[1] Instead of attempting to illustrate these stages in my own language, I shall avail myself of the lucid exposition of Adam Smith : 'As we have no immediate experience of what other men feel, we can form no idea of the manner in which they are affected, but by conceiving what we ourselves should feel in the like situation. Though our brother is upon the rack, as long as we ourselves are at our ease, our senses will never inform us of what he suffers. They never did, and never can, carry us beyond our own person, and it is by the imagination only that we can form any conception of what are his sensations. Neither can that faculty help us to this any other way, than by representing to us what would be our own, if we were in his case. It is the impressions of our own senses only, not those of his, which our imaginations copy. By the imagination we place ourselves in his situation, we conceive ourselves enduring all the same torments, we enter as it were into his body, and become in some measure the same person with him, and thence form some idea of his sensations, and even feel something which, though weaker in degree, is not altogether unlike them. His agonies, when they are thus brought home to ourselves, when we have thus adopted and made them our own, begin at last to affect us, and we then tremble and shudder at the thought of what he feels. For as to be in pain or distress of any kind excites the most excessive sorrow, so to conceive or to imagine that we are in it excites some degree of the same emotion, in proportion to the vivacity or dulness of the conception.

'That this is the source of our fellow-feeling for the misery of others, that it is by changing places in fancy with the sufferer that we come either to conceive or to be affected by what he feels, may be demonstrated by many obvious observations, if it should not be thought sufficiently evident of itself. When we see a stroke aimed, and just ready to fall upon the leg or arm of another person, we naturally shrink and draw back our own leg or our own arm; and when it does fall, we feel it in some measure, and are hurt by it as well as the sufferer. The mob, when they are gazing at a dancer on the slack rope, naturally writhe and twist and balance their own bodies as they see him do, and as they feel that they themselves must do if in his situation. Persons of delicate fibres and a weak constitution of body complain that, in looking on the sores and ulcers which are exposed by beggars in the streets, they are apt to feel an itching or uneasy sensation in the corresponding part of their own bodies. The horror which they conceive at the misery of those wretches affects that particular part in themselves more than any other; because that horror arises from conceiving what they themselves would suffer, if they really were the wretches

feeling, however, is perhaps necessarily weaker than that which we should ourselves experience under the like circumstances: for, in the first place, it is impossible exactly to reproduce the circumstances in which our neighbour is placed, and they will usually be reproduced in a less rather than in a more vivid form; and, in the second place, the interest excited by another's joys or sorrows can hardly, with very rare exceptions, be equal to that excited by our own. The intensity of the feeling will, of course, depend, to a great extent, on relationship, friendship, neighbourhood, and the like connexions, but of this circumstance I shall speak hereafter. It should also be noticed that the feeling, however vivid, is all along accompanied with the consciousness that the joy or sorrow with which we are sympathising is not our own.

With the intellectual representation and the consequent emotion, the act of sympathy is often complete. But, wherever it is possible to alleviate suffering, there ought to follow a third stage, namely, the disposition to assist

whom they are looking upon, and if that particular part in themselves was actually affected in the same miserable manner. The very force of this conception is sufficient, in their feeble frames, to produce that itching or uneasy sensation complained of. Men of the most robust make observe that in looking upon sore eyes they often feel a very sensible soreness in their own, which proceeds from the same reason; that organ being in the strongest man more delicate than any other part of the body is in the weakest.

'Neither is it those circumstances only, which create pain or sorrow, that call forth our fellow-feeling. Whatever is the passion which arises from any object in the person principally concerned, an analogous emotion springs up, at the thought of his situation, in the breast of every attentive spectator. Our joy for the deliverance of those heroes of tragedy or romance who interest us is as sincere as our grief for their distress, and our fellow-feeling with their misery is not more real than that with their happiness. We enter into their gratitude towards those faithful friends who did not desert them in their difficulties; and we heartily go along with their resentment against those perfidious traitors who injured, abandoned, or deceived them. In every passion of which the mind of man is susceptible, the emotions of the bystander always correspond to what, by bringing the case home to himself, he imagines should be the sentiments of the sufferer.' Adam Smith's Moral Sentiments, Part I, sect. 1. chap. 1.

the sufferer. In sympathy with joy, the corresponding disposition is superfluous; for it is comparatively seldom that we can, by any overt act, increase our neighbour's joys. Moreover, even in sympathy with sorrow, there are many cases in which assistance is impossible, as, for instance, where the sorrow is too great, or the means at our disposal are inadequate, or the sorrow, as in plays and novels, is simply an ideal or generalised one. But, wherever such assistance is possible, the disposition, at least, ought to follow, though more weighty considerations may prevent it from passing into action. For, if this be not the case, if the feeling of sympathy be constantly excited within us, unaccompanied by any disposition to act upon it, even where such action is possible, the heart inevitably becomes hardened, and human joys and sorrows come at last to be viewed with curiosity rather than with sympathy, as the transactions in a play rather than the events of real life. But, though this is undoubtedly the case in the experience of actual life, it may be questioned whether the objection commonly taken to works of fiction, on this ground, can really be sustained. For, where we are thoroughly conscious of the fictitious character of the recital or representation, and know that any active participation of our own in the events described is entirely out of the question, it is difficult to see how the disposition to render assistance to real distress can possibly be weakened. And, where the fiction is more completely realised and we are partially deceived into mistaking the fiction for reality, there is surely nothing to prevent the disposition to render assistance from being also partially (or, if I may employ such a term, incipiently) excited, till the deception is removed. The objection seems, any way, to apply with as much force to a history graphically told as to a work of fiction.

In a complete act of sympathy, then, there are three stages, the mental representation of the circumstances, the emotional act of fellow-feeling or sympathy, properly so called, attended with the consciousness that the joy or suffering is not our own, and, lastly, the disposition to render assistance, if possible, to the object sympathised with. The term 'sympathy' is sometimes applied to the second act only of this series, frequently to the combination of the first two, and sometimes to the entire series. In the remainder of this chapter, it will be employed in the widest signification of which the context admits.

II. It is, as already intimated, in the various relations of the family[1], that we find the roots of the sympathetic affections. In tracing the gradual extension of sympathy from this source, it will, perhaps, be most convenient, first, to consider the development of society and the corresponding sympathies under favourable, or what may in this case justly be called the normal, conditions, and, then, to take into account the various obstacles that have frequently been encountered in the actual course of development, at the same time pointing out the manner in which those obstacles have been, or may be, overcome. This enquiry will obviously lead to the other division which falls under this head of my subject, namely, the education or enlightenment of sympathy by means of reason and the other feelings.

To begin with the family, considered in its internal organisation. The husband and wife are not only bound

[1] I have already noticed that Mr. McLennan, in his remarkable work on Primitive Marriage, calls in question the theory of the family as the original social unit. But, as he does not deny that the family-group lies at the basis of civilised society, while, even in the most primitive and savage type of human life, the place of the family is taken by the tribe, his objections do not, in any material respect, affect my argument.

together by the ties of conjugal love, but, in their normal condition, the husband feels that he owes protection to the wife, and the wife obedience to her husband. Here, then, there are three distinct forms of sympathy, the feeling of love, the feeling elicited by an object to which we are conscious of extending our protection, a feeling which appears to have no appropriate name, and the feeling corresponding to obedience freely rendered, which may, perhaps, be called reverence or loyalty. When we proceed to consider the relations of the children, at least in the normal condition of a family, we seem to detect, first, the feeling of filial love in relation to their parents, the feeling entertained towards the mother being of a more tender description than that entertained towards the father; secondly, the feeling of reverence, or a mixed feeling of love, admiration, and fear, which seems to be entertained towards the father, in addition to the feeling of filial love already mentioned; thirdly, the feeling of fraternal love which governs their relations amongst themselves; and fourthly, feelings of a certain kind between the elder children and the younger, and the males and the females, elicited, as in the case of the husband and wife, by the protection afforded by the one and the modified obedience rendered by the other. In addition to these special forms of feeling, there is the general feeling of family union, or loyalty to the family tie, which is felt in common by all members of the group. Thus, even in the simplest form of social union, we find a variety of sentiments, some of them also, as we have seen, existing in a variety of degrees. When the family has, by the natural process which I need not here describe, grown successively into the house, gens, or clan, and then into the tribe[1], these feelings are extended, by means of

[1] The reader is probably familiar with this view of the growth of society. If

analogy and association, to new objects, and thus assume new, though similar, forms. The feeling of reverence, for instance, as entertained towards the father, is now extended to the leader of the tribe; the feeling of fraternal affection is extended, though in a weakened degree, to all fellow-tribesmen; what I have called the feeling of family-union, or loyalty to the family tie, is extended, and often without suffering any diminution of strength, to the larger groups which constitute the clan and tribe, thereby becoming loyalty to these larger groups, or, in the noblest sense of the expression, clan-feeling. In undergoing these extensions, the sympathetic sentiments, as they originally existed in the family group, and in reference to their original objects, are not necessarily weakened, but, for the most part, remain unimpaired. Thus, when the family has expanded into the clan or tribe, there seems to be no reason why conjugal affection, filial affection, and fraternal affection should be less intense than before. But, as the father, unless he be the head of the clan or tribe, is not the main-stay and sole support of the family in the same sense as he was, when it lived in isolation, the reverence felt towards him in this character seems to be necessarily diminished and shared with the leaders of the larger aggregate. It is difficult for us now to realise the absolute submission and deference with which the father of the family was treated even by his adult sons in primæval times. For a similar reason, the family-feeling would be weakened when the clan-feeling, and still more when the tribal feeling, began to exist side by side with it. Moreover, weakened forms of sympathy, diluted forms, so to speak,

not, he is referred to Sir H. Maine's Treatise on Ancient Law, as presenting it in the briefest and most intelligible form. He may also consult with advantage the very suggestive work of De Coulanges, 'La Cité Antique.'

of family love, would come into existence; as, for instance, what I shall hereafter designate as friendship, attachment, regard, respect, and the like. In the next stage of social development, the amalgamation of tribes into a nation, the sympathetic feelings would attach themselves to new objects, and undergo extensions similar to those which they underwent when the family passed successively into the gens and tribe. Thus, the feeling of reverence entertained towards the father and the heads of the clan and tribe would now be extended to the head of the state and his subordinate officers, the feeling being probably, as before, weakened by its dispersion. Again, the same sentiment which produced family-feeling, clan-feeling, and loyalty to the tribe, though still, perhaps, continuing to exist in those forms, and possibly with undiminished strength, would now appear in the new form of state-feeling, loyalty to the state, or, to call it by its appropriate name, *patriotism*[1]. Moreover, the fraternal feeling which existed in the family, and which, in the clan and tribe, assumed the greatly weakened form of a feeling of sympathy towards fellow-clansmen and fellow-tribesmen, would now assume the still more weakened form of a feeling of community with fellow-countrymen. This weakened form of sympathy would, however, in certain cases, be

[1] It is impossible to name this sentiment, without noticing the important part which it has played historically in subjugating the selfish to the sympathetic feelings. At a time when society was mainly organised on the military basis, the love of country was a sentiment of sufficient majesty to over-rule all minor and narrower considerations, and to inspire deeds of heroism and devotion which no other sentiment then existing could have done. The patriotic sentiment has no doubt, in the development of society, been weakened by the more general intercourse between different nations, and modified by science and philosophy, but, as we have seen even in our own generation, it is still capable of being kindled into vigorous action, and of becoming an overpowering force, when the honour or independence of a nation is at stake. Its tendency, however, in an industrial age or country, appears to be to give place to the wider feelings of general good-will and philanthropy.

intensified by other considerations, such as neighbourhood, identity of employment, similarity of tastes, and the like, thus sometimes rising into friendship. The stronger forms of sympathy, such as conjugal love, filial love, fraternal love, affection towards kinsmen, attachment towards clansmen and tribesmen, if, at least, the clan and tribe continued to be integral parts of the society, might still remain unimpaired. The great extension and variety which the sympathetic feelings have acquired by the expansion of the tribe into the state will, however, now be apparent without any further illustration. There remains one stage more, the development of these narrower sympathetic feelings into philanthropy and humanity. *Philanthropy*, or the feeling of sympathy with man simply because he is man, probably owes its origin and recognition to a variety of causes. Amongst these may be enumerated commerce and the consequent *rapprochement* between different nations, the collection of various races under the same empire, a cause which seems especially to have operated in the case of the Roman Empire, the teaching of the later Stoic philosophy[1], anticipated by a few scattered

[1] As in the following passages:

'Ecce altera quaestio, quomodo hominibus sit utendum. Quid agimus? quae damus praecepta? ut parcamus sanguini humano? quantulum est, ei non nocere, cui debeas prodesse! magna scilicet laus est, si homo mansuetus homini est. praecipiemus, ut naufrago manum porrigat, erranti viam monstret, cum esuriente panem suum dividat? Quando omnia, quae praestanda ac vitanda sunt, dicam? cum possim breviter hanc illi formulam humani officii tradere: omne hoc, quod vides, quo divina atque humana conclusa sunt, unum est: membra sumus corporis magni. natura nos cognatos edidit, cum ex iisdem et in eadem gigneret. haec nobis amorem indidit mutuum et sociabiles fecit. illa aequum iustumque conposuit. ex illius constitutione miserius est nocere quam laedi. ex illius imperio paratae sint iuvantis manus. Ille versus et in pectore et in ore sit:

Homo sum, humani nihil a me alienum puto.

Habeamus in commune, quod nati sumus. societas nostra lapidum fornicationi

expressions amongst the older Greek moralists[1], the gradual development of Monotheistic notions, inevitably suggesting that, if men have a common Father in heaven, they must themselves be brethren, and, above all, the teaching combined with the example of the Divine Founder of Christianity and his more immediate followers. Exactly, however, to apportion amongst these and other causes their precise share in bringing about the result, seems hardly to fall within the scope of this work.

Humanity, as opposed to Cruelty, would, from the first,

simillima est, quae casura, nisi invicem obstaret, hoc ipso sustinetur.' Seneca, Epist. Mor. 95 (51–3).

In the same Epistle, he speaks of 'homo, sacra res homini.' § 33.

'Hoc nempe ab homine exigitur, ut prosit hominibus, si fieri potest, multis, si minus, paucis, si minus, proximis, si minus, sibi. nam cum se utilem ceteris efficit, commune agit negotium.' Seneca, Dial. VIII. 3 (5).

Καθ' ἕτερον μὲν λόγον ἡμῖν ἐστιν οἰκειότατον ἄνθρωπος, καθ' ὅσον εὖ ποιητέον αὐτοὺς καὶ ἀνεκτέον. Marcus Antoninus, Comm. V. 20.

With these we may compare the following passages from Cicero, quoted by Fritzsche on Aristotle's Eth. Nic. VIII. 11 (7):

'Sic enim mihi perspicere videor, ita natos esse nos, ut inter omnes esset societas quaedam.' Cic. Læl. V. 19. 'Meminerimus autem, etiam adversus infimos justitiam esse servandam.' Cic. Off. I. 13, 41.

[1] The words *φιλανθρωπία, φιλάνθρωπος*, &c., are not uncommonly employed by Attic writers, as the student will find on consulting any Greek Lexicon. As to the sentiment itself, the following passages will supply favourable illustrations:

Φύσει τ' ἐνυπάρχειν ἔοικε (sc. *φιλία*) *πρὸς τὸ γεγεννημένον τῷ γεννήσαντι* [*καὶ πρὸς τὸ γεννῆσαν τῷ γεννηθέντι*], *οὐ μόνον ἐν ἀνθρώποις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν ὄρνισι καὶ τοῖς πλείστοις τῶν ζώων, καὶ τοῖς ὁμοεθνέσι πρὸς ἄλληλα, καὶ μάλιστα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ὅθεν τοὺς φιλανθρώπους ἐπαινοῦμεν. ἴδοι δ' ἄν τις καὶ ἐν ταῖς πλάναις ὡς οἰκεῖον ἅπας ἄνθρωπος ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ φίλον.* Eth. Nic. VIII. 1 (3).

ᾗ μὲν οὖν δοῦλος, οὐκ ἔστι φιλία πρὸς αὐτόν, ᾗ δ' ἄνθρωπος· δοκεῖ γὰρ εἶναί τι δίκαιον παντὶ ἀνθρώπῳ πρὸς πάντα τὸν δυνάμενον κοινωνῆσαι νόμου καὶ συνθήκης· καὶ φιλίας δή, καθ' ὅσον ἄνθρωπος. VIII. 11 (7).

Κἂν δοῦλος ᾖ τις, σάρκα τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει·
φύσει γὰρ οὐδεὶς δοῦλος ἐγενήθη ποτέ·
ἡ δ' αὖ τύχη τὸ σῶμα κατεδουλώσατο.

Philemon. fragm. fab. inc. XXXIX.

(Quoted by Fritzsche in illustration of the last passage).

In the Republic, Plato, while commending humanity and moderation to the Greek states in their wars with each other, appears quite unconscious that there are any duties whatever towards barbarians. See Rep. V. 469–71.

advance *pari passu* with the sympathies entertained by men towards one another. But its extension to the brute creation requires, perhaps, to be separately accounted for. Hitherto I have said nothing of the slave, but it is plain that his introduction into the family would be the occasion of largely developing the feeling elicited by a consciousness of protection on the one hand and the feeling corresponding to obedience on the other. Of other feelings I say nothing at present, for it must be remembered that, at this stage, we are only concerned with the brighter side of the picture. Now the slave seems to form a natural link between the related members of the family on the one hand and the domestic animals on the other. When, therefore, the feeling of sympathy had once attached itself to the slave, it would, by a natural process of association, be extended to the domestic animals. Where this link was wanting, the extension of sympathy from the human members of the household might still take place, but it would probably be slower and more capricious. The extension of sympathy, and consequently of humanity, from our own domestic animals to those of others, and from domestic animals to wild animals, would require a long lapse of time and is even still but very imperfectly accomplished.

Hitherto, we have looked only at the bright side of the picture. We have considered sympathy as continuously developing itself in correspondence with the new relations into which mankind is brought, without taking into account the checks which it may receive from counteracting forces. To this task, however, I must now proceed. Not only do the various sympathies often interfere with each other, but they frequently come into collision with antipathies, which antipathies are themselves

occasioned by resentment springing from real, fancied, or apprehended hurt. There is always, moreover, the opposition between self-love in its manifold forms and the sympathetic affections. From the very earliest times there can be no doubt that all these three classes of checks have been operative. Even in the family, each individual has his own separate interests as well as his family-interests; there is always a danger lest the father should become tyrannical, the children rebellious, lest the mother should be partial, the sons quarrelsome and jealous. The more complex the relations of the family, and the more numerous the individuals of whom it is composed, the more are these dangers aggravated. It is only because the power of sympathy is so strong, that it usually surmounts these obstacles, and that the normal relations of the family are harmonious instead of hostile.

It may be of use to consider, in a few instances, the retarding influences which are frequently at work in an early condition of society.

From the very constitution of the family, when existing in its isolated state, the father must be absolutely supreme over the other members of the household. There is no external authority to check him, and a rebellion within the household itself would only substitute one absolute head for another. It is plain that these circumstances are not unlikely to develope a tyrannical disposition in the father, and that mere fear, sometimes deepening into hatred, will, in that case, almost certainly take the place of reverence in the subject members of the family. As society multiplies, these antagonistic feelings are likely to be aggravated by the observation of other families living under more favourable conditions, till at last the paternal form of government becomes intolerable and the absolute authority of the father is subordinated to that of the head of the clan

or the state. But, though the sympathetic feelings within the family circle are often thus perverted, this very circumstance often contributes to the formation or consolidation of a wider union. The son, discontented with his position at home, looks for reparation to the state, and his recognition as a citizen must ultimately lead to his emancipation as a member of the family. Indeed his political activities are stimulated by the very fact of domestic repression. Thus, at Rome, where the *patria potestas* still lingered on in a more or less modified form to the fall of the empire, it was often practically a dead letter in consequence of the civil or military position of the son in the state[1]. While, then, the tyrannical temper or tyrannical acts of the father would undoubtedly have a dissociating effect within the family itself, they might, for that very reason, contribute indirectly to the consolidation of the larger aggregate. Had the mutual relations of the members of the family been in all cases unexceptionable, the political union would probably never have been accomplished so perfectly as has actually been the case.

Family Pride, on the other hand, while it consolidates the family, is frequently a serious obstacle to political unity. Still more is this the case with Pride of Class or Caste, a noxious feeling which, at least in its later forms, possesses hardly any redeeming features. Men have often been found who would hazard the disruption of the commonwealth, rather than part with exclusive and invidious privileges; even in the quietest times, there is probably no one cause which acts more perniciously in the way of drying up the natural sympathy of man with man, which produces more bitterness of feeling, or which more effectu-

[1] The reader will find an excellent account of the Patria Potestas, in the history of which there are many gaps, by referring to Maine's Ancient Law, ch. V.

ally prevents community of action for the attainment of the common good.

Amongst the causes which have retarded the growth of the sympathetic affections, and arrested the domestic and political effects which result from them, an important place must be assigned to Polygamy. By dispersing over a number of distinct wives and distinct progenies the affection which would otherwise be concentrated on one wife and one progeny, it, in most cases, prevents the sympathetic feelings of the father from ever assuming a sufficiently intense form; another effect, moreover, which is almost inevitable is the creation of jealousies and the fostering of a mean spirit of intrigue between the different wives and their different families. If, then, as Sir John Lubbock[1] and others imagine, Polygamy was almost universal in the early history of mankind, the advance to Monogamy was a definite and important stage in human progress.

It is, perhaps, unnecessary to give any further instances of the circumstances which have retarded or counteracted the normal development of sympathy, as the reader will easily supply them for himself. Thus, as family pride stands in the way of patriotism, patriotism itself frequently stands in the way of philanthropy, and, on the other hand, a disproportionately developed feeling of philanthropy will often prevent a man from discharging his more immediate duties to his family, his friends, and his neighbours. In these and similar cases, the only remedy is the maintenance of a due proportion among our affections, which can only be effected by taking a wide view of our various relations to the various sections of the society in which we move, by carefully observing the consequences of our acts, and by strictly subordinating all our feelings to the control of reason.

[1] Lubbock on the Origin of Civilization, ch. 3.

To enable men to carry out this discipline, as it may be called, of the affections, it is, from the nature of the case, impossible to give precise rules. It may, however, be remarked that it is even still the tendency of mankind to develope the narrower sympathies at the expense of the wider. That this class of sympathies should be proportionately more intense, there can, of course, be no question; but it may be doubted whether we have yet arrived at the stage of human progress at which, except in rare instances, philanthropy, humanity, and the wider interests and sympathies generally, have received their due development even amongst civilised and cultivated men.

The obstacles to the operation and development of any particular form of sympathy have already been classified as due either to self-love or to antipathies or to rival sympathies. But, though from one point of view these may be regarded as obstacles, they are, on the other hand, necesary agents in the education of sympathy. It is plain that any one form of sympathy, if it were not checked by the growth of any other forms, might become inordinately and perniciously developed; it is plain too that a man who had no antipathies, who never felt resentment, would present an inexpressibly weak type of character and would be unable to protect either himself or his friends from the most outrageous injustice; and, lastly, on the slightest reflexion it will be seen that a certain amount of self-love is absolutely necessary to the maintenance of our very existence. The relations of these various forces can only be compared by reason, observing and reflecting on their consequences.

To consider these points somewhat more at length. Any one form of sympathy may become utterly pernicious, if not duly coordinated with and checked by other forms. Thus, to take a familiar case, a mother may have a favourite child, and may be so passionately attached to

him, as to neglect her other children, and to ruin, by her irrational conduct, the unfortunate object of her attachment. Again, a man may be so entirely devoted to his family as to have no public spirit, or, on the other hand, so taken up with public affairs, as to neglect his more immediate concerns; or, to take one more instance, family, class, or caste pride may have taken such complete possession of a man as to make him utterly neglectful and unsympathetic towards those beyond his own circle. Now, in all these and similar cases, there is, so to speak, an excessive outflow of sympathy in one direction, causing a deficiency of the supply in other channels. And this disproportion is itself due to the absence either of imagination or of reflexion, that is to say, either of the power of entering mentally into the circumstances of others or of the power of comparing those circumstances and of estimating relatively the respective claims on our sympathy and good offices. It is, then, in intellectual discipline, in expanding the imagination and cultivating the reason, that we must rest our best hopes of rectifying those disproportional sympathies which are the cause of so much real suffering both in domestic and in national life. Let a man try to throw himself into the circumstances of others, to view things as they view them, and to feel as they feel, and he can hardly be guilty of those little acts of unkindness or those gross acts of injustice which usually mark the career of men of narrow intellects, of confined imaginations, and of partial sympathies.

It is almost impossible to quit this branch of the subject without alluding to the mischievous tendencies of religious and political fanaticism. The true fanatic is a man who can sympathise with no one whose opinions do not coincide with his own. From a deficiency of imagination, he is unable to enter into the views of his antagonists, or

even of those who hold aloof from his aims or party; and hence, mistrusting their sincerity, he begins by ascribing to them evil motives, and usually ends in cordially detesting them, if not in actively planning their extermination. Here, again, the true remedy is a wise education of the imagination and the reason. The sympathy that is concentrated on one's own party or sect requires to be partially diverted to those whose convictions differ from our own. We may still believe that they are in error, and, consequently, our sympathy with them cannot be so complete as it might otherwise be, but it need not, on that account, be altogether dried up.

Still, however, it must be confessed that there are justifiable antipathies. When, after making all due allowances for circumstances, we conclude that, to the best of our belief, a man's motives are base and his acts pernicious, we should be singularly deficient in moral sentiment if we felt no antipathy towards his person. Resentment towards the evil-doer is, as will be made plain in the next chapter, an essential part of our moral nature. Our sympathies, therefore, require to be checked by justifiable antipathies. To sympathise with the criminal, to the extent, at least, of condoning or unduly palliating his crime, to shield the oppressor, the calumniator, or the secret foe would plainly be to contribute to the disorganisation of society. Even here, however, there is a point beyond which our antipathies must not carry us. We must never forget that the object of our resentment is a human being, even if he be bound to us by no closer ties. Moreover, in almost every case which excites our resentment, there are, if we could only discover them, extenuating circumstances to be taken into account. What allowance we shall make for these circumstances, how far we shall carry our resentment, and what pro-

portion we shall endeavour to maintain between our sympathies and our antipathies, can only be determined, as in the former case of the opposition between rival sympathies, by a well-regulated intellect carefully taking account of all the circumstances attendant on each individual case, and carefully tracing the consequences of all our acts. When an intellectual habit of this kind has once been formed, the feelings may be said to be under the control of the reason.

That the sympathetic feelings must, to some extent, be checked by the self-regarding feelings hardly needs to be insisted upon. The precise extent, however, to which we should forego our own interests for the sake of others, or, what comes to the same thing, forward the interests of others at the expense of our own, is often, even to those who are thoroughly desirous of doing what is right, a question of extreme difficulty. It can only be answered correctly, where the sympathetic affections are duly developed, and where, as in the instances already discussed, the intellect has been carefully trained in the consideration of individual circumstances, and has acquired the power of rapidly tracing the manifold results of our actions. That, in the great majority of cases, even well-intentioned men are likely to care too little for others, wherever the interests of their neighbours clash with their own, is a remark which it may perhaps appear superfluous to make. It may not, however, be equally superfluous to suggest that this defect is, to a great extent, due to the peculiar vividness with which we realise the circumstances in which we are ourselves placed, and the corresponding difficulty which we experience in throwing ourselves into the circumstances of others.

III. I may now proceed to enumerate the various forms

under which sympathy presents itself, and then to explain various terms which are appropriated to express sympathetic affections. The terms *Sympathy* and *Fellow-Feeling*, as already noticed, are used in a general sense, for expressing alike any act of the mind by which we enter into the joys or sorrows of others, though they are often also used in the restricted sense of entering into the sorrows of others only. To the act of '*rejoicing with others*' there is no single term appropriated, and that, perhaps, for the reason suggested by Bishop Butler, that the feeling itself is comparatively rare[1]. The outward expression of the feeling is, however, known as *congratulation*. That feeling by which we enter into the sorrows of others is, omitting the generic terms of sympathy and fellow-feeling, variously known as *compassion*, *pity*, and *commiseration*. Its outward expression is somewhat inadequately represented by the term *condolence*. The three terms which represent the feeling itself are not exactly synonymous, *pity* expressing, perhaps, a more intense feeling than compassion, and *commiseration* than pity, while both these last terms seem to imply, more even than is the case with compassion, a consciousness of superiority to the person who is the object of the sympathy. The common use of the generic term, sympathy, in the specific sense of compassion, may be accounted for from the fact that there seems to be no assumption of superiority in saying that we sympathise with a man, whereas this idea is always more or less in-

[1] 'Of these two, delight in the prosperity of others, and compassion for their distresses, the last is felt much more generally than the former. Though men do not universally rejoice with all whom they see rejoice, yet, accidental obstacles removed, they naturally compassionate all in some degree whom they see in distress: so far as they have any real perception or sense of that distress: insomuch that words expressing this latter, pity, compassion, frequently occur, whereas we have scarce any single one by which the former is distinctly expressed.' Sermon V, Upon Compassion.

volved in, or, at least, may be attached to, the expressions that we compassionate, pity, or commiserate him.

Good-Will and *Benevolence* are terms coextensive with Sympathy. They express, however, not the act of entering into the feelings of others, which is the meaning of that term when employed in its stricter sense, but the subsequent disposition to assist the object of sympathy, whether in the way of positively increasing his happiness or of relieving his pains. When this disposition passes into action, Good-Will or Benevolence becomes *Beneficence.* When Beneficence implies considerable self-denial, it is called *Generosity*, though this term is also applied to the disposition to make such sacrifices.

A peculiar openness to the feeling of compassion is frequently called *Sensibility.*

Compassion, when it passes into action, and is exercised in favour of a person who has no claim to our sympathy, or, at least, who has no claim to the extent to which the compassion is exercised, is called *Mercy.* Thus, to spare a prisoner taken in war was formerly called an act of mercy, and a judge who passes lenient sentences is often called a merciful judge. Not to exact our full rights in a pecuniary transaction, to refrain from retaliating on a person who has offended us or from punishing a person who has injured us, and to decline to prosecute a criminal are often also called acts of mercy. It requires little reflexion to see that, in many of these cases, the mercy may be entirely misplaced, and that the results of such misplaced mercy may be highly pernicious. To decline to prosecute or to give information against a criminal, or to pass sentences which are inadequate to restrain men from crime, is, in fact, simply to transfer the punishment from the guilty to the innocent members of society; and,

generally speaking, to intensify the punishment in the transfer.

'Mercy but murders, pardoning those that kill[1].'

And, even in foregoing our own rights, it is often necessary to consider to what extent we are bringing into jeopardy the rights of others. A man of good property, or with few calls on his purse, will often waive pecuniary rights, the loss of which may entail considerable suffering on his neighbours or successors. Again, to exact no penalty from those who have injured or insulted us would often be simply to encourage insolence or vice.

The question, then, seems to arise whether mercy, in the sense in which I have understood it, is ever a commendable quality. That it is actually praised there can be no doubt; to be merciful being usually regarded as a peculiarly amiable characteristic. Is there, then, no ground for this popular estimation? Notwithstanding the contrary opinion expressed by Kant[2], it appears to me that the feeling is, in many cases, justifiable and even commendable. To refrain from insisting on our full rights, when such abstention is attended with no injury, direct or indirect, to others, is surely a lovely and praiseworthy, rather than an 'offensive' act, and the disposition from which it springs must contribute to the advantage rather than to the detriment of mankind. Thus, to excuse a payment to a poor man, where such exemption is not likely

[1] Romeo and Juliet, Act III. Sc. 1.

[2] 'There is likewise an offensive (beleidigende) variety of this pity called Mercy (Barmherzigkeit), by which is meant that kind of benevolence shown to the unworthy; but such an expression of benevolence ought never to take place betwixt man and man, no one being entitled to boast of his worthiness to be happy.' Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Tugendlehre, § 34 (Semple's Translation of the Metaphysic of Ethics, p. 266). This passage affords one amongst many instances of Kant's systematic depreciation of the affections in the moral conduct of life. The definition of mercy as 'benevolence shown to the unworthy' is one which, to a great extent, begs the question at issue.

to form an injurious precedent, to suppress information which would lower a man in the estimation of other persons and subserve no useful purpose to society, to refrain from pushing an advantage against an enemy even where he would have no right to complain if we did so, are surely not only evidences of an amiable disposition but acts which tend to make life happier and sweeter than it would otherwise be. The frequent repetition of what was at one time regarded as an extraordinary act of mercy, sparing the life of an enemy captured in war, undoubtedly gave rise, though passing through the intermediate stage of enslavement, to the more humane practices of modern warfare. In the ordinary intercourse of life, there are numberless cases in which to insist strictly on our rights would render existence harsh and disagreeable, while a generous rivalry to forego them constitutes the charm of society. These can hardly be called acts of mercy, but, under the names of *kindness* and *courtesy*[1], they are in the lesser morals what mercy is in the greater.

The reason, perhaps, why even too great a value has usually been attached to mercy, is that men have looked too exclusively to the amiable character of the feeling, without sufficiently taking into account the pernicious consequences to which its indiscriminate and unintelligent exercise frequently gives rise. Another reason also may be found in the imperfect ideas of justice which were often formerly entertained. The harsh views of justice which at one time prevailed often led men to contrast justice and mercy, where now the 'act of mercy' would simply be regarded as an 'act of justice.'

[1] Of these two, kindness is rather a positive, courtesy rather a negative virtue. Though the two terms are often used without observing any definite line of demarcation, *kindness* may be defined as a disposition to confer benefits, *courtesy* as a disposition to waive rights; both having reference to the minor circumstances of life.

Returning to the generic feeling of sympathy, it assumes various manifestations according to the intensity of the sentiment, and the nature and range of the persons towards whom it is directed. *Love; Affection, Attachment, Regard* seem all to denote, in diminishing degrees, intensified forms of sympathy, and they all, and especially the two former, and still more especially the first, seem to be limited in their range to a small number of persons. Love and affection imply intimacy; attachment and regard at least some knowledge of the persons towards whom they are entertained. To discriminate more closely between these terms, the limits between which are very indistinctly marked, would carry me beyond my present purpose. *Friendship* may, without entering into niceties, be defined as a consciously reciprocated affection between equals. The fraternal relation, when in its normal condition, is the type of the relation between friends, but the feeling which corresponds with that relation is usually called love and not friendship. In both love and friendship, the object of the affection seems to be permanently regarded as a sort of ἄλλος αὐτός[1], another self, and this characteristic may perhaps be taken as distinguishing these two feelings from all others. *Gratitude* may be defined as an attachment towards those who have conferred benefits upon us, with a disposition to return those benefits, if the opportunity shall occur.

Of all these feelings, it may be remarked that they may exist in undue proportion, either with respect to each other or with respect to the other feelings of our nature. Thus, love, as felt towards one person or a small circle of persons, may be so intense as to dry up all the other sympathetic

[1] ἔστι γὰρ ὁ φίλος ἄλλος αὐτός. Eth. Nic. IX. 4 (5).
ἕτερος γὰρ αὐτὸς ὁ φίλος ἐστίν. Id. IX. 9 (10).

affections; or friendship may lead us to overlook the claims of gratitude; or, though this is a rare case, our concern for others may prevent us from having a due regard to our own interests. There would be few more valuable results of a moral education than the production of a due balance of the sympathetic affections. If the affections are capable of cultivation, as they undoubtedly are, they might surely be cultivated in some fixed order and in some definite relation to each other.

Amongst less intensified forms of sympathy, are those which are entertained towards persons of the same profession, rank, &c., or those of the same neighbourhood, race, or country. Of these it may be remarked that, though the feeling towards any given individual of the class may be very weak, the feeling towards the whole aggregate, and towards the various objects associated with that aggregate, may be intensely strong. Thus, though a person may entertain little sympathy towards many individuals of the same profession, rank, or country as himself, he may have an intense *feeling of class or caste*, or be actuated by intense *patriotism*[1]. The feeling, in these cases, is directed not only towards an aggregate of persons now existing, but towards a succession of persons past and to come, and is associated, at least in the case of patriotism, with innumerable scenes and traditions, with innumerable laws, customs, and institutions, with innumerable hopes, fears, and aspirations. Hence feelings of this kind may rise to almost any pitch of enthusiasm. It may be added that *party-zeal* is a feeling of this description.

These feelings are abused when they unduly interfere with the action of wider sympathies, as, for instance, when

[1] On these feelings the reader will recall some remarks in an earlier part of the Chapter. See pp. 83-84, 88.

the feeling of class or caste (which is, at all times, a feeling of questionable propriety) or party-zeal tends to check the spirit of patriotism, or when the spirit of patriotism itself interferes unduly with those wider manifestations of sympathy which I now proceed to note.

Sympathy in its most extended form becomes *Philanthropy* or *Humanity*. Philanthropy is sympathy with mankind as men, and not on account of any narrower bonds of union; Humanity extends even to the brute creation. Philanthropy is both a positive and a negative virtue; it attempts to promote happiness as well as to alleviate misery: Humanity simply shrinks from inflicting pain, or attempts to relieve pain already inflicted. To Philanthropy is opposed *Misanthropy*, to Humanity *Cruelty*. It should be noticed, however, that Misanthropy is seldom inclined to perpetrate actual mischief; it usually contents itself with standing aloof from human affairs.

Philanthropy and Humanity, though the most diluted forms of sympathy, may often glow intensely in persons of peculiarly vivid imaginations or peculiarly susceptible feelings. The extent of their range compensates for the want of special interest in the individual objects of sympathy, which is often one of their characteristics.

These wider feelings become, at least to that extent, a source of evil when they unduly dwarf the more special sympathies, or when they interfere unduly with the conduct of a man's own life. Such abuses, however, are of comparatively rare occurrence.

There are many other manifestations of sympathy besides those already enumerated, falling mainly within the scope of the minor morals, and not seeming to require any specific treatment. Such are *Amiability*, *Sociality* or *Sociability* (the opposite of which, to borrow a term from Kant, may be called *Anthropophoby*), *Geniality*, *Affability*,

Friendliness. The possession of these qualities, though it does not make a man virtuous, tends to make him cheerful and happy, and to diffuse cheerfulness and happiness amongst those around him. Their absence, on the contrary, though it does not constitute him vicious, is often the source of much unhappiness to a man's self, and renders him a gloomy and unwelcome companion.

There are certain mixed feelings of which it may be convenient to speak in this place—namely Respect, Admiration, Awe, Reverence. *Respect* may, perhaps, be briefly defined as the feeling which we entertain towards a person whose general conduct and character we approve. But, as, in forming such a judgment, we must almost inevitably put ourselves in his place and ask ourselves what judgment we should have passed upon our own conduct or character, had it been the same as his, the feeling of sympathy is evidently a principal constituent of that of respect. This feeling may, in fact, be regarded as a combination of sympathy and approbation. When we feel that a person's conduct is such as we could ourselves only be capable of in our best moments, or such, perhaps, as we could rather wish ourselves capable of than feel any confidence in our power to imitate, the feeling of respect rises into that of *Admiration.* This term, it may be noticed in passing, is much more frequently applied to single acts than is the term Respect. *Awe* seems to be an admixture of fear with respect or admiration. The two terms Awe and Admiration are frequently applied to inanimate objects, as to a stupendous mountain or the starry heavens, but, when so applied, they seem invariably to be associated with those feelings with which they are applied to the conduct or actions of men. *Reverence* or *Veneration* (a somewhat feeble synonym) appears to be a combination of love and awe, or, if we resolve the last feeling into its constituent

elements, of love, admiration, and fear. Like the kindred feeling of love, it seems to be necessarily confined to a small number of objects. A man may reverence God, his father, his leader, his instructor, but, if the term be at all widely applied, it seems to be proportionally stripped of its significance.

Loyalty, when the word is used absolutely, that is, without any qualification, may be defined as the feeling of reverence entertained towards the sovereign ruler or chief representative of a state. When it is not regarded as directed to a person, the term seems to be always qualified, as when we speak of 'loyalty to his cause,' 'loyalty to the institutions of the state,' &c.

The general abuses of sympathy are Misplaced Sympathy and Perverted Sympathy. *Misplaced Sympathy* is sympathy with an unworthy object, or with a worthy object to an exaggerated degree. And of such sympathies it may be remarked that they are usually at the expense of more worthy and legitimate objects. The feeling is often not extended but transferred. This is, however, not invariably the case, and many of those who feel an exaggerated sympathy even for unworthy objects are by no means deficient in those sympathies which seem to be rightfully due from them. Under the head of *Perverted Sympathy* seems to fall that gratuitous interest in the affairs of others which, taking the forms of impertinent curiosity, impertinent interference, and the disposition to give unsolicited advice, is often the occasion of real, though usually disguised, pain to its objects. It may appropriately be called a perversion of sympathy; for it generally takes its rise in kindly feeling, though, in its ultimate result, it has a tendency to become pure curiosity and meddlesomeness.

We often use the word sympathy of a fellow-feeling with

a man's general character rather than with his particular pleasures and pains. Opposed to Sympathy, in this sense of the word, is *Antipathy*. As the one feeling brings us into union with our fellows, so the other tends to separate us from them. As sympathy is a perception of community of nature, so antipathy is a perception of non-community, or rather of opposition, of natures. Like sympathy, antipathy assumes a variety of forms, antipathy to those of a different family, antipathy to those of a different race or nation or colour, antipathy to those of a different occupation or to rivals in the same occupation, antipathy to those of different tastes or opinions or to those of a different religion or a different party or a different grade in society. But antipathy, unlike sympathy, is not an original principle of human nature; it is founded in resentment, for an antipathy is always, in the first instance, excited by the idea of injury or harm, or of something associated with injury or harm, even though that injury or harm be, as it so frequently is, only of an imaginary character. Hence, this feeling will be more appropriately treated in the chapter on Resentment than in this place. It may, however, be remarked that our antipathies are by no means so common as our sympathies, and that, as education tends to enlarge our sympathies, so it tends to diminish our antipathies.

Midway between sympathy and antipathy comes *Indifference*, but it may be questioned whether we are ever really indifferent towards persons of whom we have any knowledge. They soon become objects either of antipathy, or, as is much more frequently the case, of sympathy. And, with respect to particular pleasures and pains, it is difficult to suppose that we can ever witness them with absolute indifference. Our natural impulse is to sympathise with them. If we do not do so, we probably feel pleasure in our

neighbour's pains, and pain at his pleasures, this reversal of the natural order being due to the feeling of resentment entertained, either consciously or unconsciously, towards him.

We remarked at the close of the last chapter that the highest form of self-regard was self-respect, a regard for our moral character and fear to do anything to weaken or impair it. Similarly, the highest form of sympathy shews itself in respect for others and fear to do anything that can weaken or impair true self-respect in them. He who is penetrated by this feeling for others, will do all in his power to enable and encourage them to form habits of self-dependence and dispense with that direct assistance which in earlier ages seems to have been regarded as the sum of charity. At this point the two great relative virtues of benevolence and justice seem to coalesce, and the highest and most unselfish benevolence takes the form of justice.

CHAPTER III.

On the Resentful Feelings.

Nature, origin, and necessity of the feeling of Resentment. Its various forms. Its enlightenment in the individual and in Society. Growth of a Sense of Justice. Nature of Justice and Injustice. Wrong, Right, Duty, Obligation, Sanction, Crime, Sin, &c. defined. Relation of Morality and Law. Virtue of Veracity.

THE principles of human nature which came under examination in the last chapter have all an obvious tendency to strengthen the bonds of society. They are, in fact, but various forms of benevolence or sympathy. But we are now about to examine a principle, the tendency of which, at first sight, is to dissociate rather than to associate men, to break up society rather than to hold it together. This principle is called by various names,—Anger, Indignation, Resentment, Passion. The term Resentment is here selected, as being, perhaps, of all these synonyms, the most neutral in its ethical signification. We blame a man, indeed, when we speak of him as being unduly resentful, but, when the term Resentment is used without any qualification, we appear to speak of a principle which, in itself, is neither virtuous nor vicious, and which depends entirely for its ethical character on the circumstances under which it is exerted, and the degree to which it is carried.

When we feel angry or indignant, or, in other words, experience the feeling of resentment, it is always because we conceive that either we ourselves or those in whom we take an interest have been the victims of *hurt* or *injury*. These words, *hurt* and *injury*, are not synonymous, and, for the purposes of this discussion, require to be carefully distinguished. Hurt is simply the infliction of pain. An Injury is a particular kind of hurt. It must, in the first place, be inflicted either intentionally or through some inadvertence which, with due care, might have been avoided, and for which, therefore, the person committing the injury may reasonably be held to be responsible; in the second place, it must either be unprovoked, or, at least, exceed the provocation given; lastly, it must be inflicted on some assignable person or persons and without the consent of the person or persons injured, points which must at present be taken for granted, but to which I shall recur hereafter in my treatment of Justice. An Injury, then, may be briefly defined as a hurt inflicted on some assignable person or persons either intentionally or through avoidable inadvertence, without the consent of the person or persons on whom the hurt is inflicted, and either without provocation or with insufficient provocation[1]. To take instances, a stone or a brute animal may hurt me, but it cannot properly be said to injure me, or to commit an injury or

[1] See Austin's Lectures on Jurisprudence, Lectures XXIV, V.

'Intention or Inadvertence is a necessary ingredient in injury or wrong.'

'Consequently, injury or wrong supposes unlawful *intention*, or one of those modes of unlawful *inadvertence* which are styled negligence, heedlessness, and rashness. For unless the party knew that he was violating his duty, or unless he *might* have known that he was violating his duty, the sanction could not operate, at the moment of the wrong, to the end of impelling him to the act which the Law enjoins, or of deterring him from the act which the Law forbids.' Lecture XXV.

I have avoided the use of the word 'unlawful,' because I am here engaged with a question of Ethics and not with a question of Jurisprudence.

injustice. Again, a criminal execution is a hurt, but not an injury. An assault, a slander, or a theft, on the other hand, is both a hurt and an injury. If I lose money entrusted to me through negligence or speculation, I commit an injury, and may, under certain circumstances, be made to restore it or be punished for a malversation of trust; but if it be lost without any fault on my part, as by a fire or a robbery, a hurt is certainly inflicted on the owner, but I cannot be held to have injured him.

Now resentment, I have said, is excited either by simple hurt or by injury; both these causes, under the existing circumstances of human nature, being effective in producing it. We often see men exhibiting resentment, when they have been the victims of mere hurt as distinguished from injury; as, for instance, when they have been struck by an inanimate object, or when they have lost their money through a misadventure, as a shipwreck or the explosion of a mine, for which no individual person could reasonably be blamed. But it will be seen, when they come to reflect, that, in these cases, resentment serves no purpose. The fear of resentment, had even the resentment been foreseen, could not have prevented the infliction of the hurt, nor is it likely to have any effect in preventing similar hurts for the future. But, when a feeling is itself of a painful nature, and has a tendency to lead to the infliction of pain on others, as is the case with resentment, both prudence and benevolence dictate its repression, unless, in its ultimate effects, it be likely to produce a balance of good. This condition, as we have seen, is not satisfied in the case of resentment against mere hurt, and, consequently, the feeling is productive solely of pain, certainly to a man's self, and probably also to others. With the growth of intelligence, therefore, and with the increasing enlightenment of the feelings, it is invariably found that men exhibit less

resentment at merely hurtful acts, and that the feeling becomes more and more restricted to acts of injury or injustice[1].

I shall offer hereafter some historical illustrations of the fact just noticed.

Confining ourselves, then, to resentment against injury proper, a very slight amount of reflexion will be sufficient to shew that this principle, when duly controlled, is so far from being inimical to the interests of society, that it is absolutely essential to its existence. Suppose a state of things in which injuries were inflicted without exciting any resentment, or, at least (to draw a distinction which will be explained presently), without entailing any requital; the lives and properties of men would simply be handed over at discretion to those who had the greatest capacity and will for mischief. Rapine, assault, and murder would become so universal, that, at last, there would be left no victims on which they could be exercised. Imagination fails to depict the utter chaos to which, on this strange supposition, mankind would be reduced.

But it may be objected that the beneficial effects which are due to resentment might be equally well produced, and that without any alloy of evil, by the action of cool self-love and rational benevolence. Resentment, it may be said, is certainly not essential to requital. Men may, on reflexion, see that to leave injuries unpunished, or inadequately punished, is to ensure their repetition, and, con-

[1] The reader will hardly fail to call to mind the distinction drawn by Bp. Butler between 'hasty and sudden' or 'settled and deliberate' Resentment. The appropriate object of the former is said to be mere harm or hurt as distinct from injury, while that of the latter is injury, injustice, or moral wrong. See Butler's Sermon on Resentment. It appears to me, however, that hasty resentment, which cannot be justified on reflexion, is simply an abuse of the principle, and that mere harm, as distinct from injury, is not the appropriate object of any feeling of human nature, except it be sorrow or compassion.

sequently, self-love, in their own case, and benevolence, in the case of others, will impel them to the infliction of a punishment sufficient to prevent the repetition of the offence. But in the present condition of mankind, or in any condition which we can reasonably contemplate, is it likely that cool self-love and rational benevolence will operate so quickly and so surely as to enable men to dispense altogether with the feeling of resentment? For it is, we must recollect, an instantaneous feeling, which operates immediately on the occurrence of its appropriate object. We might almost as reasonably expect men to take sufficient nourishment without the promptings of hunger and thirst, out of a simple regard to their own well-being, as to provide for the prevention of crime without the incitement of resentment, or to requite an affront without the occurrence of any angry feeling. The legislator and the judge, it is true, act or ought to act purely out of a far-seeing regard for the interest of the community; but then the legislator and the judge are exceptionally selected out of the mass of society, and have, moreover, to deal either with general rules of conduct, or, at least, with cases remote from their individual observation: A physician might, with constant care and supervision, be able to sustain life, even where the appetite was wholly lost, but we could hardly rely on the patient continuing to do so himself.

It must be recollected too that, in the economy of our nature, the feeling of resentment is counterbalanced by the feeling of compassion, and that, if the one were to be eradicated, it would be necessary to eradicate the other as well. For, suppose that mankind retained the feeling of compassion, but had lost the feeling of resentment; in how many cases, where others were concerned, would rational benevolence sufficiently triumph over compassion

to ensure the punishment of offenders? Where we were ourselves concerned, it is true that even cool self-love might, in most cases, overpower the voice of compassion, but, where the wrong was only done to our neighbours, pity for the offender, as soon as a punishment was proposed, would, with the great majority of men, at once displace all general regard to the interests of society. The individual offender and his sufferings under the proposed punishment would be vividly present to our minds; the persons whose interests would be affected by the commission of similar crimes in the future would be realised only vaguely and indefinitely, and the narrower our experience, and the lower our state of education, the more would this be the case. It is plain, then, that, if human nature is to find room for compassion, it must find room also for resentment. Compassion for the offender must be corrected by resentment for the offence.

The following remarks of Bishop Butler are so apposite, that I append them at length:

'Since therefore it is necessary for the very subsistence of the world, that injury, injustice, and cruelty should be punished; and since compassion, which is so natural to mankind, would render that execution of justice exceedingly difficult and uneasy: indignation against vice and wickedness is, and may be allowed to be, a balance to that weakness of pity, and also to anything else which would prevent the necessary methods of severity. Those who have never thought upon these subjects may perhaps not see the weight of this: but let us suppose a person guilty of murder, or any other action of cruelty, and that mankind had naturally no indigration against such wickedness and the authors of it; but that everybody was affected towards such a criminal in the same way as towards an innocent man: compassion, amongst other things, would render the

execution of justice exceedingly painful and difficult, and would often quite prevent it. And notwithstanding that the principle of benevolence is denied by some, and is really in a very low degree, that men are in great measure insensible to the happiness of their fellow-creatures; yet they are not insensible to their misery, but are very strongly moved with it; insomuch that there plainly is occasion for that feeling which is raised by guilt and demerit, as a balance to that of compassion. Thus much may, I think, justly be allowed to resentment, in the strictest way of moral consideration.

'The good influence which this passion has, in fact, upon the affairs of the world, is obvious to every one's notice. Men are plainly restrained from injuring their fellow-creatures by fear of their resentment; and it is very happy that they are so, when they would not be restrained by a principle of virtue. And after an injury is done, and there is a necessity that the offender should be brought to justice; the cool consideration of reason, that the security and peace of society require examples of justice should be made, might indeed be sufficient to procure laws to be enacted, and sentence passed: but is it that cool reflection in the injured person which, for the most part, brings the offender to justice? Or is it not resentment and indignation against the injury and the author of it? I am afraid there is no doubt which is commonly the case. This, however, is to be considered as a good effect, notwithstanding it were much to be wished, that men would act from a better principle—reason and cool reflection[1].'

Before quitting this branch of my subject, it may be remarked that, as resentment against the author of an injury to ourselves has its root in self-love, so resentment against the author of an injury to our neighbour has its

[1] Butler, Sermon VIII.

root in sympathy,—sympathy, namely, for the victim of the injustice. We are angry, in the one case, at those who have been the cause of pain to ourselves, in the other, at those who have been the cause of pain to beings with whom, to adopt an ordinary but very expressive phrase, we have a fellow-feeling. Resentment, without this reflex regard to ourselves or others, as the victims of the injury, would be impossible. Now, as Resentment seems to be the only original principle in human nature which is, even in appearance, directed to compassing the ill rather than the good of others, it appears to follow from what has just been said that there really exists no such thing in man (nor, so far as we can observe, even among brute animals) as any *natural* principle of *disinterested* malevolence. That the principle of resentment may be so abused as to become directly malevolent cannot be denied, and will be pointed out presently. But, in its natural state, it seems simply to consist in a painful feeling excited by a supposed hurt or injury inflicted upon ourselves or others, with a desire of retaliation based upon this feeling. It would hardly, therefore, be an exaggeration to say that resentment is, in the one case, only a peculiar form of self-love, in the other, of benevolence.

If the view here taken, that there is originally no such thing as disinterested ill-will in one man towards another, be correct, some very important practical consequences would seem to follow. In the first place, as pure or disinterested malevolence (or what amounts approximately to such) is an abuse of a natural feeling, its growth may be prevented by a moral education. Again, as increasing enlightenment has a tendency to shew the identity of a man's own interests with those of his fellows, it may reasonably be hoped that even interested malevolence, so far as it is in excess of justifiable resentment, will tend

indefinitely to diminish as intelligence advances. It is indeed to an improved moral condition of mankind, a state in which there shall be far fewer antipathies, jealousies, and divisions of interest than at present, that the hopes of those who advocate the diffusion of education should be mainly directed.

Taking the principle as it seems to exist originally in human nature, I shall now attempt to trace (1) its abuse, (2) its enlightenment, noticing, under either head, the various forms which it assumes according to its different applications to the circumstances of human life.

Resentment, I have said, is naturally directed against mere hurt as well as injury, though on reflexion, that is to say, as it becomes enlightened, it ceases to be directed against the former, and is directed exclusively against the latter. In considering the abuse of the natural sentiment, however, we must take into account the unreflecting as well as the reflecting form of it. Resentment against mere hurt is generally excited instantaneously, lasts but for a short time, and is usually, though not exclusively, called *Anger*. The very term Anger, unlike Resentment, seems, in most cases, to imply some amount of blame, and thus, perhaps, affords evidence of the feeling of civilised communities against that form of resentment, natural though it be, which cannot be justified on reflexion. Now the natural feeling of anger may be in excess, or, in other words, may be, in various degrees, disproportioned to its object. It seems then to obtain the names of *Passion*, *Rage*, *Fury*, all of which terms undoubtedly convey a notion of blame, and express an abuse, in excess, of the natural sentiment. It should be remarked of all the three terms just specified that, though they seem to be invariably applied to acts of hasty resentment which, on reflexion, are found to be

wholly or partially unjustifiable, such hasty resentment may be excited by injury as well as hurt, and, where it is partially justifiable, must, in fact, be so excited. The term Anger, moreover, itself is undoubtedly sometimes applied to resentment against injury, and, in these cases, it may be wholly or partially justified on reflexion. While, therefore, it would be convenient if this and its kindred expressions could be confined to resentment against mere hurt, it must be remembered that they are extended by usage to denote hasty resentment in general, though, perhaps, there is a growing tendency to employ them more exclusively in the sense I have suggested.

It may be convenient here to notice two other expressions, the English term Peevishness, and the Greek term Χαλεπότης. Peevishness is the habit of constantly complaining of real or supposed hurts, hurts so small that they would hardly attract the attention of persons in an ordinarily healthy frame of mind. To adopt the expressive words of Bishop Butler, it is the mark of a 'feeble temper, and languidly discharges itself upon every thing which comes in its way[1].' Χαλεπότης (for which term there is no

[1] The following passage, in which Butler contrasts *passion* and *peevishness*, is worth quoting: 'As to the abuses of anger, which it is to be observed may be in all different degrees, the first which occurs is what is commonly called *passion*—to which some men are liable, in the same way as others are to the *epilepsy*, or any sudden particular disorder. This distemper of the mind seizes them upon the least occasion in the world, and perpetually without any real reason at all; and by means of it they are plainly, every day, every waking hour of their lives, liable and in danger of running into the most extravagant outrages. Of a less boisterous, but not of a more innocent kind is *peevishness*; which I mention with pity, with real pity to the unhappy creatures, who, from their inferior station, or other circumstances and relations, are obliged to be in the way of, and to serve for a supply to it. Both these, for aught that I can see, are one and the same principle: but, as it takes root in minds of different makes, it appears differently, and so is come to be distinguished by different names. That which, in a more feeble temper, is peevishness, and languidly discharges itself upon every

exact equivalent in English, but which may, perhaps, be approximately represented by 'moroseness' or 'crabbedness[1]') is a more passive habit. It refuses to receive any gratification, and resents, as if it were a hurt or an affront, any attempt to afford it pleasure. Which of these unfortunate tempers is the more calamitous to its possessor and to those who are brought into contact with him, it would be difficult to say. They both plainly have their origin in the same source, the habit of indulging in petty sallies of anger on small and trivial occasions, but, while the peevish man seems to lose no opportunity of displaying his temper whenever he conceives himself to be suffering from the slightest hurt, the δύσκολος, difficilis, or morose man, appears to reserve it precisely for those occasions when its ebullitions might be least expected.

Resentment against injury is what is most appropriately called resentment, and it would be convenient if the term could be used exclusively in this sense. The abuses of the natural feeling arise either from mistaking hurt for injury, from exaggerating the amount of the injury inflicted, from cherishing the feeling for too long a time, from attempting to requite the real or supposed injury with undue severity,

thing which comes in its way; the same principle, in a temper of greater force and stronger passions, becomes rage and fury. In one, the humour discharges itself at once; in the other it is continually discharging. This is the account of *passion* and *peevishness*, as distinct from each other, and appearing in different persons. It is no objection against the truth of it, that they are both to be seen sometimes in one and the same person.' Sermon on Resentment.

[1] The Greek word Χαλεπός or δύσκολος has an exact equivalent in the Latin word 'difficilis.' See, for instance, Horace, De Arte Poetica, l. 173, where he is describing the character of the old man:

'Dilator, spe longus, iners, avidusque futuri,
Difficilis, querulus, laudator temporis acti
Se puero.'

Our English term 'cross-grained' is perhaps the nearest approach to the Greek expression.

or, lastly, from imputing it to the wrong persons. To mistake a hurt for an injury is a simple error of judgment, and though it may lead ultimately to all the abuses of the passion of Resentment, which will be noticed presently, it cannot in the first instance be called more than *Misplaced Resentment.* Exaggeration of the amount of the injury inflicted leads to *Undue Resentment.* The word *Wrath* is, perhaps, appropriated to express this feeling of undue resentment, when it becomes peculiarly violent. It may, at least, be questioned whether this term is ever employed to denote a feeling of resentment against mere hurt, as distinct from injury, real or supposed. When the feeling of resentment is peculiarly violent, and it is cherished beyond the time at which it might reasonably be supposed that the offence which excited it had been forgotten, it assumes the form of *Hatred.* This is a settled feeling of deep, permanent, and undue resentment. Hatred passes almost insensibly into the next stage of *Malice*, which seeks to accomplish, by all the means in its power, the ill of the real or supposed offender. It is not easy again to distinguish Malice from *Revenge*, as employed to denote a feeling, though this latter term seems to express the still further stage, when the feeling is beginning to pass into act, and a punishment disproportioned to the offence is on the point of being inflicted. The word Revenge, however, is most frequently employed to denote the act itself, but, whether it signifies the act or the feeling, it seems always to imply the notion of undue severity. *Spite* is pretty nearly synonymous with malice, but is sometimes employed where the word malice could not well be used; as where the occasion is trivial, or the revenge sought is only slight. It may, in fact, be regarded as a minor form of malice. Closely allied with the feeling which prompts us to compass the ill of another is that which rejoices when ill

happens to him from any other quarter. For this feeling the Greeks had a special name, ἐπιχαιρεκακία.

There remains for consideration that species of abuse of the natural feeling of resentment against injury, which arises from imputing the injury to the wrong persons. Men are often peculiarly unreasonable in this respect. They will transfer their resentment from the person who really deserves it to his relations, his friends, his associates, his profession, his party, his sect, his countrymen, and even to mankind at large. Under the last form, the abuse of the feeling acquires a specific name, and is called *Misanthropy*. There is perhaps no more pitiable condition into which a man can fall than this. What to other men are sources of pleasure,—social gatherings, domestic enjoyments, communication with their fellows,—are often to him real sources of pain. But even in its minor forms this misapplication of the feeling of resentment is a calamity of no ordinary description, whether we regard the person who is afflicted with it or the objects of his ill-will. *Antipathies* of this kind (for that is the name usually given to resentments against classes of men, though the term is not used exclusively in this sense[1]), antipathies, social, political, or

[1] We sometimes speak of an antipathy to a single person. This use of the term simply implies a dislike founded on something which he has done, or which we believe him capable of doing. It is on account of its extension to this latter idea, or to character as distinct from acts, that the term differs from Resentment. Moreover, antipathies to classes of persons do not always originate in a transference of resentment from particular individuals who are regarded as representative of the class, though it may be fairly surmised that this is one of the commonest grounds of them. They are often, as in the case of religious and political antipathies, grounded on tradition or on that species of pride or self-conceit which causes us to be indignant at any individual or any class that does not adopt the opinions which we adopt, or is not satisfied with the arguments with which we are satisfied, especially if those arguments happen to have been frequently reiterated, in speaking or writing, by ourselves. Another main cause of this feeling is the secret and suppressed doubt which men often entertain of some of their most

religious, have hitherto been at least as instrumental as any other cause in robbing human life of its charms. It can only be hoped that, as intelligence advances, these antipathies, by being shewn to be groundless, will be removed. Increasing intelligence almost always increases our sympathies and diminishes our antipathies, and, hence, it is to a wider knowledge of human relations that we must mainly look, in this as in so many other respects, for an improved morality.

There are two other very widely-spread feelings which, in their ultimate analysis, appear to be abuses of the feeling of Resentment. These are *Envy* and *Jealousy*. I am said to feel envious of another man, or to regard him with envy. What does this mean? He has obtained some superiority, say, in reputation, position, or wealth, over myself, and, as I believe this superiority to be unmerited, I resent it. But what is the injury which calls forth the resentment, and from whom does it proceed? The injury is that he has taken my place, but I ought, on reflexion, to see that this injury proceeds solely from society, or from that portion of it through whose instrumentality the man has obtained his advantage; unless, indeed, he has employed some sinister means in order to compass his objects, in which case indignation against undeserved success would be perfectly legitimate. Now, if this account be correct, envy commits the error of imputing to the individual an

loudly professed convictions. Any attitude in another person which tends to revive this doubt causes irritation, and is resented as a personal injury.

An antipathy is not necessarily a perverted sentiment. It may often be justifiable, as when we believe that a particular man, or a particular class of men, is a real source of mischief to society. The danger is that we should form these beliefs too hastily and on insufficient evidence, but, if we have satisfied ourselves that the belief is conformable to facts, to cease to feel the antipathy would frequently be to withdraw from morality one of its strongest bulwarks.

injury which (if it exists at all) proceeds from Society. But why then, it may be said, should I not transfer the feeling, and bear a grudge against society? Simply because I am encouraging a painful feeling, a feeling causing pain, perhaps, to others as well as to myself, when, according to the ordinary course of things, it cannot bring about any good result or remedy any evil one. Where, however, the manifestation of such a feeling may be attended by a good result in the way of warning, as in cases of misbestowal of patronage, there seems to be no reason why it should not be indulged; and, in fact, when directed to its proper object, the successful individual, if he be himself to blame, or his patrons, if he be blameless, *indignation against undeserved success* rightly counts as a virtue rather than a vice.

Envy, then, seems to consist in the wrong imputation of a real or supposed injury, that injury being the unmerited superiority of some other individual to ourselves. But it generally does not stop at the mere feeling of resentment, but attempts, by detraction or other means, to bring down its object to its own level. It thus passes into *Malice*, the characteristic of which, as I have already said, is to attempt to compass the ill of its victim.

Jealousy approaches very nearly to Envy, and may, in fact, generally be regarded as a species of it. The reason why it cannot always be so regarded is that, whereas envy seems invariably to attach to superiority, jealousy frequently attaches to equality or even to approximation to equality. From this point of view, Jealousy is a term of wider signification than Envy, but, when we come to the nature of the superiority or equality which Jealousy resents, it seems to be generally used in a much narrower sense. Envy attaches to any kind of superiority, whereas the superiority or equality which is resented by Jealousy seems usually to have reference to the affection or esteem

of some particular individual or some small group of individuals. According to a French proverb, Jealousy has love for its father and fear for its mother. A man is jealous of his wife, or a wife of her husband, a child is jealous of another child, a friend of some third party, a servant of his fellow-servant. When the person feeling the jealousy supposes that he ought to have an exclusive interest in some one's affection or esteem, as is the case, for instance, in the married state, he may resent the slightest approximation to equality.

It will be noticed that, in speaking of the distinction between Jealousy and Envy, I have employed vague expressions, such as 'generally,' 'frequently,' 'sometimes.' It is, in fact, here, as in the case of most other related ethical terms, impossible to draw a perfectly definite distinction, or to give a perfectly precise definition. Thus, by way of exception to what has been said in the preceding paragraph, it might be alleged that we speak of one nation as being jealous of another, where the object of the jealousy is clearly not esteem or affection, but power. Here it might be replied that 'envious' was the more appropriate term, but we should still be in a similar difficulty, if the nation towards which the feeling was entertained were suspected of aiming not at superiority, but only at equality or an approximation to equality. So important is it to speak with due caution and limitations, in endeavouring to fix the use of ethical terms.

Before quitting this subject, it may be desirable to distinguish Envy and Jealousy from *Emulation.* Envy and Jealousy, as we have seen, are abuses of the feeling of resentment, but in Emulation, as such, there is no element of resentment whatever. It is simply the desire to approach, equal, or surpass some one who is engaged in the same pursuits, or who is brought into some relation

or other with us. Nothing can be more honourable than this feeling frequently is, while it remains in its pure state. It is often compatible with the most intimate friendship between the persons who are said to emulate each other. As soon, however, as one rival begins to feel any resentment at the success of another, it passes into the form of envy or jealousy.

Having discussed the various modes in which the natural feeling of resentment is abused, I shall now proceed to trace its enlightenment, and it will be convenient at present to confine ourselves to the case of the individual, leaving the historical treatment of the question for a later stage of the enquiry.

The natural feeling of Resentment, I have already said, is directed against mere hurt as well as injury. One result of the enlightenment of the feeling, I have also said, is to confine it to cases of injury only. This limitation is due to two causes, the action of the intelligence which shews that the resentment of mere hurt has no tendency to prevent its recurrence, and the action of other feelings, compassion, benevolence, prudence, and the like, which are sufficiently powerful to check the operation of a merely gratuitous resentment. The action of these causes in arresting resentment against mere hurt has already been noticed. But they are no less potent in modifying the nature and the degree of the resentment which is felt against injury. At first, few distinctions are drawn between different classes of injury, and all are resented in pretty nearly the same degree. The child, according to his temper, will strike a blow or burst into tears, whenever he feels himself offended. Similarly, an uneducated man will visit with indiscriminate resentment almost any conduct on the part of another which he

regards as injurious. What restrains either the child or the uneducated man is generally not any insight into the futility of his resentment but the intervention of some other feeling, such as love or compassion. As intelligence advances, however, and experience increases, it is seen that injuries are of the most various character and degrees: that some of them are so slight as hardly to warrant any notice, while others are so great in degree or attended with such aggravating circumstances as to justify a deep and continued resentment; that some injuries are of such a character as to be peculiarly open to prevention from fear of resentment and the requital which resentment usually brings with it, while others are little likely to be arrested by such considerations. Thus, intelligence seems to operate mainly in two ways. First, as was noticed before in the case of mere hurt, it tends to check a feeling which is found by experience to be futile, and, by parity of reasoning, to diminish one which is found to be attended with only slight effects. What we cannot prevent, or can do little towards preventing, we generally acquiesce in without a struggle. Even fear often ceases to operate, when it is in the presence of what is inevitable. Secondly, with growing intelligence, we learn to distinguish between the different kinds and degrees of intention and inadvertence from which an injury proceeds. An act which proceeds from pure malice we resent more deeply than one which simply proceeds from the agent's desire to benefit himself at our expense, and an act which is done through inadvertence, criminal though that inadvertence may be, is always less resented than an act which we know to have been done intentionally.

But it is not simply by its direct action that the intelligence operates in enlightening the feeling of resentment; by its enlightenment of the other feelings it con-

tributes indirectly to the same result. Thus, the feelings of self-love, compassion, gratitude, affection, benevolence, and the like, will, even in their natural state, limit[1] the action of resentment, and, perhaps, there is sometimes a danger lest they should limit it too far; but, when these feelings are themselves duly enlightened by intelligence, they will limit our resentment just so far, and so far only, as to confine it to its proper sphere and intensity. An equilibrium, so to speak, or (to employ a very convenient term) a co-ordination, of the feelings will be established, the result of which will be right conduct. It may be useful to illustrate my meaning by one or two instances. When our resentment, or, at least, the exhibition of it is attended with danger to ourselves, self-love will often check it, or if, at first, it check only the exhibition of the feeling, it will often end in checking the feeling itself; now, it is plain that the feeling of resentment might be so far checked by the action of self-love as to lead to the perpetration or sufferance of unmanly, unjust, or ungenerous actions, but, if self-love be itself enlightened and duly limited by the other feelings equally enlightened, it will act only so far as to restrain our resentment within the due bounds of prudence, without crushing the feeling or deteriorating the character. Again, suppose some one, who has once conferred on us some great benefit, afterwards inflicts on us a great wrong. The unenlightened feeling of resentment might, and probably would, lead us to requite the wrong, without any regard to the previous benefit. On the other hand, the unenlightened feeling of gratitude, if it were very vivid, might lead us, in con-

[1] This is the effect which it is here most pertinent to notice, but they will frequently promote the action of resentment, as where compassion is felt for the victim of an injury. In fact, as already stated (p. 112), resentment on behalf of others appears to originate in compassion.

sideration of the past benefit, to ignore altogether the present wrong. Now, either of these courses might, it is plain, be exceedingly inequitable in the particular case, and furnish a most pernicious precedent for the future. But, if both feelings were duly enlightened, they would so limit each other, that neither the benefit nor the injury would be forgotten, and that the course of conduct resulting would be precisely what was equitable under the circumstances.

Briefly to sum up. Intelligence enlightens the feeling of resentment, by distinguishing between mere hurt and injury, by ascertaining the exact character and amount of the injury, if it be injury that is inflicted, and by tracing the consequences which will follow on any exhibition of resentment or any attempt to requite the wrong. It must, of course, be understood that this process of enlightenment is gradual, and is only the result of the exercise of the intelligence during many recurrences of the feeling. When the feeling has become thus enlightened, and it has a clear appreciation of its object, its action is promoted or retarded by the other feelings, and, if these be also duly enlightened, there will result a course of conduct exactly appropriate to the occasion.

The principle of Resentment, we have seen, becomes, in the case of the individual, gradually limited, directed, and enlightened, or, to employ a convenient expression, moralised, partly by the direct control of the reason, and partly by the action of intelligent self-love and sympathy, that is, of a rational regard to our own interests and to those of our neighbours. We shall find also that it undergoes the same process historically, in the progress of a race or any large aggregate of men. In savage tribes, few, if any, limits seem to be imposed on the gratification of individual

'and family vengeance. The natural feeling of resentment has full course, unrestrained by any fear of legal consequences or, probably, by any regard to its effects on the public welfare.

'Among the lower races of men,' says Sir John Lubbock[1], 'the chiefs scarcely take any cognisance of offences, unless they relate to such things as directly concern, or are supposed to concern, the interests of the community generally. As regards private injuries, every one must protect or avenge himself. The administration of justice, says Du Tertre, "among the Caribbians is not exercised by the captain, nor by any magistrate; but, as it is among the Tapinambous, he who thinks himself injured gets such satisfaction of his adversary as he thinks fit, according as his passion dictates to him, or his strength permits him: the public does not concern itself at all in the punishment of criminals, and, if any one among them suffers an injury or affront, without endeavouring to revenge himself, he is slighted by all the rest, and accounted a coward and a person of no esteem."

'In Ancient Greece there were no officers whose duty it was to prosecute criminals. Even in the case of murder the state did not take the initiative; this was left to the family of the sufferer, nor was the accused placed under arrest until he was found guilty. Hence the criminal usually fled as soon as he found himself likely to be condemned.

'Among the North American Indians, if a man was murdered, "the family of the deceased only have the right of taking satisfaction; they collect, consult, and decree. The rulers of a town or of the nation have nothing to do or say in the business."'

Even in the most primitive condition of society, however, men are probably often ready to accept compensation in

[1] Origin of Civilisation, 2nd Ed., pp. 360, 1.

some form or other for the injuries done to them. The desire for appropriation is certain to be, in many cases, quite as strong as the desire for revenge. Thus, compensation for homicide seems to have been very common in early forms of society, the family of the murdered man being conceived to have had a property in him, which property they had lost and for which they might be reimbursed. But it is not till law, or custom having the effect of law, interferes in some shape between the injured person and the injurer that compensation for crime can be said to mark a distinct stage in progress. This interference of law or custom seems, in its earlier stage, to have taken the form of fixing the amount of composition for each offence, wherever the aggrieved party was willing to accept compensation in lieu of revenge, and, in some countries, though not in all, of enforcing the contract, when once made. At this stage of society, however, it was always competent to the aggrieved party to decline to receive compensation, and to insist on the right of private revenge, if not after the completion of the contract with the wrongdoer, at least before it.

The custom of the Greeks, while they remained in this stage of society, may be illustrated by the following passage from Grote's History of Greece:

'That which the murderer in the Homeric times had to dread, was, not public prosecution and punishment, but the personal vengeance of the kinsmen and friends of the deceased, who were stimulated by the keenest impulses of honour and obligation to avenge the deed, and were considered by the public as specially privileged to do so. To escape from this danger, he is obliged to flee the country, unless he can prevail upon the incensed kinsmen to accept of a valuable payment (we must not speak of coined money in the days of Homer) as satisfaction for their slain com-

'rade. They may, if they please, decline the offer, and persist in their right of revenge; but, if they accept, they are bound to leave the offender unmolested, and he accordingly remains at home without further consequences. The chiefs in agora do not seem to interfere, except to ensure payment of the stipulated sum[1].'

On the other hand, the custom of the Icelandic tribes, which, it will be seen, differs in allowing the option of private revenge, even after the principle of compensation has been admitted, and an appeal has been made to the courts, may be illustrated by the following passages taken from Sir G. Dasent's Introduction to the Burnt Njal and from an Essay on 'The Norsemen in Iceland' by the same author:

'We must never forget that, as it is the Christian's duty to forgive his foes, and to be patient and long-suffering under the most grievous wrongs, so it was the heathen's bounden duty to avenge all wrongs, and most of all those offered to blood relations, to his kith and kin, to the utmost limit of his power. Hence arose the constant blood-feuds between families, of which we shall hear much in our story, but which we shall fail fully to understand, unless we keep in view, along with this duty of revenge, the right of property which all heads of houses had in their relations. Out of these twofold rights, of the right of revenge and the right of property, arose that strange medley of forbearance and bloodthirstiness which stamps the age. Revenge was a duty and a right, but property was no less a right; and so it rested with the father of a family either

[1] Grote's History of Greece, Pt. I. Ch. xx. Speaking of the representation on the shield of Achilles, Mr. Grote says, in a note on the same chapter: 'In the representation on the shield of Achilles, the genuine proceeding about ποινή clearly appears: the question there tried is, whether the payment, stipulated as satisfaction for a person slain, has really been made or not—δύο δ' ἄνδρες ἐνείκεον εἵνεκα ποινῆς Ἀνδρὸς ἀποφθιμένου, &c. (Il. xviii. 498).'

to take revenge, life for life, or to forego his vengeance, and take a compensation in goods or money for the loss he had sustained in his property. Out of this latter view arose those arbitrary tariffs for wounds or loss of life, which were gradually developed more or less completely in all the Teutonic and Scandinavian races, until every injury to life or limb had its proportionate price, according to the rank which the injured person bore in the social scale. These tariffs, settled by the heads of houses, are, in fact, the first elements of the law of nations; but it must be clearly understood that it always rested with the injured family either to follow up the quarrel by private war, or to call on the man who had inflicted the injury to pay a fitting fine. If he refused, the feud might be followed up on the battlefield, in the earliest times, or, in later days, either by battle or by law[1].'

'The Icelander in the tenth century, though for certain purposes it suited him to respect the law, never abandoned that natural right which could at any moment appeal to the god of battles to decide all questions in dispute. He had the firm conviction that Valfadir would protect his own, and he had no hesitation in offering to decide his quarrel by the sword. In all suits and in all actions this natural right only lay dormant, and we find numberless instances in the Sagas of suits legally and formally conducted, but in which, when the chicanery of either party becomes intolerable, the proceedings are at once quashed, and the case of the worsted party assumes a brighter aspect, by a demand that his antagonist will at once proceed to settle the matter after the old fashion, on an island (hólm) in the river which ran close by the place of assembly. For these duels (hólmgöngur) a rude code of honour was drawn up and stipulations made according

[1] Burnt Njal, Introduction, pp. xxix–xxxi.

to which either party, if beaten, might ransom his life. In theory, nothing could be fairer than these combats, which were based on the notion that the god of battles was also a god of justice, and from which it may be remarked that right of an appeal to arms which so long existed in English trials took its rise; but in practice, even in Icelandic law, they were found to be unfair and inconvenient, and so when Christianity came in, this appeal to arms vanished along with the right of bearing arms at all at the Allthing, and the freeman was fast bound by legal chicanery, and left without the power of cutting its Gordian knots by the sword[1].'

When, as in the later Teutonic codes, the aggrieved party is compelled to accept the prescribed compensation, without the option of private revenge, there can be no doubt that a distinct and most important step has been made in social progress. Law has already, even in this stage, most emphatically asserted its supremacy over private feeling. At the same time, the idea most prominent to the mind of the legislator is the satisfaction of the injured person and not the repression of a public wrong. The state simply bribes or avenges the individual, in order to prevent him from avenging himself. There is, as yet, little or no idea of a wrong done to the state, which every citizen is bound to resent as if it were done to himself, and which demands punishment, in the interests of society, for the amelioration of the offender and as a warning to others.

Sir John Lubbock does not distinguish between the two stages,—of compensation with the option of personal vengeance and compensation without such option, a distinction which to me appears so important. His illustrations, however, of what he calls 'Regulated Revenge,' a

[1] Oxford Essays for 1858, p. 210.

term which would apply to both these stages, are so interesting and throw so much light on what has already been said that I shall quote them at some length[1]:

'It would seem that the object of legal regulations was at first not so much to punish the offender, as to restrain and mitigate the vengeance inflicted by the aggrieved party. The amount of legal revenge, if I may so call it, is often strictly regulated, even where we should least expect to find such limitations. Thus in Australia, crimes "may be compounded for by the criminal appearing and submitting himself to the ordeal of having spears thrown at him by all such persons as conceive themselves to have been aggrieved, or by permitting spears to be thrust through certain parts of his body; such as through the thigh, or the calf of the leg, or under the arm. The part which is to be pierced by a spear, is fixed for all common crimes, and a native who has incurred this penalty sometimes quietly holds out his leg for the injured party to thrust his spear through." So strictly is the amount of punishment limited, that if, in inflicting such spear wounds, a man, either through carelessness or from any other cause, exceeded the recognised limits—if, for instance, he wounded the femoral artery—he would in his turn become liable to punishment[2].'

From this case it will be seen that the compensation offered to the aggrieved party is sometimes simply in the shape of revenge, bringing to him no advantage except the gratification of the feeling of resentment.

In this stage, or, according to my classification, in these

[1] The reader will find some most interesting illustrations of the mode in which offences were regarded in this stage of society, by consulting Sharon Turner's History of the Anglo-Saxons, Bk. xi, entitled 'The History of the Laws of the Anglo-Saxons.' Mr. Turner, however, does not fully comprehend the principle on which what he calls 'punishment' was assessed.

[2] Origin of Civilisation, 2nd Ed., pp. 361, 2.

two stages, mere hurts inflicted by accident and injuries inflicted by design were generally placed on the same level.

'Since, then, crimes were at first regarded merely as personal matters, in which the aggressor and the victim alone were interested, and with which society was not concerned, any crime, even murder, might be atoned for by the payment of such a sum of money as satisfied the representatives of the murdered man. This payment was proportioned to the injury done, and had no relation to the crime as a crime. Hence, as the injury was the same whether the death was accidental or designed, so also was the penalty. Hence our word "pay," which comes from the Latin "pacare," to appease or pacify[1].'

Offenders caught in the act were also subject to much heavier penalties than those subsequently detected, on the principle that the aggrieved party would himself have exhibited much deeper resentment in the one case than in the other.

'In the old Roman law, as in that of some other countries, thieves were divided into manifest and non-manifest. The manifest thief who was caught in the act, or at any rate with the stolen goods still in his possession, became, according to the law of the twelve tables, the slave of the person robbed, or, if he was already a slave, was put to death. The non-manifest thief, on the other hand, was only liable to return double the value of the goods he had stolen. Subsequently, the very severe punishment in the case of the manifest thief was mitigated, but he was still forced to pay four times the value of what he had stolen, or twice as much as the non-manifest thief. The same principle was followed by the North American Indians. Again, in the German and Anglo-Saxon codes,

[1] Id. p. 362.

a thief caught in the act might be killed on the spot. Thus the law followed the old principles of private vengeance, and, in settling the amount of punishment, took as a guide the measure of revenge likely to be taken by an aggrieved person under the circumstances of the case[1].'

To continue the quotation: 'In the South Sea Islands, according to Williams, cases of theft were seldom brought before the king or chiefs, but the people avenged their own injuries. The rights of retaliation, however, had almost a legal force, for "although the party thus plundered them, they would not attempt to prevent the seizure: had they done so, the population of the district would have assisted those, who, according to the established custom, were thus punishing the aggressors. Such was the usual method resorted to for punishing the petty thefts committed among themselves."

'So also as regards personal injuries. Among the Anglo-Saxons the "wergild," or fine for injuries, was evidently a substitute for personal vengeance. Every part of the body had a recognised value, even the teeth, nails, and hair. Nay, the value assigned to the latter was proportionately very high; the loss of the beard being estimated at twenty shillings, while the breaking of a thigh was only fixed at twelve. In other cases also the effect on personal appearance seems to have carried great weight, for the loss of a front tooth was estimated at six shillings, while the fracture of a rib was only fixed at three. In the case of a slave the fine was paid to the owner.

'The amount varied according to the rank of the person injured. All society below the royal family and the Ealdorman was divided into three classes; the Tywhind man, or Ceorl, was estimated at 200 shillings according

[1] Id. pp. 363, 4.

to the laws of Mercia; the Sixhind man at 600 shillings, while the death of a royal thane was estimated at 1,200 shillings.

'The severity of early codes, and the uniformity in the amounts of punishment which characterises them, is probably due to the same cause[1]. An individual who felt himself aggrieved would not weigh very philosophically the amount of punishment which he was entitled to inflict; and no doubt when in any community some chief, in advance of his time, endeavoured to substitute public law for private vengeance, his object would be to induce those who had cause of complaint to apply to the law for redress, rather than to avenge themselves; which of course would not be the case if the penalty allotted by the law was much less than that which custom would allow them to inflict for themselves.

'Subsequently, when punishment was substituted for pecuniary compensation, the same rule was at first applied, and the distinction of intention was overlooked. Nay, so long had the importance of intention been disregarded, that, although it is now recognised in our criminal courts, yet, as Mr. Bain points out, "a moral stigma is still attached to intellectual error by many people, and even by men of cultivation[2]."'

As they become consolidated, and approach maturity,

[1] Of both these characteristics of the early codes the reader will find some interesting illustrations in Grote's remarks on the Draconian legislation, History of Greece, Pt. II, ch. x. The Draconian code was, in the times of Greek literature best known to us, proverbial for its severity, but, as Mr. Grote shews, the ordinances respecting homicide (which alone have come down to us in any detail) were 'partly a reform of the narrowness, partly a mitigation of the rigour, of the old procedure.'

It is noticed by M. De Coulanges (La Cité Antique, Livre IV. ch. 8) that, while, in the code of Draco, the right of prosecuting a crime was confined to the family or gens of the victim, it was extended by the code of Solon to every citizen of the state.

[2] Id. pp. 364–6.

all nations seem to pass from these preliminary stages into the final stage, in which the graver injuries, even though inflicted directly only on single individuals, are regarded as crimes or public wrongs, not to be compensated for the satisfaction of the aggrieved party, but to be punished for the security of the commonwealth. Even here, however, there is much difference in the points of view from which the punishment is regarded. At first, ideas of vengeance are still prominent. Society has been aggrieved, and it is but just, it conceives, that the offender should be visited with its wrath Hence, even after entering on the stage which I am now considering, punishment is often needlessly severe; death is frequently awarded for minor offences, and torture is no uncommon occurrence. Subsequently, as general intelligence advances, more enlightened views prevail, and it becomes the ideal of legislators to inflict only so much punishment as is absolutely necessary to ensure the security of society. All punishment, not strictly limited by this end, is regarded as a needless, and, consequently, an unjustifiable, infliction of pain.

We have thus seen how, in the history of a nation, individual resentment is, at first, entirely unrestrained; how it, then, becomes partially limited by appeals to self-interest; how the community, from making these appeals to voluntary obedience, passes in the next stage to enforcing them; how, when the idea of an uniform punishment, enforced by law, and leaving no option of private revenge to the injured party, has thus established itself, the idea of a wrong inflicted on the individual is soon replaced by that of a crime perpetrated against the society, which every member of that society is equally interested in repressing; and, lastly, how, in the most enlightened ages, the infliction of vengeance on the offender ceases altogether to be the

aim of punishment, the object of which is now regarded as simply confined to taking necessary precautions for the security of the community, those precautions including, I may observe, the reformation of the offender himself.

In what has been said above, two capital facts will be noticed: first, that the natural feeling of resentment is originally restrained only by a regard to a man's own interests, or, but this is a very important alternative, to those of his family; second, that, as the social sympathies widen, and the feeling of resentment itself, being now excited not so much on behalf of ourselves as on behalf of the community at large, becomes a sort of quasi-social feeling, it is further restrained by a regard to the interests of our neighbours, our country, mankind. Enlightened self-love, then, and enlightened benevolence are the two powerful checks by which, in the more matured and intelligent life both of the individual and of society, this feeling is controlled. Under such checks, there is little fear lest it should be too strong. It has passed, it is true, by its gradual enlightenment in the more advanced races and the most cultivated individuals, from being a leading to being a subordinate principle in human nature; but, notwithstanding its diminished strength, we could ill afford to dispense with it altogether. How many men would be found to bring the offender to justice, how many to stamp with their disapproval acts of tyranny, of cruelty, of ingratitude, if resentment were altogether banished from the human breast? Even the most enlightened benevolence and self-love might often be insufficient to protect society from the consequences of wrong-doing, if there were not this inward monitor to warn us of the presence of the wrong-doer, and to supply some stimulus to us in the pursuit of him.

And here it may not be out of place to remark that

principles such as resentment, gratitude, fear, sense of shame, and the like, properly play only a subordinate part in shaping human conduct; that they may supply the first incentive to action, but that, if they are to act to any good purpose, they require to be regulated by the more general principles of self-love and benevolence, themselves illuminated by intelligence. Or to express our meaning in other words, it is rational self-love and rational benevolence which alone furnish *rules* of conduct, and to these rules the principles which supply only *motives* must conform themselves. Thus, to take an example, I am moved by resentment to requite a wrong. But to what extent, and in what manner, shall I requite it? This question must be determined by considerations of self-regard, in case the wrong has been done to myself, and of regard to the interests of my friend or the community, in case the wrong has been done to others; tempered, in either case, by a regard, which ought never to be altogether absent, to the interests of the object of the resentment himself. Resentment, then, may give the impulse to action, but the measures and degrees of actions must be determined by other principles.

The feeling of resentment, when duly enlightened and moralised, results in the creation of a sense of Justice in the individual and the establishment of Law in society. Without entering on any exact definition of the terms Law and Justice, thus much will be apparent from what I have already said. But it is desirable that I should now attempt to fix with precision the meaning of these and kindred terms, and to discuss certain ethical questions connected with their employment.

To commence with Justice. Justice, Justitia, is obviously the abstract form of justum, that which is binding, or enforced by law (jus). But many actions are called just or

unjust which not only are not enforced or forbidden by law, but which we do not even conceive as fit subjects for such an injunction or prohibition. Thus, we often speak of a man as acting unjustly in the distribution of patronage, or in withholding his favour or affection from some one to whom we regard it as due, and we even speak of a law itself as unjust. What, then, is the common attribute or group of attributes which belongs to all those actions which we call just or unjust, or, confining ourselves to the alternative which most easily admits of examination, to those which we call unjust? It would seem that, in all cases where we employ this term, or the synonymous terms, an injustice, a wrong, an injury, we imply harm inflicted, either intentionally or through avoidable inadvertence. We seem, moreover, to imply that it is inflicted upon some assignable person, or persons, or group of persons, such as a corporation or a state; for a *wrong* is the infraction of a *right*, and a right cannot be said to exist, unless we can point to the persons in whom it exists. We imply also that it has been unprovoked, or, at least, that it exceeds the provocation given, for retaliation within certain limits cannot be called unjust. Lastly, it appears essential to the idea of a wrong, that it should be inflicted without the consent of the person wronged. A *wrong*, an *injury*, an *injustice*, an *unjust act* may, then, be formally defined as *harm inflicted either intentionally or by avoidable inadvertence on some assignable person, or persons, or group of persons, without the consent of such person or persons, and with no or with insufficient provocation.* A *just act*, on the other hand, is an act which, in cases where it is competent to commit such harm, avoids the commission of it, and *justice* is that habit, state, or attitude of mind which causes a man to refrain from committing unjust acts.

These definitions require some further explanation and

illustration. A just act, as I have already intimated, means, strictly and originally, an act in accordance with the law of the land, and an unjust act an act contrary to the law of the land. But, when the law of the land comes itself to be compared with another and a higher standard, namely, the dictates of morality, or, as they are metaphorically styled, the moral law, its commands or prohibitions are often themselves denominated just or unjust, according as they agree or disagree with this further standard. By a not inexplicable, but, at the same time, a very inconvenient extension of the terms, the word just is sometimes, from this point of view, employed as synonymous with moral or virtuous, and the word unjust with immoral or vicious. This is the widest, as the former is the narrowest usage of the terms. But there is an intermediate use in which they are now commonly received, and which, though difficult to fix with precision, is indispensable in ethical terminology. According to the prevailing usage of terms, there are many vicious or immoral acts which we should not call unjust, though we should call all unjust acts vicious or immoral; as, on the other hand, there are many unlawful acts which we should not call unjust, and many unjust acts which we should not call unlawful. What, then, are the considerations which determine this intermediate and prevalent use of the terms? There is, in most societies, a growing feeling that the law should interfere in many cases where it does not, or, at least, when it would be inconvenient to invoke the sanctions of positive law, that their place should be supplied by the social instruments of praise and blame, of approbation and censure. Hence many actions come to be designated just or unjust, though they are not enjoined or prohibited by the law. At the same time, there is a growing feeling that the law should confine itself to those offences which affect the

interests of others, taking no cognisance of the breaches of what is called one's duty towards oneself. Here, then, there arises a limitation of the ideas of just and unjust, as applied to actions. Those actions only are just or unjust, which affect the interests of others. Again, it is seen that the law can only properly interfere to prevent harm and to punish the vicious; that it is transcending its functions, when it attempts to promote good, or to reward the virtuous. Hence, a further limitation. Actions can only be called just or unjust, if they prevent or inflict positive harm. It is this consideration which distinguishes a just action from a benevolent one, the proper end of which is not to prevent harm, but to do good. But the harm which the unjust action inflicts must have been intentionally designed, or, at least, must have arisen from avoidable inadvertence; else it would not be a fit object of the legal sanction, or of its substitute, the social one. We do not punish harm merely as such, but harm for which we conceive the agent to be responsible, and which he may, therefore, be prevented from repeating. In this way, we arrive at the idea of the prevention or infliction of harm, proceeding either from design or from avoidable inadvertence, as an essential characteristic of what we call justice and injustice. But, further, the harm must not be indefinite. I have said that there is, in most societies, a growing feeling that the law should only interfere where an act affects the interests of others than the agent himself. But, if this be the case, we ought, before invoking the legal or social sanction, to be able to point out the particular person or persons whose interests are affected; except, indeed, the act be such as affects the entire community, which may then be regarded in the light of a group of persons. Lastly, harm, to which a man himself consents, may be regarded as self-inflicted, and, therefore, not within the cognisance

of the law; and harm inflicted by way of retaliation, providing the retaliation be not excessive or forbidden by law, cannot properly be regarded as a wrong, for the original wrong-doer may justly be held responsible for the ultimate consequences of his own acts. Thus we see how, starting with the notion of what is enjoined or forbidden by law, and guided, to a great extent, all along by this conception, we come, at last, to attach the words justice and injustice, just and unjust, to the group of ideas which I have included in my definition.

From what has been said, it will be seen that Justice and Benevolence cover the whole field of virtuous conduct, considered in its relation to others. It will be seen, moreover, how appropriately justice may be described as 'negative benevolence.'

Having now defined a wrong, an injury, an injustice, an unjust act (all of which I regard as synonymous expressions), I may proceed to define or explain certain related terms.

To the term 'a wrong' corresponds the term '*a right.*' I have a 'right' not to be 'wronged,' and a 'wrong' is the violation of a 'right.' Like the correlated terms 'a wrong,' 'an injury,' &c., 'a right' is primarily a legal, and secondarily an ethical term. A Right, that is, a legal right, is defined by Mr. Austin as 'the capacity or power of exacting from another or others acts or forbearances[1].' I may propose as a wider definition, applicable to a moral as well as to a legal right, '*a claim either on the law or on society or on the individual conscience to protection from wrong.*' Thus, I have a right, in which the law will uphold me, to my property; I have a right, in which the general opinion of society will uphold me, not to have my confidences abused by my friends; I have a right, which neither the law nor

[1] Lecture XVI.

the average sentiment of society will uphold, but which will be respected by the moral feeling of the more enlightened portion of mankind, to be protected from impertinent curiosity either as to my opinions or my private affairs. Or again, to take another instance of the last kind, I have a right, provided I am of mature age and am not inflicting any injury on others or disappointing any just expectations, to dispose of my own time or my own money as I think proper, or even to be what people call eccentric, without eliciting any unasked for advice or any impertinent remarks on the part of my neighbours. The recognition of this right to be protected from impertinent advice, impertinent curiosity, or impertinent interference, may be adduced, perhaps, as one of the best instances of the delicate and sensitive perceptions of right conduct which exist in the more refined and intelligent minds of modern society. It is just this delicate perception of the very smallest rights of others, it may be remarked, which constitutes the gentleman.

Every *right* implies in some other person or persons a corresponding *duty*. It is the *duty* of every one, with whom I am brought into any relations, to respect my *rights*. A *duty*, when the word is employed in this sense, may be defined as 'an obligation imposed on (or, perhaps, residing in) some person or persons to respect the rights residing in some other person or persons.' These duties are called *duties of perfect obligation*, because they always have definite rights corresponding with them. But we often use the word 'duty' in a far more extended sense, making its sphere, in fact, co-extensive with that of the whole of morality. Thus we speak, not only of the duties of beneficence, charity, liberality, &c., but of our duty towards God and our duty towards ourselves. Such duties are called *duties of imperfect obligation*, and are so extensive

that they can only be defined negatively as 'those moral obligations which do not give birth to any right[1].'

In my definition of the word 'duty,' I have been compelled to employ the word 'obligation,' which itself requires explanation. This word was originally a purely legal one, and was, in fact, a technical term of the Roman law. Sir H. Maine gives the following account of the original employment of the term:

'What was an Obligation? It is defined by the Roman lawyers as "Juris vinculum, quo necessitate adstringimur alicujus solvendæ rei." This definition connects the Obligation with the Nexum through the common metaphor on which they are founded, and shows us with much clearness the pedigree of a peculiar conception. The Obligation is the "bond" or "chain," with which the law joins together persons or groups of persons, in consequence of certain voluntary acts. The acts which have the effect of attracting an Obligation are chiefly those classed under the heads of Contract and Delict (i.e. of Agreement and Wrong); but a variety of other acts have a similar consequence which are not capable of being comprised in an exact classification. It is to be remarked, however, that the act does not draw to itself the Obligation in consequence of any moral necessity; it is the law which annexes it in the plenitude of its power, a point the more necessary to be noted, because a different doctrine has sometimes been propounded by modern interpreters of the Civil Law who had moral or metaphysical theories of their own to support. The image of a *vinculum juris* colours and pervades every part of the Roman law of Contract and Delict. The law

[1] This latter definition is adopted *verbatim* from Mr. Mill. See Utilitarianism, p. 73. He adds: 'I think it will be found that this distinction' (namely, the distinction between duties of perfect and of imperfect obligation) 'exactly coincides with that which exists between justice and the other obligations of morality.'

bound the parties together, and the *chain* could only be undone by the process called *solutio*, an expression still figurative, to which our word "payment" is only occasionally and incidentally equivalent. The consistency with which the figurative image was allowed to present itself, explains an otherwise puzzling peculiarity of Roman legal phraseology, the fact that "Obligation" signified rights as well as duties, the right, for example, to have a debt paid as well as the duty of paying it. The Romans kept in fact the entire picture of the "legal chain" before their eyes, and regarded one end of it no more and no less than the other[1].'

It is, perhaps, needless to observe that the word has now entirely ceased to signify a right, but it is more important to remark that, unless it be qualified with the distinctive epithet 'legal,' the sphere of the actions to which it applies is precisely co-extensive with that of morality. Thus, whenever we speak of any moral or immoral act, we may say that a man is *under an obligation* to perform it or to refrain from it. There is, indeed, one exception, or rather apparent exception, to this remark. We do not speak of a man being under an obligation to himself, in the same way that we speak of a man's duty to himself, though we might without impropriety speak of being *bound* to perform even personal duties, an expression which is really the equivalent of the other[2].

The necessity of employing in the definition of a term another term which is almost synonymous with it frequently arises when, as in the present case, we are dealing with terms which have been completely naturalised in popular discourse. I have employed the word 'obligation'

[1] Maine's Ancient Law, pp. 323, 4.

[2] On what constitutes Moral Obligation, I shall speak in a subsequent chapter (ch. 6).

in the definition of 'duty' rather than the reverse, because, of the two terms, it is the less ambiguous and, perhaps, the more familiar.

Duties or obligations are enforced by *sanctions*. A sanction is strictly a legal term, and, while confined to this meaning, is simply the punishment by dread of which the command of the sovereign authority is enforced. In this sense, it may be defined as the punishment which attends the violation of a law. But, besides legal sanctions, there are physical sanctions, social sanctions, moral sanctions, and religious sanctions. A sanction, generally, may be defined as the consideration or considerations by which legal or moral duties are enforced. Legal sanctions are confined to punishments, because it is the end of law to prevent wrongs rather than to encourage goodness, and because to reward those who observe the law would be impossible, while to punish those who break it is comparatively easy[1]. But the other sanctions include rewards as well as punishments. Thus, physical sanctions are the pleasures and pains which follow naturally on the observance or violation of physical laws, the sanctions employed by society are praise and blame, the moral sanctions, strictly so called, are self-approbation and self-disapprobation, or, as it is often phrased, the approval and dis-

[1] '"Reward," says Bentham, speaking of legislation, "ought never to be employed, when the same effect can be produced by punishment." And, in support of this paradox, I employ another:—"Let the means be penal, and the desired effect may be attained without giving birth to suffering: let the means be remuneratory, and suffering is inevitable."

'The oracular style, however, being no longer in fashion, I shall in plain language give the solution of this enigma.

'When a punishment is denounced against the breach of a law, if the law be not broken, no one need be punished. When a reward is promised to obedience, if everybody obey the law, everybody ought to be rewarded. A demand for rewards is thus created: and these rewards can only be derived from the labour of the people, and contributions levied upon their property.' The Rationale of Reward, Bk. I. ch. 7.

approval of conscience; lastly, the religious sanctions are either the fear of future punishment and the hope of future reward, or, to the higher religious sense, simply the love of God, and the dread of displeasing Him[1].

Before quitting this branch of my subject, it may be convenient to define the expressions *civil injury, crime, delict, sin.*

A *Civil Injury* is a wrong for which the law awards reparation to the injured individual.

A *Crime* is a wrong regarded as inflicted on the community at large, and punished by the law, not for the purpose of reparation to the person injured, but for the purpose of deterring either the individual himself or others, or both, from committing the like offence again.

A *Delict* (in the wider signification of the term[2]) is any wrong of which the law takes cognisance. It, thus, includes both *civil injuries* and *crimes*, and supplies us with a convenient term for designating all legal offences.

A *Sin* is a violation of a divine command. It may, somewhat metaphorically, be regarded as a wrong against God; I say metaphorically, for the Deity cannot properly be considered as subject to harm.

It is plain that the same act may be styled, in its moral aspect, a wrong, in its legal aspect, a civil injury or a crime, and in its religious aspect, a sin.

The discussion of Justice with its kindred terms, and

[1] For a fuller account of the Sanctions of Conduct, see my Progressive Morality, Ch. I.

[2] In its narrower signification, Delict is simply a technical term of Roman Law, and, as such, does not here concern us. See Austin's Jurisprudence, Vol. I, Outline, pp. xcviii–c. (Ed. 2), and Sandars' Justinian, Lib. IV. Tit. 1 ad init.

specially of the ambiguities connected with the use of those terms, naturally suggests a very interesting and important topic, namely, the relation of Law to Morality, or, in other words, of Ethics to Jurisprudence. By Morality, in its most extended sense, we mean the whole circle of duties, whether to ourselves or others, which are enforced by the social and moral sanctions, of praise and blame, of self-approbation and self-disapprobation. By Law, we mean the whole body of commands which, in any particular state, are dictated by the sovereign authority[1] and enforced by the legal sanction of punishment. In order to distinguish Law, in this its strict sense, from various metaphorical uses

[1] It is, perhaps, sufficient for my purpose to state that by the sovereign or the sovereign authority I mean the supreme authority of a state, whether that authority reside in an individual or in a body. For an explanation of the various difficulties connected with this conception, the reader is referred to Mr. Austin's 'Province of Jurisprudence Determined,' Lecture VI. Mr. Austin thus introduces the subject:

'The superiority which is styled sovereignty, and the independent political society which sovereignty implies, is distinguished from other superiority, and from other society, by the following marks or characters.—1. The *bulk* of the given society are in a *habit* of obedience or submission to a *determinate* and *common* superior: let that common superior be a certain individual person, or a certain body or aggregate of individual persons. 2. That certain individual, or that certain body of individuals, is *not* in a habit of obedience to a determinate human superior. Laws (improperly so called) which opinion sets or imposes, may permanently affect the conduct of that certain individual or body. To express or tacit commands of other determinate parties, that certain individual or body may yield occasional submission. But there is no determinate person, or determinate aggregate of persons, to whose commands, express or tacit, that certain individual or body renders habitual obedience.

'Or the notions of sovereignty and independent political society may be expressed concisely thus.—If a *determinate* human superior, *not* in a habit of obedience to a like superior, receive *habitual* obedience from the *bulk* of a given society, that determinate superior is sovereign in that society, and the society (including the superior) is a society political and independent.'

On the ambiguity of the word Sovereignty, according as it is employed in a political or in a strictly legal sense, see Professor Dicey's Law of the Constitution, pp. 64–70.

of the term, such as the 'moral law,' the 'law of nature,' and the like, it is not uncommon to speak of it as 'positive law' or the 'law of the land.'

Now it is plain that there may be many commands dictated by the law of the land which are not moral duties, as, on the other hand, there may be many moral duties which are not commanded by the law of the land. Neither is Morality a part of Law, nor Law of Morality. The provinces of the two may, and always do, partly coincide, but neither is inclusive of the other.

There appears, however, to have been a period in the history of human society when the present distinction between Law and Morality did not exist. In very ancient forms of society, as observed by Sir H. Maine[1], a law in the sense of a definite command set by a definite political superior, and enforced by a definite sanction, has not yet come into existence; its place is supplied by *custom*, or *customary law*, the breach of which is enforced by no definite penalty, and which includes within its range all those actions, whether important or unimportant, whether affecting only the individual himself or the society at large, which are the objects of social disapprobation.

But, when Law has once assumed its present form, it is obviously impossible that it should continue to apply to so wide a range of acts as those formerly included under Custom. Many acts, condemned by custom, are of so trifling a character, or so difficult to prove or to define, that it must, from the first, have appeared impracticable to attach to them any definite penalty to be inflicted by a definite authority. Notwithstanding, however, the impracticability of making law altogether coextensive with custom, or of identifying the legal with the social sanction, it was certainly the aim of early legislators to include

[1] Ancient Law, Ch. I; Village Communities, Lect. 3.

within their codes as many and as minute provisions as possible. Ἃ μὴ κελεύει ὁ νόμος, ἀπαγορεύει[1], says Aristotle, and in all early codes which have come down to us entire, we find the most minute regulations as to the conduct of individual and social life.

As societies, however, have advanced in extent and intelligence, there seems to have been a growing tendency to draw a sharp line between the provinces of law and morality, and to confine legislation within narrower and narrower limits. And this tendency appears to be the necessary result of experience, as will be seen from a consideration of the cases to which, by almost universal consent, legislation is now regarded as inapplicable.

These cases I now proceed to consider. I shall commence with what may be called *personal duties*, such as chastity, sobriety, cleanliness, and the like.

Of these, it may, in the first place, be remarked that the inconveniences arising to the individual himself from the breach of this class of duties are generally sufficiently grave to act as a strong deterring motive, and that, consequently, the intervention of direct legislation is, in most cases, superfluous. Nature herself has, so to speak, attached a penalty to the offences, and, hence, there is no occasion for the interference of the law. But, it may be objected, there still remains the fact that, in many cases, this natural punishment is an insufficient deterrent, and that habitual drunkenness, unchastity, and the like, are, by no means, uncommon occurrences even in advanced societies. How, then, is it that, in these cases, the legislator still refrains from interfering?

The general answer to the question is that, in this class of cases, the interference of the legislator would be productive of more harm to society than good. It would

[1] Arist. Eth. Nic. V. 11 (1).

require the creation of a cumbrous and costly machinery, would embitter the relations of private life, and would be an endless source of jealousy and discontent. There would, in the first place, be the difficulty of definition. How could we define, say, drunkenness or extravagance, so as to enable the judge to apply the law with impartiality and to the general satisfaction of the spectators? Theft or murder is a definite act, but it is difficult to say where drunkenness begins and ends. Again, there is the difficulty of proof. The existence of many self-regarding offences is known only to a man's self or to his nearest relatives, friends, or neighbours. If society were seriously to undertake the punishment of such offences, it would be necessary to institute a system of the strictest espionage, which would destroy all confidence, and poison many of the most intimate and agreeable relations of life. And to maintain such a system in efficiency, it would be essential that the police should have at its disposal the most extravagant rewards, for the remuneration of informers. It would, in fact, be found impossible to stop short of the institution of a moral inquisition, with all its hideous appliances and the whole train of its pernicious consequences. To these considerations may be added the severity of the punishments which it would be found necessary to inflict, in order to produce any deterring effect; the difficulty of apportioning them to the circumstances of the offence and the offender; the vast multiplication of laws; and, lastly, a consideration of great importance, the very varying sentiments of disapprobation with which many self-regarding offences are viewed by different sections of society. Before the legislator can effectively punish an offence, there must be a tolerable amount of unanimity not only as to the fact, but as to the amount, of its criminality.

Notwithstanding the growing tendency of the law to

ignore self-regarding offences, suicide and the attempt at suicide are still regarded as fit subjects for legislation. Without discussing the propriety of this exception, it may be observed that many of the remarks made above are obviously inapplicable to these particular offences[1].

With respect to *relative duties*, it may be convenient, in this connexion, to regard them as either duties to God or duties to our neighbour, and to divide the latter into those which are dictated by benevolence and those which are dictated by justice.

Religious duties were, in early times, almost universally the subject of legislation. They have now almost universally ceased to be so, except in the case of ministers of established religions, and others, who receive a pecuniary or social consideration for submitting themselves to the control of an additional body of laws. Nor is it difficult to see how this transition has been effected. The religious unanimity of a population has almost invariably disappeared before growing intelligence and the interchange of ideas with peoples of other faiths and countries. Now, as already remarked, it is practically impossible, at least for any length of time, to enforce a body of laws on the expediency of which a population is not substantially agreed. Experience, moreover, has conclusively shewn that, wherever the law has attempted to enforce certain religious observances or the profession of a certain religious faith, though it may have succeeded in producing hypocrisy, it has never succeeded in producing conviction. But, though experience infallibly teaches this lesson, mankind has been slow to learn it. Its earlier recognition might have advanced civilisation by centuries, and would certainly have relieved the world from an incalculable amount of cruelty

[1] The general question of Suicide has been discussed in Ch. I. See pp. 29, 30.

and anguish. Its fuller recognition, even now, in those countries and amongst those classes which are least open to the influence of progressive ideas, seems essential to the consolidation of society.

Of the relative duties which concern our neighbours, it is plain that those which are dictated by benevolence cannot be subjects of legislation; for, by the very fact of their becoming so, they would, at once, be transferred from the category of benevolence to that of justice. Thus, if a man refuses to pay poor-rates, or neglects to provide for his family, to the extent to which such a provision can be enforced by law, he is violating a definite legal right, and is, therefore, guilty of a definite act of injustice. But, though the application of the legal sanction at once converts benevolence into justice, there is, perhaps, no branch of morality to which the social sanction is so frequently and so stringently applied as to what is called, by a slight abuse of the term, the duty of benevolence. A rich man is *expected*, as the phrase goes, to be liberal, and, if he neglects to be so, society stamps his conduct with disapprobation. A passer-by who neglected to save a drowning man would justly incur the most severe reprobation[1].

[1] Bentham expresses an opinion that 'the limits of the law on this head, seem to be capable of being extended a good deal farther than they seem ever to have been extended hitherto. In particular, in cases where the person is in danger, why should it not be made the duty of every man to save another from mischief, when it can be done without prejudicing himself, as well as to abstain from bringing it on him?' In a note, he illustrates this position as follows: 'A woman's head-dress catches fire: water is at hand: a man, instead of assisting to quench the fire, looks on, and laughs at it. A drunken man, falling with his face downwards into a puddle, is in danger of suffocation: lifting his head a little on one side would save him: another man sees this, and lets him lie. A quantity of gunpowder lies scattered about a room: a man is going into it with a lighted candle: another, knowing this, lets him go in without warning. Who is there that in any of these cases would think punishment misapplied?' Principles of Morals and Legislation, Ch. XIX,

We come, lastly, to those relative duties which fall under the head of justice. It is these with which law, at least in its most developed stage, is almost exclusively concerned. But, still, there are many duties dictated by a sense of justice which do not fall under the cognisance of the legislator. There are, for instance, many little acts in a man's daily intercourse with his children, his domestics, his neighbours, which may fitly be denominated just or unjust, but which it would be ridiculous to make the subject of legislation. These may, for the most part, be regarded as exempted on account of their trifling character. It is plain that there must somewhere be a limit to legislation, and this limit is usually drawn with tolerable equity by the good sense of the community. The law will interfere, if I starve or beat my domestic, but not, if I wound his feelings by neglect, contempt, or undue severity of language. But there are many acts of injustice which, though by no means of a trifling character, are not visited by the law. Take, for instance, a gross act of ingratitude, or a lie or an unfulfilled verbal promise which may have been a cause of the greatest inconvenience, or even suffering, to the person deceived. Why does the law refrain from interfering in cases of this kind? In such cases it will generally be found that there is either a great difficulty in defining the offence[1], or a great difficulty in proving it[2], or

§ 1, art. 19. It is, perhaps, superfluous to remark, after what has been already said, that, if Bentham's suggestion were adopted with regard to these particular cases, they would, at once, cease to be duties imposed by benevolence and would become duties imposed by justice.

[1] See Bentham's Principles of Morals and Legislation, Ch. XIX, § 1, art. 13.

[2] The difficulty of proof must, of course, be taken as including the difficulty of discovery. Now, the greater the difficulty of detection, the more severe must be the punishment inflicted on those who are detected. But the difficulty of detection may become so great as to render it impossible to find a punishment sufficiently severe to act as a deterrent. In these cases,

a great difficulty in apportioning the punishment, or a combination of two or of all these difficulties. Experience appears surely, though often, it must be owned, but slowly, to discover the cases in which the evils attendant on punishing a class of offences exceed the evil of allowing them to escape with impunity. But the impunity, it must be recollected, is only impunity from the law. The other sanctions are still operative, and are frequently all the more operative on account of the inaction of the legislature.

And here, it may be observed that, as the limits of legislation become more confined, it is necessary that the social sanction should be guided, strengthened, and enlightened, so that it may be duly applied, and applied with sufficient force, to those pernicious actions which are no longer regarded as fitting cases for the direct intervention of the law. Nor will this sanction be invoked in vain. For, in an advanced society, it is, perhaps, in all but the lowest sections, more powerful, as it is certainly more far-reaching, than the law itself.

As many acts dictated by morality are not dictated by the law, so many acts dictated by the law would not otherwise be dictated by morality. This is plainly the case with respect to the laws which regulate taxation, the specific duties of trustees, the procedure of courts of justice, and the like. I should be under an obligation not to commit murder or theft, even if the law were silent on the subject, just as I am under an obligation not to tell a lie, even though I incur no legal punishment by doing

therefore, it is desirable that the legislator should not interfere at all, as the punishment, in the rare cases in which it could be inflicted, would be inflicted to little or no purpose, or, to use the language of Bentham, would be *unprofitable*. On the limits to legislation occasioned by the difficulty of proof and the difficulty of definition, some most instructive and exhaustive remarks will be found in Bentham's Principles of Morals and Legislation, Ch. XIX, § 1, Arts. 13, 14.

so. But I should be under no obligation to pay taxes, still less to pay a particular sum for a particular object at a particular time, or to prosecute or defend a suit in a particular way before a particular court, or to keep my trust accounts in a particular manner, unless the law prescribed these duties. But, when once prescribed, they become (with certain exceptions, to be noticed presently) moral as well as legal duties, all of them for one, and some of them for two reasons. In the first place, it is our duty, even when we can foresee no inconvenience likely to arise from our acting otherwise, to obey the law; for, if the contrary principle were once allowed, the law would retain hardly any hold whatever on the more ignorant classes of society. But, in the second place, the ill consequences resulting from the breach of even merely legal regulations may be of such a character as, quite independently of the former consideration, to constitute a moral offence. Take the non-attendance of a witness in a court of justice. A very little reflexion will shew that this is a breach of faith, and may be attended with the gravest inconveniences, or even the most disastrous consequences, to other persons. Or take the case of smuggling, or of a false return of income-tax. These are both distinct cases of theft, though they are not ordinarily accounted as such. All honest people pay their customs' or excise duties, and make a full return of their income, on the supposition that others do the same, and, if I fail to meet this expectation, I am shifting the burden which justly falls on my shoulders to theirs, and am as distinctly robbing them as if I were to put my hands into their pockets. It is true that the sum of which I rob each individual tax-payer is infinitesimal and inappreciable, but the sum of which all the dishonest tax-payers rob all the honest tax-payers is, it is to be feared, a very considerable and appreciable item, and, by

my act of dishonesty, I am, so to speak, taking my place in the gang of robbers.

Those laws which, before their enactment, would not be dictated by morality are often called *positive laws*, though this term is also frequently applied to the whole body of the law of the land, or, as it is often styled, the *municipal law*. *Moral Law* is often used in contra-distinction to *Positive Law*, and may thus, according to the respective meanings of positive law just noticed, signify either all moral injunctions and prohibitions, whether enacted by the law of the land or not, or simply those moral injunctions and prohibitions which are dictated solely by morality. It would be convenient if we could always employ the expression 'Moral Law' in the former sense, the expression 'Municipal Law' in the sense of law of the land, and 'Positive Law' as denoting that portion of the municipal law which would not otherwise be dictated by morality.

Though there can be no question that, in all matters indifferent, we should obey the law of the land, a very grave question arises when any portion of this law comes into direct conflict with the dictates of morality, or what we conceive to be such. Hobbes, indeed, denies that there can ever be any question of our obedience; for, in the case of the subject, the duty of submission to the law over-rides all other duties whatsoever, and, in fact, includes them all. But the almost unanimous opinion of other moralists has decided, and, as I conceive rightly, that cases may occur in which transgression of the law becomes not only excusable, but even a positive duty. The defence of this position hardly belongs to the present place, and, indeed, would now be superfluous; but it may be convenient if I here suggest briefly certain rules of conduct to be observed in cases of a real or supposed conflict

between the dictates of Law and Morality. First, the presumption should always be in favour of the Law. Unless we have very fully considered the matter, and have had good opportunities for forming a judgment, it is more likely that the legislator is right than that we are. But, supposing that we have taken the best opportunities of informing ourselves, and that we have arrived at a deliberate conviction that the Law enjoins what is morally wrong or prohibits us from doing that which we feel morally bound to do, we are justified in disobeying the law, and, in fact, are under a moral obligation to do so. A further question, however, here arises as to whether we shall simply submit passively to the punishment which the law prescribes for its infringement, or engage in active measures for the repeal of the law itself. If we embrace the latter alternative, a final question arises as to whether we shall confine ourselves within constitutional limits, or resort to more violent and revolutionary expedients. It is plain that these are questions of the utmost gravity, and it appears to me that they can be solved only by considering in each particular instance the consequences, both general and special, both direct and remote, which are likely to result from this or that mode of acting to ourselves, to those who come within the range of our influence, to our country, and to mankind at large.

At this point, it may be well to say a few words on the reciprocal influence of law and morality. There can be no doubt, on the one hand, that the laws of a country have their source in the average morality and enlightenment of the citizens, or, at least, of the better instructed portion of them, and that any improvement in the laws must be due to a corresponding improvement in morality and enlightenment. For, even where the laws are enacted by a single

legislator, the people must be sufficiently moral and enlightened to acquiesce in their provisions. But, on the other hand, it should be noticed that the laws themselves re-act on the character of a people, in the way of fixing and rendering permanent the moral sentiment, or some particular mode of viewing particular classes of actions. This is, to a great extent, the case throughout the whole of society; for men generally are much less disposed to call in question what is fixed by law than what is fixed by fashion, custom, or the average opinion of their fellow-citizens. But it is especially the case with the lower and less instructed sections of society; for, among them, the moral and social sanctions are comparatively inoperative, and the disposition to question the wisdom of established institutions hardly exists, except in times of disquiet or revolution. Here, then, the legal and religious sanctions are practically the restraining forces of conduct, and the main instruments in moralising the character. But of the two, the legal sanction is, speaking generally, the more operative, for it appeals immediately to the fears of mankind, whereas the other, at least in its lower form, appeals to them only remotely; nor does the reality, nature, or incidence of the legal sanction admit of any dispute, whereas the religious sanction, inasmuch as it does not appeal to the senses, is always more or less open to cavil.

The malignant and selfish passions of the great mass of mankind being thus restrained almost exclusively by law, either directly by the fear of legal punishment, or indirectly by the moulding influence of law upon character, it is not surprising that some moralists have attached a disproportionate importance to the legal sanction, and have appeared to regard it as, in the last resort, if not actually at least rightfully, the sole determining force of conduct. This is

especially the case with Hobbes, who, while he recognises what he calls the 'laws of nature' as the guide of the ruler, regards the will of the ruler or the law itself as the sole guide of the individual citizen. To a less extent, the same criticism is applicable to the systems of Austin and Bentham. But, with respect to all these moralists and others of a similar character, it should be recollected that they approach ethics from a practical rather than a speculative, from a legal rather than a philosophical point of view. The main object of their investigations is the origin, nature, and expediency of the positive institutions of a particular country rather than the ultimate facts of human nature; and, hence, they are more concerned with constructing rules for the guidance of ordinary men than with examining all the springs of conduct or providing for the diffusion of a refined and exalted morality, appealing to other than prudential regards. Their business is with the actions of men rather than with their dispositions; their aim is the amelioration of law rather than the purification of character. The services which these *juridical moralists*, for so they might appropriately be called, have rendered to the science of ethics and to practical morality must, at the same time, not be underestimated. It is, perhaps, equally important with, though, as we have seen, of quite a different kind from, that which has been rendered by what might be called, in contradistinction to them, the *psychological moralists*, such as Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Butler, and Hume.

It, perhaps, hardly needs to be remarked that it is the special province of education, in the true sense of that term, to guide and develope the moral, social, and religious sanctions, so that they may fortify the legal sanction where it is present, correct it in the few cases where it is defective, and supply its place in the numerous

cases where it is absent. In an advanced and complex state of civilisation, like ours, the legal sanction, however good the laws which it enforced, would be of little avail for the protection of society, unless it rested on and were supplemented by these other sanctions.

Before bringing this long chapter to a close, it seems necessary to add a few remarks on the virtue and duty of Veracity. As long ago, at least, as the time of Plato[1], 'to tell the truth' was regarded as a branch of Justice. And it is under this head that the obligation may still be best exhibited. Why are we bound to tell the truth? Because our neighbour has a right not to be deceived, or, in other words, because to deceive him is to wrong him. To volunteer a statement, the effect of which is to mislead another person, is obviously to expose him to harm, or, at least, to inconvenience, and will be found to satisfy all the conditions of the definition of an Injury, given above. And it is equally plain that the same is the case in giving a deceptive answer to any question which another person has a right to put to us, whether that right be recognised by law or only by the tacit understanding of society. So inconvenient, and indeed often so injurious, would it be, if we could not depend on one another answering truthfully to a question put even in the ordinary course of conversation, that the presumption always is that the respondent speaks the truth. But are there no limits to the right of receiving a truthful answer? Certainly it would seem, primâ facie,

[1] At the beginning of the Republic, Plato imputes to the old man, Kephalus, a definition of Justice as ἀληθῆ τε λέγειν καὶ ἃ ἂν λάβῃ τις ἀποδιδόναι. And it is notable that the definition is rejected, not because it is too wide but because it is too narrow, and because it relates to external acts rather than to the internal disposition of which they are the result.

that the right is limited by the right of putting the question. That a magistrate, an officer of the government, or any other person in authority, such as a parent, an employer, a master, tutor, or guardian, has, in all things appertaining to his authority, the right to administer questions, and, therefore, in all such matters, the right to receive a truthful answer, appears to admit of no doubt. Nor is there any doubt with respect to what may be called innocent questions, by whomsover asked, that is to say, questions the answer to which is not likely to expose the respondent or any one connected with him to shame or trouble or loss. But questions having this tendency, when put by a person whose relation to the respondent does not justify him in asking them, are properly designated impertinent questions. And here occurs the casuistical difficulty: as the questioner has no right to put the question, is the respondent bound to return a truthful answer? As a mere matter between himself and the questioner, I conceive that he is not, and certainly the questioner would have no cause to complain, if the answer were deceptive. But further considerations here supervene. The questioner may repeat the answer, and so other persons, who had no share in the impertinent act, may be deceived to their hurt or inconvenience. And this is a consideration which obviously ought to be taken account of, even within the limits of strict justice. But, outside the limits of justice, and irrespectively of their duty to others, many persons are often restrained, and quite rightly so, from returning an untruthful or ambiguous answer by purely self-regarding feelings. They feel that to give an untruthful answer, even under such circumstances as I have supposed, would be to burden themselves with the subsequent consciousness of cowardice

or lack of self-respect. And hence, whatever inconvenience or annoyance it may cost them, they tell the naked truth rather than stand convicted to themselves of a want of courage or dignity. Thus, Veracity has the advantage that it is protected not only by the more direct sanction of a Sense of Justice but also by indirect sanctions derived from some of the noblest of our self-regarding feelings.

Yet the duties of Veracity, like any other duties, may come into collision with duties arising from other sources. To tell the truth is no more binding under all conceivable circumstances than to refrain, under all conceivable circumstances, from taking away a man's life or property or character. Veracity, though this was by no means always the case, has become the point of honour in the upper ranks of modern civilised societies, and hence it is invested with a sanctity which seems to attach to no other virtue; and to the uninstructed conscience of the unreflective man the duty of telling the truth appears, of all duties, to be the only duty which never admits of any exceptions from the unavoidable conflict with other duties. And yet there might be occasions where the scrupulosity which would return a truthful answer to an impertinent question might endanger the life or liberty or property of another, or expose to penury not only the answerer himself but those dependent on him for their subsistence. In such cases, the responsibility for the lie appears to me to attach wholly to the questioner, and, in no degree, to the respondent. Happily, however, such cases are very rare in actual life, and, with the spread of enlightenment, sympathy, a stricter sense of justice, and more courteous manners, are becoming rarer and rarer. As I have said elsewhere: 'Without maintaining that there are no conceivable circumstances under which

a man would be justified in committing a breach of veracity, it may at least be said that, in the lives of most men, there is no case likely to occur in which the greater social good would not be attained by the observation of the general rule to tell the truth rather than by the recognition of an exception in favour of a lie, even though that lie were told for purely benevolent reasons[1].' Of course, I do not include in this statement purely conventional phrases which society has invented for the purpose of combining courtesy to others with the convenience or comfort of the individual employing them.

On the historical question of the variation of the moral sentiment with respect to the importance of Veracity, as exemplified in different countries, at different times, and in different stages of civilisation, it will be more convenient to speak in a subsequent Chapter[2].

[1] Progressive Morality, pp. 59, 60.

[2] See Ch. V, pp. 218-221.

CHAPTER IV.

On the Semi-Social Feelings.

Various forms of these feelings. Love of Approbation and Fear of Disapprobation. The Social Sanction. Codes of Honour.

I NOW proceed to examine a group of feelings which are of complex, or, at least, of ambiguous origin. Though known by different names, and assuming different forms, they may all be classed generically under the heads of love of approbation and fear of disapprobation.

Our experience furnishes us with no instance of a man in whom these feelings are altogether absent, nor is it easy to conceive of men having ever existed entirely without them. In the simplest family or tribal relations, it would seem as if men must have formerly, as they do now, courted the approbation and deprecated the disapprobation of those with whom they lived, must have been gladdened by kindly words and cheerful looks, and must have dreaded, and shrunk from, those manifestations of displeasure which are generally much more strongly expressed, both in tones and gestures, amongst savage and barbaric than amongst civilised races.

But, at the outset of this enquiry, there occurs the question, whether these feelings have any claim to be classed apart, or whether they are not simply forms of

self-regard. Approbation and disapprobation, it has been contended, are usually, and especially in the early years of life, attended by material consequences which are quite sufficient, on the principles of association, to account for their afterwards becoming objects of desire or aversion in themselves. 'Black looks' and chiding words are, in childhood, usually the precursors of punishment, while expressions of approval are frequently followed by rewards. Pains and deprivations of various kinds, it is argued, thus become associated with approbation, while disapprobation is similarly associated with pleasures and privileges. There is no reason, therefore, why a man, who would otherwise be entirely callous to the opinion of others, may not, through the circumstances of his education, come to be affected by it, as we now see to be actually the case.

In this reasoning, there is, undoubtedly, a certain amount of truth, and it is quite conceivable that a being who took no pleasure in giving pleasure to others, and felt no pain in giving pain to them, might come to cultivate and esteem the good opinion of his fellows simply from the connexion unconsciously existing in his mind between that good opinion and the consequences which frequently follow upon it. But it does not appear to me that this consideration sufficiently accounts for the love of approbation, as it actually exists in man. If we examine this feeling closely, we shall find, not, perhaps, in every instance, but, certainly, in some instances, that there enter into it the following constituents: first, though, in the majority of instances, by no means mainly, our expectation of the possible good consequences which may result to ourselves; second, a simple feeling of delight, independently of all consequences, in the reflexion that another thinks well of us; third, a pleasure, and this is

often very intense, in being the source of pleasure to another. To realise the intensity, as well as the distinct character, of the last element, we have only to recall or notice how often boys and young men are spurred to exertion by the thought of the pleasure which their success will bring to their parents, relatives, or friends. In mature life, a man's success is, perhaps, outside the family circle, oftener a cause of jealousy and chagrin to others than of pleasure, and hence this last constituent has, as life advances, a tendency to become obscured. But, when once attention is called to the fact, no one can fail to notice how often, and how intensely, we are influenced by the feeling that our actions will give pleasure to those who love and esteem us. Now, whatever may be said of the second element, it seems impossible to refer this one, of which I am now speaking, to a self-regarding origin. It appears to be as purely sympathetic as any feeling can be. But, if such be the case, and we think it necessary to have recourse to the theory of association in order to discover the origin of the second element, there seems to be as much reason for deriving it from the third as from the first. Granted that, in the love of approbation as it is usually, or frequently, found in human nature, there is a purely sympathetic and a purely self-regarding element, and a third element, the nature of which is doubtful, it seems quite as reasonable to suppose this last element to have grown by association out of the sympathetic as out of the self-regarding element; or rather it seems most reasonable to regard it as having grown out of both. But, be this as it may, the purely sympathetic element, which is often, if not always, to be detected in it, is sufficient to shew that the love of approbation is a feeling of a mixed character, and, of course, what has been said

of the love of approbation applies, with equal force, to the fear of disapprobation.

So much for the origin of these feelings, and their claim to a distinct classification.

I may now proceed to treat briefly of the various forms which they assume, and the various names by which they are designated.

It is matter of experience that many men care most for the opinion of some one person, of their own family, or of some narrow circle in which they move; others for that of larger aggregates, such as their town or country. In the former case, the feeling retains the generic name of *love of approbation*, in the latter it usually assumes the more specific appellation of *love of reputation.* The terms love of approbation and love of reputation, however, are also differently applied according to the nature of the acts or qualities on which a man prides himself, and which he hopes may elicit for him approbation or reputation as the case may be. If the acts or qualities be such as men perform or display in the ordinary conduct of life, and especially if they be what we call moral, the desire of recognition would usually be known as love of approbation; if, on the other hand, they transcend the ordinary level of performance or practice, and especially if they be of an intellectual character, the desire of recognition would usually be known as love of reputation. These two expressions are not discriminated very accurately, but we generally speak of a man as aiming at approbation, when he seeks to conciliate the good-will of those immediately around him by his ordinary conduct, especially in the practical affairs of life; on the other hand, we usually speak of a man as aiming at reputation, when he seeks to attain recognition from a wider circle by extraordinary effort, especially if that effort be held to imply

the possession of high intellectual aptitudes. Both approbation and reputation, it is plain, may be awarded in very various measures, and the respective desires of them, which, of course, may co-exist, may be entertained with very varying degrees of intensity.

When the love of reputation exists in a high degree, and especially when it aims at recognition over a wide area or through a long period of time, it often assumes a new appellation, as the *love of fame*. There are many cases in which we might appropriately speak of a man as actuated by a desire of reputation, where we could hardly speak of him as inspired by a love of fame, and these cases seem to be distinguished by inferiority of degree, extension, or duration. Thus, we do not speak of the reputation, but of the fame of a great general or a great poet, and, though we should never, I think, employ the expression 'posthumous reputation,' we frequently employ the expression 'posthumous fame.'

The insatiable craving for fame, and especially for posthumous fame, which is the actuating principle of so many minds, has been a constant subject of remark and wonder amongst moralists of all ages. Men will often undergo the greatest hardships, will even risk life itself or patiently submit to a life-long series of trials and privations, in order that their names may be mentioned in the pages of history or that their works may be read by an admiring posterity. Strange, at first sight, as this feeling may appear, it is not really difficult to account for it. Men of keen imagination and lively sympathies can easily transport themselves into times and countries far distant from their own, where they are the theme of conversation or reflexion. These distant times and remote countries are but an extension of the circles in which they live, while in these new spheres the jealousy and

ignorance which now impede the recognition of their merits no longer exist. And the prospect of a recognition in their own country at a distant time may well possess a peculiar charm; for, while distant times evoke more curiosity than distant countries, the feeling of kinship with our own descendants excites a deeper sympathy than can be felt with foreign races. Love of reputation and love of fame, even though the fame be posthumous, are, thus, we perceive, only extensions and varieties of the love of approbation. Of the desire for posthumous fame it may be specially remarked, that it is obviously free from the coarser taint of selfishness, and the regard to material advantage, which may always attach to the love of merely contemporary approbation, reputation, or fame.

There is a peculiar and abnormal feeling, arising out of those already mentioned, though it is a distorted form of them, which may best be designated as the *love of notoriety*. The love of reputation and the love of fame both imply a desire of approbation over a wide area, but the love of notoriety thinks only of the wide area, and is regardless of the approbation. It burns to be talked about, to be on the lips of men, and is comparatively careless of what they say. So morbid may this feeling become, that men have been actually known to commit the most horrible crimes, simply from the attraction of having their names constantly in the mouths of other men[1]. The love of notoriety affords an excellent instance of the power of abstraction, and of the extent to which the mind, by dwelling on accidental

[1] The story of Herostratus, who set fire to the temple of Artemis at Ephesus, in order that he might immortalise himself, will be fresh in the recollection of every reader. Incendiarism, sensational murders, and impostures of various kinds, such as those of fasting girls, pretended wizards or witches, spirit-rappers, and the like, are frequently due to the passion for notoriety, which, in many cases, becomes literally a mania. In estimating the evidence for 'wonderful events,' not nearly sufficient account, probably, is taken of this morbid tendency in human nature.

circumstances, may entirely lose sight of the one essential circumstance with which they are connected. Men begin by desiring the approbation of their fellows, one concomitant of which is to be much talked about and discussed. As the craving increases, they care less for the intensity of the approbation than the extent of the area over which it is diffused; till, at last, the one consideration is wholly lost sight of in the other, and it becomes a simple source of delight to them to feel that they are, or are likely to be, talked about, quite irrespectively of what is said. Then, if they can perform no great or heroic acts, they are conscious that they can, at least, perform extraordinary ones, and hence the peculiarly morbid manifestations of this feeling which are so frequently met with, and the peculiar results which so frequently ensue upon it. It may be remarked that individual eccentricities have often their origin in this source The love of fame, it should be also noticed, has a constant tendency to degenerate into mere love of notoriety, and it is sometimes very difficult to discriminate between the two.

Ambition, as is remarked in the chapter on the Self-Regarding Feelings, has two sources, the Love of Reputation, and the Love of Power. So far as it originates in the latter source, it is, till associated with other desires, wholly self-regarding. So far as it originates in the Love of Reputation, it has a semi-social character, but as, in this aspect, it does not really differ from Love of Reputation or Love of Fame, it hardly requires a distinct treatment in this place. I need only refer back to what I have already said of Ambition, and remark, in this connexion, that a man, who is conscious of ambitious feelings, should make it his constant endeavour to associate them, as far as possible, with objects by the attainment of which he may confer real benefits upon his fellow-men. By such

means, the feeling becomes purified, and, instead of being a scourge and pest, may become the source of innumerable blessings to mankind.

The fear of disapprobation, unlike the love of approbation, does not give rise to a number of distinct feelings, or, at least, not to such as are designated by specific names. There is, however, one feeling which is so designated, and which has a special interest for the moralist. This is *Shame*. The word Shame seems properly to be applied not to that dread of disapprobation which would prevent a man from performing a dishonourable, or neglecting to perform an honourable act, but to that confusion which ensues, when he is detected in having done so. We are, strictly speaking, said to be ashamed when we are discovered in doing that which public opinion or the opinion of our friends or associates requires us not to do, or in forbearing to do that which the same opinion requires us to do. But, by a natural extension of the word, Shame is made prospective, and is often spoken of as forcing us to do or preventing us from doing that which public opinion, or the opinion of those whom we value, would condemn us, if we were to leave undone, or to do, as the case may be. In this sense, however, it seems not to be distinguishable from the more general phrase, fear or dread of disapprobation.

That shame is one of the most powerful feelings of our nature, it is unnecessary to insist on. A man who has ceased to feel shame is justly regarded as the most degraded of human beings. And this feeling, it should be remarked, is entirely independent of any regard to the material consequences which may result on detection. It has respect simply to the loss of character and estimation in the eyes of those before whom we stand abashed. A man will often display this feeling, though he has no

more to hope or fear in this world. And that it is not derived from association with our purely self-regarding propensities is tolerably plain from the fact that it is chiefly the young who shew it in its more marked forms. A child or a young man is hardly ever shameless; an old or a middle-aged man, a hardened offender as we call him, is so not infrequently. To the mixed origin, then, of the class of feelings under discussion, the phenomenon of shame may be regarded as a very important testimony.

A true and healthy feeling of shame is one of the most effective, and, at the same time, one of the sternest guardians of virtue. But there is also such a thing as *False Shame*, the feeling ashamed of things of which we ought not to be ashamed, and of which, on reflexion, we ought to see that we ought not to be ashamed. Than this there is hardly any feeling more enfeebling to the character, or more largely productive of gratuitous misery. A man ought not to be ashamed of that which he cannot help, of his race, his origin, his condition, his poverty, his appearance, his lack of early advantages, or of anything which is due to causes beyond his own control; and, if he encourages rather than represses the disposition to entertain this feeling, he is probably laying up for himself stores of incalculable unhappiness. As I have said elsewhere[1], it is under the influence of this motive that many a man lives above his income, not for the purpose of gratifying any real wants, either of himself or his family, but for the sake of 'keeping up appearances,' though he is exposing his creditors to considerable losses, his family to many probable disadvantages, and himself to almost certain disgrace in the future. The whole character is often deteriorated by the false estimate which a man affixes, or which he supposes the world to affix, to the

[1] Progressive Morality, p. 175.

accidental circumstances of which this perverted feeling takes account. A sound moral education ought to make it one of its main aims, to direct this feeling of shame, especially amongst the young, into its proper channels; to repress false, and to foster true shame.

False shame is doubtless a grave moral defect in the individual who experiences the feeling. But a far larger share of the blame ought often to be assigned to society at large, which is apt to attach a wholly disproportionate value to adventitious advantages, such as those of birth or wealth or connexions; and specially to those members of society who, possessing or fancying that they possess these claims to superiority, ill disguise their contempt for those whom they suppose to be without them or to possess them in an inferior degree to themselves. Honour and dishonour ought to be apportioned to qualities and circumstances which are under a man's own control, while that which he has had no share in producing is no fit subject either for admiration or for contempt[1].

Having now considered the various forms assumed by love of approbation and fear of disapprobation, I proceed to estimate generally the relation in which the approbation or disapprobation of our fellow-men stands to the dictates of morality. As contrasted with the moral sanction, strictly so called, and the legal sanction, which is derived from the law of the land, the sanction which is derived from the opinions and requirements of society is frequently called the *social sanction.* These three sanctions were, probably, in very early times, identical, as is now also probably the case in the simplest forms of society. In other words, law, custom, and morality,

[1] On the share which the present form taken by Class-distinctions has in aggravating the feeling of false-shame, see 'Progressive Morality,' pp. 176–9.

in primitive societies, are not yet distinguished; law being no other than custom, and individual men not having yet begun to reflect on the grounds of their actions or on the unquestioned opinions entertained by those around them, so as to have reached any independent criterion of their own, or to have formed any rules of conduct for themselves. A man may, indeed, in primitive society, act contrary to the common sentiment, but it probably never occurs to him that he is right and the common sentiment is wrong. In civilised societies, however, and especially among their more cultivated members, these various sanctions are sharply discriminated, and it is a matter of notoriety that the law may dictate one course of action, and society, or that section of it in which we move, another, while our own judgment, formed to the best of our power, may frequently be at variance with one or both of the other authorities. Wherever this conflict takes place, and the matter is of sufficiently serious import, a man is, of course, bound ultimately (after full consideration) to follow his own judgment, to obey the voice of conscience, as we phrase it; nor need he ordinarily have the same compunction in doing so, where it is simply the opinion of society that is concerned, as where his conflict is with the law of the land. For the opinions of society, especially on questions of the minor morals, are proverbially fickle, are often antiquated or founded on insufficient data, and sometimes only require a strong protest to ensure their reversal. But, at the same time, before a man opposes his own judgment to that of society, especially if it be the judgment of society at large, he ought to feel great confidence in the accuracy of his judgments and in the importance and wisdom of his non-conformity. For, in qualification of what has been just said, it must be recollected that, on all the weightier

points of practice, the opinion of society has generally been the result of long and varied experience, and that, however inapplicable, in special cases, it may be to the requirements of our present mode of life, it has almost invariably, in its origin, had a deep significance and an adequate justification. But the relations of the moral sentiment of society at large to that of the individual, and the position of the moral philosopher with respect to the prevalent moral code, will be expressly treated in the two next Chapters, and hence it would be superfluous to say more on this subject in the present place.

Besides the general moral sentiment pervading society at large, there are also to be found, in any complex society, special forms of moral sentiment peculiar to smaller aggregates. Just as the moral sentiment of society at large is enforced by what may be called the general social sanction, consisting of approbation and disapprobation, with certain social rewards and penalties consequent thereon and imposed by the whole society; so are there special social sanctions, often more stringent and effective than the general social sanction, recognised by these smaller aggregates and enforcing the moral sentiment approved of by them. If we require instances of these special forms of moral sentiment, and special social sanctions, they are to be found, at least in civilised society, everywhere around us,—in our family, in our circle of friends, in our club, in the profession to which we belong, in the class with which our interests are identified. There are no two families, no two circles of intimate friends, whose views of the duties and requirements of life are exactly the same, who would pass precisely the same judgment on all the moral acts and qualities which might be submitted to them. It is true that the same thing might also be said of the individuals who compose these aggregates, but, by constantly

associating together, men form, as it were, a corporate opinion which they hold in common amongst themselves, and distinct from that of other bodies of a like character. To the special moral sentiment of families and groups of friends no specific name is given, but when men form themselves into clubs, parties, professions, and the like, or when they are formed, by the gradual evolution of society, into classes, the body of moral sentiment which they hold distinct from the ordinary moral sentiment of society at large is distinguished by a specific name, as *a law or code of honour*. Thus 'gentlemen,' as such, are said to have a code of honour, and we might with almost equal propriety speak of a code of honour as common to the working classes. Such a term could, at least, be used with the strictest propriety of the rules and sentiments obtaining in a Trades' Union. Similarly, lawyers, doctors, clergymen, bankers are said to have a code of honour, or, what amounts to the same thing, to observe certain rules of professional etiquette. The boys of particular schools, also, and 'public-school boys' in general, are supposed to have a code of honour peculiar to themselves. But the most conspicuous instances, perhaps, of these minor social sentiments and minor social sanctions, distinct from the general social sentiment and general social sanction, are to be found among the officers of the army and navy; and the culminating instance, perhaps, is to be found in the historical one of the institution of chivalry, as obtaining among the knights of the middle ages. It is needless, however, to multiply instances. Every one's observation will furnish him with a sufficient number of examples of rules and sentiments insisted on with the utmost pertinacity within the limits of some particular aggregate, and having no validity beyond it. The *special social sanctions*, as they may most appropriately be called, by

which these special rules and sentiments are enforced, are carefully to be distinguished from the *general social sanction* which may most conveniently be taken to be conterminous with the country in which we live or the race to which we belong. And here it may be remarked, in the first place, that the general social sanction, being enforced with the approval of the whole society, is far less likely to be arbitrary, harsh, or unjustifiable than the special social sanctions which are enforced only by small sections of that society. A large aggregate of men is more likely to find its way to sound principles of conduct than a small aggregate, unless that small aggregate have some special qualifications for its task. Moreover, though the rules which are found to be most conducive to the interests of some trade, profession, or class may be, and are very likely to be, also most conducive to the interests of the nation at large, it is quite possible that they may be the reverse, and that it may be the interest, if not the duty, of all other citizens to resist them. In this case, the utmost assistance and encouragement should be afforded to any-one within the trade, profession, or class who has the courage to stand aloof from his associates, and to set at defiance the so-called 'code of honour.' Instances of the pernicious character of rules such as those of which I am speaking are not far to seek. Rattening, duelling, and the persistency with which schoolboys refuse to give up the names of their comrades, even when they commit gross offences, will be familiar to every-one, and will be generally recognised as pernicious. But there are many rules of professions, and many sentiments current in particular classes of society, which, when closely examined, would be found, if not equally pernicious, at least equally irrational. It is, perhaps, to these more special forms of moral sentiment, whether they be 'codes of honour,' 'rules of the trade,'

'etiquette of the profession,' or by whatever name they may be called, that the criticisms of the moralist can, at present, be most usefully and most effectively applied. But, even here, he must recollect that he is dealing with what is founded on some reason or other, with what has a history and is, possibly, inextricably bound up with many other rules and observances, and that, till he has attempted to trace all the probable results of interference, it will be rash to put forth his hand and destroy. And, above all, he must recollect that the 'esprit de corps' of any small aggregate of men is, as such, always an ennobling and inspiriting sentiment, and that, unless it detach them too much from the rest of the community, and is attended with plainly pernicious consequences to the society at large, it is unwise, if not reckless, to seek to impair it.

Before concluding this chapter, it should be remarked that a too emphatic and exclusive insistence on 'codes of honour,' and, speaking generally, on the moral ideal and moral sentiment of particular classes, is apt to divert the attention of men from the dictates of wider codes and the more general principles of morality. The Wahhabee who would on no account smoke tobacco, but who thinks lightly of murder and adultery, or the Pharisee who tithes his mint and cummin and anise, and who would not profane the Sabbath by helping his neighbour out of a pit, though he would have no hesitation in devouring widows' houses or committing gross acts of injustice, are no inadequate representatives of what is constantly going on around us. Men of ruined fortunes will often pay their 'debts of honour,' though they will leave far more equitable claims unsatisfied. A man, whose attention is unduly concentrated on particular points of a moral code, is almost certain to overlook others, though they may be of far

more importance. This absorption, too, in what may be called class or professional morality has frequently a most injurious effect in blinding men to the claims of those outside their own class or profession. A mediæval knight, who was keenly alive to the sufferings of a noble lady, had little sympathy for the sufferings of a villein. A lawyer, a doctor, a clergyman, or an officer, who will be grossly scandalised by a breach of professional etiquette, will have no scruple in being rude or arrogant to his inferiors. And here, perhaps, I may venture to suggest that it is well worthy of consideration whether the constant reiteration of the word 'gentlemanly,' especially in our school and university education, as if a 'gentleman' had necessarily and on all points a different standard of moral conduct from the rest of mankind, is not apt to engender a disregard and contempt of the feelings and interests of the lower classes,—a disregard and contempt which is, perhaps, one of the most dangerous symptoms of our present form of social life. Those, at any rate, who are entrusted with the grave responsibilities of education, ought to do everything in their power to soften class-distinctions, and, at least, to avoid, by any word or deed, widening those breaches which to every student of society already appear fraught with so much danger to the future.

On the importance of the class of feelings just discussed it is unnecessary to dilate. By means of the social sanction each man is constituted the guardian of his neighbour's conduct,—in a very real sense his brother's keeper. Every one's experience will furnish him with numberless examples of the supreme influence often exerted by the opinion of a man's circle, by custom, and even by fashion. These, in some points, and specially in the case of men of weak will and undetermined character, are often far more powerful forces in shaping human conduct than

the commands of the law, the dictates of religion, or even a man's own sense of right and wrong[1]. The social sanction of praise or blame, of approving or disapproving looks, of kindly or sarcastic and bitter language, is one from which, living, as we do, in constant intercourse with each other, we never escape; it is ever operative; it reaches to the most minute details of our daily conduct. Hence the danger of attaching too much weight to it, and the duty, incumbent on the moralist, of reviewing its decisions and properly adjusting its claims with those of the other influences which ought to control our conduct.

The feelings of Pride and Vanity, of Envy and Jealousy, which might seem to have some claim to be treated in this Chapter, it has been found more convenient to treat, the former under the head of the Self-Regarding, the latter under that of the Resentful Feelings.

[1] It is most important to notice not only the acts sanctioned by law or morality which are forbidden by custom, but also the acts sanctioned by custom which are forbidden by law or morality. Thus, smuggling and duelling, though forbidden by law and, as may be seen on the slightest reflexion, by the most elementary principles of morality, are, if not sanctioned, at least but very faintly condemned by the general opinion of most European countries. It ought to be one object of education to shew that such acts as these are really wrong, and thus to enlist the general voice of society on the side of law and reason.

And here it may be observed that the social standard, as applied to conduct, may often be advantageously corrected not only by what is strictly called the moral standard, derived from or approved by our own reflexion, but also by the legal standard. For, as I have said elsewhere, 'the laws of a country express, as a rule, the sentiments of the wisest and most experienced of its citizens, and hence we might naturally expect that they would be in advance of the average moral sentiment of the people, as well as of the social traditions of particular professions or classes.' Progressive Morality, pp. 14, 15.

CHAPTER V.

On Moral Approbation and Disapprobation.

Objects of the *feelings* thus denominated. Analysis of the entire process. Peculiar attributes ascribed to the Moral Faculty. Variation of the Moral Sentiment. Functions of the Moral Faculty.

IN the last chapter the group of feelings considered were all various forms or degrees of the Love of Approbation or Fear of Disapprobation. But I did not enter, except incidentally in one or two cases, on the consideration of the various kinds of acts or qualities which might be the object of those feelings. Now these acts or qualities, it is plain, might be of the most different description; such, for instance, as personal appearance, prowess, skill, industry, the possession of power or wealth, literary, artistic, or intellectual ability, and innumerable others. But one kind of these acts and qualities is so important, and so intimately concerns the moralist, that, when approbation and disapprobation are applied to them, they receive the specific names of moral approbation and moral disapprobation. The acts in question are those we denominate right or wrong; the qualities are those which constitute the moral character. Of such acts and qualities, and of the feelings with which we regard them, much has already been said incidentally in the preceding chapters. But in this and the next chapter, I shall proceed more formally and expressly to consider, first, the nature of Moral Approbation and Disapprobation strictly so called;

and, subsequently, the character of those acts and qualities which we denominate right and wrong, or, in other words, the nature of the idea of Rectitude. The problem in both cases is really the same, but it will be advantageous to approach it from different sides.

In the present chapter, the object of enquiry will be the nature of Moral Approbation and Disapprobation. And it will be convenient to consider, first, the characteristics of those actions or qualities which are the objects of the feelings thus denominated, including our relative estimate of the motives and results of actions; secondly, the analysis of the entire process of moral approbation or disapprobation; thirdly, the explanation of various peculiarities which are commonly ascribed to the Moral Faculty, such as its authoritativeness, its absoluteness, its supremacy, its immediacy; fourthly, a circumstance which appears to be inconsistent with these attributes, the varying character of our moral judgments, or, as it is generally phrased, the variation of the moral sentiment; and, finally the several functions of the Moral Faculty.

(1) I shall begin with the question: What are the characteristics of those actions or qualities which elicit the feelings of moral approbation or disapprobation?

All those acts[1], it seems to me (and from the charac-

[1] The following pages (pp. 181–194) have been adapted, with slight modifications, from Chap. 3 of my 'Progressive Morality.' It must be distinctly borne in mind that, in this first section, I am engaged only with the *feelings* of Moral Approbation and Disapprobation; the analysis of the entire process being deferred to the second section. At the same time, in attempting to determine the objects to which the feelings attach themselves, it is impossible to avoid all consideration of the judgments on which such feelings are consequent, or which are implicated with them. It should also be remarked that, in the discussion which immediately follows, I have in mind only the particular acts of individual persons, or of definite aggregates of persons, and not large classes of actions, considered in the abstract, a distinction the importance of which will be pointed out subsequently. See pp. 195, 196.

teristics of the acts those of the qualities, which give birth to them, can easily be inferred), which elicit a distinctively moral feeling have been the result of some conflict amongst the various appetites, desires, and affections, or, to adopt the more ordinary phraseology, of a conflict of motives. We neither approve nor disapprove of acts with regard to which there seems to have been little or no choice, which appear to have resulted naturally from the pre-existing circumstances. It is difficult to see, if there are no considerations present to a man's mind inducing him to act wrongly, why we should praise him for acting rightly; or, contrariwise, why, if there are no considerations present to his mind inducing him to act rightly, we should blame him for acting wrongly. When the good or evil inducements have been eliminated by the formation, respectively, of a bad or a good habit, it seems to me (as I shall presently state more fully) that the proper object of our blame or praise is the habit or character and not the act; or, in other words, the permanent moral condition and not the volition immediately preceding action.

Another characteristic of acts which we praise or blame, in the case of others, or approve or disapprove, on reflexion, in our own case, seems to be that they must possess some importance. The great majority of our acts are too trivial to merit any notice, such as is implied in a moral judgment. When a man makes way for another in the street, or refrains from eating or drinking more than is good for him, neither he nor the bystander probably ever thinks of regarding the act as a meritorious one. It is taken as a matter of course, though the opposite conduct might, under certain circumstances, be of sufficient importance to incur censure. It is impossible here, as in most other cases where we speak of 'importance,' to draw a definite line, but it may at least be laid down that an

act, in order to be regarded as moral or immoral, must be of sufficient importance to arrest attention, and stimulate reflexion.

Thus far, then, we have arrived at the conclusion that acts which are the objects of moral approbation and disapprobation must have a certain importance, and must be the result of a certain amount of conflict between different motives. But we have not as yet attempted to detect any principle of discrimination between those acts which are the objects of praise or approbation and those which are the objects of censure or disapprobation. Now it seems to me that such a principle may be found in the fact that all those acts of others which we praise or those acts of ourselves which, on reflexion, we approve involve some amount of sacrifice, whereas all those acts of others which we blame, or those acts of ourselves which, on reflexion, we disapprove involve some amount of self-indulgence. The conflict is between a man's own lower and higher good, or between his own good and the greater good of others, or, in certain cases, as we shall see presently, between the lesser good of some, reinforced by considerations of self-interest or partiality, and the greater good of others, not so reinforced, or even, occasionally, between the pleasure or advantage of others and a disproportionate injury to himself; and he who, in the struggle, gives the preference to the former of these motives usually becomes the object of censure or, on reflexion, of self-disapprobation, while he who gives the preference to the latter becomes the object of praise or, on reflexion, of self-approbation. I shall endeavour to illustrate this position by a few instances mostly taken from common life. We praise a man who, by due economy, makes decent provision for himself in old age, as we blame a man who fails to do so. Quite apart from any public or social

considerations, we admire and applaud in the one man the power of self-restraint and the habit of foresight, which enable him to subordinate his immediate gratifications to his larger interests in the remote future, and to forego sensual and passing pleasures for the purpose of preserving his self-respect and personal independence in later life. And we admire and applaud him still more, if to these purely self-regarding considerations he adds the social one of wishing to avoid becoming a burden on his family or his friends or the public. Just in the same way, we condemn the other man, who, rather than sacrifice his immediate gratification, will incur the risk of forfeiting his self-respect and independence in after years as well as of making others suffer for his improvidence. A man who, by the exercise of similar economy and forethought, makes provision for his family or relations we esteem still more than the man who simply makes provision for himself, because the sacrifice of passing pleasures is generally still greater, and because there is also, in this case, a total sacrifice of all self-regarding interests, except, perhaps, self-respect and reputation, for the sake of others. Similarly, the man who has a family or relations dependent upon him, and who neglects to make future provision for them, deservedly incurs our censure far more than the man who merely neglects to make provision for himself, because his self-indulgence has to contend against the full force of the social as well as the higher self-regarding motives, and its persistence is, therefore, the less excusable.

I will next take the familiar case of a trust, voluntarily undertaken, but involving considerable trouble to the trustee, a case of a much more complicated character than the last. If the trustee altogether neglects or does not devote a reasonable amount of attention to the affairs

of the trust, there is no doubt that, besides any legal penalties which he may incur, he merits moral censure. Rather than sacrifice his own ease or his own interests, he violates the obligation which he has undertaken and brings inconvenience, or possibly disaster, to those whose interests he has bound himself to protect. But the demands of the trust may become so excessive as to tax the time and pains of the trustee to a far greater extent than could ever have been anticipated, and to interfere seriously with his other employments. In this case no reasonable person, I presume, would censure the trustee for endeavouring, even at some inconvenience or expense to the persons for whose benefit the trust existed, to release himself from his obligation or to devolve part of the work on a professional adviser. While, however, the work connected with the trust did not interfere with other obligations or with the promotion of the welfare of others, no one, I imagine, would censure the trustee for continuing to perform it, to his own inconvenience or disadvantage, if he chose to do so. His neighbours might, perhaps, say that he was foolish, but they would hardly go to the length of saying that he acted wrongly. Neither, on the other hand, would they be likely to praise him, as the sacrifice he was undergoing would be out of proportion to the good attained by it, and the interests of others to which he was postponing his own interests would not be so distinctly greater as to warrant the act of self-effacement. But now let us suppose that, in attending to the interests of the trust, he is neglecting the interests of others who have a nearer claim upon him, or impairing his own efficiency as a public servant or a professional man. If the interests thus at stake were plainly much greater than those of the trust, as they might well be, the attitude of neutrality would soon be converted into

one of positive censure, unless he took means to extricate himself from the difficulty in which he was placed.

The supposition just made illustrates the fact that the moral feelings may attach themselves not only to cases in which the collision is between a man's own higher and lower good, or between his own good and that of another, but also to those in which the competition is entirely between the good of others. It may be worth while to illustrate this last class of cases by another example. I will take one from the very familiar instance of a man having to appoint to, or vote in the election to, a vacant office or situation. The interests of the public service or of some institution require that the most competent candidate should be preferred. But a relative, or a friend, or a political ally is standing. Affection, therefore, or friendship, or loyalty to party ties often dictates one course of conduct, and regard for the public interests another. When the case is thus plainly stated, there are probably few men who would seriously maintain that we ought to subordinate the wider to the narrower considerations; and still, in practice, there are few men who have the courage to act constantly on what is surely the right principle in this matter, and, what is worse still, even if they did, they would not always be sustained by public opinion, while they would be almost certain to be condemned by the circle in which they move. So frequently do the difficulties of this position recur, that I have often heard a shrewd friend observe that no man who was fit for the exercise of patronage would ever desire to be entrusted with it. The moral rule in ordinary cases is plain enough; it is to appoint or vote for the candidate who is most competent to fulfil the duties of the post to be filled up. There are exceptional cases in which it may be allowable slightly to modify this rule, as where it is desirable to

encourage particular services, or particular nationalities, or the like, but, even in these cases, the rule of superior competency ought to be the preponderating consideration. Parliamentary and, in a lesser degree, municipal elections, of course, form a class apart. Here, in the selection of candidates within the party, superior competency ought to be the guiding consideration, but, in the election itself, the main object being to promote or prevent the passing of certain public measures, the elector quite rightly votes for those who will give effect to his opinions, irrespectively of personal qualifications, though, even in these cases, there might be an amount of unfitness which would warrant neutrality or opposition. Peculiarly perplexing cases of competition between the rival claims of others sometimes occur in the domain of the resentful feelings which, in their purified and rationalised form, constitute the sense of justice. My servant, or a friend, or a relative, has committed a theft. Shall I prosecute him? A general regard to the public welfare undoubtedly demands that I should do so. There are few obligations more imperative on the individual citizen than that of denouncing and prosecuting crime. But, in the present case, there is the personal tie, involving the obligation of protection and assistance. This tie, obviously, must count for something, as a rival consideration. No man, except under the most extreme circumstances, would prosecute his wife, or his father, or his mother. The question, then, is how far this consideration is to count against the other, and much must, evidently, depend on the degree of relationship or of previous intimacy, the time and amount and kind of service, and the like. A similar conflict of motives arises when the punishment invoked would entail the culprit's ruin, or that of his wife or family or others who are dependent upon him. It is impossible, in cases of this kind,

to lay down beforehand any strict rules of conduct, and the rectitude of the decision must largely turn on the experience, skill, and honesty of the person who attempts to resolve the difficulty.

Instances of the last division, where the conflict is between the pleasure or advantage of others and a disproportionate injury to oneself, are of comparatively infrequent occurrence. It is not often that a man hesitates sufficiently between his own manifest disadvantage and the small gains or pleasures of his neighbours to make this class of cases of much importance to the moralist. As a rule, we may be trusted to take care of ourselves, and other people credit us sufficiently with this capacity not to trade very much upon the weakness of mere good-nature, however much they may trade upon our ignorance and folly. The most familiar example, perhaps, of acts of imprudence of the kind here contemplated is to be found in the facility with which some people yield to social temptations, as where they drink too much, or bet, or play cards, when they know that they will most likely lose their money, out of a feeling of mere good fellowship; or where, from the mere desire to amuse others, they give entertainments which are beyond their means. The gravest example is to be found in certain cases of seduction. Instances of men making large and imprudent sacrifices of money for inadequate objects are very rare, and are rather designated as foolish than wrong. With regard to all the failings and offences which fall under this head, it may be remarked that, from their false show of generosity, society is apt to treat them too venially, except where they entail degradation or disgrace. If it be asked how actions of this kind, seeing that they are done out of some regard to others, can be described as involving self-indulgence, or the resistance to them can be looked on in the light

of sacrifice, it may be replied that the conflict is between a feeling of sociality or a spirit of over-complaisance or the like, on the one side, and a man's self-respect or a regard to his own highest interests, on the other, and that some natures find it much easier to yield to the former than to maintain the latter. It is quite possible that the spirit of sacrifice may be exhibited in the maintenance, against temptation, of a man's own higher interests, and the spirit of self-indulgence in weakly yielding to a perverted sympathy or an exaggerated regard for the opinions of others.

Before concluding this division of the subject, there are a few objections to be met and explanations to be made. In the first place, it may be objected that the theory I have adopted, that the moral feeling is excited only where there has been a conflict of motives, runs counter to the ordinary view, that acts proceeding from a virtuous or vicious habit are done without any struggle and almost without any consciousness of their import. I do not at all deny that a habit may become so perfect that the acts proceeding from it cease to involve any struggle between conflicting motives (though it is, of course, always itself the result of such struggles in the past); but, in this case, I conceive that our approbation or disapprobation is transferred from the individual acts to the habit from which they spring, and that what we really applaud or condemn is the character rather than the actions, or at least the actions simply as indicative of the character. And the reason that we often praise or blame acts proceeding from habit more than acts proceeding from momentary impulse or immediately precedent deliberation is that we associate such acts with a good or evil character, which we regard as potentially productive of numberless acts of the same kind, and as, therefore, of far more importance than an individual action determined by temporary causes.

It may possibly have occurred to the reader to ask why, in treating of moral approbation and disapprobation, I have referred usually to the social sanction of praise and blame rather than to the distinctively moral sanction of self-approbation and self-disapprobation. I have employed this language solely for the sake of convenience, and to avoid the cumbrous phraseology which the employment of the other phrases would sometimes have occasioned. In a civilised and educated community, the social sentiment may, on almost all points except those which involve obscure or delicate considerations of morality, be taken to be identical with the moral sentiment of the most reflective members of the society, and hence in the tolerably obvious instances which I have selected there was no need to draw any distinction between the two, and I have felt myself at liberty to be guided purely by considerations of convenience. All that I have said of the praise or blame, the applause or censure, of others, of course, admits of being transferred to the feelings with which, on reflexion, we regard our own acts.

I am aware that the expressions, 'higher and lower good,' 'greater and lesser good,' are more or less vague. But the traditional acceptation of the terms sufficiently fixes their meaning to enable them to serve as a guide to moral conduct and moral feeling, especially when modified by the experience and reflexion of men who have given habitual attention to the working of their own motives and the results of their own practice. As I shall shew in the next chapter, any terms which we employ to designate the test of moral action and the objects of the moral feeling are indefinite, and must depend, to some extent, on the subjective interpretation of the individual. All that we can do is to avail ourselves of the most adequate and intelligible terms that we can

find. But, admitting the necessary indefiniteness of the terms, it may be asked whether it can really be meant, as a general proposition, that the praise of others and our approbation of ourselves, on reflexion, attach to acts in which we subordinate our own good to the greater good of others, however slight the preponderance of our neighbour's good over our own may be. If we have to undergo an almost equal risk in order to save another, or, in order to promote another's interests, to forego interests almost as great, is not our conduct more properly designated as weak or quixotic, than noble or generous? This would not, I think, be the answer of mankind at large to the question, or that of any person whose moral sentiments had been developed under healthy influences. When a man, at the risk of his own life, saves another from drowning, or, at a similar risk, protects his comrade in battle, or, rushing into the midst of a fire, attempts to rescue the helpless victims, surely the feeling of the bystanders is that of admiration, and not of pity or contempt. When a man, with his life in his hands, goes forth on a missionary or a philanthropic enterprise, like Xavier, or Henry Martyn, or Howard, or Livingstone, or Patteson, or when a man, like Frederick Vyner, insists on transferring his own chance of escape from a murderous gang of brigands to his married friend, humanity at large rightly regards itself as his debtor, and ordinary men feel that their very nature has been ennobled and exalted by his example. But it is not only these acts of widely recognised heroism that exact a response from mankind. In many a domestic circle, there are men and women, who habitually sacrifice their own ease and comfort to the needs of an aged or sick or helpless relative, and, surely, it is not with scorn for their weakness that their neighbours, who know their privations, regard them, but with

sympathy and respect for their patience and self-denial. The pecuniary risks and sacrifices which men are ready to make for one another, in the shape of sureties and bonds and loans and gifts, are familiar to us all, and, though these are often unscrupulously wrung from a thoughtless or over-pliant good-nature, yet there are many instances in which men knowingly, deliberately, and at considerable danger or loss to themselves, postpone their own security or convenience to the protection or relief of their friends. It is in cases of this kind, perhaps, that the line between weakness and generosity is most difficult to draw, and, where a man has others dependent on him for assistance or support, the weakness which yields to the solicitations of a reckless or unscrupulous friend may become positively culpable.

The last class of instances will be sufficient to shew that it is not always easy to determine where the good of others is greater than our own. Nor is it ever possible to determine this question with mathematical exactness. Men may, therefore, be at least excused if, before sacrificing their own interests or pleasures, they require that the good of others for which they make the sacrifice shall be plainly preponderant. And, even then, there is a wide margin between the acts which we praise for their heroism, or generosity, or self-denial, and those which we condemn for their baseness, or meanness, or selfishness. It must never be forgotten, in the treatment of questions of morality, that there is a large number of acts which we neither praise nor blame, and this is emphatically the case where the competition is between a man's own interests and those of his neighbours. We applaud generosity; we censure meanness: but there is a large intermediate class of acts which can neither be designated as generous nor mean. It will be observed that, in my enumeration of

the classes of acts to which praise and blame, self-approbation and self-disapprobation attach, I have carefully drawn a distinction between the invariable connexion which obtains between certain acts and the ethical approval of ourselves or others, and the only general connexion which obtains between the omission of those acts and the ethical feeling of disapproval. Simply to fall short of the ethical standard which we approve usually neither merits nor receives censure, though there is a degree of deficiency, determined roughly by society at large and by each individual for himself, at which this indifference is converted into positive condemnation. A like neutral zone of acts which we neither applaud nor condemn, of course, exists also in the case of acts which simply affect ourselves or simply affect others, though it does not seem to be so extensive as in the case where the conflict of motives is between the interests of others and those of ourselves.

It should also be remarked that, in all societies, and specially in civilised societies, there is a certain average standard of conduct, the observance of which is pre-supposed, and, consequently, under ordinary circumstances, excites no attention, and, thus, elicits no conscious feeling of approbation; while, on the other hand, its breach would excite marked attention, and, thus, elicit marked reprobation. I do not praise a guest, or even a waiter, because he has not carried away any of my silver spoons, though I should express my condemnation loudly enough, were he to do so. It is, perhaps, needless to add that this average standard varies within very wide limits, so that acts or forbearances which in one age, or country, or social circle, are 'a matter of course' and attract no attention, may, in another, be exceptional, and so become the objects of praise or blame.

To sum up the results now arrived at, I may repeat that

we praise, in the case of others, and approve, in our own case, all those actions (provided they be of sufficient importance to arrest our attention and stimulate our reflexion), in which a man subordinates his own lower to his higher good, or his own good to the greater good of others, or, when the interests only of others are at stake, the lesser good of some to the greater good of others, as well as, under certain circumstances, those actions in which he refuses to subordinate his own greater good to the lesser good of others; while we blame, in the case of others, and disapprove, in our own case, all those actions of the above kind, in which he manifestly and distinctly (for there is a large neutral zone of actions, which we neither applaud nor condemn) subordinates his own higher to his lower good, or the greater good of others to his own lesser good, or, where the interests only of others are at stake, the greater good of some to the lesser good of others, or, lastly, under certain circumstances, the greater good of himself to the lesser good of others, especially where that greater good is the good of his higher nature.

Though the idea of Rectitude will not be subjected to any express examination, till we arrive at the next chapter, it should here be stated that those actions which I have been describing as the objects of Moral Approbation, whether in the case of ourselves or that of others, are denominated *right*, and, similarly, those which I have been describing as the objects of Moral Disapprobation, are denominated *wrong*.

Before proceeding further, it is desirable here to make a few remarks on a question which has much vexed and divided writers on Moral Philosophy, namely, whether the character of an action should be estimated by its motives or its results, or partly by the one and partly by the other. But I must first say a few words on the meaning of the terms themselves. By the results of an action, is meant,

of course, not the accidental results, which no ordinary foresight could have anticipated, and for which the agent cannot fairly be held to be responsible; but those results only which are the natural and calculable consequences of the *intention*, that is, of the volition immediately preceding the overt act. Thus, if I fire a gun at random down a frequented street, and any one happens to be killed or wounded by my act, I am undoubtedly responsible for my criminal recklessness; but if I fire it in the middle of a desert, and some one, who happens to be skulking in a pit, is struck by the shot, however much I may regret the occurrence, I can hardly, with justice, blame myself or be blamed by others. The results, in the latter case, are not such as are recognised either by law or morality. Again, the word 'motive' admits of an ambiguity, which ought to be noticed, though it will not be found to affect the subject now under consideration. Sometimes it is employed to signify the end or object which the agent has in view, sometimes the appetite, desire, affection, or moral habitude which prompts him to seek that end. Thus we say, almost indifferently, that a man's motive is selfishness, or to aggrandise himself, or, more specifically, to make money or reputation; that it is compassion, or to relieve misery, or to alleviate the sufferings of some particular person; that it is ambition, or to obtain some place or honour. But, in either sense of the word, the distinction between motives and results seems to be the same. Now, in attempting to determine the question at issue, it is most important to distinguish between large classes of actions, such as murder, theft, lying, fulfilment of contracts, reciprocation of benefits, and the like, considered, as it were, in the abstract, and the particular acts of individual persons or of definite aggregates of persons. In the former case, the motives being so different in different instances, and

often so complex or obscure, abstraction is made of them, as of special circumstances, and the attention, in judging of the acts as a class, is directed exclusively, or almost exclusively, to the results. Murder and lying, for instance, regarded as classes of acts, seem to be reprobated on account of their pernicious consequences, with little or no regard to the motives which usually give birth to them. But, when we come to the particular acts of individual persons or of definite aggregates of persons (which alone I have thus far considered in this chapter, the general classes of acts coming more naturally into consideration in the next chapter, where the discussion will assume a more objective form), it seems to me impossible, in forming our judgment, to keep out of sight either the predominant motive or motives, on the one side, or, on the other, the results, that is, the consequences resulting, either to the agent himself or to others, from the choice of goods or evils which he makes. If a man builds a hospital, out of sheer vanity, I cannot, in sincerity, profess much admiration for his act. If, on the other hand, he builds an almshouse, which encourages laziness and thriftlessness, I cannot, however benevolent his motives, regard his act as a commendable one. There seems to be a point at which the agent becomes morally responsible for defective intelligence and insufficient foresight. And, indeed, wherever the calculable results of an action, as above explained, are pernicious, this very fact is a proof either that the motives are not properly rationalised, or not properly co-ordinated one with another; or else that the agent fails either in that sustained patience or that mental capacity which is requisite to forecast the proper means to his ends or to trace the various consequences of his actions. Thus, the experience of the consequences, whether of our own actions or of those of others, ought to be continually

corrective of defects both in our motives and our intelligence, and, if it be not so, the fact is usually a sign of either indifference, thoughtlessness, or obstinacy. Except, therefore, in the one case of natural intellectual deficiency, there always seems to be, in the agent himself, some preventable cause of pernicious action. And hence it is that the common sense of mankind seems hardly ever altogether to condone acts, the results of which are plainly and unmistakeably harmful, and, I think, never positively to commend them. At the same time, it admits the excellence of motives as an extenuating circumstance. In both these courses it finds its expression in the Law, which, though it quite rightly refuses to take account of motives in determining the criminality of an act, admits their consideration in mitigation of sentence.

As excellence of motive extenuates, so badness of motive intensifies, our condemnation of pernicious action. In like manner, the better the motive or motives, the more we praise beneficial action; while I question whether we ever really commend it, though by many men it may be condoned, when the motives, which gave rise to it, have been ascertained to be unquestionably evil. The detection of a venial motive, like vanity, however, may not be inconsistent with the award of a certain amount of praise to an act which is recognised as distinctly beneficial.

Before dismissing this subject, there are one or two observations which it seems important to make. One is that our motives are very frequently mixed, and, in those cases, it is often very difficult to disentangle them—an additional reason why men, in general, are apt to look rather to the consequences of the acts than the motives of the agents. Another is that, in judging of the actions and principles of men in other times, countries, and circumstances, we ought, as far as possible, to put ourselves in their place,

and not only consider the maxims and courses of action adapted to their position but also limit our requirements to what might fairly be expected from them. In that case, I think, we should come to attach more importance to their motives than to the consequences of their acts, and, in some instances, even to approve their actions and principles, though, from our present stand-point, we see that they were attended with evil results. Lastly, in admitting the consideration of motives as partially determining the moral character of particular acts, it is necessary to state that I am not recognising two ultimate tests of conduct, but only employing the same test in two different applications. Motives, so it seems to me, can only be called good or bad, in any intelligible sense, because they tend to produce good or evil, that is to say, beneficial or pernicious, actions; or, to put it in what is perhaps a more precise form, because what is called a good motive, like gratitude or self-respect, has a tendency to produce beneficial rather than pernicious actions, and what is called a bad motive, like envy or avarice, has a tendency to produce pernicious rather than beneficial actions. If we found a motive, ordinarily reputed as good, frequently giving rise to pernicious actions, we should soon, I think, recognise a new variety of it with a dyslogistic name, as, in fact, has actually been the case with misplaced and perverted sympathy.

(2) I now proceed to enquire: what is the analysis of the entire process of moral approbation or disapprobation? For the process is obviously not a simple one. The feeling, of which I have just been attempting to determine the objects, plainly implies a previous act of comparison and judgment, as is clearly shewn by the instances which have been selected in illustration of its operation. Hence the entire process of moral approbation or disapprobation

admits of analysis into at least two elements (which may be briefly designated as a moral judgment and a moral feeling), namely, an act of judgment on the character of the action, and a feeling of satisfaction or dissatisfaction, of approval or disapproval, consequent upon the judgment. If an action or quality is deemed right, it at once and inevitably excites a feeling of approval or satisfaction; if wrong, of disapproval or dissatisfaction.

But this analysis, though of great importance, by no means furnishes a complete solution of the difficulties. There still remain the questions, What is the nature of the ultimate feeling of approval or disapproval, and What is the character of the process which results in the moral judgment.

It will be convenient, first, to consider the latter of these questions, and the best mode of approaching it will be to take some concrete instances.

Take an act of cruelty. We have no hesitation in pronouncing such an act to be wrong, but how do we arrive at the judgment? We see, say, one man commit a brutal and unprovoked assault on another. This conduct excites the feeling of sympathy with the sufferer, of resentment against the offender, and, perhaps, by means of association, of fear or insecurity with regard to our own position. In this case, all these feelings combine to produce moral reprobation of the act. The feelings are all justified on reflexion, when we consider the circumstances and consequences of the act, and we deliberately regard it as morally wrong, and worthy of punishment.

Take, again, an act of self-sacrifice undertaken for some adequate end, as, for instance, where one man risks his own life for the sake of saving that of another. Here there is excited a feeling of admiration for the man who risks his life, of gratitude, when we put ourselves in the place of the man who is saved, and of faith, so to speak, in human

nature, when we perceive the capacity and willingness of men to help one another. As in the former case, all these feelings operate in the same direction; only that, instead of reprobation, they produce approbation of the act. They are all justified on reflexion, and our deliberate judgment on the act is that it is virtuous and praiseworthy.

Now, let us take some acts which excite more mixed feelings. A man, say, spends his money liberally, and with the best intentions, but does a good deal of harm by his indiscriminate charity. Here we sympathise with the kindly feeling which prompts the acts of generosity, and admire the self-denial which makes them possible; but, when we trace the consequences, we cannot but regret, and sometimes even we resent or despise, the want of foresight which took no account of the ulterior mischiefs likely to result. If the foresight was such as we might reasonably expect to have been exercised, and still more if we suppose that the person himself had any suspicion of the tendency of his acts, the feeling of resentment may become really strong, and our final judgment may be adverse rather than favourable to its object. In the case of the agent's conduct being clearly productive of more harm than good, our judgment could not, I think, be distinctly favourable; at most it would be neutral, the excellence of the motives, even though insufficiently enlightened, being allowed, under the special circumstances, to condone the pernicious consequences of the acts[1] and the want of forethought thereby evidenced. But, whatever the nature of the judgment, it is plain that it will be preceded by conflicting feelings, and formed on a review of

[1] I am, of course, not including such cases as those of charitable bequests which, from sheer alteration of circumstances, have come to be attended with effects different from those contemplated by the donor. In such cases, what may be called the historical sense comes in, and we measure the act by the circumstances of his time and not of our own.

opposing considerations. The judgment, if sufficiently decisive, will be followed by a feeling of approbation or disapprobation, as in the former instances, though it is probable that, owing to the comparative difficulty of arriving at a decision, it will be far weaker in degree.

Again, take the case of a person perpetrating a crime through an intense feeling of sympathy for others, as where a daughter enables her father to escape from prison, or a mother steals food for her famishing children; or the case of immoderate revenge, executed not on one's own behalf, but on that of a friend; or the case of a man sacrificing his own interests, or those of his family, for some public object. All these cases will excite mixed feelings, and the final act of judgment, which may be arrived at only after considerable hesitation, will be the resultant of these feelings or rather of the judgments with which they are inextricably blended. It is plain, too, that different persons may arrive at different judgments, and, consequently, may entertain the feeling of approbation or disapprobation for the act as a whole, according as they overlook this or that circumstance, or according as the facts of their own mental history lead them to attach a peculiar significance to this circumstance or the other.

In all these cases, as well as in the parallel cases where we reflect on past acts of our own, there are, as it would seem, no less than four stages to be distinguished. First, there is the excitement of certain, often a great variety of, nascent feelings, sometimes operating in the same, sometimes in different directions[1]. Next, each of these nascent

[1] I am not speaking here, and have not been speaking in the foregoing examples, of that previous 'conflict of motives' which seems to me to be always implied in any particular action which we denominate right or wrong, but of the feelings subsequently excited in the mind on reflexion, whether the act thus contemplated be our own or that of another. These feelings may plainly all operate in one direction, though in the state of mind which preceded the

feelings is attended by a judgment, such as that the act is prudent or imprudent, just or unjust, benevolent or malignant, wise or unwise, grateful or ungrateful, and the like. Thirdly, there is a comparison of these judgments, instantaneous, where they all fall under the common category of right or wrong, but often long, elaborate, and hesitating where they fall partly under the one category and partly under the other; fourthly, as a result of this comparison, we have a final judgment as to the character of the act, whereby it is pronounced definitively to be right or wrong, the judgment, however, being strong or weak, according as the individual judgments, of which it is the resultant, point in the same or in opposite directions. Lastly, when the intellectual process, thus analysed, is completed, there follows instantaneously and inevitably a feeling of satisfaction or dissatisfaction, approbation or disapprobation, according as the action is decided to be right or wrong. Human nature is so constituted, that there is no man in whom an act, when once regarded as wrong, does not excite a feeling of dissatisfaction, or in whom an act, when once regarded as right, does not excite a feeling of satisfaction, however liable these feelings may be to be afterwards overpowered by, and so absorbed in, others.

What then, it remains to be asked, is the nature of this ultimate feeling? Is it original, and altogether distinct from those feelings which have already been examined, or does it admit of being explained by reference to them? It seems to me that, on reflexion, we are led to adopt the

act, or the formation of the habit of which the act was the result, opposing motives were at work. Thus, to recur to the first example, a man who commits an unprovoked assault on another subordinates the feelings of sympathy and self-respect, of which no man is entirely devoid, to an innate or acquired love of cruelty; but the spectator who condemns his conduct, or even the same man, when he reflects on his own act at a later period of life, may see in it no extenuating circumstances, so as to embarrass or modify his judgment.

latter alternative. What are the classes of acts, under their most general aspect, which elicit the feelings of moral approbation and disapprobation? They are such, respectively, as promote or tend to promote, thwart or tend to thwart, the good either of ourselves or of others. Now the feelings of which these classes of acts are the direct object are the self-regarding and the sympathetic feelings (for into these the resentful and semi-social feelings can ultimately be resolved), or, as they have been sometimes called, the egoistic and altruistic feelings. When any of these feelings are gratified, we feel satisfaction; and, on the other hand, when they are thwarted, we feel dissatisfaction. These feelings of satisfaction and dissatisfaction are called reflex feelings, because they are reflected, as it were, from the objects of our desires and affections. Amongst such reflex feelings, it seems to me, are included those ultimate feelings which ensue on our moral judgments, and which are called distinctively moral approbation and disapprobation. The two classes of feelings are, however, by no means coextensive. When, for instance, we gratify the appetites of hunger or thirst, or our love of curiosity or power, we feel satisfaction, but we can hardly be said to regard the gratification of those appetites or desires with moral approval or disapproval. We perform thousands of acts, and see thousands of acts performed, every day, which never excite any moral feeling whatever. But there are few men in whom an undoubted act of kindness or generosity or resistance to temptation would not at once elicit admiration or respect, or, if they reflected on such acts in their own case, of self-approval. Now, what are the circumstances which distinguish those acts which merely cause us satisfaction from those which elicit the moral feeling of approbation? The answer to this question has already been given under the first head in this chapter, in

which I attempted to determine the specific objects of moral approval and disapproval; and reference may, accordingly, be made back to that place. Putting together the statements made in this place and that, the ultimate feeling of moral approbation may be explained as an indirect or reflex form of one or other of the sympathetic or self-regarding feelings, or of some combination of such feelings; occurring when, as the result of a moral judgment, we realise that, in matters involving, either now or previously, a conflict of motives, and of sufficient importance to warrant reflexion, one or other of these feelings, or some combination of them, has been gratified by the subordination of a lower to a higher good. It will be noticed that it is essential to the operation of this feeling that the gratification of the direct feeling should be justified on reflexion. Moral disapprobation may, of course, easily be explained, *mutatis mutandis*. By comparison with the next chapter it will be seen that I thus regard both the idea of Rectitude and the feeling of Moral Approbation of which it is the object as alike yielding to analysis.

At the same time, it should be remarked that, by constant repetition, and from the fact that the several combinations of the direct feelings as well as the circumstances of the actions, to which they attach, are of countless variety, the reflex feelings of moral approbation and disapprobation have a tendency to become dissociated, in our minds, from their antecedents, and so appear to acquire an independent and original character. The same remark, it will be found in the next chapter, also applies to the ideas of right and wrong. And thus, to those who are not accustomed to analyse their conceptions and feelings, it is a natural conclusion that the ideas of right and wrong, as well as the feelings of moral approbation and disapprobation which are appropriate to them, are simple and inexplicable.

(3) It would seem as if in common parlance, and even by some philosophical writers, the ultimate feeling, which has just been under consideration, were often regarded as the sole and exclusive function of the principle variously designated as the Moral Faculty, the Moral Sense, the Conscience, or the like. This confusion between the entire process and a part of it will account for many of the attributes which have been ascribed to these terms, and which have often been the subject of keen controversy amongst speculative moralists. Thus, for instance, it is often said that the Moral Sense, Conscience, or whatever the Moral Principle may be called, acts *instantaneously* or *immediately*. This statement is undoubtedly true, if we confine ourselves to the feeling succeeding the final act of judgment; but, if it be intended to apply to the whole process intervening between our first directing our attention to the act and the feeling of satisfaction or dissatisfaction which it ultimately excites, the statement is, at least in a great many cases, undoubtedly incorrect. There are, as we shall see presently, several instances in which the various processes recently discriminated are passed through so rapidly that they seem to form only a single process, and the action under review seems at once to excite our approval or disapproval; but this is by no means universally the case, and, even where it is the case, the various stages may be distinguished in thought, though not in time. The hesitation, however, with which we pronounce our judgments, when conflicting feelings are at work, is a matter of notoriety.

Again, the Conscience or Moral Sense or Moral Faculty is sometimes called *authoritative*, or *absolute*, or *supreme*. As none of these attributes could possibly be applicable to an uncompleted process, it is plain that, so far as they apply at all, they apply to the final act of judgment and the feeling inseparable therefrom. But we must exercise

great caution in the employment of these terms, and in the associations which we connect with them. The final decision, as it is the total result of reflexion, is, of course, authoritative. But it can only be called absolute and supreme in the sense that there is no appeal from it to any other tribunal than to the subsequent action of Conscience itself. But there always is, or ought to be, an opportunity of making this appeal back to the Conscience itself, as guided by better information and further reflexion. We are, therefore, quite justified in using these attributes as exclusive of any external authority, but we are not justified in using them as exclusive of the subsequent and more matured judgments of the Moral Faculty, sitting, as a court of appeal, on its own previous decisions [1].

That these and the like attributes, when thus limited and explained, are not inconsistent with varying degrees of certainty in the ultimate act of judgment, and with varying degrees of strength in the ultimate feeling of satisfaction or dissatisfaction, will be plain on a little reflexion. However hesitating the judgment we form, and however slight the satisfaction or dissatisfaction consequent thereon, it is, nevertheless, *our* judgment, formed to the best of our ability, and after duly reviewing all the considerations before us; attended, moreover, by a feeling, distinct, however slight, of approbation or disapprobation. There is, by the very supposition made, no appeal from this judgment and this feeling, except it be, on some future occasion and after fuller information and further reflexion, to the same tribunal. We must, for the present

[1] This paragraph must be taken as modifying, or perhaps rather as explaining, the statement made in Part I, ch. 2 (p. 55) that 'Conscience is not absolute in its moral judgments.' There is another use of the word 'absolute,' namely, as opposed to 'relative,' which is not true of Conscience in any sense. For each man's conscience is always relative to his education, circumstances, and general intelligence.

at all events, be content to abide by them, and, if need be, to act on them, as the best lights available to us. But our judgment is by no means always, or even generally, a hesitating one. It is usually enforced by all, or a large majority of, the considerations present to our minds. It is in such cases especially that its authoritative character is apparent, and that, as we hardly contemplate the possibility of its reversal, it not unnaturally offers itself to us as practically absolute and supreme.

Moreover, as already intimated, the whole process of moral approbation or disapprobation is often, to all appearance, instantaneous. When an act has been repeated frequently, we come to repeat it unconsciously. Similarly, when several acts in a series have been constantly repeated in the same order, we likewise come to repeat them unconsciously in that order. Hence, many of the moral actions or qualities which we praise or blame being exactly or almost exactly the same as those which we have frequently praised or blamed before, we run unconsciously along the various steps of the process, and it thus seems to us as if the whole process were instantaneous and immediate. So readily, in fact, do the moral actions and qualities, which occur to our minds, range themselves under classes, or associate themselves with similar actions or qualities experienced in the past, that, as life advances, we seldom have to pause before pronouncing a judgment. The danger is lest we should pronounce our judgments too much as a matter of course. The action or quality strikes us as like this, that, and the other of which we have had previous experience, and the same judgment follows instantaneously and without consideration. It is not unnatural, then, that, the majority of our moral judgments being of this kind, we should come to regard all as being so; and, hence, we have another reason for the immediate

and instantaneous character not infrequently ascribed, without exception, to our acts of moral approbation and disapprobation.

The same considerations will easily shew how the *power* or *faculty* of performing these processes came to be regarded as an original and independent aptitude of the human mind. Those who regarded the act of approbation itself as incapable of analysis would naturally suppose that we are endowed with a special faculty for performing it. And in such a supposition there is this much of truth, that mental powers and feelings, which have frequently occurred in conjunction or succession, have a tendency to coalesce, and so to assume the appearance of simplicity, where a deeper analysis will shew that there are really several parts of our nature in operation. The so-called faculties of imagination (that is to say, complex, not simple imagination) and of generalisation will afford a good illustration of what I mean.

It will be plain, from what has been said both in this chapter and elsewhere, that I regard the Moral Faculty as at once rational and emotional: forming, by means of reason, its judgments on the tendencies of actions, and determined to approval or disapproval, according as those tendencies fall in with or run counter to our conceptions of the greater good, which conceptions themselves have been determined by the interaction of the various feelings, as moderated, directed, and co-ordinated by the Reason.

(4) It will now be easy to explain what to many who have reflected on these subjects has appeared so great an anomaly and difficulty; namely that, while, in the case of any given individual at any given time, the moral sentiments seem to be immediate, unhesitating, and absolute, the qualities thus stamped with approval or disapproval

by different individuals, or even by the same individual under different circumstances or at different periods of his life, may vary within almost any assignable limits. In the first place, we must bear in mind what has already been said as to the sense in which alone these attributes can strictly be assigned to the moral sentiments[1], as well as the hesitating character which often still attaches to many of our moral judgments. Then, bearing in mind these limitations, the variety is easily explicable; it is, in fact, just what we should expect. In one man some self-regarding feeling or other, in a second some sympathetic feeling or other, in a third some resentful feeling or other, in a fourth a semi-social feeling, in a fifth some particular combination of these feelings, is predominant, and by this predominant feeling or group of feelings his conceptions of the greater and lesser good or evil, of right and wrong, are sure to be more or less affected, though, of course, they may be far from being wholly, or even mainly, determined by it. A similar explanation plainly applies to the varying judgments and sentiments of the same man under different circumstances. What a man *thinks* right at one time, he may *think* wrong at another, and, consequently, what gives him *satisfaction* at one time may give him *dissatisfaction* at another; in other words, the very same act may elicit approval at one time, disapproval at another. Now this difference is clearly owing to the different relations in which the various feelings may stand to one another at

[1] The expression 'moral sentiment' is used habitually in two senses, as the equivalent (1) of the moral feeling of approbation or disapprobation only, (2) of the entire moral process, including judgment as well as feeling. It is in the latter sense, for instance, that we speak of the 'current moral sentiment' of any given age or country, meaning the opinions then and there prevalent on moral questions, reinforced by the feeling of approbation or disapprobation. I have endeavoured (though I cannot be sure that there may not be an occasional oversight) to employ 'moral sentiments' uniformly in the former, and 'the moral sentiment' uniformly in the latter sense.

different times or under different circumstances. The character of the actions approved or disapproved will depend on the *bias* of the approver or disapprover, and this bias will depend on his mental condition at the given time. It is true, to return to the case of different men, that the moral judgments, and, consequently, the moral sentiments, of two men whose passions and affections are *duly* adjusted and under *due* control will, except so far as they are inevitably influenced by and relative to their age, country, and surroundings, be identical. And it is precisely one of the objects of moral philosophy to determine what this *due* adjustment and *due* control are. The problem can only be solved by observing and tracing the consequences, internal and external, direct and remote, of our acts and dispositions, and as this calculation can, in several cases, only be made very roughly, there must always be several cases in which the answer of the moralist is somewhat vague and faltering, but as time passes on, and as experience accumulates, and as knowledge advances, the number of such cases ought to be, and seems to be, gradually diminishing.

It, perhaps, hardly needs to be pointed out that the theory just propounded may be called indifferently a theory to account for the variation of the Moral Sentiment or a theory to account for the different ideas of Right and Wrong. Right and Wrong are, indeed, as has already been so often intimated, the specific ideas with which the Moral Sentiment is concerned.

The foregoing theory may at once be illustrated and verified by considering a few examples of the singular divergences of ethical custom and opinion which have obtained in different countries and at different stages of civilisation.

In savage life we encounter the greatest variety in the

moral sentiment. Not only do the moral ideas of savages differ materially, as we might expect, from those of barbaric or civilised races, but they shew the most considerable divergences amongst themselves. It is usually impossible to predicate this or that moral idea of savages in general. 'Among travellers abroad as well as philosophers at home,' says Dr. Tylor, in a very valuable paper contributed to the Contemporary Review for April, 1873, 'there appear two contradictory opinions as to the moral state of savages. On the one hand, the ugliest stories are told to prove them brutal, filthy, licentious, false, and cruel; on the other hand, there is pictured the simple idyllic life of the noble savage, man in the happy state of nature. The reason why notions so opposite should have arisen and maintained themselves, is mainly that there is truth in both. Looking toward the worst side of the picture, it is easy to collect a museum of repulsive traits. Think of the shivering limpet-pickers of Tierra del Fuego, sparing their dogs in famine time and eating their old women, because the dogs could catch otters and the old women could not,—or of the heavy-witted dwellers in the luxuriant forests of the Amazons, whose brutish indifference is only stirred to its depths by the craving for murderous revenge or the mad drunken orgies of the moonlight dance, —or of North American warriors standing round to watch the women and children prolong hour after hour with curious ingenuity the agonies of the tortured captive at the stake. Yet these may be balanced by many a story of the attractive traits of wild men's life. Among American Indians, hospitality is a sacred duty. In the Mandan hut the pot was always boiling, and the hungry might come for meals at will; the lazy loafer who would not hunt for himself was despised, yet no one disputed his claim to sit and eat. It was thus also in South Africa. Among the

Hottentots, he who had anything to divide would give till he had but a morsel left, and, though their food were hardly enough for themselves, they would call passers-by to partake. The thrifty Hollanders showed some surprise at the black men's freehandedness, but their explanation was simple and conclusive, "Dit is Hottentots Manier," "'Tis Hottentots' fashion." Or again, it seems to us a gentle touch in the old German poem, where Crimhilt's rose-garden was fenced in with a single silken thread:—

"Sie het ein anger weite, mit rosen wol bekleit,
Darumb so gieng ein maure, ein seiden faden fein."

Can modern days show any land so honest, that such slight fence can keep the garden against thieves? Yes, among the rude Juris of South America, Martius the Bavarian traveller saw gaps in the hedges round the fields mended with a single cotton thread, and the same slight barrier in times past served to hedge in the crops of the natives of Cumana[1].'

The variety of marriage laws among savages is well known. In some tribes, it is forbidden to marry without the tribe, in others to marry within it. In some tribes polygamy, in others polyandry is the established rule[2].

Again, in some savage tribes the greatest care is taken of the aged and infirm, while in others it is a moral duty to kill, and in some to eat, them. 'On the whole,' says Dr. Tylor, 'the lower races maintain their old folks after they have fallen into useless imbecility, treating them with respectful and even tender considerateness, and among many tribes continuing this care till death. Among many tribes, however, filial kindness breaks down earlier. Such care of the incurable infirm seems too burdensome under

[1] pp. 703, 4.

[2] See Sir John Lubbock's Origin of Civilisation, ch. 3, and McLennan's Primitive Marriage.

the hand-to-mouth conditions of the rudest savagery, and it is judged best on all hands to give up the hopeless attempt to preserve a useless and suffering life. Thus South American forest tribes had brought themselves to reckon the killing of the sick and aged a family duty, and in some cases they simply ate them. We realize the situation fairly among nomade hunting tribes, where the strain of actual necessity is irresistible. The clan must move in quest of game, the poor failing creature cannot keep up in the march, the hunters and the heavy laden women cannot carry him, he must be left behind. Many a traveller has beheld in the desert such heart-rending scenes as Catlin saw when he said farewell to the white-haired old Puncah chieftain, all but blind, and shrunk to skin and bone, crouched shivering by a few burning sticks, for his shelter a buffalo hide set up on crotches, for his food a dish of water and a few half-picked bones. This poor old warrior was abandoned by his own wish, when his tribe started for new hunting-grounds, even as years before, he said, he had left his own father to die, when he was no longer good for anything. It appears from classic records that various barbaric peoples in Asia and Europe kept up the savage practice within historical times. Such were the Massagetæ, of whom Herodotus relates that when a man is extremely old, his assembled relations slay him and boil him with other meat for a feast, holding this the happiest kind of death; or the Sardinians, whose law, according to Ælian, was for the sons to kill with clubs their aged fathers, and bury them, considering it shameful to live on in bodily decrepitude. When a nation settled in the agricultural state has reached a moderate degree of wealth and comfort, there is no longer the excuse of necessity to justify slaying of the aged. Yet the practice may still go on, partly from the humane intent of putting

an end to lingering misery, but perhaps more through survival of a custom inherited from harder and ruder times. This is well marked among our Aryan race. Slavonic nations continued even after their conversion to Christianity to put the aged and infirm to death, while among the Wends it is asserted that there was practised, as among the Massagetæ, the hideous rite of cooking and eating them. Old Scandinavian tradition tells of the worn-out warriors setting out for Walhalla by leaping from the *ätternis stapi* or "family rock;" while in Sweden, up to A. D. 1600, there were still kept in churches certain clumsy ancient clubs, known as *ätta-klubbor*, or "family clubs," wherewith in old days the aged and hopelessly sick were solemnly killed by their kinsfolk[1].'

Amongst all savage races revenge, often taking the form of a wild and perverted sense of justice, is a far more dominant feeling than among civilised nations. In all savage races, too, the maxim 'Thou shalt love thy neighbour and hate thine enemy' seems to obtain with full force, the neighbour being identified with those who are of the same tribe or clan, the enemy with those who are outside it. Hence it is that among savage tribes it appears to hold universally that theft and homicide, while forbidden and severely punished, if practised within the limits of the clan, are not only allowed but encouraged and often rewarded, when the members of other clans are the victims. To quote once more from Dr. Tylor's interesting article: 'The teaching of the law of theft among the lower races is similar. Read the account of that fierce South American race, the Mbayas, whose pride and glory and prosperity were fed by the slaughter and plunder of other tribes. These warriors claimed divine sanction for their freebooting life; the Great Eagle, they said, had bidden them

[1] Contemporary Review for April 1873, pp. 704, 5.

to live by making war on all other tribes, slaying the men, taking the women for wives, and carrying off the goods. Or for an instance from Africa, read the description of a Zulu party who have stealthily crept upon a distant village and massacred men, women, and children, returning with exulting hearts and loads of plunder from the ransacked kraal flaring on the horizon behind them. Yet both Mbayas and Zulus, within their own tribe-limits, have their definite moral obligations as to property. Their law, "thou shalt not steal," applies only to tribesmen and allies, not to strangers and enemies. It is well known that many North American tribes had a high standard of honesty among themselves, but this standard simply was not held to apply to foreigners, and especially to the white men, whom they thought it no shame to rob or cheat[1]. Mr. Sproat puts this well in describing the Ahts of British Columbia. An article placed in an Indian's charge on his good faith is perfectly safe, yet thieving is a common vice where the property of other tribes or of white men is concerned. But, he says, it would be unfair to regard thieving among these savages as culpable in the same degree as among ourselves; for they have no moral or social law forbidding thieving, *i.e.*, intertribal thieving, which has been commonly practised for generations. Here then we find well-marked among savages the ethical stage of the ancient Germans in Cæsar's famous description; "larcenies beyond the bounds of each community have no infamy, but are recommended as a means of exercising the youth and of diminishing sloth." As Lord Kames justly observes, this was precisely the case of the Highlanders of Scotland till they were brought into subjection after the

[1] I cannot refrain from adding, as an illustration, that, similarly, schoolboys are often guided by an entirely different code of honour in their dealings with their masters from that which they observe among themselves.

rebellion of 1745. The same causes act among certain classes or communities within the state, who, united by bonds of their own, look upon their fellow-citizens outside as foreigners. Our government has been of late engaged in putting down the criminal clans or castes of British India, clans whose moral law naturally seems to themselves virtuous, but which the authorities deem incompatible with the well-being of society. One of these clans is the Zaka Khail of the North-West Provinces, whose peculiar profession is that of digging through the walls of stables and dwellings by night in order to plunder. When a man-child is born among this clan, they consecrate it for its duty of life by the following curious symbolic ceremony: passing the baby three times through a hole dug in the house-wall, they say over him three times, "Ghal Shah!" that is to say, "Be thou a thief!" In the midst of modern civilization, the principle of honesty within limits is expressed in the maxim, "honour among thieves," and worked out in the doctrine that outsiders, strangers, foreigners, and the rich are fair game, an opinion systematically acted on by classes who have a higher standard of honesty in dealings with their relatives and friends, and even with their whole social class. All this accords with the view that the ordinance which civilized moralists proclaim in the form of a universal law against theft does not arise from a primary moral generalization, but is a product of advancing culture, the prohibition in its earlier and ruder forms applying only within the limits of the family or tribe[1].'

These divergences, whether between savage races themselves, or between savage life, as a whole, and barbaric or civilised life, may be fully accounted for from the special circumstances in which the tribes are or have been placed,

[1] pp. 715–717.

but it would carry me beyond my limits to enter on such an explanation in the present place.

The life depicted in the Homeric poems, the customs of the savage and barbaric races described by Herodotus, the Aristotelian and Stoic ideals of the virtuous or wise man, the ascetic ideal of the early Christians, the chivalric ideal of the Middle Ages, the revived Platonism of the Renaissance, the stern codes of the Puritans, the lax casuistry of the Jesuits, are all illustrations of the shifting moral sentiment of different ages, creeds, and nations, and I may add, in my own opinion, of the relation which invariably subsists between the prevailing forms of the moral sentiment and the other circumstances of any given age or country.

The chivalric ideal exercised so powerful an influence through so many ages, and presents, in many respects, such curious features, that it seems to deserve the peculiar attention of the moralist. 'There are,' says Mr. Hallam, 'three powerful spirits, which have from time to time moved over the face of the waters, and given a predominant impulse to the moral sentiments and energies of mankind. These are the spirits of liberty, of religion, and of honour. It was the principal business of chivalry to animate and cherish the last of these three. And whatever high magnanimous energy the love of liberty or religious zeal has ever imparted was equalled by the exquisite sense of honour which this institution preserved[1].' But with the very virtues of chivalry,—its valour, its frankness, its lively sense of honour, its gallantry, its magnanimity, its loyalty, its munificence, its courtesy, its alacrity to protect the weak and the wronged,—there were inextricably blended many serious defects of moral character which a more civilised and enlightened age

[1] Middle Ages, Ch. IX. Pt. II.

would, without scruple, pronounce to be vices. The gallantry of the knight had a tendency to degenerate into dissoluteness, nor were even the sanctions of religion sufficient to prevent the habitual violation of the marriage vow. An undue thirst for military renown was the natural result of a life so exclusively devoted to war. But the insufficiency of the chivalric code is, like that of all codes of honour, most apparent when the knight is brought into relation with persons of a different social grade from his own. His courtesy, his gallantry, his magnanimity, often his very munificence exist for the men and women of his own class only; he has no regard for his inferiors; towards them his attitude is simply one of indifference, if not of contempt and cruelty. This tendency of chivalry to narrow the sympathies and to widen the separation between the different classes of society is well illustrated by the following story, extracted by Mr. Hallam from Joinville, 'who was himself imbued with the full spirit of chivalry and felt like the best and bravest of his age. He is speaking of Henry count of Champagne, who acquired, says he, very deservedly, the surname of Liberal, and adduces the following proof of it. A poor knight implored of him on his knees one day as much money as would serve to marry his two daughters. One Arthault de Nogent, a rich burgess, willing to rid the count of this importunity, but rather awkward, we must own, in the turn of his argument, said to the petitioner: My lord has already given away so much that he has nothing left. Sir Villain, replied Henry, turning round to him, you do not speak truth, in saying that I have nothing left to give, when I have got yourself. Here, Sir Knight, I give you this man and warrant your possession of him. Then, says Joinville, the poor knight was not at all confounded, but seized hold of the burgess fast by the collar, and told him

he should not go till he had ransomed himself. And in the end he was forced to pay a ransom of five hundred pounds. The simple-minded writer who brings this evidence of the count of Champagne's liberality is not at all struck with the facility of a virtue that is exercised at the cost of others[1].'

I will add only one more illustration, which I will take from the varying estimate put upon the virtue of Veracity. No one can have studied ancient literature to any serious purpose, whether sacred or profane, without noticing the little attention which this virtue there receives as compared with the frequent references made to it in the conversation and literature of our own times. The prohibition of the Ninth Commandment appears to be limited to judicial cases, and, at least till he arrives at the time of the Prophets, the reader of the Old Testament must be surprised to find how little the virtue of truthfulness in general is commended, and how seldom acts of untruthfulness or deceitfulness are reprobated. The same testimony is afforded by Greek literature. The general admiration for the wily and shiftful Odysseus is appropriately illustrated by the evident surprise with which Herodotus regards the scrupulous observation of the truth which was credited to the Persians[2]. And the maxims put by the same author into the mouth of Darius[3], on the indifference

[1] Hallam's Middle Ages, Ch. IX. Pt. II.

[2] See Herodotus, I. 136, 138. In the latter passage he says *αἴσχιστον δὲ αὐτοῖσι τὸ ψεύδεσθαι νενόμισται*. It would hardly occur to an Englishman of the present day to note this fact as a peculiarity. The next basest thing, says Herodotus, amongst the Persians is to be in debt, for the note-worthy reason that it forces a man to tell lies.

The prominence assigned, amongst the Persians, to the virtue of Veracity is curiously illustrated in the Behistun Inscription. See Appendix to Rawlinson's Herodotus, vol. ii. Cp. also the eloquent encomium on Truth, represented as having been pronounced by Zerubbabel in the presence of Darius, 1 Esdras, iv. 33–42.

[3] See Herodotus, III. 72. The speech of Darius occurs in the story of the

between truth and falsehood, so long as they both conduce to the same end, probably represents but too accurately some of the contemporary ethical teaching in Greece. Plato, in his Republic, dwells more on the legitimate exceptions in favour of lying than on the general obligation to tell the truth. But, perhaps, the most remarkable proof of the comparatively low esteem in which Veracity was held by the Greeks, in the time of Aristotle and Plato, is to be found in the fact that Aristotle treats Truthfulness as only one of the secondary virtues, and even then understands by it rather truthfulness as to deportment and pretensions than what we call Veracity[1]. It is probably owing mainly to the development of commerce, and to the consequent necessity, in many cases, of absolute trustworthiness, that Veracity has come to take the prominent position which it now occupies among the virtues; though the keen sense of honour, engendered by Chivalry, may have had something to do in bringing about the same result. Among the Teutonic races, and especially amongst those of English origin, that position may be described as the primatial one, and to 'tell the truth,' as already remarked, has with us become the point of honour. How far this was from being the case even in the middle ages, the ages of faith and chivalry, is plain from the extraordinary sanctity and solemnity of the oaths by means of which the religious sanction was invoked to supplement the defective moral obligation to speak the truth.

But, though the social virtue of Veracity or 'telling the truth' is unquestionably held in higher esteem in modern times, and especially among ourselves, than it was in the

Seven Conspirators. The sentiments seem to be Greek rather than Persian.

[1] Eth. Nic. IV. 7. Aristotle does, however, in this chapter, make the general statement: *Καθ' αὑτὸ δὲ τὸ μὲν ψεῦδος φαῦλον καὶ ψεκτόν, τὸ δ' ἀληθὲς καλὸν καὶ ἐπαινετόν.*

ancient world, it may be doubted whether the intellectual virtue of the Love of Truth, or the pure and simple desire to ascertain the truth,—Truthfulness to oneself, as it might be called—was not more fully recognised by the ancients, and especially by the Greeks[1], than it is by us. Many causes, especially, perhaps, the religious repression which so long existed in Europe, and which was frequently extended from religion to the domains of literature, philosophy, and science, and the social and material penalties which even still often attach to any considerable aberration from the popular sentiment in such matters, have contributed to bring about this result. But it is a result which is much to be deplored, and it greatly concerns the moralist, and indeed every-one who cares for the moral and intellectual progress of mankind, to attempt to elevate the low tone of feeling ordinarily prevalent on this subject.

(5) Having now discussed the objects, nature, and variations of the Moral Faculty, I shall proceed to say something of its functions. Its primary and obvious function is to pronounce judgment on the past acts of ourselves or of others, such judgment being attended with satisfaction in the case of an act which we believe to be right, and with dissatisfaction in the case of an act which we believe to be wrong. But the satisfaction or dissatisfaction which results from the contemplation of an act is so intimately associated with the act itself, that, in future, no sooner is the idea of the act presented to the mind,

[1] The Greek sentiment, or at least the sentiment prevalent in cultivated circles in Greece, on this subject is beautifully embodied in the words of Aristotle, *ἀμφοῖν γὰρ ὄντοιν φίλοιν* (i.e. Plato and Truth) *ὅσιον προτιμᾶν τὴν ἀλήθειαν*. Eth. Nic. I. 6 (1). But, perhaps, a still more striking exemplification of it is to be found in Plato's own distinction between the spoken lie and the lie (or, as we should call it, error) in the soul; the latter of which he, strangely, as it appears to us, calls the true and genuine lie. See Rep. p. 382. A, B.

than it at once suggests the satisfaction or dissatisfaction which was previously experienced in reflecting upon it. In this manner, the pleasure or pain which has followed on the contemplation of an act, whether of ourselves or of others, becomes an incentive or a deterrent with reference to future acts of the same kind. If, for instance, I have committed some act of injustice, which I have subsequently recognised to be such, and which has, consequently, caused me pain, I am deterred from committing a similar act of injustice on another occasion by the pain and dissatisfaction which associate themselves with the past act. Or, if I have been disgusted at another man's want of veracity, I am less likely to tell a lie of the same kind myself. The more intense the feeling of satisfaction or dissatisfaction, and the more frequently it has been experienced, the more strongly, of course, is the association rivetted, and the more likely is it to influence our future actions. Conscience, Moral Sense[1], or by whatever name the Moral Principle may be called, becomes in this way not only a faculty judging of past, but one prescribing future conduct. It stimulates and checks as well as approves and disapproves. It may thus, without exaggeration, be styled the guide of life. Though its judgments must never be regarded as infallible, and though it always admits of further enlightenment and improvement, it is, in cases of emergency, our only resource; for there are many cases in which, if we stopped to reflect, we should be lost, in which we are compelled, so to speak, to use the fruit of our former experiences. Moreover, if, as we ought to do, we understand by the moral faculty, not only an immediate but a reflective faculty, we may say that it is our

[1] Of these two expressions, Conscience is the one usually appropriated to the moral principle, when regarded as impelling to or deterring from action. Thus, I might say 'my Conscience,' but I could hardly say 'my Moral Sense' impels me, or forbids me, to act on such or such a suggestion.

only guide on matters of conduct, under all circumstances whatsoever. Provided only that we are careful to bear in mind that this faculty requires education, hardly any epithet, except that of infallible, seems too exaggerated to apply to it. It is, in one sense, absolute; for there is no appeal from it, except to itself. It is the supreme guide of life; for, in the last resort, there is no other guide. It is the supreme judge of action; for, in the last resort, there is no other judge. Nor need we attribute less importance to its functions, because we are able to trace its origin and analyse its nature. For, in the words of Hartley, 'all the pleasures and pains of sensation, imagination, ambition, self-interest, sympathy, and theopathy, as far as they are consistent with one another, with the frame of our natures, and with the course of the world, beget in us a moral sense, and lead us to the love and approbation of virtue, and to the fear, hatred, and abhorrence of vice. This moral sense therefore carries its own authority with it, inasmuch as it is the sum total of all the rest, and the ultimate result from them; and employs the force and authority of the whole nature of man against any particular part of it, that rebels against the determinations and commands of the conscience or moral judgment[1].'

The explanation offered in the present chapter, as it appears to me, accounts at once for the strength and the varying strength of the moral principle. In those cases where a variety of feelings, sympathetic and self-regarding,

[1] Hartley on Man, Part I, Ch. IV, Sect. 6. I have left this passage intact, though what Hartley calls the 'pleasures and pains of theopathy' constitute, in the system of Ethics here expounded, a distinct sanction, namely, the religious sanction; which, however, in the purer religions, co-operates with and intensifies the moral sanction. And indeed, in its higher form, the religious sanction often becomes so inextricably blended with the moral sanction, that the two are sometimes almost indistinguishable. See latter part of Ch. X.

have coalesced to form our moral judgments, they are simply irresistible. And each time they are repeated, they become stronger still, until at last we find it next to impossible to conceive the reverse of them. They thus appear to be immediate, primary, absolute truths; the 'voice of God within us.' But in those cases where our feelings or some of them act in mutual antagonism, though there will be a determination of the moral judgment in one direction or the other, it may be a comparatively weak one. Even here by constant repetition it may become stronger, but it is always liable to be reversed by the occurrence of some change in the relative strength of our feelings, or by the presentation of some new considerations to our understanding. We see, then, not only how the 'conscience' or 'moral sense' may be said to be strong in one man and weak in another, but how, even in the same man, it may be weak on some points and strong on others.

After what has been said, it, perhaps, hardly needs to be remarked that the feeling of moral approbation or disapprobation, when applied to our own actions and characters, thus assuming the form of self-approbation or self-disapprobation, constitutes the *moral sanction*, strictly so called. It is this sanction which, to men of pure and elevated character, is the most powerful guardian of morality, and, to all men, it remains as the ultimate guardian, when the other sanctions have become inoperative.

The difficulties attaching to the questions treated of in this Chapter will be still further cleared up, when I have discussed the allied question how it is that one action comes to be denominated right and another wrong; in other words, when I have analysed the idea of Rectitude. To this task I proceed in the next Chapter.

CHAPTER VI.

On Rectitude.

Is the idea of Right a simple or complex idea? Its origin and nature. Conception of the General Welfare. Cautions to be observed in applying this conception. The source of Moral Obligation. Relation of the ideas of Right, Good, and Pleasure. Whether Pleasures differ in Kind. Desire and Pleasure. Relation of the views maintained in this and the last chapter to those of Utilitarian Writers.

PERHAPS the most fundamental controversy in the Theory of Morals is that which turns on the nature of Rectitude or Right. Is this a simple idea incapable of analysis, or is it a complex idea capable of analysis, and, if so, into what simpler ideas may it be resolved ; or, in other words, is there any explanation to be given of it, and, if so, what is that explanation ?

Some moralists, as we have seen, speak of an action being 'right in itself[1].' This expression has been already criticised, and need not be discussed any further. It may, however, be noticed that, according to this view, rectitude is a quality of actions perceived immediately by the mind in the same way that a colour is perceived by the eye or a sound by the ear. The idea thus derived admits of no resolution or explanation. It is an ultimate fact and must be accepted as such.

By another class of moralists Rectitude is regarded as an

[1] See remarks on Price in Part I, Chapter I.

a priori idea of the mind in no way due to experience; by which actions may indeed be measured, but of which the contemplation of actions is in no sense the source. 'From what has been said,' says Kant[1], 'it is clear that all moral conceptions have their seat and origin completely *a priori* in the reason, and that, moreover, in the commonest reason just as truly as in that which is in the highest degree speculative; that they cannot be obtained by abstraction from any empirical and therefore merely contingent knowledge; that it is just this purity of their origin that makes them worthy to serve as our supreme practical principle, and that, just in proportion as we add anything empirical, we detract from their genuine influence, and from the absolute value of actions; that it is not only of the greatest necessity, in a purely speculative point of view, but is also of the greatest practical importance to derive these notions and laws from pure reason, to present them pure and unmixed, and even to determine the compass of this practical or pure rational knowledge, *i.e.*, the whole faculty of pure practical reason; and, in doing so, we must not make its principles dependent on the particular nature of human reason, though in speculative philosophy this may be permitted, or may even at times be necessary; but, since moral laws ought to hold good for every rational creature, we must derive them from the general concept of a rational being. In this way, although, for its *application* to man, morality has need of anthropology, yet, in the first instance, we must treat it independently as pure philosophy, *i.e.*, as metaphysic, complete in itself (a thing which in such dis-

[1] Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals, Sect. 2, Abbott's Translation in 'Kant's Theory of Ethics.' This passage has been already quoted in the account of Kant given in Part I, Chapter 2, but, as I have here an opportunity of quoting it from Mr. Abbott's translation, and it is convenient that the reader should have it before his eye, I have thought it better to repeat it, *mutatis mutandis*.

tinct branches of science is easily done); knowing well that, unless we are in possession of this, it would not only be vain to determine the moral element of duty in right actions for purposes of speculative criticism, but it would be impossible to base morals on their genuine principles, even for common practical purposes, especially of moral instruction, so as to produce pure moral dispositions, and to engraft them on men's minds to the promotion of the greatest possible good in the world.'

This view, it will be seen, agrees with the former in its most essential point. Though the one regards rectitude as a quality of actions, exciting a corresponding idea in the mind, and the other as 'having its seat and origin completely *a priori* in the reason,' both alike view it as an ultimate fact, having no history, and incapable of analysis.

In opposition to this apparently simple account of the matter, we maintain that the idea of right is relative to the circumstances in which man is placed; that it is explicable by the idea of good; and that it is possible to discover its origin and trace its growth in the history both of the individual and of the race. At the same time, man being a creature having reason and certain affections, and being placed in certain relations to his fellow-men and the external world, the idea of right is one which must necessarily arise in his mind, and, having arisen, must necessarily, to a large extent, govern his actions.

These positions we shall now attempt to establish.

There can be no dispute as to the nature of a colour or sound, or, at least, if there be persons whose organs of sight or hearing are abnormally constituted, it is usually easy to persuade them that their own judgments are mistaken and that those of mankind at large are correct. But this is not the case with our moral judgments. Different men may take an entirely different view of the same action, one

asserting it to be right and another wrong. Nor is it always, or even generally, possible to bring about an agreement between the dissidents; even when a reconciliation is effected, it is usually the result of continuous and elaborate discussion.

Or again, suppose the idea of rectitude to be *a priori*. We shall not here enquire whether the mind has *a priori* ideas, or, if it has such ideas, in what sense it may be said to have them. It is sufficient for our purpose to compare the idea of rectitude with that, say, of equality, which by those who maintain the doctrine of *a priori* ideas is always included amongst them. Wherever magnitudes or numbers admit of comparison, there is no difficulty in applying this idea, nor are the conclusions arrived at open to dispute. But it is altogether different with the idea of rectitude. Any man, who is honest with himself, must constantly find that he has great difficulty in determining whether particular actions of himself or others are right or wrong; that his decisions, even when he has arrived at them, are often exceedingly doubtful and unsatisfactory to himself; and that the verdict of his neighbours is often at variance with his own. Nor is this divergence confined to particular actions. Men often differ as to the measures of right and wrong, one man looking at the interests of a wider, another at those of a narrower circle, one man deferring more to his feelings, another to his reason.

Moreover, when we examine these divergences, we find that they coincide to a great extent with differences of race, of culture, of education, of early association, and even of climate and geographical position. They are, in fact, exactly of such a character as we should expect would be the result of a variety of external circumstances acting upon a rational, sympathetic, and self-regarding being. What

we have to account for is both the identity and the diversity of moral sentiment. We seem sufficiently to account for the identity by the fact that we all alike possess the same faculties and the same feelings, or, in other words, the same human nature; for the diversity by the different circumstances under which those faculties are exercised and those feelings elicited.

What those who maintain the simplicity and ultimate character of the idea of right have never been able to account for is the diversity of moral sentiment. They ascribe this phenomenon indeed to the infusion of feeling and the counter-attractions of desire. But this explanation, while it may account for our acting wrongly in spite of our knowledge, can hardly account for our forming false judgments on questions of morals, as undoubtedly we frequently do. For, on this hypothesis, not only ought the cultivated man never to mistake his way, but, if right and wrong are either *a priori* notions of the mind or qualities of actions intuitively perceived by all men, there seems to be no adequate reason why the moral opinions of the savage should differ from those of the European, those of the peasant from those of the philosopher, or those of the child from those of the man.

But, granting that this theory is inadequate to explain the phenomena, is it possible, it may be asked, to find a theory which will fully explain them?

It appears to me that, if we recognise man as a being having feelings towards others as well as towards himself, as sympathetic and resentful as well as self-regarding, with a reason capable of comparing the ends to which his feelings impel him and of finding means for the attainment of those ends, there is no difficulty, except in detail, in explaining the process by which men arrive either at the moral judgments in which they agree or at those in which they differ.

My conception of the gradual growth of the notions of right and wrong in the mind, and, correspondently, of the sentiments appropriate to them, may be briefly illustrated by the following sketch.

Let us suppose, first of all, the case of the individual, who forms a member of the primæval household. He will have his individual interests, such as his share of the food and clothing, the amount of labour or danger to be undertaken by him in the perils of the chase or in the other occupations of the family. He will also have interests identical with those of the other members, as in the common expeditions made for the purpose of securing skins or food, the common manufacture of tools, or the common precautions against the incursions of wild beasts or the ravages of the elements. Co-operation of this kind, which is, of course, essential to the subsistence of the family, at once introduces the subordination of individual to common interests, and, by necessary consequence, the occasional subordination of one man's interests to another's. Moreover, a man will soon find that it is only by exerting a certain amount of self-restraint over the gratification of his appetites and passions that he can perform his work efficiently; and the obligation to exercise this self-denial will be imposed upon him by the opinion of the other members of the family as well as by his own experience. Again, if a member of the household becomes sick or disabled, he will excite the pity of the others, as well as require their material assistance. Or, if he shews peculiar skill or has extraordinary success, he will evoke admiration or that sympathy with joy which may be called congratulation; or possibly, on the other hand, jealousy or envy. The actions and behaviour of each member of the family, too, will be the object of approval or disapproval on the part of the others, and, in the rude condition of life which I am imagining, such approval or

disapproval will probably be exhibited by rough and unmistakeable methods. The disapproval will sometimes take the form of settled resentment at injuries, real or supposed, to themselves or others. To obtain approval and to avoid disapproval will thus become powerful motives of conduct. Lastly, the conduct which elicits the approval or disapproval of others will become an object of reflexion, and probably of corresponding approval or disapproval, to the individual himself. And the same will be the case with such of his actions as he finds, by experience, to produce pleasure or satisfaction, pain or inconvenience, to himself, or to gratify or thwart his feelings of sympathy with others or his feeling of resentment against them.

Here then we seem to have already detected all the elements which enter into morality. There are the various groups of feelings—self-regarding, sympathetic, resentful, and semi-social; there is the reason comparing the results of various courses of action, as a guide to future conduct; there is the approval or disapproval of the acts of others; there is the operation of reflexion on a man's own acts, resulting in the feeling of self-approbation or self-disapprobation; and, lastly, there is the conscious choice of one course of conduct rather than another, because, in the conflict of ends, it presents itself to the mind as the greater good or the lesser evil. It is in these two last elements, namely, the conscious choice of the greater good or lesser evil and the feeling of self-approval or self-disapproval which supervenes thereon, that morality proper seems to make its first appearance. For, in the collision of ends, we must always sacrifice some one inclination to another, and, when the primitive man feels conscious, on reflexion, that he has sacrificed the lower inclination to the higher one, say, the coarser to the more refined pleasure, the immediate to the more remote and permanent advantage, or his own

narrow interests to the wider interests of his family, or his own convenience to that of a sick or helpless relative, he probably feels a glow of satisfaction, similar in kind, though perhaps it may be less distinctly realised, to that which, in our more advanced and reflective condition, we experience ourselves.

When the family comes into contact with other families, or, by the natural process of development, has expanded into the tribe, those feelings which have others for their object are necessarily extended in range. But there is this difference amongst them: that, whereas the sympathetic and semi-social feelings are almost necessarily diminished in intensity, when they transcend the family circle, the resentful feelings, no longer held in check by natural affection and domestic ties, have a tendency to assume a much more important position than before in the economy of human nature, and, at times, even to exercise a baneful ascendancy over the entire man. As one tribe comes into collision with another, this tendency increases, so that, at some stages in the history of society, hatred and the passion for revenge become the predominant feelings. The self-regarding feelings, of course, have more scope for their exercise, as the social area extends, and, consequently, the position of the individual in society becomes more important. Thus, the general effect of the expansion of society is to render the relations of the individual more complex, and hence to increase the number and perplexity of the cases of conflicting claims which require from him a decision. His reasoning powers thus become more acute by exercise, his vision is expanded, and he begins to form a conception of his own greatest good, as a whole, as well as of the greatest good of that social aggregate which, at this stage of his progress, is to him the largest. Moreover, the instances in which his own

apparent good seems to collide with that of others, or of the social aggregate of which he is a member, are being constantly multiplied; so that it becomes necessary to strike some sort of balance, and to form certain rough maxims of conduct, by means of which to determine beforehand when, and under what circumstances, one class of claims is to give way to the other. Each man of ordinary intelligence probably does this work, to a certain extent, for himself; but as each man also does it, through the expression of his opinions, for others as well, there results an average code of conduct, set by the society in the aggregate, and governing the ordinary actions of ordinary men. Right conduct, as usually understood in such a society, is conduct which conforms with, and wrong conduct is conduct which diverges from, such a standard. But the individual, exercising his own powers of reflexion, may, in certain respects, be dissatisfied with the standard of society, and, in such respects, shape his conduct according to a standard of his own. If the divergence be in the direction of the higher and more characteristic principles of his nature, of sympathy, for instance, rather than self-regard, of a sense of justice rather than unregulated revenge, or of the purer rather than the more sensual pleasures, his example will have a tendency to raise the average standard of moral requirement; if the reverse, to lower it.

As society advances still further, and the tribal is replaced by the national type of life, the influence of the individual becomes still greater, and, on the whole, the tendency is to a more elevated, as it certainly is to a wider, conception of morality. The conception of individual welfare includes man's moral, intellectual, religious and æsthetic as well as his material interests. And the goodwill which a man bears to others is not only similarly

enlarged, in respect to the objects of their welfare, but gradually comes to be extended from his family or tribe or immediate neighbourhood to the country of which he is a citizen, and, ultimately, to mankind at large. With this expansion of our desires and affections, both as to the objects which they embrace and the persons to whom they are extended, there is a corresponding increase of the cases in which we have to adjust rival claims, whether of the different parts of our own nature, or of the different members or different aggregates of society, or of our own interests as compared with those of other individuals or of various social aggregates or of society in general. But the characteristics of the acts which we denominate right seem to be always the same: namely, the subordination of the lesser to the greater good, and of the greater to the lesser evil, including a readiness to sacrifice our lower to our higher inclinations and the interests of ourselves to the interests of others. There thus comes to be formed a general conception of the greatest attainable well-being[1]

[1] In my 'Progressive Morality' (pp. 99–101) I have given the following reasons for preferring the use of the terms 'welfare' and 'well-being' to designate the ultimate end of action, rather than 'pleasure' and 'happiness' on the one side, or 'perfection' and 'development' of 'character' on the other. 'But are there no terms by which the somewhat exclusive associations connected with the two sets of phrases already examined may be avoided? I venture to suggest that such terms may be found by reverting to the old, but now usually discarded, expressions "welfare" and "well-being." These words, it seems to me, do not primarily suggest material prosperity, like happiness, nor the gratification of the lower parts of our nature, like pleasure, nor the exclusive development of the higher parts of our nature, like perfection, but cover the whole ground of healthy human activity and the conditions which are favourable to it. Corresponding, too, almost exactly with the εὐδαιμονία of Aristotle, they have the advantage of venerable historic associations. Lastly, they seem to have less of a personal and more of a social reference than any of the other terms employed. We speak, I think, more naturally of the well-being or welfare of society, than of the happiness, pleasure, or perfection of society. I cannot, therefore, but think that the moralist would be wise in at least trying the experiment of recurring to these terms in place of those which, in recent systems of ethics, have usually

of mankind, or even of all sentient beings, as a whole, of which whole we individuals are indeed parts but only parts. Every voluntary act which, when considered in all its bearings, has a tendency to further this ultimate end may be denominated *right*, as every voluntary act which has a contrary tendency may be denominated *wrong*. I say *voluntary*, because the application of the word 'right' implies that the act, being one of two or more alternatives, might have been wrong*; and, consequently, as the agent is a human agent, that it is the result of choice.

When an idea has been gradually, slowly, and almost imperceptibly built up, whether in the mind of the individual or the history of society, men are apt to lose sight of its origin, and to regard it as an original element of their mental constitution, incapable of analysis or explanation. Especially is this the case, if the idea is in constant use, and applicable to a great variety of objects or circumstances. Hence it is, as it appears to me, that the idea of 'right' (or, to use a less ambiguous term, of

superseded them. If it be said that they are vague, and that different people will attach different meanings to them, according to their own prepossessions and their own theories of life, I can only reply that this objection applies with at least equal force to any of the other terms which we have passed in review. And, if it be said that our conceptions of well-being and welfare are not fixed, but that our ideas of the nature and proper proportions of their constituents are undergoing constant modification and growth, I may ask if this is less the case with regard to happiness, or the sum of pleasures, or the balance of pleasures over pains, or the perfection or due development of human character, all of which expressions, indeed, when properly qualified and explained, I acknowledge to be the equivalents of those for which I have stated a preference.'

In order to avoid misunderstanding, I may say that I conceive of the 'perfection of character' as a perennial source of satisfaction to its possessor, as well as a constant cause of action beneficially affecting other men. Thus, it is not opposed to the ideas of 'happiness' and 'welfare,' but all three expressions, when taken in a sufficiently wide sense, really convey the same group of conceptions; providing, of course, that we understand the 'perfection of character' to pre-suppose the external and corporeal conditions essential to its attainment.

'ought') has come to be so generally regarded as a 'simple idea,' having no history and admitting of no further account than that it actually is. But, if we cease to regard it in the abstract, as detached from the actual facts of every-day life, and ask, in each particular case, whether we cannot justify its application and give some account of its meaning, it will, if I mistake not, always be found to attach itself to that course of conduct which, on reflexion, we conceive to be the greater good, or, in other words, to be most conducive to the welfare of all those, ourselves included, whom it may affect.

But it may be objected with some justice that the phrase 'the general welfare' or 'the greatest attainable well-being' of mankind is vague and difficult of application. I proceed, therefore, to explain and limit it more precisely.

If we were so constituted that one man's actions had no effect whatever upon another, we should each pursue exclusively his own interests. Each man would be busied with the gratification of his own desires, but would need to take no thought about those around him. But still, excepting the pleasures and pains attendant on sympathy and antipathy, he would have the same pleasures and pains, with the same differences of kind and degree, that he has now. The intellectual and æsthetic pleasures would still be as distinct as they now are from the pleasures of sense and appetite; they would still be characteristic of man, and, in their higher forms, of the higher races of man. Amongst competing pleasures, therefore, it would still be man's duty to prefer some to others; it would still be wrong to sacrifice the higher parts of his nature to the lower, or, for the sake of immediate pleasure, to entail upon himself a large amount of future pain and suffering. Moreover, the reflexion that he had curbed the lower parts of his nature, that

he had subjugated his passions to his reason, and that he had developed his more refined and exalted capacities, would still be attended with that peculiar satisfaction which we call the moral feeling. In shaping his conduct, therefore, he would have to be guided by a variety of considerations, and the object of his moral endeavours might be aptly denominated his own general welfare. The circumstances in which this welfare consisted, when considered practically with reference to the various needs and circumstances of his life, would have to be gathered from his own individual experience, from his observation of others, and from reflexion on the tendencies of actions. The particular decisions at which he arrived would depend to a great extent on his education, his associations, the strength of his reasoning faculty, and his general elevation of character. There would doubtless be many difficulties in detail, but still the general conception of his own greatest good as the end to be aimed at, together with an enlightened insight into the constituents of that good, would afford the leading principles of solution. A knowledge of his own organism and of the external environment in which it is placed would complete the means at his command.

We have only to add the feelings which are elicited by man's relations with his fellows,—sympathy, resentment, and the love of approbation,—in order to represent him as he really is. The existence of these feelings renders it impossible for him to satisfy the necessities of his nature without consulting the interests of others as well as his own. Hence arise additional rules of conduct, generally coinciding with those which would be dictated by an exclusive regard to his own interests, but occasionally clashing with them. At first, these rules are tolerably simple. For, in the earliest state of society, the interests

of the individual are almost absolutely identified with those of his family, while they are usually in direct antagonism with those of any other groups with which he may be brought into contact. The simple rule 'to love your friends and hate your enemies' thus obtains with full force. But, as the family group widens into the clan and the tribe, and these again become transformed into the state, the relations of each man with his fellows assume a far more complex character, and the difficulties of right action seem to be multiplied beyond all comparison. The man who desires to do his duty has now not only to reconcile conflicting interests of his own or his family, but to adjust these interests, even when ascertained, with those of his neighbourhood, his country, mankind at large. This task, if each individual had to do it afresh for himself, would indeed be a hopeless one. But the fact is that each race of mankind has been gradually, and, for the most part, silently and imperceptibly, doing this work, in its aggregate capacity, from time immemorial. As the result of slow experience, and by a gradual effort to accommodate itself to the circumstances in which it is placed, each tribe or nation has constructed, so to speak, for itself a code of laws, customs, and sentiments, written or unwritten, by which most of the difficulties which present themselves in practice are already anticipated and provided for[1]. This

[1] See Progressive Morality, Ch. 4, from which I extract the following passage: There are 'two different ways in which the test of conduct may be, and as a fact is, applied. One mode is the conscious and intentional application of it by the reflective man. The other is the semi-conscious and almost instinctive application of it by the community at large. In morals, as in the arts, men, almost without knowing it, are constantly re-adjusting their means to their ends, feeling their way to some tentative solution of a new difficulty or a better solution of an old one, shaping their conduct with reference to the special needs of the situation in which they are placed. It is thus, for the most part, that new circumstances develope new rules, and that the simple maxims of a primitive people are gradually replaced by the multifarious code of law and morals with which

code forms part of the heritage of each clansman, tribesman, or citizen, and, in the less advanced societies, whole generations may pass away without witnessing any sensible alteration in it. Of course, in actual life, many cases will occur for which this code, extensive as it is, does not provide, and, with regard to these, the individual must, perforce, decide for himself. But even these cases will usually be decided in conformity with the general sentiment and on the analogy of others for which the law or customary morality provides. Frequent as are the practical aberrations from the received code of morality, it is seldom, except in the most advanced sections of the most advanced communities, that any part of it is called in question on theoretical grounds.

we are now familiar. The guiding principle throughout the process is the conception of their own good, comprehending, as it does, not only ease, personal comfort, and gratification of the various appetites and desires, which, in the early stages of society, are the preponderating considerations, but also those higher constituents of welfare, both individual and social, which attain an ever-increasing importance as society advances, such as are the development of the moral, the intellectual, and the æsthetic faculties, the purification of the religious sentiments, the expansion of the sympathetic feelings, the diffusion of liberty and prosperity, the consolidation of national unity, the elevation of human life. This principle works throughout the community, actuating some men in its higher, others in its lower forms; but, except where the force of tradition or prejudice is too strong for it, invariably moulding conduct into accordance with the more complex requirements of advancing civilisation. Its action, of course, is not wholly advantageous. Growing needs and more complicated relations suggest to men fresh devices for compassing their selfish ends, such as the various forms of fraud, forgery, and conspiracy, as well as more enlarged or more effective schemes of beneficence, stricter or more intelligent applications of the principle of justice, and possibilities of higher and freer developments of their faculties. But, on the whole, and setting aside as exceptional certain periods of retrogression, such as the decline of the Roman Empire, the evolution of society seems to be attended by the progress of morality, and specially by the amelioration of social relations, whether between individuals, families or states. The intelligence that apprehends the greater good re-acts upon the desire to attain it, and the result is the combination of more rational aims with a purer interest in the pursuit of them.'

When the laws, customs, and sentiments of a race are closely examined, it will almost invariably be found that they are all dictated by considerations of the public good, even though those considerations may be mistaken ones. The laws, customs, and sentiments which are common to most tribes or nations, such as those against murder, stealing, breach of contracts, and the like, are founded on tolerably obvious considerations of utility. Peculiar customs, such as those of exogamy or endogamy, destruction of aged parents, encouragement, in special cases, of theft, and the like, are to be accounted for by some peculiarity in the circumstances of the tribe. There remain, perhaps, some customs which can only be accounted for by a desire to propitiate the Gods, but even these are dictated by considerations of utility, by the desire, namely, to avert the wrath or secure the favour of invisible beings who have a power over our destiny. Thus, wherever we look, we shall find that, consciously or unconsciously, by sudden revolutions or by gradual adaptations, men have endeavoured to accommodate themselves, to the best of their knowledge and ability, to the circumstances in which their lot was cast. Their efforts may often have been ill-judged or unsuccessful, but the motive which has inspired them has nearly always been the same, namely, the desire to avoid misery, discomfort or misfortune and to ensure well-being or happiness.

In the more advanced societies it is inevitable that men should, from time to time, review the rules which their ancestors have bequeathed to them, and consider whether the laws, customs, and current moral sentiment really conduce to the ends at which they aim. It is no less inevitable that, as we learn more of our own nature and of the world in which we live, and as we become better acquainted with the laws, customs, and moral

sentiment of other races, we should detect, or imagine that we detect, many superfluities, defects, and wrongful decisions in our own moral code. As soon as this process begins, there will always be more or less of antagonism between the moral sentiment of different sections of society. Moreover, there will arise a special class of men, called moral philosophers, who will claim to themselves the right of reviewing the whole moral code, of estimating its provisions in direct reference to its ends, and of pronouncing accordingly on its validity or invalidity, its title to observance or its need of alteration or abrogation.

That this procedure may be of eminent advantage, while at the same time it is fraught with considerable danger, is at once apparent. No one can take into consideration the diversity of moral sentiment which obtains or has obtained on the face of the globe, the cruel rites, the pernicious customs, the needless restraints which have been consecrated by the support of the moral sanction, without perceiving how essential it is that the work of revision and correction should, from time to time, be undertaken by the most competent members of a society. Hence we can understand the ardour with which moralists like Plato, in ancient, or Bentham, in modern times, have insisted on referring to first principles the most cherished sentiments and the most venerable institutions. The rigidity and formalism, moreover, which are apt to be engendered by the constant observance of rules, require, from time to time, to be corrected by a recurrence to the ends for which the rules exist. At the same time, the moral reformer ought never to lose sight of the fact that a moral sentiment is more easily undermined than replaced, nor to forget the many opportunities of error or the gravity of the issues which are involved in these considerations. Much of the opposition which Moral

Philosophy has encountered is doubtless due to the haste with which her decisions have frequently been formed and the uncompromising boldness with which they have at once been advanced.

In bringing existing laws or prevalent opinions to the test of utility, as well as in estimating the moral character of individual acts or dispositions, the moralist should, at least, observe the following cautions:

I. To regard the existing custom or sentiment as having a presumption in its favour; in other words, not to disturb it, unless the reasons against it are clear and cogent. It is plain that the very existence of society would be endangered, if men were always digging round the roots of the received morality. It was partly an exaggerated reputation for this tendency, which made the Sophists so odious in Greece, and it must always be with great risk both to themselves and others that philosophers undertake to criticise the current moral sentiment, however necessary it may be that, from time to time, some of the more instructed members of a community should have the courage to set about this task. We should always remember that no practice or opinion can have come into existence unless at the time there has been a valid reason for its introduction; and, unless we are acquainted with that reason, we are seldom in a position to estimate even its present value[1]. The most cruel and

[1] Compare one of the grounds which I have assigned in my 'Progressive Morality' (Ch. 4) for not rashly disturbing the existing moral sentiment: 'But there is also the speculative ground that any given society, and indeed mankind generally, has been engaged for ages in feeling its way, instinctively or semi-consciously, towards a solution of the self-same problems which the philosopher is attempting to solve consciously and of set purpose. That, on the whole, a society has solved these problems in the manner best suited to its existing needs and circumstances may fairly be taken for granted, and, even where the ethical stand-point of the reformer is very superior to the stand-point of the society which he wishes to reform, he will be

absurd customs, when traced to their origin, are usually found to have been connected with some laudable feeling, a feeling which, among some sections of society, may even still be associated with them; in such cases, the wise reformer will make it his effort to abolish the custom without impairing the feeling. In a number of cases, moreover, there will be a balance of considerations, and in these it would seem to be the clear duty of the philosopher not to disturb existing sentiment till his own mind is fully decided.

In laying down the principle that the presumption of the moralist should always be in favour of existing rules of conduct, there is one exception to be taken account of. That exception consists of those cases which are legitimate, though not obvious, applications of existing rules, and to which, therefore, the ordinary moral sentiment does not attach in the same way that it does to the plainer and more direct applications. Thus, if it can be shewn, as it undoubtedly can be, that smuggling falls under the head of stealing, and holding out false hopes under that of lying, the moralist need take no account of the lax moral sentiment which exists with regard to these practices, though, of course, in estimating the guilt of the individual as distinct from the objective character of the

wise in endeavouring to introduce his reforms gradually, and, if possible, in connexion with principles already acknowledged, rather than in attempting to effect a moral revolution, the ultimate results of which it may be impossible to foresee. The work of the moralist is, therefore, best regarded as corrective of, and supplementary to, the work which mankind is constantly doing for itself, and not as antagonistic to it. The method is the same in both cases: only it is applied semi-consciously, and merely as occasions suggest it, in the one case; consciously and spontaneously in the other. In both cases alike the guiding principle, whether of action or of speculation upon action, is the adaptation of conduct to surrounding circumstances, physical and social, with a view to promote, to the utmost extent possible, the well-being of the individual and of the society of which he is a member.'

act, due allowance must be made for his imperfect appreciation of the moral bearings of his conduct. This exception covers, and therefore at once justifies, a large proportion of the criticisms which, in the present advanced stage of morality, when the more fundamental principles have been already settled, it is still open to us to make[1].

II. It is an obvious caution, though not always remembered in practice, that, in estimating the morality of an act, we should regard it as one of a class, and consider, not what is likely to be the consequence of this particular act, but what would be the consequences if acts of this kind were general. The so-called Categorical Imperative of Kant ('Act only on that maxim whereby thou canst at the same time will that it should become law universal') is merely an unqualified statement of this principle. The necessary qualifications of it will be discussed under the next Caution. But, meanwhile, the principle itself requires some further elucidation. Let us take, as an instance, the virtue of veracity. There are many particular occasions, easily conceivable, on which a breach of truth would be very convenient to ourselves, and inflict little or no injury on others. But, suppose that such violations of the obligation to veracity were to become common (and by our conduct we may be doing all that we can to make them so), there would soon be hardly any confidence between man and man, and one of the virtues, on which the very existence of society depends, would be seriously impaired. Unless the occasions on which licence was allowable were very strictly defined, and this task it would be extremely difficult to execute, the example would become contagious, and both we ourselves and others should soon

[1] I have adapted this passage from my 'Progressive Morality,' Ch. 4.

learn to apply it to contiguous cases, till, at last, by a gradual deterioration of the standard, the boundaries between truth and falsehood would be effectually obliterated. In cases of this kind, there is no better practical preservative against error than to place ourselves in the position of the indifferent spectator, or to observe the homely rule of doing to our neighbour what we would that he should do unto us[1]. However slight the particular bad consequences of an act might be, we should seldom, if ever, approve in another of an act whose general

[1] On the necessity, in morals, of having regard to general rules, see Paley's Moral Philosophy, Bk. II. Chs. 6, 7, 8. The following examples, taken from Paley, of the distinction between the general and particular bad consequences of an act afford so excellent an illustration of the principle I am endeavouring to enforce, that I subjoin them at length:

'The particular consequence of coining is the loss of a guinea, or of half a guinea, to the person who receives the counterfeit money: the general consequence (by which I mean the consequence that would ensue, if the same practice were generally permitted) is to abolish the use of money.

'The particular consequence of forgery is a damage of twenty or thirty pounds to the man who accepts the forged bill: the general consequence is the stoppage of paper currency.

'The particular consequence of sheep-stealing, or horse-stealing, is a loss to the owner, to the amount of the value of the sheep or horse stolen: the general consequence is that the land could not be occupied, nor the market supplied, with this kind of stock.

'The particular consequence of breaking into a house empty of inhabitants is the loss of a pair of silver candlesticks, or a few spoons: the general consequence is that nobody could leave their house empty.

'The particular consequence of smuggling may be a deduction from the national fund too minute for computation: the general consequence is the destruction of one entire branch of public revenue; a proportionable increase of the burden upon other branches; and the ruin of all fair and open trade in the article smuggled.

'The particular consequence of an officer's breaking his parole is the loss of a prisoner, who was possibly not worth keeping: the general consequence, that this mitigation of captivity would be refused to all others.

'And what proves incontestably the superior importance of general consequences is that crimes are the same, and treated in the same manner, though the particular consequence be very different. The crime and fate of the house-breaker is the same, whether his booty be five pound or fifty. And the reason is that the general consequence is the same.' Bk. II. Ch. 8.

bad consequences were really pernicious. We are often excellent judges of others, where we are but indifferent judges of ourselves.

III. As a qualification of this last rule, however, it should be observed that, while, so to speak, we ought to generalise our acts, we ought, at the same time, to have regard to any special circumstances in which we may be placed. It is, in one sense, true that no moral rule admits of exceptions, that we should always act so that our action might be transformed into an universal law. But, as, in the physical world, there are counteracting laws which modify or neutralise the effects of each other, so, in the moral sphere, there are clashing duties one of which may modify or nullify the obligation under which we are placed to the other. In these cases, we are often compelled to decide on the spur of the moment, and there is little to guide us to a correct or satisfactory decision. A man could hardly determine on *a priori* grounds whether it was his duty to save first from the flames his aged parent or his young child. Sometimes, on the other hand, the decision, though admitting of discussion, seems tolerably obvious, and would meet with general approval. There are few men, probably, who, at the risk of their own lives or those of their friends, would think it necessary to tell the truth to a gang of robbers, or who would not think it foolish, if not criminal, in others to do so. At the same time, a man of scrupulous honour would scorn to save his life or liberty from the hands of justice by means of a lie, and, if he did so, would certainly incur the disapprobation of others. In like manner, there are few men, at least in our own day, who would disapprove of rebellion against a cruel and tyrannical government, but, probably, fewer still who would approve of any disturbance of an established con-

stitution, except on the gravest and most conclusive grounds. In these and numberless cases of a similar kind which might be multiplied indefinitely, our only course is to decide amongst two or more conflicting obligations by a review of all the circumstances of the particular case. But cases resemble each other in certain features, and thus we are often guided to a decision by previous experience or by *a priori* considerations of what we or others ought to do under imaginary circumstances. The less instructed part of mankind, too, are often, in this respect, greatly indebted to the deliberations of their superiors.

In connexion with these latter remarks, it would be disingenuous to conceal my opinion that the art of Casuistry has often been most unjustly decried. It has unfortunately been associated, owing to the peculiar treatment of it by certain Jesuit Divines, with lax views of morality and specially of the virtue of Veracity, but the association is mainly an accidental one. Granted that duties may clash (and I do not perceive any sense, at once intelligible and unambiguous, in which the opposite position can be maintained), or that general rules may be modified by special circumstances, it is surely most important to determine beforehand, so far as we can, what those circumstances are, and, in the case of clashing duties, which should yield to the other. Now this, and this alone, is the task which 'Casuistry' or the attempt to 'resolve cases of conscience' proposes to itself. Owing to the infinite variety of the cases which may be imagined and the endless complexity of the circumstances which occur in actual life, the Casuist may not be able, to any great extent, to anticipate practical difficulties; but he can, at least, always deal with cases which have already occurred, nor do the limitations of an art seem to

furnish conclusive reasons against the attempt to exercise it.

It is from neglect of the rule now under consideration that men are often so unjust to the moral sentiment which prevails in classes of society different from their own, or in other countries, or in other forms of civilisation. The peculiar circumstances of an age or country may often explain and justify its peculiar institutions, and, even where they do not wholly justify, they may so extenuate them as to leave the critic no excuse for hasty and unqualified condemnation.

IV. A fourth rule is to have regard to the remote as well as the proximate consequences of an act, principle, or law. The necessity of this rule, as well as the difficulty of applying it in practice, that is, of ascertaining that we have really taken into account all the consequences, however remote, will be obvious, and requires no illustration. But the nature and kinds of these consequences is less obvious, and, as it is a topic of great importance and has been treated with singular felicity by Bentham, I shall here, notwithstanding the length of the quotation, incorporate that portion of his work:

'The mischief of an act may frequently be distinguished, as it were, into two shares or parcels: the one containing what may be called the primary mischief; the other, what may be called the secondary. That share may be termed the *primary*, which is sustained by an assignable individual, or a multitude of assignable individuals. That share may be termed the *secondary*, which, taking its origin from the former, extends itself either over the whole community, or over some other multitude of unassignable individuals.

'The primary mischief of an act may again be distinguished into two branches: 1. The *original*; and, 2. The *derivative*. By the original branch, I mean that which alights upon and is confined to any person who is a sufferer in the first instance, and on his

own account; the person, for instance, who is beaten, robbed, or murdered. By the derivative branch, I mean any share of mischief which may befal any other assignable persons in consequence of his being a sufferer, and no otherwise. These persons must, of course, be persons who, in some way or other, are connected with him. Now, they may be connected in the way of *interest* (meaning self-regarding interest) or merely in the way of *sympathy*. And again, persons connected with a given person, in the way of interest, may be connected with him either by affording *support* to him, or by deriving it from him.

'The secondary mischief, again, may frequently be seen to consist of two other shares or parcels: the first consisting of *pain*; the other of *danger*. The pain which it produces is a pain of apprehension; a pain grounded on the apprehension of suffering such mischiefs or inconveniences, whatever they may be, as it is the nature of the primary mischief to produce. It may be styled, in one word, the *alarm*. The danger is the *chance*, whatever it may be, which the multitude it concerns may, in consequence of the primary mischief, stand exposed to, of suffering such mischiefs or inconveniences. For danger is nothing but the chance of pain, or, what comes to the same thing, of loss of pleasure.

'An example may serve to make this clear. A man attacks you on the road, and robs you. You suffer a pain on the occasion of losing so much money: you also suffered a pain at the thoughts of the personal ill-treatment you apprehended he might give you, in case of your not happening to satisfy his demands. These together constitute the original branch of the primary mischief, resulting from the act of robbery. A creditor of your's, who expected you to pay him with part of that money, and a son of your's, who expected you to have given him another part, are in consequence disappointed. You are obliged to have recourse to the bounty of your father, to make good part of the deficiency. These mischiefs together make up the derivative branch. The report of this robbery circulates from hand to hand, and spreads itself in the neighbourhood. It finds its way into the newspapers, and is propagated over the whole country. Various people, on this occasion, call to mind the danger which they and their friends, as it appears from this example, stand exposed to in travelling; especially such as may have occasion to travel the same road. On

this occasion they naturally feel a certain degree of pain: slighter or heavier, according to the degree of ill-treatment they may understand you to have received; the frequency of the occasion each person may have to travel in that same road, or its neighbourhood; the vicinity of each person to the spot; his personal courage; the quantity of money he may have occasion to carry about with him; and a variety of other circumstances. This constitutes the first part of the secondary mischief, resulting from the act of robbery; viz. the alarm. But people, of one description or other, not only are disposed to conceive themselves to incur a chance of being robbed, in consequence of the robbery committed upon you, but (as will be shown presently) they do really incur such a chance. And it is this chance which constitutes the remaining part of the secondary mischief of the act of robbery; viz. the danger.

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'The means by which one robbery tends, as it should seem, to produce another robbery, are two: 1. By suggesting to a person exposed to the temptation, the idea of committing such another robbery (accompanied, perhaps, with the belief of its facility). In this case the influence it exerts applies itself, in the first place, to the understanding. 2. By weakening the force of the tutelary motives which tend to restrain him from such an action, and thereby adding to the strength of the temptation. In this case the influence applies itself to the will. These forces are, 1. The motive of benevolence, which acts as a branch of the physical sanction. 2. The motive of self-preservation, as against the punishment that may stand provided by the political sanction. 3. The fear of shame; a motive belonging to the moral sanction[1]. 4. The fear of the divine displeasure; a motive belonging to the religious sanction. On the first and last of these forces it has, perhaps, no influence worth insisting on; but it has on the other two.

[1] By the 'moral sanction' Bentham means what I call the social sanction. Indeed, he ignores altogether the moral sanction, strictly so called. See Part I of this work, p. 105. It is obviously of great importance to include the 'moral sanction' proper among the 'tutelary motives' of which Bentham speaks in the text. Nor, probably, are the first and fourth of Bentham's sanctions so inoperative, even on a man disposed to commit a robbery, as he seems to imagine.

'The way in which a past robbery may weaken the force with which the *political* sanction tends to prevent a future robbery, may be thus conceived. The way in which this sanction tends to prevent a robbery is by denouncing some particular kind of punishment against any who shall be guilty of it: the *real* value of which punishment will of course be diminished by the *real* uncertainty: as also, if there be any difference, the *apparent* value by the *apparent* uncertainty. Now this uncertainty is proportionably increased by every instance in which a man is known to commit the offence, without undergoing the punishment. This, of course, will be the case with every offence for a certain time; in short, until the punishment allotted to it takes place. If punishment takes place at last, this branch of the mischief of the offence is then at last, but not till then, put a stop to.

'The way in which a past robbery may weaken the force with which the *moral*' (i.e. the social) 'sanction tends to prevent a future robbery, may be thus conceived. The way in which the moral sanction tends to prevent a robbery is by holding forth the indignation of mankind as ready to fall upon him who shall be guilty of it. Now this indignation will be the more formidable, according to the number of those who join in it: it will be the less so, the fewer they are who join in it. But there cannot be a stronger way of showing that a man does not join in whatever indignation may be entertained against a practice, than the engaging in it himself. It shows not only that he himself feels no indignation against it, but that it seems to him there is no sufficient reason for apprehending what indignation may be felt against it by others. Accordingly, where robberies are frequent, and unpunished, robberies are committed without shame. It was thus amongst the Grecians formerly. It is thus among the Arabs still.

'In whichever way, then, a past offence tends to pave the way for the commission of a future offence, whether by suggesting the idea of committing it, or by adding to the strength of the temptation, in both cases it may be said to operate by the force or *influence of example*.

'The two branches of the secondary mischief of an act, the alarm and the danger, must not be confounded: though intimately connected, they are perfectly distinct: either may subsist without the other. The neighbourhood may be alarmed with the report of a

robbery, when, in fact, no robbery either has been committed, or is in a way to be committed: a neighbourhood may be on the point of being disturbed by robberies, without knowing anything of the matter. Accordingly, we shall soon perceive, that some acts produce alarm without danger: others, danger without alarm.

'As well the danger as the alarm may again be divided, each of them, into two branches: the first consisting of so much of the alarm or danger as may be apt to result from the future behaviour of the same agent: the second consisting of so much as may be apt to result from the behaviour of other persons; such others, to wit, as may come to engage in acts of the same sort and tendency.

'The distinction between the primary and the secondary consequences of an act, must be carefully attended to. It is so just, that the latter may often be of a directly opposite nature to the former. In some cases, where the primary consequences of the act are attended with a mischief, the secondary consequences may be beneficial, and that to such a degree, as even greatly to outweigh the mischief of the primary. This is the case, for instance, with all acts of punishment, when properly applied. Of these, the primary mischief being never intended to fall but upon such persons as may happen to have committed some act which it is expedient to prevent; the secondary mischief, that is, the alarm and the danger, extends no farther than to such persons as are under temptation to commit it: in which case, in as far as it tends to restrain them from committing such acts, it is of a beneficial nature.

'Thus much with regard to acts that produce positive pain, and that immediately. This case, by reason of its simplicity, seemed the fittest to take the lead. But acts may produce mischief in various other ways, which, together with those already specified, may all be comprised by the following abridged analysis.

'Mischief may admit of a division in any one of three points of view: 1. According to its own *nature.* 2. According to its *cause.* 3. According to the person, or other party, who is the *object* of it. With regard to its nature, it may be either *simple* or *complex:* when simple, it may either be *positive* or *negative:* positive, consisting of actual pain: negative, consisting of the loss of pleasure. Whether simple or complex, and whether positive or negative, it

may be either *certain* or *contingent.* When it is negative, it consists of the loss of some benefit or advantage: this benefit may be material in both or either of two ways: 1. By affording actual pleasure: or, 2. By averting pain or *danger*, which is the chance of pain; that is, by affording *security*. In as far, then, as the benefit which a mischief tends to avert is productive of security, the tendency of such mischief is to produce *insecurity*. 2. With regard to its *cause*, mischief may be produced either by one *single* action, or not without the *concurrence* of other actions: if not without the concurrence of other actions, these others may be the actions either of the *same person*, or of *other* persons: in either case, they may be either acts of the *same kind* as that in question, or of *other* kinds. 3. Lastly, with regard to the party who is the *object* of the mischief, or, in other words, who is in a way to be affected by it, such party may be either an *assignable* individual, or assemblage of individuals, or else a multitude of *unassignable* individuals. When the object is an assignable individual, this individual may either be the person *himself*, who is the author of the mischief, or some *other* person. When the individuals, who are the objects of it, are an unassignable multitude, this multitude may be either the *whole* political community or state or some *subordinate* division of it. Now, when the object of the mischief is the author himself, it may be styled *self-regarding:* when any other party is the object, *extra-regarding:* when such other party is an individual, it may be styled *private:* when a subordinate branch of the community, *semi-public:* when the whole community, *public.* Here, for the present, we must stop. To pursue the subject through its inferior distinctions, will be the business of the chapter which exhibits the division of offences.

'The cases, which have been already illustrated, are those in which the primary mischief is not necessarily otherwise than a simple one, and that positive: present, and therefore certain: producible by a single action, without any necessity of the concurrence of any other action, either on the part of the same agent or of others: and having for its object an assignable individual, or, by accident, an assemblage of assignable individuals: extra-regarding, therefore, and private. This primary mischief is accompanied by a secondary; the first branch of which is sometimes contingent and sometimes certain, the other never otherwise than

contingent: both extra-regarding and semi-public: in other respects, pretty much upon a par with the primary mischief; except that the first branch, viz. the alarm, though inferior in magnitude to the primary, is, in point of extent, and therefore, upon the whole, in point of magnitude, much superior.

'Two instances more will be sufficient to illustrate the most material of the modifications above exhibited.

'A man drinks a certain quantity of liquor, and intoxicates himself. The intoxication in this particular instance does him no sort of harm; or, what comes to the same thing, none that is perceptible. But it is probable, and, indeed, next to certain, that a given number of acts of the same kind would do him a very considerable degree of harm; more or less according to his constitution and other circumstances; for this is no more than what experience manifests every day. It is also certain, that one act of this sort, by one means or other, tends considerably to increase the disposition a man may be in to practise other acts of the same sort; for this also is verified by experience. This, therefore, is one instance where the mischief producible by the act is contingent; in other words, in which the tendency of the act is no otherwise mischievous than in virtue of its producing a *chance* of mischief. This chance depends upon the concurrence of other acts of the same kind; and those such as must be practised by the same person. The object of the mischief is that very person himself who is the author of it, and he only, unless by accident. The mischief is, therefore, private and self-regarding.

'As to its secondary mischief, alarm, it produces none: it produces, indeed, a certain quantity of danger by the influence of example; but it is not often that this danger will amount to a quantity worth regarding.

'Again. A man omits paying his share to a public tax. This, we see, is an act of the negative kind. Is this, then, to be placed upon the list of mischievous acts? Yes, certainly. Upon what grounds? Upon the following. To defend the community against its external as well as its internal adversaries, are tasks, not to mention others of a less indispensable nature, which cannot be fulfilled but at a considerable expense. But whence is the money for defraying this expense to come? It can be obtained in no other manner than by contributions to be collected from indi-

viduals: In a word, by taxes. The produce, then, of these taxes is to be looked upon as a kind of *benefit* which it is necessary the governing part of the community should receive for the use of the whole. This produce, before it can be applied to its destination, requires that there should be certain persons commissioned to receive and to apply it. Now, if these persons, had they received it, would have applied it to its proper destination, it would have been a benefit: the not putting them in a way to receive it, is then a mischief. But it is possible that, if received, it might not have been applied to its proper destination; or that the services, in consideration of which it was bestowed, might not have been performed. . . . The benefit is therefore contingent; and, accordingly, upon a certain supposition, the act which consists in the averting of it is not a mischievous one. But this supposition, in any tolerably-ordered government, will rarely indeed be verified. In the very worst-ordered government that exists, the greatest part of the duties that are levied are paid over according to their destination: and, with regard to any particular sum that is attempted to be levied upon any particular person upon any particular occasion, it is therefore manifest that, unless it be certain that it will not be so disposed of, the act of withholding it is a mischievous one.

'The act of payment, when referable to any particular sum, especially if it be a small one, might also have failed of proving beneficial on another ground: and, consequently, the act of non-payment, of proving mischievous. It is possible that the same services, precisely, might have been rendered without the money as with it. If, then, speaking of any small limited sum, such as the greatest which any one person is called upon to pay at a time, a man were to say that the non-payment of it would be attended with mischievous consequences; this would be far from certain: but what comes to the same thing as if it were, it is perfectly certain when applied to the whole. It is certain that, if all of a sudden the payment of all taxes was to cease, there would no longer be anything effectual done, either for the maintenance of justice, or for the defence of the community against its foreign adversaries: that therefore the weak would presently be oppressed and injured in all manner of ways, by the strong at home, and both together overwhelmed by oppressors from abroad. Upon

the whole, therefore, it is manifest, that in this case, though the mischief is remote and contingent, though in its first appearance it consists of nothing more than the interception of a *benefit*, and though the individuals, in whose favour that benefit would have been reduced into the explicit form of pleasure or security, are altogether unassignable, yet the mischievous tendency of the act is not on all these accounts the less indisputable. The mischief, in point of *intensity* and *duration*, is indeed unknown: it is *uncertain*: it is *remote*. But in point of *extent* it is immense: and in point of *fecundity*, pregnant to a degree that baffles calculation.

'The investigation might, by a process rendered obvious by analogy, be extended to the consequences of an act of a beneficial nature. In both instances, a *third* order of consequences may be reckoned to have taken place, when the influence of the act, through the medium of the passive faculty of the patient, has come to affect his active faculty. In this way, 1. Evil may flow out of *evil*:—instance; the exertions of industry put a stop to by the extinction of inducement, resulting from a continued chain of acts of robbery or extortion. 2. *Good out of evil*:—instance; habits of depredation put a stop to by a steady course of punishment. 3. *Evil out of good*:—instance; habits of industry put a stop to by an excessive course of gratuitous bounty. 4. *Good out of good*:—instance; a constant and increasing course of industry, excited and kept up by the rewards afforded by a regular and increasing market for the fruits of it[1].'

It should be noticed that this Rule, though occasionally coinciding in result with the second, is by no means to be confounded with it. The caution contained in the second rule may be stated briefly as follows: Consider what would happen, if everybody were to act as you are doing. The caution contained in the fourth rule may be stated thus: Consider the consequences which your act will entail not now only and on those immediately affected by it, but in future and on those whom it will or may affect, however remotely. In the one case we generalise the act, in the other we trace its individual consequences. It is plain that, in

[1] Bentham's Theory of Morals and Legislation, Ch. 12, § 1 (3–17).

order to arrive at a due estimation of its moral character, both processes are necessary.

V. The last rule suggests, or, more properly speaking, includes another. The moralist is specially bound to consider the effects of acts or rules not only on the external condition of the individual or society, but also on the habits and dispositions, in one word, on the character both of the agent himself and of others. For it is obvious that an act or rule which, in its immediate consequences, is beneficial, may ultimately do more harm than good by its deteriorating influences on character. Thus, it might be immediately beneficial to remove some needless restraint which imposed practical inconveniences on society; but if the removal of this restraint were likely to weaken the moral character, and so loosen the hold of other rules on the conscience, no wise man would recommend it without considerable hesitation or except under the pressure of grave necessity. Or, again, it may be important in a school or similar institution to insist on the punctual performance of tasks; but, if this practice be carried so far as to produce a distaste for intellectual pursuits, it will defeat its own object. Or, once more, innocent indulgence on my part, as in wine or recreation, may tend to confirm vicious or indolent habits in others. In estimating, therefore, the remote consequences of an act or rule, one of the principal circumstances to be taken into consideration is its probable results on the habits and dispositions of those whom it may affect. To all who are entrusted with educational functions, it is needless to point out that this rule is of supreme importance.

In connexion with these rules, it seems desirable to make two supplementary remarks.

The first is that, though the general welfare should be

the ultimate end and the ultimate test of all our actions, it is, as a rule, best promoted by each man attending to his own interest and that of those who immediately surround him and are dependent on him. In order to perceive this truth, we have nothing to do but to put in force the second rule given above, and to suppose each man engaged primarily in promoting the interests of others instead of his own, of his neighbourhood rather than of his family, of his country rather than of his neighbourhood, and of mankind at large rather than of his own country. The absurdities, inconveniences, and mischiefs which would hence ensue are tolerably obvious. Society, in fact, would soon be dissolved. There is no fear, however, human nature being constituted as it is, of such practices or theories ever becoming general; and, consequently, it is always more needful for the moralist to insist on the necessity of men limiting their regard to their own interests by some regard to those of others, their regard to the interests of narrower aggregates by some regard to the interests of wider aggregates, their regard to the interests of sections of mankind by some regard to the interests of humanity itself. Philanthropy may, it is true, easily degenerate into a vague sentiment, the objects of which are too remote to afford much occasion for its exercise, but it is the legitimate development of our sympathetic nature, and any system of morals which fails to recognise this fact must be incomplete and untrue. To lay down an absolute rule that the wider interest should always take precedence of the narrower, would, as we have seen, be absurd and mischievous, but it would be little less mischievous to lay down an absolute rule to the reverse effect. In considering actual cases where the wider and the narrower interests clash, one, however, of the many circumstances to be taken into consideration is undoubtedly this: that,

as a rule admitting of many exceptions, the interests of the world are best promoted by each man pursuing his own.

It may be remarked, secondly, that a regard to the general ends for the promotion of which moral rules exist, and in conformity with which they ought to be framed, might be found a most useful corrective of that rigid formalism and extreme scrupulosity which have often rendered virtue unamiable, and, by so doing, diminished her influence over mankind. Unless we bear in mind that a rule exists as a means to the furtherance of some end beyond itself, we are apt to become slaves of the rule, and to insist on its observance in minute and trivial cases where it promotes no good end, or even where it frustrates the attainment of other ends in themselves desirable. We all know the practical inconveniences and discomforts which, in ordinary life, are often caused by men who 'never break their rules,' especially when those rules, as is frequently the case, are of a very minute and formal character. But this rigidity and formalism often assume a far more serious aspect and lead, by a not unnatural reaction, to the comparative neglect of the higher and broader rules of morality. Such is the spirit of the Pharisee who tithes the mint and cummin and anise, and who would rather that his neighbour should perish than himself break the least tittle of the law; or the spirit of the Stoic who, with the rigid inflexibility of a precisian, pronounced all crimes to be equal, because they are all deflexions from the standard of absolute rectitude. And it is a spirit which is constantly reappearing, and must constantly be reappearing, amongst mankind; for it is due to, a cause which is in constant operation, namely, the tendency to lose sight of the end while pursuing the means. Its only corrective is to keep that end steadily in view

adjusting our conduct wisely and cautiously to the great aims of human life and the supreme objects for which society exists.

Before bringing this chapter to a close, there remain two important questions, intimately connected with the topics already discussed, to which the moralist is undoubtedly bound to attempt to supply a categorical answer.

First, though I conceive that the answer is implicitly contained in what has already been said, it might be asked definitely: What is it, when we have ascertained what is right, which obliges us to its performance? Or, in other words, what is the theory here adopted of Moral Obligation[1]? I reply, in one word, that the obligation to do what is right and refrain from what is wrong is imposed upon us by our *moral nature*, by which I mean the whole nature of man, sympathetic as well as self-regarding, rational as well as emotional, capable of reflecting on its own acts and, as a consequence of that reflexion, capable of passing on them a

[1] Strictly speaking, the word Obligation implies a person or persons to whom we are obliged, as God, the Sovereign, some section of our fellow-men, or our fellow-men in general. But it has now come to be used without this connotation, and to signify any consideration which appears authoritatively to prescribe to us the observance or avoidance of any course of conduct. Moral Obligation, therefore, signifies a consideration of this kind, based on grounds which are distinctively moral. Similarly, Duty originally implied some person or persons, other than the agent himself, to whom a given course of conduct was due; though it is now used simply in the general sense of right conduct, as when we speak of a man's 'duty to himself.' The verb 'ought' corresponds with the substantive 'duty.' Thus to say that we are 'under a moral obligation' to do a thing, that we 'ought' to do it, or that it is our 'duty,' are equivalent forms of expression.

It will be plain, from what I have said in this and the preceding Chapters, that I do not agree with Professor Sidgwick (Methods of Ethics, Book I, Ch. 3) in regarding the idea connoted by these terms as 'ultimate and unanalysable.

definitive sentence of approval or disapproval. My answer, of course, implies that there are in man higher and lower appetites and capacities; that he is able, by reflexion, to discriminate between the two; and that, in practice, he has the power of giving effect to the results of that discrimination. If it be objected that this theory of obligation is a purely subjective one, I reply that all theories of obligation must be so, in the last analysis. Even those who find their theory of obligation in the law of the land rest it ultimately on our fear of punishment. To a man who was insensible to the prospect of pain or privations the law would speak in vain. And, similarly, those who ground the obligation to right conduct on the will or nature of God really appeal either to our hope of future reward and fear of future punishment or to that higher sanction which is found in the love and awe of God and the consequent desire to shape our conduct in accordance with what we conceive to be His. The majesty of the moral law, if that be regarded as the source of moral obligation, implies, on our part, a recognition of that law, a reverence for it, and a willingness to conform our actions to its requirements. And so, in whatever direction we turn, we shall always find that the moralist, though he may begin by apparently referring moral obligation to some external source, really appeals, in the last resort, to some principle or set of principles in human nature itself. Again, it may be objected that this theory of moral obligation founds morality on a purely human basis. I reply that this is not the case. Believing, as I do, that human nature has had its origin in a Divine Source, and that it has been divinely appointed to work out great ends in the economy of the universe, I regard the moral nature of man as a consummate example of the divine workmanship, and none the less so, because it has been gradually developed and is being developed still,

instead of being an instantaneous product, incapable of improvement or growth. Though, therefore, my ultimate reference, in all matters of conduct, is to the constitution of man's nature, it is to man's nature as God's work. Furthermore, it may be objected that this theory does not provide any infallible standard of reference. It certainly does not, though I may reply that, in the great majority of cases likely to occur in actual life, it provides a sufficiently trustworthy one, and one the application of which, in most cases, cannot reasonably be questioned. The enlightened conscience of a reflective man, though not infallible and though necessarily relative to his time and circumstances, is not likely, in practical issues, if it avails itself of all the external aids which are open to it, to go far astray. Lastly, it may be said, and said quite truly, that the appeal to the higher elements of a man's nature may have no effect. But this objection applies, in some measure, to all schemes of morality and even to all sanctions of conduct. And that for the very reason, as was said in replying to the first objection, that the ultimate appeal must always be to some feeling or principle of human nature itself. If that feeling or principle be dead or dormant or inactive, we can plainly pursue the appeal no further. It is always open to a man to say that he does not admit our reasons, or recognise the reality or force of the sanctions propounded to him. Happily, those who are deaf to the higher considerations of religion and morality, who have no prickings of conscience and stand in no awe of God, are often influenced by the fear of the reprobation of society, or, at a still lower level, of the physical sanction of punishment administered by the law.

The second question which might be asked is what is my conception of the relation between right, good, and

pleasure; or wrong, evil, and pain. My conception of the relation between right and good (and, therefore, *mutatis mutandis*, wrong and evil) has already been stated with sufficient definiteness. It will, for our present purposes, be sufficient to recal the brief definition given of a right act as the result of a conscious choice of the greater good or lesser evil[1]. But, then, it may fairly be asked what precise meaning do I attach to the word 'good,' and what is the relation of this conception of 'good' to another conception so frequently employed in ethical speculations, that of 'pleasure'? Terms so exceedingly familiar as these are, of course, peculiarly difficult to define. It is impossible to discover, for their explanation, terms more familiar than themselves, and the utmost that we can hope to do is to exhibit them in their relations to one another and to kindred terms. I have, therefore, thus far employed them without any attempt at definition, the context, I think, in each case, sufficiently shewing, for our purposes, the ethical import attaching to them. At the same time, I acknowledge that, in a work like the present, there ought somewhere to be a statement, at least approximately precise, of the place which an author conceives these and such like terms to occupy in his theory of the economy of human nature.

Now, setting aside other applications of the term 'good,' which are entirely beyond our purpose, and confining ourselves to the good of an organic being, the simplest account seems to be that the good of any part of it is the satisfaction or development of that part, and the good of the whole the development of its entire nature or the attainment of that end or those ends for which it is naturally fitted. Thus, if we consider any one human appetite, desire, or affection in itself, and without any

[1] See pp. 234, 235.

reference to anything else, the result of its gratification may be called good, and, similarly, of its frustration evil. But, inasmuch as our appetites, desires, and affections are constantly clashing, the gratification of one of them, in its relation to our nature as a whole, may come to be evil, and its frustration good. Thus, for reasons and in ways already sufficiently explained, man is led to co-ordinate his various feelings, and to aim at the satisfaction of his nature as a whole, rather than that of any particular part or parts of it. But man is so constituted that his nature can only receive satisfaction in a constant growth or progress, and, hence, in his case, the term satisfaction may be conveniently replaced by development. Again, man can only be adequately developed in society, and, consequently, the development of the individual man implies the development of society, as, correspondently, the development of society plainly implies the development of the individual. Lastly, as man is placed in a material environment, and is thereby subjected to certain limitations and conditions, his nature must be developed in a certain conformity therewith. The good of man, therefore, as a whole, may be conceived of as the development of the various parts of his nature in harmony with one another and with the social and material medium in which he exists.

But how are we to know whether the functions of any part of our nature are being promoted or thwarted? Surely, at any given moment, we know, and can know the fact only by the feeling of pleasure or pain which attends their exercise; and, though present pain may be the condition of future pleasure and at times essential to the creation or renewal of healthy action, it is not till the pain passes away, and the pleasure comes, that we can say the function is being promoted. Thus pleasure and pain are the *signs* of good and evil, the means by which we know,

from moment to moment, whether our condition is a good or an evil one. If pressed for a definition of them, I can hardly say more than that they are the feelings which supervene respectively on the gratification, satisfaction, or promotion of any appetite, desire, affection, tendency, or requirement of our nature; and, on the other hand, on the frustration, disappointment, thwarting, or breaking in on the same. Now, as pleasure and pain, though not identical with good and evil, are the signs by which they become known to us, men have not unnaturally been led, to a certain extent, to use the two pairs of terms as convertible, and even philosophers and moralists to speak of good and evil in terms of pleasure and pain. There is, however, at the same time, a very important difference which may often be detected in the ordinary employment of the two sets of terms. Pleasure and pain are frequently applied to designate momentary feelings; good and evil to designate permanent, or, at least, more permanent conditions. Thus, take the homely instance of drawing a tooth. The patient, if an adult, willingly submits to the pain, or, if a child, is exhorted to submit to it, because it is 'for his good.' But, when we come to look more closely into the meaning of this expression, there is really no identification between pain and good, as such, or any opposition between pleasure and evil, as such. At the cost of momentary pain, the patient is secured against the constant recurrence of pain in the future, together with the many inconveniences (that is, deprivations of pleasure) which attend on a diseased organ. These recurring pains and inconveniences are, whenever they occur, signs of 'something amiss,' as we say, and hence, from moment to moment, at any rate, pain and evil, pleasure and good, may be regarded as practically identical. But then experience informs us that momentary good or pleasure is often enjoyed at the cost of often-re-

curring or prolonged or even permanent evil or pain; and, similarly, that submission to a slight or brief pain or evil will often ensure a large amount of pleasure or good or freedom from pain in the future. And hence, there being need of some expressions to denote this familiar opposition, the words good and pleasure, and, similarly, evil and pain often come to be contrasted: good and evil being applied to often-recurring, prolonged, or permanent states; pleasure and pain to momentary, seldom-recurring, or comparatively brief feelings. The ambiguity thus resulting from this double use of the word pleasure in its relation to good may evidently become a matter of great embarrassment to the moralist and a source of constant confusion to the student. It would, therefore, it appears to me, be a real gain in ethical nomenclature, if we could, wherever there is any chance of misunderstanding, employ the words 'good' and 'evil' rather than 'pleasure' and 'pain' to designate the measures of our actions; for, in cases of conflict, they seem to suggest the sacrifice of the transitory to the permanent rather than of the permanent to the transitory. At the same time, when properly explained and qualified (a process which is not always easy), the terms 'pleasure' and 'pain' may be employed interchangeably with 'good' and 'evil.' Happiness and Misery (which seem to mean respectively a decided balance of pleasure over pain and a decided balance of pain over pleasure) are not open to the main objection attaching to the words 'pleasure' and 'pain,' namely, that of suggesting merely momentary feelings; but the word Happiness, when employed to designate the ethical test or end, is peculiarly open to the objection that men are apt to understand by it material rather than mental conditions, comfort and what is called 'success in life' rather than the development of our manifold faculties, culminating in the

intellectual, moral, and spiritual nature. A favourable medium, certain opportunities, and a certain amount of external prosperity are indeed, as was long ago observed by some of the ancient moralists, essential to the full and satisfactory exercise of these capacities; but this consideration, as well as the more important one of the development of our human nature itself, seems to be sufficiently covered by the term 'good.' I have, therefore, usually, though not exclusively, employed this term (and, *mutatis mutandis*, its opposite 'evil'), in the present work, rather than any others, to denote the test or standard by which the moralist should measure human acts, dispositions, and characters. Cognate terms, which, besides combining the other advantages of the term 'good,' still more clearly imply permanence, and exclude merely momentary pleasures, are 'welfare' and 'well-being'; but, from the want of opposites in common use, they are, generally speaking, not equally convenient. In the formal statement, however, of the ultimate criterion of action, I have employed them, as being least open to ambiguity or misunderstanding.

All these terms are, in this sense, inadequate and indefinite, that, as society advances and the moral horizon is extended, they are undergoing a constant process of expansion and rectification. 'Pleasure,' 'Happiness,' 'Good,' 'Welfare,' 'Well-being' convey a very different meaning to a savage and a cultivated European, a clown or a sage, a man who is swayed by passion or governed by forethought and reflexion. But this fact, to those who believe in the progress or even movement of human nature, constitutes no real objection to their employment. It is a necessary incident of morality, considered as a progressive, or even fluctuating, and not a stationary condition, and only reminds us that language is no more

stable, or exempt from change, than any other human product or institution. Terms such as perfection of character, self-realisation, and the like, it hardly needs to be pointed out, are equally relative to the conceptions of those who employ them, and, consequently, equally circumscribed by the limitations of time, nationality, and circumstance.

As the functions of the various parts of our compound nature vary indefinitely, ranging from those of the purely animal appetites up to those which seem to link the human nature with the divine, the question naturally occurs whether the pleasures and pains which supervene upon their satisfaction or disappointment do not participate in a like difference. Is the pleasure, for instance, which results from a hearty meal of the same kind as that which ensues on healthy muscular exertion, or either of them as the pleasure derived from looking at a beautiful picture or reflecting on a generous action? The consciousness of different men may give a different answer to this question, but to me, and, if I mistake not, to many others, the true answer appears to be that they are not of the same kind, and that these pleasures differ in quality, rather than in mere amount or quantity. How then, it may be asked, can we compare or equate them, so as to employ the results of the comparison either as the measure of past or as a guide to future conduct? It may be replied, in the first place, that, even when two pleasures are of the same kind and one follows immediately on the other—the simplest case we can take—it is impossible to compare them with mathematical precision, and to say that one is, for instance, just double or treble of the other. Consequently, the difficulty of exact mensuration is not introduced by the distinction of quality in pleasures, but already exists, even on the theory that pleasures differ

only in amount. There will, of course, be increasing divergence of judgment, as amongst different men, and increasing uncertainty even in the decisions of the same man, when differences of quality as well as quantity have to be taken into account in the estimation of pleasures and pains. But it is only an additional difficulty, and it is one which we are all of us engaged in solving, each for himself, and society for us all, throughout the whole of our lives, while mankind, ever since men became conscious and reflective beings, has been, throughout the long eras of its existence, incessantly occupied in the same work. The mensuration, it is true, can never become exact; it is, necessarily, always more or less rough: but, with increasing experience and increasing reflexion, it is constantly becoming more and more precise, and better adapted to the practical needs of each generation[1]. The general result of this process, in a society which is morally progressive, is an ever-growing preference for the higher and more refined pleasures of the æsthetic, intellectual, moral, and spiritual nature over those of the merely appetitive and animal part of man. So marked may this preference ultimately become, that no amount of physical enjoyment would tempt, and no amount of physical suffering deter, a man from carrying through some course of conduct which he conceives to be right or from satisfying one of the deeper needs of his moral or spiritual being. In such cases our pleasures or pains, or, as perhaps more commonly happens, a pleasure and pain, are said to be 'incommensurable.' Of course, the relation between the terms may sometimes be reversed, and, in men of a low or degraded type, the pleasures and pains connected with the love of

[1] Here I may refer back to what has been already said on this subject, in the criticism of Bentham's treatment of pleasures and pains. See Part I, ch. 3, pp. 124–127.

gain or the gratification of some sensual impulse may entirely obliterate all the higher motives and more refined feelings. Happily, however, with the development of society, the tendencies of humanity, in this respect, are usually in the direction of elevation rather than degeneration.

It may not be out of place, in connexion with the topics which have just been discussed, to offer a few remarks on the vexed question of the relation of pleasure to desire. Are our pleasures and pains simply the concomitants of the satisfaction and disappointment of our desires, or is the attainment of pleasure or the removal of pain or discomfort the express object at which our desires aim? I may state my own opinion briefly as follows. Each appetite, desire, or affection seems to be directed primarily to its appropriate object, as hunger to food, ambition to honour, benevolence to the good of others, and similarly with the rest. In other words, each appetite, desire, or affection aims directly at an objective end, and not, at least in the first instance, at the attainment of the subjective feeling of pleasure or relief from pain. Yet, if, owing to the concomitant circumstances or subsequent results, the gratification of a desire produced, on the whole, more pain than pleasure, it would probably recur, on the next occasion, in a weakened form. And if, after repeated experiences, the desire were still attended with more pain than pleasure, or its gratification invariably resulted in more pain than its frustration[1], it is difficult to conceive

[1] The gratification of a desire is in itself, and apart from attendant circumstances or subsequent results, always pleasurable. But the attendant circumstances or the subsequent results may be so disagreeable as entirely to obliterate the pleasure derived from the gratification of the desire, and so invest, in our minds, the gratification of the desire itself with a disagreeable character. Thus, the gratification of hunger is, in itself, always pleasurable, but the viands with which the appetite is gratified may be so disagreeable

that it could much longer continue to operate. On the other hand, when the attainment of the object of desire is attended with a large balance of pleasure or with relief from pain, the desire itself is stimulated and intensified. Thus, pleasure and pain may, in a certain sense, be said to determine action; because we naturally gratify those desires which are attended with pleasure and check or intermit those which are attended with pain. But, in the generality of cases, we seem to be unconscious, or at any rate only imperfectly conscious, of this action of prospective pleasure and pain upon the will; and it appears to be comparatively seldom that men expressly place before their minds the attainment of pleasure or the removal of pain as the object to be definitely aimed at[1]. I cannot, at the same time, doubt that, in some cases, the two objects are consciously combined, and that men not only seek to compass their desires but also dwell with conscious satisfaction on the pleasure or relief from pain which they expect to result from their gratification. We may see, therefore, both how this question as to the proper object of desire came to be raised, and also that the solution of which it admits is by no means a simple one[2].

or produce such disagreeable consequences, that we may dread the recurrence of the appetite. The more violent, however, the appetite or the more intense the desire, the less do we care for the unpleasantness of the concomitant circumstances or of the subsequent results,—a proof, if any were needed, that the satisfaction of the appetite or desire, in itself, and apart from all other circumstances, is always attended with pleasure.

[1] Professor Sidgwick (Methods of Ethics, Bk. I, ch. 4) has pointedly expressed almost the same position as follows: 'A man's predominant desire is, I think, most commonly not a conscious impulse towards pleasure: but, where there is strong desire in any direction, there is commonly keen susceptibility to the corresponding pleasures; and the most devoted enthusiast is sustained in his work by the recurrent consciousness of such pleasures.'

[2] Amongst the most interesting authorities on this question are Butler's Sermons, Preface and Sermons I, XI; Sidgwick's Methods of Ethics, Bk. I,

Its practical importance consists in its bearing on the question whether we have or have not disinterested feelings, that is to say, feelings other than those which are directed to the attainment of our own pleasures or the relief of our own pains. The reply is, I think, that we undoubtedly have such feelings; but that, in the actual experience of life, the thought of the pleasures and pains which are likely to result to ourselves from their gratification or disappointment is, either by latent association or conscious forethought, often inextricably blended with them, so that this consideration also comes to be a powerful factor in conduct.

Though in this and the preceding chapter I have not infrequently adopted or approximated to the views of the so-called Utilitarian moralists, I hope it will be plain that I have insisted on the necessity of recognising the distinctively moral sanction of self-approbation and self-disapprobation (a recognition which, in my view, is essential to the very existence of Ethics); on the importance, or rather necessity, of including among the elements of human welfare the satisfaction of all the higher requirements both of the individual nature and of Society, as well as of taking into account the reflex effects of rules and actions on our habits and dispositions; and, finally, on that theory of Moral Obligation which, while grounding it on the characteristics and tendencies of human nature as a whole, finds it specially in that authoritative, though still fallible, principle, which is variously denominated the Moral Faculty, the Moral Sense, or Conscience. I am far from insinuating that the eminent, and often ill-

ch. 4 (a chapter which it is important to read in the last, i.e. 3rd, edition); and Bain on the Emotions and Will, The Will, ch. 8, together with the article on Butler in his Manual of Mental and Moral Philosophy.

understood, writers to whom I have alluded have always denied, or even ignored, these important truths, but, partly, no doubt, owing to the circumstances under which they wrote and their objects in writing[1], they have certainly not insisted on them with the clearness and emphasis which their indispensable position in any theory of Morals demanded.

[1] See the remarks on Bentham, in Part I. Ch. 2.

CHAPTER VII.

On the Reason.

The Functions of the Reason in determining Conduct. Analysis of Moral Action. Co-ordination of the Feelings by the Reason.

HAVING now considered the various feelings which enter into our moral nature, together with their appropriate objects, it may be convenient to proceed next to investigate the functions of the Reason in the determination of conduct.

The word Reason is usually employed in one or other of two senses. Sometimes it is used to denote the real or supposed faculty which furnishes *a priori* ideas,—ideas, that is to say, which are supposed to have an existence prior to all experience, even though experience may be necessary in order to elicit them. It is not our business to consider the doctrine of *a priori* ideas in general, but, so far as it affects the moral ideas of right and wrong, it has already been sufficiently discussed[1]. We have attempted to shew that it does not adequately account for the diversity of those ideas, which fact can be adequately accounted for on another hypothesis, and hence we have been led to reject it. It is not, therefore, necessary in the present place to revert to this sense of the word Reason.

[1] See Part I. Chapter 2, and beginning of Chapter 6.

In the second of the two senses alluded to above, Reason is the faculty of comparison or reflexion, including in that process what is necessarily involved in it, namely abstraction. This is the ordinary sense of the word Reason, both in English philosophy and in common life. Thus, we are said to employ Reason, when we infer a conclusion, when we make a generalization, when we pronounce a judgment, or when we analyse a conception. In all these cases, it will be found that we compare objects, qualities, notions, or judgments, and that, in making the comparison, we invariably abstract certain qualities, attributes, or notions, for the purpose of concentrating our attention the more exclusively on the others[1].

Now Reason enters into morality, both in the way of determining and of estimating conduct. The slightest reflexion will shew that neither the one nor the other of these processes would be possible without the employment of Reason. So essential, in fact, is Reason both to the right direction and the right estimation of human conduct, that many writers have spoken as if they exclusively depended upon it, as if the slightest admixture of emotion vitiated both our acts and our judgments, as if man had only to rid himself of all his passions and affections and reduce himself to the state of a purely intellectual being, in order both to act rightly and to pronounce rightly on the past acts both of himself and others. That we do not share in these opinions, but, on the other hand, believe both reason and emotion to concur as well in our moral

[1] The expressions 'to abstract' and 'abstraction' are frequently employed improperly to designate the circumstances on which the attention is fixed rather than those circumstances which are 'drawn off' or withdrawn from the range of mental vision, in order that the attention may be concentrated on those which remain. Thus, in Classification, we do not, properly speaking, 'abstract' the qualities by means of which, as being common, the classes are defined, but those which, not being common, are left out of consideration.

acts as in our moral judgments, is abundantly evident from what has already been said in previous chapters.

Of the respective elements contributed by reason and emotion in forming an estimate of conduct, so much has been said in the chapter on the Moral Faculty, that it would be superfluous to recur to the question in the present place. I propose, therefore, to confine my attention in this chapter to the operation of reason in the determination of conduct, or, in other words, to the functions of reason in the process of moral action and in that of the co-ordination of the feelings.

The most obvious distinction to draw, when we look at a human action for the purpose of analysis, is that into end and means. In every action, a man proposes to himself, consciously or unconsciously, a certain end, and even in the mere exertion of the muscles he is taking a means towards the attainment of an end. Some of our actions, indeed, are automatic or instinctive, but instinct, we must recollect, is only another form of reason, and even in those actions which we call instinctive there is always an end to be attained, though that end may not be consciously present to us. Now, speaking broadly, it may be laid down that the end is always suggested by some emotion, while the means for the attainment of the end are always devised by reason.

To make this proposition plain by examples. A man, say, feels the sensation of hunger, and so desires food. If no other desire conflict with this one, he will take the first opportunity of gratifying it; the means taken for the accomplishment of his end being of a more or less complex character. Thus, the food may be within his reach, and he may simply have to walk across the room, or into another room, to obtain it; or he may have to send for it, or to purchase it. In all these cases, reason dictates the means

by which the end is attained. We either repeat mechanically the same means which, under similar circumstances, we have hitherto been accustomed to employ, or we consider what means we have employed on a previous and similar occasion, or, out of various alternatives by which the end may be compassed, we, after reflexion, select some particular one.

But it frequently happens that, no sooner does one desire present itself, than other and conflicting desires are simultaneously excited. Thus, I may desire food, but it may occur to me that, if I gratify the desire now, I shall have no appetite for my next meal, or that I may be prevented from purchasing some object on which I have set my mind, or that I may not be able to relieve another person who is in more want of food than myself, or that by gratification of the desire, under present circumstances, I may impair my health. Some of the conflicting desires may, as will be evident from the examples, be of an equally transitory character with the desire of food, but others may, like the desire of health, be permanently present to us, and always ready to modify or restrain any desire which may conflict with them. The objects of these various desires may all be regarded as ends, some of them being of a transitory and some of a permanent character; and a reflective being, such as is man, does not arbitrarily pursue, first one, then the other, but, aided by his experience of the past, compares them by tracing out the consequences which are likely to follow from the gratification of each desire. Now this process can only be effected by reference to some common standard, with which the various ends may be compared, and to which, therefore, they may be regarded as instrumental. But this is only to say that what were formerly regarded as ends are now regarded as means, as means, namely, to the attainment

of that further end to which they are, in various degrees, conducive. Thus, food, sleep, exercise, work, relaxation, which, from one point of view, may all be regarded as distinct ends, may, from another, be regarded as means towards the attainment of health, to which end they are all more or less conducive, and by reference to which they may all be compared. Similarly the desire of health itself may conflict with the desire of wealth, of sensual enjoyment, of knowledge, or of reputation. These ends may be compared by reference to some common object, to which all conduce, or are supposed to conduce, and may thus come to be regarded as means; and so we may go on, till, at last, we reach some one end which, being itself the ultimate end of action, cannot be estimated by reference to any further end[1]. This end, with reference to individual action, is our own general welfare; with reference to society, or even to the individual regarded as an unit of society, it is the general welfare of mankind at large.

[1] Arist. Eth. Nic. X. 6 (6). *Ἅπαντα γὰρ ὡς εἰπεῖν ἑτέρου ἕνεκα αἱρούμεθα πλὴν τῆς εὐδαιμονίας· τέλος γὰρ αὕτη.*

This consideration of the constant conversion of ends into means, when themselves regarded with reference to some further end, may serve to explain a difficulty which must frequently have occurred to readers of the early chapters of the Third Book of the Ethics. Aristotle, in analysing the process of moral action, there distinguishes three steps, namely:

(1) *βούλησις*, or the *ὄρεξις* of the end.

(2) *βούλευσις*, or deliberation on the means.

(3) *προαίρεσις*, or choice of means.

But, in comparing these steps, the question naturally occurs to us: do we not deliberate on the desirability of our ends themselves, as well as on the most appropriate means for attaining them? Undoubtedly we do, nor could this fact have well escaped the notice of Aristotle. If, however, we bear in mind what has already been stated in the text, the analysis may be regarded as complete; for, no sooner do we begin to deliberate on the desirability of an end, than we compare it with some other end with which it is supposed to come into competition, and this comparison can only be instituted by reference to some common standard, or further end, to which the competing ends are regarded as conducive. As soon, therefore, as we begin to deliberate on an end, it is transferred from the category of ends to that of means.

We may now, perhaps, see the origin of the mistake which has led many moralists to speak of Reason as capable of supplying 'the sole spring of action.' Our ends are always suggested by some passion, appetite, desire, or affection, in short by some emotion. The means for the attainment of those ends are always devised and compared by reason. But, then, there is no end, except the ultimate end or ends of human action, which may not come itself to be regarded as a means towards the attainment of some further end, and, immediately it is so regarded, it falls under the domain of Reason. It seems, however, to escape the notice of the moralists of whom I am speaking, that, in the first instance, all these ends originate in the emotional part of our nature. They, or their consequences, may afterwards come to be compared by reference to some further standard, but they must originally have occurred to us, in virtue of some unsatisfied want or stimulated affection. A merely rational being, so far as we can conceive, would be incapable of any act[1].

[1] See Tucker's admirable Chapter on Reason, where this position is satisfactorily established and copiously illustrated.

Mr. Herbert Spencer is, perhaps, inclined to underestimate the share taken by Reason in determining conduct, but the following passage (transcribed from his Study of Sociology, chap. 15) will supply an apposite illustration of what has been advanced in the text: 'It is thus with conduct of every kind. See this group of persons clustered at the river side. A boat has upset, and some one is in danger of drowning. The fact that in the absence of aid the youth in the water will shortly die, is known to them all. That by swimming to his assistance his life may be saved, is a proposition denied by none of them. The duty of helping fellow-creatures who are in difficulties, they have been taught all their lives; and they will severally admit that running a risk to prevent a death is praiseworthy. Nevertheless, though sundry of them can swim, they do nothing beyond shouting for assistance or giving advice. But now here comes one who, tearing off his coat, plunges in to the rescue. In what does he differ from the others? Not in knowledge. Their cognitions are equally clear with his. They know as well as he does that death is impending; and know, too, how it may be prevented. In him, however, these cognitions arouse certain correlative emotions more strongly than they are aroused in the rest. Groups of feelings are excited in all; but whereas in the others the deterrent feelings

Even the Deity himself is regarded as animated with a desire for the good of his creatures. As Aristotle truly remarks: *διάνοια αὐτὴ οὐθὲν κινεῖ, ἀλλ' ἡ ἕνεκά του καὶ πρακτική*[1], and, in an earlier passage, *Πράξεως μὲν οὖν ἀρχὴ προαίρεσις, ὅθεν ἡ κίνησις, ἀλλ' οὐχ οὗ ἕνεκα, προαιρέσεως δὲ ὄρεξις καὶ λόγος ὁ ἕνεκά τινος*[2]. 'Reason,' says Hutcheson, 'judges of the tendency of our actions: it can never suggest an action in the first instance.'

One circumstance, perhaps, which has had no inconsiderable share in creating the opinion that our acts may proceed from reason alone, and that Reason is 'the sole spring of virtuous action,' is the fact that, by common consent, our virtuous actions are called 'reasonable.' This mode of speaking is noticed, and, to a certain extent, explained by Hutcheson in his Illustrations of the Moral Sense[3]: 'We may transiently observe,' he says, 'what has occasioned the word "reasonable" as the epithet of only virtuous actions. Though we have instincts determining us to desire ends without supposing any previous reasoning, yet by use of Reason we find out the means for attaining our ends. When we do not use our Reason, we are often disappointed of our ends. We, therefore, call those actions which are effectual to their ends "reasonable."' To this remark might be added, and ought to have been added, the consideration that no vicious act can strictly be called 'reasonable,' however much it may conduce to the attainment of any of the minor ends of life. An act, for instance, which was the means of acquiring a large fortune at the expense of veracity, would not be a strictly 'reasonable'

of fear, &c., preponderate, in him there is a surplus of the feelings excited by sympathy, joined, it may be, with others not of so high a kind. In each case, however, the behaviour is not determined by knowledge, but by emotion. Obviously, change in the actions of these passive spectators is not to be effected by making their cognitions clearer, but by making their higher feelings stronger.'

[1] Eth. Nic. VI. 2 (5). [2] Id. VI. 2 (4). [3] Sect. 1.

act: for, though it might secure to us the minor end of wealth, it would not really be instrumental to the attainment of the supreme end of life, by reference to which all other ends must be measured and estimated, namely, the greatest attainable welfare of ourselves and others; or, as I have elsewhere[1] said, 'if we choose to employ different but equivalent expressions, of the individual considered as an unit of society, or of society considered as including the individual.'

Having thus pointed out that, in all our acts whatsoever, the end, so far as it remains an end, is the object of some emotion, while the means, and all ends which are regarded in the light of means to the attainment of some further end, are compared and estimated by Reason, I may now proceed to consider the functions of Reason generally with respect to the emotional part of our nature.

We have seen that the various ends suggested by our simpler desires may conflict with one another, that they are then compared with reference to some further end, that this end, conflicting with some other end, may, in like manner, be compared with it in reference to some still further end, and so on, till, at last, a fixed subordination is established among our ends, and we thus attain a habit of at once dismissing one desire and fostering another, because the one thwarts and the other promotes the supreme objects of life. It is this process, frequently repeated in the individual and the race, which has created that perfect habit of self-control by which some men seem to have attained such complete ascendancy over their appetites, such complete independence of all disturbing circumstances, and such a complete power of moulding all their acts with reference to the main aims

[1] Progressive Morality, ch. 4.

and actuating principles of their lives, whatever those may be. Nor is this process confined to acts. It is plain that, by constant repetition, its effects may be extended from individual acts to the desires from which they spring, so that a particular desire, if it come into conflict with another particular desire, may usually, or even invariably, give way. There might conceivably even be cases where a desire was eradicated altogether, so as no longer to form any part of our nature[1]. Again, what is true of particular desires may, through association and the continuous operation of similar influences, become true of groups of similar desires. Thus, if our master-passion be some self-regarding principle, it may stifle, first one, and then another affection, till, at last, our sympathies are almost crushed out. Or, on the other hand, if the master-passion be some philanthropic sentiment, first one, and then another selfish desire may succumb before it, till, at last, we seem as if we lived almost entirely for the sake of others. And, exactly in the same way, our various desires, instead of one extirpating another, may one modify another, so as to become co-ordinated and harmonised, each contributing its due share to the general purposes of our being. That Reason is the instrument by which this subordination or co-ordination, as the case may be, is effected, will be abundantly clear from what has already been said in this chapter. The mode in which it operates with respect to the several groups of feelings, whether by co-ordinating the feelings

[1] Bacon (De Augmentis, Bk. VII. ch. 3) speaks of 'one passion regulating another,' and 'how they employ each other's assistance to conquer some one, after the manner of hunters and fowlers, who take beast with beast, and bird with bird; which man, perhaps, without such assistance, could not so easily do. And upon this foundation rests that excellent and universal use of rewards and punishments in civil life. For these are the supports of states, and suppress all the other noxious affections by those two predominant ones, fear and hope. And as, in civil government, one faction frequently bridles and governs another; the case is the same in the internal government of the mind.'

within each group or the several groups with each other, or by subordinating one feeling or one group to another, is described at length in the chapters which treat of the emotional parts of our nature. Morality has there been regarded as resulting from the co-ordination of the various Feelings by the Reason, in subordination to the general welfare of the individual and of society; and it is the business of theoretical ethics to trace the process by which this co-ordination is effected. History shews how, on a large scale, it has been accomplished in the gradual evolution of society, observation may illustrate the process by which it is now going on in the minds of individuals, and personal experience ought to confirm the teachings of history and of observation.

It should here be remarked that, though the co-ordination of our several desires and feelings, sympathetic, self-regarding, semi-social, and resentful, is effected by Reason, this co-ordination always has reference to some end other than Reason itself. Reason, in fact, is only the instrument by which our lower desires are subordinated to our higher, our lesser ends to our greater, and our various principles of action directed to some common object. This truth is so obvious that it may appear as if it hardly needed to be stated; but, both in ancient and modern times, many authors have spoken as if the employment of reason were, in some way, itself the end of action, as if the great aim of the virtuous man ought to be to eradicate his desires and feelings, and as if human action had no external ends to compass. We, on the other hand, have endeavoured to shew that the great ends of action are the adaptation of the individual and of society to the circumstances in which they are placed, the amelioration of man's condition, material, moral, social, and intellectual, and the gratification of all the desires of human nature in exact proportion

to their relative worth and dignity. The means to the attainment of these ends is the co-ordination, or, to use a convenient and expressive term, the moralisation, of the feelings by the reason; a faculty whose function it is, in relation to practice, to trace and compare, by reference to past or present experience, the consequences of our actions, and to estimate, in the last resort, all acts and desires in relation to the dominating conception of the general well-being of humanity.

It will, of course, be understood that, when we speak of the Reason in this chapter, it is exclusively of the Reason as exercised on the practical affairs of life, and in its relation to morals. The cultivation of the Reason in the intellectual sphere may, indeed, affect Morals indirectly, either as rendering the instrument more effective, or as amassing knowledge which may be available for the purpose of practice. But, as the observation of most men will testify, the highest developments of Reason may be consistent with a very low condition of the moral feelings. Cases of this kind are, indeed, comparatively rare, but they are sufficiently frequent to prove that the intellectual and moral sides of our nature are not necessarily governed by any law of equable development.

Before concluding this chapter, it may be desirable to remind the reader that, though, for purposes of logical analysis, the rational and emotional elements in the mental process preceding action may, without much difficulty, be roughly distinguished, yet, to use Hobbes' expression, 'thought is' so 'quick' that, in cases as they actually occur, the two elements are often so implicated as to appear to be inextricably blended. Moreover, it must be remembered that the emotions themselves, in

the case of men who have attained to any degree of civilization, have generally become more or less rationalised, and only, on occasion of extraordinary excitement, occur in their more violent and primitive forms. Especially pre-eminent has been this process of rationalisation in the formation of those feelings which attach to the ultimate ends of human conduct. Yet, notwithstanding these modifications in practice, the general theories enunciated in this chapter will, I believe, be found, on candid reflexion, to hold good.

CHAPTER VIII.

On the Imagination.

The office of the Imagination in Morals. Moral Ideals and Moral Maxims. Their relation to Scientific Ethics. Analogy of Beauty and Virtue.

THE subject of the functions of the Imagination in the determination of conduct may perhaps best be approached by drawing a distinction, which will hereafter be found of great importance, between Simple and Complex Imagination.

By an act of Simple Imagination, I represent to myself some absent object of Perception. Thus I may reproduce in my mind the features of some particular man, some flower, some pageant or picturesque view which I have seen in bygone years, some sound which I have heard, some odour which I have smelt, some past feeling of my own or some act of another. What we aim at in all these cases is to reproduce the absent object or past phenomenon, as exactly as we can, in all its circumstances, and the more we succeed in this effort, the more vivid is the act of Imagination. Fidelity of reproduction being what constitutes the perfection of this kind of Imagination, it is sometimes also called Reproductive Imagination.

If, in an act of Simple Imagination, we omit any of the elements of the object we are endeavouring to reproduce, the act is an imperfect one. But if we introduce any elements which were not there, that is to say, import them

from some other past or present phenomenon, the act ceases to be an act of Simple Imagination altogether. We have now passed to Complex Imagination, which may be distinguished from Simple Imagination by the fact that it combines phenomena, or portions of phenomena, whether absent or present, into a new whole. Thus, to take a very simple case, the representation of a centaur, combining portions of a horse and a man, which never were and never could be united in any single act of perception, would afford an instance of an act of Complex Imagination. Other instances would be afforded by many of our dreams, by those pictures of art and scenery which by the painters of the last century were called 'Compositions,' by poetical descriptions, by novels and plays, by 'characters,' such as Achilles, Hamlet, or Mephistopheles, the μεγαλόψυχος of Aristotle or 'the Wise Man' of the Stoics. In all these cases, there is an union of objects, attributes, or properties derived from different acts of perception and then recombined, with more or less of verisimilitude, into new wholes. This kind of Imagination, inasmuch as it seems to imply more activity of the intellect than the other, is sometimes called Productive or Creative Imagination, and, when we speak of Imagination, without any qualification, it is usually this form of it to which we refer.

On the more obvious uses of Imagination in the determination and estimation of conduct, it is not necessary to dwell. In forming an estimate of either our own conduct or that of others, we must, of course, reproduce from memory all or most of the circumstances attendant on the case. This estimate will also probably involve a comparison with the conduct of other persons, or of the same person at other times, and thus other groups of circumstances must necessarily be reproduced. Similarly, in determining our own conduct, we must frequently compare

our proposed course of action with what we have ourselves done in times past or with what we have observed others do. Thus, in all our moral acts, the process of reproduction from memory is constantly going on, and we can hardly advance a step without performing some act of Simple Imagination.

The essential importance of fostering the exercise of the imagination, in the way of entering into and reproducing the circumstances and feelings of others, has already been abundantly insisted on in the chapter on Sympathy.

Complex Imagination is also constantly employed in the ordinary conduct of life. Thus, we often imagine combinations of circumstances, taken separately from our previous experiences, and consider how we should act, were they to occur. For the guidance of others, it is the peculiar business of the moralist, and specially of the casuist, to 'imagine,' as we say, these 'cases.'

But Imagination is of most interest to the Moral Philosopher, as contributing to the formation of moral maxims, and entering into the construction of moral ideals, or typical exemplars of conduct.

We hear much of Idealism in Morals, and find it usually opposed to what are called analytical and *a posteriori* theories, based, as it is objected to them, simply on facts and observations. Theories of the latter kind are very commonly regarded with suspicion as resting on a lower foundation, as appealing less powerfully to the imagination, and as less calculated to excite the higher and more refined feelings of our nature. Rules of conduct, maxims of expediency, based on Induction, it is said, may indeed be practically useful as guides of conduct, but ideas lift us above ourselves, they connect us with another order of existence, they give us a strength and power which nothing

else can supply. To many persons idealistic theories seem far better suited to the sphere of morals than matter-of-fact rules; more elevated, more akin to the feelings of which a high morality is the object in generous minds.

It must be acknowledged that philosophers who have treated morals in an analytic or scientific spirit have frequently expressed themselves as if they were satisfied with the analysis alone; they have attempted no reconstruction of a kind to satisfy the moral feeling of the majority of mankind, necessarily more or less imaginative or mystical. Their analysis seems, at least to the superficial observer, to break up and disperse the feeling associated with morality. Respect or reverence for the moral law seems to be diminished as soon as the mystery is removed and its nature and object clearly discerned. Hence, in sensitive minds, there arises a certain antipathy to this mode of treatment, which a more complete and constructive treatment of the subject would in great measure remove.

We shall endeavour, in the present chapter, to decide whether, and, if so, how far, this antipathy is well-founded, to shew that, whatever mode of treatment be adopted in the science of Morals, a certain kind of Idealism must necessarily emerge, to describe the nature of our Moral Ideals and the psychological process by which they are formed, and, finally, to determine the practical purposes which they subserve.

The first remark we may make is that in all sciences whatsoever there is an ideal element of some kind or other. Thus, in Geometry there is really no such thing as the perfect circles, the perfect straight lines, the absolutely right angles which the geometrician, at every step, is obliged to assume. In Mechanics, we imagine perfect elasticity, bodies which move freely through space, par-

ticles which have neither length, breadth, nor weight. In Astronomy, the heavenly bodies are supposed to be perfectly smooth, two bodies to attract each other without any interference from other bodies, and so on. In the science of Hydrodynamics, the particles of fluids are supposed to move with perfect freedom among each other, though this supposition is directly contrary to our observations. In Anatomy, the limbs and organs are supposed to conform to a typical construction, which is never exactly realised in fact. In Political Economy, we suppose men to be influenced by only one desire, that of accumulating wealth, and we construct an imaginary state of society, proceeding entirely upon that hypothesis. And so in Morals, we imagine particular virtues and particular types of character, such as justice and the just man, veracity and the truthful man, quite distinct from other virtues and types of character, and, moreover, we combine various qualities into a moral ideal, or, by generalisation from a number of particular observations, we frame for ourselves maxims and rules of conduct which, to all appearance, are unlimited in their application [1].

Now, what is the process by which these ideal results are arrived at? Take, for instance, the conception of a just man, or its abstract equivalent, justice. We have observed a man acting in certain relations in a manner which approves itself to us. We have also observed the same man, or another man, acting similarly under similar, though more or less different, circumstances. After a number of observations of this kind, we are able, by successive acts of reproductive imagination, of abstraction and comparison, to attach a meaning to the general terms 'just' or 'justly'

[1] The reader will find this subject treated at some length, and with great ability, in Mr. G. H. Lewes' Problems of Life and Mind, Vol. i, chapter on Ideal Constructions in Science. Mr. Lewes' work appeared after the present chapter was written.

by which we ourselves, or others, denominate these actions. Each new instance in which we employ them either illustrates, and so clears up, the meaning, or expands it, by extension to new circumstances, or renders it more precise, by elimination of irrelevant considerations. A man of education, and of observant and reflective habits, thus comes, at last, to form for himself an ideal of 'justice' or the 'just man,' equally applicable to almost all circumstances of a given kind which can occur; and, though this ideal may never be capable of complete realisation in practice, it affords a norm or rule to the invariable observation of which he may more and more constantly approach. There is no man living who would act justly under all conceivable circumstances, nor, probably, any man who, during a period of time of any length, has, as a fact, done so; but this conception of perfect justice or the perfectly just man, which is constantly being elaborated by the mind, and which is constantly approaching nearer and nearer to the completeness and perfection at which it aims, has a tendency to elevate a man's practice, and to bring it into closer and closer accordance with itself. Human conceptions of justice can never reach absolute perfection, but, by being freed first from this and then from that imperfection, they may approach nearer and nearer to it. Similarly, our practice can never exactly correspond with our theory, but, by unceasing supervision and self-discipline, the interval between the two may be constantly diminished. Even in morality and the affairs of daily life, a true theory is, perhaps, the first requisite to a correct practice.

Suppose the conception of perfect justice, or of justice as perfect as we can conceive it, to have been now formed. Similarly, let us have formed conceptions of perfect courage, perfect temperance, and the like. We may next proceed to combine these various conceptions into a new whole,

constituting the more general conception of perfect moral goodness, which is embodied, in the concrete, in the perfectly good, or righteous, man. This conception, though it is more general, is less vivid than those out of which it is formed; and, because it is less vivid, it is more difficult to realise in imagination, while, because it is more general and far-reaching, it is less easy to translate into practice.

To the conception of perfect goodness, or the aggregate of all moral qualities in their perfection, may be added that of perfect wisdom, or the aggregate of all intellectual qualities in their perfection, and thus we may constitute the ideal of a perfect being. The remarks made above as to the conception of perfect goodness will, of course, apply to this more general conception with increased force.

These ideals, we have seen, may be presented either in the abstract or the concrete form, as justice or the just man, as virtue or the virtuous man, as wisdom or the wise man, as perfection or the perfect being. Moreover, we may throw them into the form of maxims or rules of conduct: as 'Be ye angry, and sin not;' 'Do unto others, as ye would they should do unto you;' 'Act from a maxim at all times fit for law universal;' 'Be ye perfect, even as your Father which is in heaven is perfect.'

All these ideals, whether in the abstract or concrete form, or in the form of maxims, are constructed by a process which in all essential respects is the same. It is, in all cases, based originally on the observations either of ourselves or others, while, in its further stages, it involves repeated acts of imagination, both simple and complex, of comparison and of abstraction. We observe particular acts and note their attendant circumstances; we reproduce these acts in imagination, compare them, and make ab-

straction of certain individual or special characteristics; then, by means of complex or creative imagination, we combine in the same conception, whether that conception be expressed in the form of a virtue, a concrete character, or a maxim, a variety of characteristics, having indeed fundamental points of resemblance, but derived from a number of different sources and possibly never found united in the same individual. In this process, it is plain that we may make abstraction of all those circumstances which, in practice, tarnish our conduct: thus, in forming a conception of benevolence or the ideally benevolent man, we abstract all those interested motives, those regards to our own reputation or the gratitude of those whom we benefit, which so frequently intertwine themselves even with those acts which, to all appearance, are most purely unselfish. No person is at all times benevolent, at all times just, or at all times wise; and yet in the ideals we construct of the benevolent, the just, or the wise man, we assume this to be the case. Similarly, when we enunciate a maxim, or general rule of conduct, we assume that it is capable of fulfilment, though we know that, as a matter of fact, it cannot be so.

The nature of moral maxims has frequently been misunderstood from not sufficiently taking into account the abstraction which they make of all imperfection, of the obstacles and limitations to be met with in practice, and of their possible conflict with other rules. Thus, to the maxim 'Do unto others, as ye would they should do unto you,' it has been objected that, on a strict interpretation, it would prevent us from punishing a criminal. But it may be replied that it assumes such a perfect perception and habit of justice, that, were we in the criminal's place, we should cheerfully submit to the prescribed punishment. Again, when it is said 'Do good unto all men,' we must

remember that one man's good may limit another's, and that, consequently, it may, quite consistently with the maxim, be far from being our duty to do the utmost possible amount of good to any given individual. Or again, when it is said 'Whosoever shall smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also,' we must recollect that the object of the maxim is simply to illustrate the perfection of patience or long-suffering, and that abstraction is made of all other qualities, such as justice or self-respect, with which patience, in practice, may possibly conflict.

But the great utility of these maxims, and of moral ideals in general, is not, on that account, diminished. Were it not that men put before themselves unattainable standards, that, when they are conscious of failure in any one duty, they are glad to have it presented to them in its most trenchant and unqualified form, there can be no doubt that their practice would be much lower than it is. These moral ideals, by being constantly present to the mind, fire the imagination and often excite an enthusiasm which purely practical precepts, with all their necessary qualifications, would be totally unable to produce. The influence of the imagination on the moral character, and especially on the heroic and saintly types of it, can hardly be exaggerated. And when men believe that their ideals have actually been realised in practice, as is the case with those who accept the divine manifestation of Christ, it is impossible to conceive, in a noble nature, a more powerful incentive to a virtuous life. But we are at this point, perhaps, transcending the limits which a scientific moralist is bound to impose upon himself.

Here it may be convenient to recur to a question raised some pages back as to the justice of the procedure of

analytical moralists and the relation of their method to the subject now under discussion, that of Moral Ideals. There can be no doubt that, if we were in search of lofty and inspiring ideals of moral excellence, we should have recourse to books of devotion or religious experience, to the lives of saints or heroes or philanthropists, to history, poetry, or even fiction, rather than to the works of professed moralists. But this paradox easily admits of explanation. The Moral Philosopher, when his vocation is viewed from one side, is like any other scientific enquirer. His business is to analyse the phenomena presented to him, to discover their ultimate constituents, and, if possible, the origin even of these. And, in the execution of this task, he must be guided solely by a love of speculative knowledge, without pausing to enquire what may be the result of his researches either on established beliefs or on current practice. Experience has shewn that knowledge can only be advanced in this manner, and a healthy instinct has led men, at least since the renaissance of learning, to entertain a well-grounded confidence that their practical interests cannot ultimately suffer by opening their minds to the pure love of truth. But the immediate results are often perplexing and apparently degrading. When men first learnt or suspected that the 'stars in their courses' were but masses of rock or vapour, they must have contemplated them with less awe and admiration than while they still supposed them to be mysterious or animated beings. And it can hardly surprise us that, at a superficial glance, there are even now those who think that the botanist, the anatomist, and the physiologist rob nature of its charms, and, by their dissections and explanations, are eradicating from the breast of man that tender sense of beauty and that awe-inspiring sentiment of sublimity which were wont of old to make him bow before

his Maker, with the utterance: 'O Lord, how manifold are thy works; in wisdom hast thou made them all!' Yet a deeper insight and further reflexion will shew that the mystery and beauty of the external world are only enhanced by its explanation. And so, I venture to suggest, it is with the speculations of the Moral Philosopher. By unravelling the tangled thread of human motives, by tracing back the history of the human mind, and by attempting to ascertain the ultimate sources of human actions and dispositions, he is only shewing how marvellous a being man is in his actual constitution, how divine in his capacities for the future. But there is another aspect from which we must view the work of the Moralist, or rather from which he ought to view his own work. The material with which he deals is not external nature, but himself,—his own motives, his own thoughts, his own acts, and those of other beings constituted as he is. It is, then, or at least ought to be, impossible for him, however impartial may be his speculative enquiries, not to be constantly pausing to consider their bearing on his own life and conduct, and on the practical aims and destination of humanity at large. An ethical treatise, therefore, to be true to itself, must, from time to time, make diversions into the domain of practical life, though this is not its main business and ought to be kept in reasonable subordination to more scientific enquiries. We seem, therefore, to have obtained an answer, not very precise, it is true, but still roughly sufficient, to the difficulty which is often experienced, on the one hand, by the popular reader at the apparent coldness of ethical treatises, and, on the other hand, by those whose familiarity is rather with other departments of science at the frequent intrusion into these treatises of practical topics. It is difficult for the ethical writer to observe the right mean in these respects, but, for

myself, I cannot avoid expressing the opinion that works on Moral Philosophy need not be less scientific, while they would certainly be more interesting and more useful, if they recognised more commonly than they now do the problems of actual life, and, with that end in view as well as the not unimportant one of attaining to greater clearness and intelligibility, directed their discussions less to abstractions and more to concrete cases.

Hitherto, we have considered only ideals of excellence. But it is plain that there may be ideals of evil as well as of good qualities, and of wicked as well as of virtuous types of character. These are formed exactly in the same way as the others, and just, as it is the tendency of the one to elevate, so, if the others are constantly present to our minds, it is their tendency to debase our practice. Selfish and worldly maxims cannot be frequently repeated without producing a corrupting and degrading influence on those who hear and those who use them. The cruelty and ferocity of savages is probably greatly intensified by the cruel and ferocious character of the gods and heroes whom they take as their models. Popular stories of bandits and housebreakers have undoubtedly added largely to the criminal classes. And it is difficult to estimate the amount of vice and misery which is due to the indiscriminate circulation of the licentious literature which is now often so greedily devoured by the young of both sexes.

It may be remarked finally that the ideal when expressed in the concrete, as the wise or good or perfect man, differs in two main respects from the examples of character which we find in actual life. In the first place, it makes abstraction of all those qualities which have a tendency to mar or counteract the quality typified; in the second place, it may combine qualities which are never found actually to

coexist in experience, and, of course, it does frequently combine qualities which are found to coexist but rarely. The more ideal are the creations of our imagination, the more completely, in both respects, is this the case.

This, perhaps, is the most convenient place for saying something of a class of expressions which has obtained wide currency both in ancient and modern works on Ethics,—Moral Beauty, the Beautiful in character, the æsthetic side of virtue, and the like. The *καλόν* was one of the most familiar epithets both of actions and characters amongst the Greeks, and many readers will hardly need to be reminded that it is especially prominent in the Dialogues of Plato[1]. Amongst English authors, Shaftesbury is the one who has taken most pains to insist on the analogy between Beauty and Morality, Art and Virtue. Thus, in a characteristic passage, he breaks out into the exclamation: 'Is there a natural Beauty of Figures? And is there not as natural a one of actions? No sooner the eye opens upon figures, the ear to sounds, than straight the Beautiful results, and Grace and Harmony are known and acknowledged. No sooner are actions viewed, no sooner the human affections and passions discerned (and they are most of them as soon discerned as felt) than straight an inward eye distinguishes, and sees the Fair and Shapely, the Amiable and Admirable, apart from the Deformed, the Foul, the Odious, or the Despicable. How is it possible therefore not to own that, as these distinctions have their foundation in Nature, the discernment itself is natural and from Nature alone[2]?'

To me, I must confess, this analogy seems, as I have

[1] A notable instance of the application of the word *καλόν* indifferently to works of art and the outward form, on the one hand, and to human actions and character, on the other, will be found in Plato's Republic, 401 B–403 C.

[2] Shaftesbury's Moralists, Part III. Sect. 2.

said elsewhere, 'to be too refined to be of much service in ethical enquiry. Take a beautiful picture. In what does its beauty consist? In the proportions of the forms and in a certain subtle harmony of colouring. Take a moral act. What is it that constitutes it moral? Its tendency, at least according to Shaftesbury's system, to promote the general welfare or the good of mankind. Now where, at first sight, is the resemblance between the beautiful picture and the moral act? It is true that with a little ingenuity we may find such a resemblance, which consists, I presume, in the act being *proportional* to the needs and constitution of human society, as any particular form in the picture is *proportional* to the rest of the picture. But, however ingenious this point of view may be, do we really throw any light on the character of human action, or the distinction between vice and virtue, by having recourse to what I must venture to call this far-fetched analogy? And so, again, with regard to a virtuous disposition. A disposition or character can only be known by its acts, and these acts must necessarily be isolated. But a picture, or statue, or a landscape may be seen at a glance. It is true that we may reflect on the nature of a character as manifested by its acts, and contemplating it, with a certain amount of mental effort, as a whole, speak with some justice of its being *harmonious* or *well-balanced*. But, though the analogy is certainly less remote here than in the case of virtuous acts, it may be questioned whether we really gain anything by this mode of speaking. The conception of "goodness" is surely more appropriate, whether we are contemplating acts or characters, than that of "beauty," and, therefore, why introduce a metaphor when a direct expression would serve our purpose better[1]?'

[1] 'Shaftesbury and Hutcheson' (published in Messrs. Sampson Low & Co.'s Series of English Philosophers), pp. 94, 95.

There are, indeed, acts approaching so nearly to the loftiest moral ideals, and diverging so far from the average standard of excellence, as where David refused to drink the water that had been obtained at the risk of the lives of his comrades, or Decius offered himself as a sacrifice for his country, that the words 'good' and 'virtuous' seem but tame epithets to describe them. But even here, perhaps, expressions such as 'lofty,' 'noble,' 'generous,' 'sublime,' 'heroic' would serve our purpose equally well with the epithet 'beautiful,' and would be free from the objection that they introduce misleading associations.

The truly æsthetic element in morality, the legitimate employment of the Imagination in the sphere of practice, is the construction, contemplation, and realisation of moral ideals. On the supreme importance of this work, it is hardly possible for the moralist to insist too strongly.

CHAPTER IX.

On the Will.

Explanation of Terms. The Controversy respecting Liberty and Necessity. Formation of the Will. Practical Conclusions.

IT is impossible, in attempting even a tolerably complete treatment of the Science of Morals, to pass over altogether without consideration the much disputed question of the Freedom of the Will. It has by many been supposed to lie at the root of all ethical discussions, and though, as the sequel will shew, I am by no means of this opinion, yet, in relation to what may be called the speculative side of Moral Philosophy, it is of great importance to have clear ideas as to the nature of the controversy. And not the least important or satisfactory result of such a study will be to shew how little bearing the issue of the dispute, whatever it may be, has on the practical conduct of human life.

After briefly touching on the psychology of the Will, I shall proceed, first, to give an outline of the course of what is called the Free-Will controversy, and, next, to consider what is the bearing, if any, of this controversy on the conception of conduct and the formation of character.

The Will is regarded by many modern psychologists as forming a distinct part of human nature, like the Intellect and the Emotions, though by the ancient

philosophers, as for instance, by Aristotle, what we call the phenomena of Volition were considered as sufficiently accounted for by analysis into an intellectual and an emotional element. But, whatever the nature of the Will and of volitions, the terms are convenient, and their use may, perhaps, best be explained by tracing the various stages through which the mind passes, or may pass, before our desires result in action. It very frequently, perhaps most frequently, happens that a desire passes at once into action, so that we are conscious of no interval between the two, as in the satisfaction of the appetites and the ordinary transactions of life. But it also frequently happens that there is a conflict of desires, and that the mind consequently passes through one or several acts of reflexion or comparison, tracing and comparing the consequences which would result from the gratification of the several desires present to it. It also occasionally happens that, even when only a single desire is operating, something occurs to suspend its passing into action. In both these cases, we are conscious of an interval between the desires, or the conflict of desires, and the action which is the result. The mind seems, as it were, to have set in a certain direction, to have arrived at a *determination*, and between this determination and the action there elapses an interval, sometimes so brief that we can hardly detect it, sometimes of very considerable duration. To this set of the mind, as it may be called, or determination, we give the name of *volition*, and, where the volition is held in suspense for a considerable time before it passes into action, we call it a *resolution*. The *Will*, by those who regard it as an independent part of our nature, is supposed to be the source of these volitions or resolutions, or, in more precise language, a power or aptitude enabling us to form them and to retain them till the moment of action

arrives. A man who adheres tenaciously to his resolutions is called a *strong-willed* man, and, if this tendency exist in excess, an *obstinate* man; on the other hand, a man who vacillates, or frequently changes his resolutions, is called a man of *weak will*.

When persons speak of a *Free-Will*, they appear to mean a power of forming volitions independently, or, at least, to some extent independently, of those desires and acts of reflexion which on all sides are admitted to precede our volitions. Those, on the other hand, who deny the Freedom of the Will, seem to maintain that our volitions exactly express the result of the various desires and acts of reflexion which precede them. A volition, according to the latter view, is simply the resultant of the various desires present to the mind and the various acts of reflexion by which the consequences of gratifying those desires have been traced and compared. The Will, as a power of forming volitions, must, on this theory, be ultimately analysed into a product of the Reason and the Emotions. But, if this account be the true one, it might conduce to clearness of conception if we ceased altogether to employ the word Will in the sense of a power of forming volitions, speaking solely of the volitions themselves without referring them to a faculty, and appropriated it exclusively to signify the power of suspending and retaining our volitions till the moment of action arrives.

The best mode of bringing before the reader the various intricate questions suggested by the controversy on the Freedom of the Will, or, as it is sometimes phrased, of Liberty and Necessity, will be to pass in brief review some of the more striking and characteristic of the theories and arguments on the subject which have obtained currency.

in the course of philosophical enquiry. Such a historical sketch, though necessarily sporadic and incomplete, will probably be found far more serviceable than any formal and detailed exposition of a dogmatic character.

The question how far, and in what sense, man is himself the author of his actions is one which most likely engaged the attention of the earliest speculators on the constitution of human nature. Accordingly, in most civilized and barbaric, and even in some savage, races, we find some theory or other which may be called determinist, fatalistic, or predestinarian. These theories have raised a variety of questions, in reality quite distinct, but which have, unfortunately, not always been distinguished from each other. Such are the questions: Can we act as we will (or are our actions in our own power)? Can we will as we will (or are our wills determined by motives)? Is the future inexorably determined by God or by fate? Ought man to be rewarded or punished for his actions? Ought he to be praised or blamed for them? Ought he to be the object of self-approbation or self-disapprobation? A brief sketch of some of the more prominent of these controversies, a sketch which by no means pretends to completeness, may, perhaps, best serve to put the reader in possession of the principal points in dispute.

In the 9th Book of the Laws of Plato, there is a remarkable passage, in which harm is contrasted with injustice. It is allowed that a man may do harm voluntarily, but it is contended that he cannot do injustice voluntarily. Injustice is regarded as a mental distemper, analogous to diseases of the body, and it may be inferred that, as no man voluntarily contracts the one, so no man would voluntarily contract the other. What then is the justification of Punishment? It has a twofold object—to cure the offender by causing him to associate the feeling

of pain with his offences, and to deter others by the force of his example[1].

It was probably with reference to this and similar passages in the Dialogues of Plato himself, as well as to the current theories of the Platonists, that the well-known chapters at the beginning of the third book of the Nicomachean Ethics were written or delivered by Aristotle[2]. The main argument of these chapters is that, if vice be involuntary, virtue must be so too, and that, consequently, vicious acts are as properly the objects of blame as virtuous acts of praise. It may be doubted whether Plato would have disputed this implication, and certainly his repeated assertion that Vice is identical with Ignorance would rather point to the conclusion that he would have acquiesced in it. But in the course of this discussion there occur one or two passages in which Aristotle, not content with enforcing his main thesis, approximates very closely to an assertion of what in modern times would be called the 'Freedom of the Will,' that is to say, the existence within us of a power which is not determined, or, at least, not wholly determined, either by external motives or by our internal desires. Such are the passages where he argues against the position that our acts are determined by *τὰ ἡδέα καὶ τὰ καλά*, or again by *θυμὸς καὶ ἐπιθυμία*, and, lastly, the passage where he enumerates, as causes, *φύσις καὶ ἀνάγκη καὶ τύχη καὶ νοῦς καὶ πᾶν τὸ δι' ἀνθρώπου*[3].

It will be noticed that, in these discussions by Plato and Aristotle, there are already raised, implicitly or explicitly, the questions whether our volitions are determined by motives, and whether our acts are the appropriate objects of reward and punishment, of praise and blame.

In the Stoic philosophy, the question of the voluntary

[1] Plato, Laws, Bk. IX. 860–862.
[2] Eth. Nic. III. 1–5.
[3] Eth. Nic. III. 1 (11); 1 (21–27); 3 (7).

or involuntary character of human actions and volitions assumes a far more important place than it had done in any of the preceding systems. That all human actions depend strictly on antecedent causes, and these on causes antecedent to them, and so on in an unbroken chain, was one of the fixed tenets of the Stoic philosophy, but, at the same time, it was a problem, amongst the leaders of the school, to reconcile this theory with what in modern times would usually be called the rival theory of human liberty. Chrysippus attempted this reconciliation by distinguishing between *causæ principales* and *causæ adjuvantes*, a distinction which is not clearly explained by either of our authorities, Cicero[1] or Aulus Gellius[2], but which may possibly have been identical with a distinction to which many authors have justly attached the greatest importance, namely, that between the permanent character, which always exercises a modifying and controlling influence, and the transient motives, which are modified and controlled by it. But, so far as concerns the merely theoretical question, it might have been replied that the permanent character itself is due to the action of antecedent causes, and that, consequently, as affecting the unbroken chain of causation which determines our volitions, this distinction is of no service.

The Stoics, anticipating, as we shall see presently, a tenet of St. Augustine, maintained that the only man who can properly be said to be free is the man who leads a virtuous life. The free-man is the man who lives as he wishes, but no man wishes to live a life of sin, and, consequently, the vicious man, however rich and powerful he may be, is really a slave, while the man who is virtuous under all circumstances, and he alone, is really free. This

[1] De Fato, cap. 18, 19. [2] Noctes Atticæ, Lib. VI. cap. 2.

tenet, which is enunciated by Cicero as one of the Stoic paradoxes, afterwards became one of the common-places of Christian theology[1].

The Greek Fathers were so much occupied with the various questions relating to the nature of the Godhead, that they had little leisure or inclination to discuss those connected with the nature of man. The first of the Christian Fathers with whom the question of human liberty becomes a principal topic of speculation is St. Augustine. In opposition to Pelagius, whose statements had forced upon him this controversy, he maintains that freedom, which had originally been an attribute of man's will, had been lost at the Fall; that, in our present condition, all our actions, when traced to their ultimate source, are to be ascribed either to sin or grace, and that, consequently, all good works are to be referred not to man himself, but to God. A 'liberum arbitrium,' therefore, in the sense of a will free to choose between good and evil, cannot now be predicated of man. But there are two other senses in which Augustine uses this expression, in both of which man may be said to have a 'free will.' In the first of these senses it stands for a will either freed from good or freed from evil; in the second, and more technical, sense, it stands only for a will freed from evil, from the yoke and bondage of sin. 'The term freedom is thus,' says Professor Mozley, 'raised from its neutrality and appropriated to a good condition of the will; such condition being still, however, not freedom in the sense of

[1] See Cicero, Paradoxa Stoica, Paradoxon V. Cp. Arrian, Epicteti Dissertationes, Lib. IV. cap 1: Ἐλεύθερός ἐστιν ὁ ζῶν ὡς βούλεται· ὃν οὔτ' ἀναγκάσαι ἐστίν, οὔτε κωλύσαι, οὔτε βιάσασθαι· οὗ αἱ ὁρμαὶ ἀνεμπόδιστοι, αἱ ὀρέξεις ἐπιτευκτικαί, αἱ ἐκκλίσεις ἀπερίπτωτοι. Τίς οὖν θέλει ζῆν ἁμαρτάνων; οὐδείς. Τίς θέλει ζῆν ἐξαπατώμενος, προπίπτων, ἄδικος ὤν, ἀκόλαστος, μεμψίμοιρος, ταπεινός; οὐδείς. Οὐδεὶς ἄρα τῶν φαύλων ζῇ ὡς βούλεται· οὐ τοίνυν οὐδ' ἐλεύθερος· κ.τ.λ.

power of choice, but a state of servitude to good—the contradictory of servitude to evil[1].'

Augustine's point of view, it will be observed, is, throughout, theological and not philosophical. His denial of the freedom of choice between good and evil is based, not on any considerations of the influence of circumstances or the endless chain of causation, but on the subsisting relations between God and man. So far, indeed, is this the case, that he conceives there was a time when man actually possessed that freedom of which he is now deprived.

The purely philosophical discussion of this question in modern times, at least from an independent point of view, may be said to have commenced with Hobbes. His theory is what may most appropriately be called Determinist. The actions of men, he holds, are, like all other events, determined, and determined wholly, by antecedent circumstances. Man, it is true, does as he wills, but to say that he wills as he wills is an absurdity. The will is 'the last desire in deliberation,' and our desires are the necessary result of their various antecedents.

'I conceive that nothing taketh beginning from *itself*, but from the *action* of some other immediate *agent* without itself. And that therefore, when first a man hath an *appetite* or *will* to something, to which immediately before he had no appetite nor will, the *cause* of his *will* is not the *will* itself, but *something* else not in his own disposing. So that whereas it is out of controversy, that of *voluntary* actions the *will* is the *necessary* cause, and by this, which is said, the *will* is also *caused* by other things whereof it disposeth not, it followeth that *voluntary* actions have all of them *necessary* causes, and therefore are *necessitated*[2].'

[1] Mozley's Augustinian Doctrine of Predestination, p. 235.

[2] On Liberty and Necessity. Molesworth's Edition of Hobbes' Collected Works, vol. iv. p. 274.

'*That* which I say *necessitateth and determinateth every action is the sum of all things, which, being now existent, conduce and concur to the production of that action hereafter, whereof if any one thing now were wanting, the effect could not be produced.* This *concourse* of *causes*, whereof every one is *determined* to be such as it is by a like concourse of *former* causes, may well be called (in respect they were all set and ordered by the eternal cause of all things, God Almighty) the *decree* of God[1].'

Hobbes was answered by Bramhall[2], and the best and clearest statement of his views is given in one of the rejoinders to Bramhall, from which the above quotations are taken.

Hume's treatment of the question does not differ in any essential point[3] from that of Hobbes. He contends that his theory unites and conciliates the rival hypotheses of Liberty and Necessity, but the only concession that he makes (and that is only an apparent one) is that we have the liberty, when not under external compulsion, to act as we will[4].

The appearance of Archbishop King's work on 'The Origin of Evil[5]' was an important epoch in the history of the Free-will controversy. He maintained what he called a Liberty of Indifferency, or an original power in the

[1] Id., p. 246.

[2] 'A Vindication of true liberty from antecedent and extrinsecal necessity.'

[3] The same remark may also be made with regard to Locke's chapter on Power, the main position of which is that freedom is an attribute of actions, and not of volitions. It is curious to find an author so acute as Dugald Stewart entertaining any doubt as to the real nature of Locke's opinions on this subject. His general accordance with Hobbes on this point appears to me to admit of no question.

[4] Hume's Essays. Essay 'Of Liberty and Necessity.'

[5] This work appeared in the year 1702. Hume's Essay on Liberty and Necessity, though referred to previously in connection with Hobbes, did not appear, in its present shape, till 1748.

Will of shaping its volitions independently of the relative strength of the motives presented to it. The following extracts from the translation of his work will give the best idea of the precise position which he holds:

'Notwithstanding therefore that the Will always does follow some judgment of the Understanding, which is made about the subsequent actions, yet it is not necessarily determined by any, for it can suspend its act, and order some other judgment, which it may follow. Since therefore it can either exert or suspend its act, it is not only free from compulsion, but also indifferent in itself, with regard to its actions, and determines itself without necessity[1].'

'In relation to a passive power, which has a natural and necessary connection with the object, the presence of which determines it to act, we may reasonably enquire what that Good is which may determine it to exert any particular action; but it is not so in an *active* power, the very nature of which is to *make* an object agreeable to itself, i.e. good, by its own proper act. For here the Goodness of the Object does not precede the act of Election, so as to excite it, but Election makes the goodness in the object; that is, the thing is agreeable because chosen, and not chosen because agreeable: We cannot therefore justly enquire after any other cause of Election than the power itself[2].'

'But if objects derive their agreeableness or disagreeableness from the choice, 'tis clear that he who has his choice may always enjoy the thing chosen (unless he choose impossibilities, &c.), and never have his appetite frustrated, i.e. be always happy[3].'

King's position, in which he was anticipated by Bramhall, is, though awkwardly expressed, a perfectly logical one.

[1] Law's Translation of King's Origin of Evil, 4th Ed., p. 224.
[2] p. 246. [3] p. 249.

If we are not entirely determined by antecedent motives, we must have the power of acting independently of motives; but this is nothing else than saying that the will may be indifferent to the motives presented to it.

King's book provoked a sharp controversy, in which, amongst other disputants, Leibnitz took part on one side, and Dr. Samuel Clarke on the other. By a not very felicitous metaphor, Leibnitz had compared the relation of motives to the will with that of weights to the scales of a balance. As the balance is turned by the heavier weight, so is the will necessarily determined by the preponderating motive or motives. Against this metaphor, almost the whole of Dr. Clarke's argument is directed.

'This notion' (namely, that 'A mere Will without any Motive is a fiction') 'leads,' says he, 'to universal Necessity and Fate, by supposing that Motives have the same relation to the Will of an Intelligent Agent, as Weights have to a Balance; so that of two Things absolutely indifferent, an Intelligent Agent can no more choose either, than a Balance can move itself when the Weights on both sides are equal. But the difference lies here. A Balance is no Agent, but is merely passive and acted upon by the Weights; so that, when the Weights are equal, there is nothing to move it. But Intelligent Beings are Agents; not passive, in being moved by Motives, as a Balance is by Weights; but they have Active Powers and do move themselves, sometimes upon the view of strong Motives, sometimes upon weak ones, and sometimes when things are *absolutely indifferent*. In which latter case, there may be very good reason to act, though two or more ways of acting may be absolutely indifferent[1].'

[1] Dr. Clarke's Fourth Reply to Leibnitz (vol. iv. of Clarke's Works, p. 621).

Leibnitz's answer to this criticism would be that no action can long remain absolutely indifferent; or, to use his own words, as employed in the Théodicée: 'An infinite number of great and small motions internal and external concur with us, which generally we are not sensible of. And I have already said that, when a man walks out of a room, there are such reasons which determine him to set one foot forward rather than the other, though he observes it not[1].'

The most acute, perhaps, of King's antagonists is Tucker, whose chapter on 'Satisfaction,' in which he deals with this question, is well worth the most careful perusal. Earlier than Tucker, and coeval with Clarke, appeared a work which at the time attracted considerable attention,—Antony Collins' 'Philosophical Enquiry concerning Human Liberty.' This book is written in a popular style, and, as it is now rarely to be met with, it may be interesting if we append one or two extracts.

In the first of these extracts, the author attempts to deal with the argument founded on experience:

'The vulgar who are bred up to believe Liberty or Freedom, think themselves secure of success, constantly appealing to Experience for a proof of their freedom, and

[1] Leibnitz's Théodicée. Opera Philosophica. Ed. Erdmann, p. 516: 'Il y a donc une liberté de contingence ou en quelque façon d'indifférence, pourvu qu'on entende par l'indifférence, que rien ne nous nécessite pour l'un ou pour l'autre parti; mais il n'y a jamais d'indifférence d'équilibre, c'est-à-dire où tout soit parfaitement égal de part et d'autre, sans qu'il y ait plus d'inclination vers un côté. Une infinité de grands et de petits mouvemens internes et externes concourent avec nous, dont le plus souvent l'on ne s'aperçoit pas; et j'ai déjà dit que lorsqu'on sort d'une chambre, il y a telles raisons qui nous déterminent à mettre un tel pied devant, sans qu'on y réflechisse.' Cp. p. 513: 'Cet équilibre est aussi absolument contraire à l'expérience, et quand on s'examinera, l'on trouvera qu'il y a toujours eu quelque cause ou raison qui nous a incliné vers le parti qu'on a pris, quoique bien souvent on ne s'aperçoive pas de ce qui nous meut; tout comme on ne s'aperçoit guères pourquoi en sortant d'une porte on a mis le pied droit avant le gauche, ou le gauche avant le droit.'

being persuaded that they feel themselves free on a thousand occasions. And the source of their mistake seems to be as follows. They either attend not to or see not the causes of their actions, especially in matters of little moment, and thence conclude they are free, or not moved by causes, to do what they do.

'They also frequently do actions whereof they repent: and because, in the repenting humour, they find no present motive to do these actions, they conclude that they might not have done them at the time they did them, and that they were free from necessity (as they were from outward impediments) in the doing them.

'They also find that they can do as they will, and forbear as they will, without any external impediment to hinder them from doing as they will; let them will either doing or forbearing. They likewise see that they often change their minds; that they can, and do choose differently every successive moment; and that they frequently deliberate, and thereby are sometimes at a near balance, and in a state of indifference with respect to judging about some propositions, and willing or choosing with respect to some objects. And, experiencing these things, they mistake them for the exercise of Freedom, or Liberty from Necessity. For ask them, whether they think themselves free? and they will immediately answer Yes: and say some one or other of these foregoing things, and particularly think they prove themselves free, when they affirm, they can do as they will[1].'

In the second extract, he urges, with considerable force, against the advocates of a Liberty of Indifferency, the fact that we always calculate on a man being capable of persuasion or dissuasion, of being influenced by the prospect of reward or punishment:

[1] Second Ed., pp. 12–14.

'Further, is not man more perfect, the more capable he is of conviction? And will he not be more capable of conviction, if he be necessarily determined in his assent by what seems a reason to him, and necessarily determined in his several volitions by what seems good to him, than if he was indifferent to propositions notwithstanding any reason for them, or was indifferent to any objects notwithstanding they seemed good to him? For otherwise, he could be convinced upon no principles, and would be the most undisciplinable and untractable of all animals. All advice and all reasonings would be of no use to him. You might offer arguments to him, and lay before him pleasure and pain; and he might stand unmoved like a rock. He might reject what appears true to him, assent to what seems absurd to him, avoid what he sees to be good, and choose what he sees to be evil[1].'

Reward and Punishment, Praise and Blame, can only be properly explained on the Determinist hypothesis:

'A fifth argument to prove man a necessary agent, is as follows: If man was not a necessary agent, determined by pleasure and pain, there would be no foundation for rewards and punishments, which are the essential supports of society[2].'

'Let me add something further in respect of praise. Men have at all times been praised for actions judged by all the world to be necessary.' Thus, the valour of Heroes is attributed to some Deity present with and assisting them. '. . . But can there be a finer commendation than that given by Velleius Paterculus to Cato, that he was good by nature, because he could not be otherwise? For that alone is true goodness which flows from disposition, whether that disposition be natural or acquired. Such goodness may be depended on; and will seldom or never

[1] pp. 79, 80. [2] p. 87.

fail. . . . Lastly, the common proverb, *gaudeant bene nati*, is a general commendation of men for what plainly in no sense depends on them[1].'

The arguments adduced by the writers referred to above, and others of their period, may be summarily stated as follows:

It is contended by the advocates of Free-Will, or the Liberty of Indifferency, as opposed to Determinism:

(1) That we are conscious of our own power, not only to act in this way or that, but also to determine on this or that course of action. In a great many cases, we feel, up to the last moment, that there are no overpowering considerations to direct our choice, and that we are perfectly free to select either of the two alternatives presented to us. In other cases, though there may be preponderating considerations in favour of one of the alternatives, we feel that we are free, if we choose, to select the other. Moreover, after we have selected one of them, we are conscious that we might, if we had chosen, have selected the other, and sometimes it is extremely difficult to recall the particular considerations which determined our choice.

(2) So far as we can observe the mental processes of others, they seem to have an equal power with ourselves of determining their conduct and their volitions.

(3) That they have full power of determining their own conduct and volitions, appears to be assumed, when we attempt to persuade them to, or dissuade them from, any course of action.

(4) Moreover, when they have acted, we frequently affect them with rewards or punishments, thereby assuming their responsibility, and, in consequence, their freedom of volition.

[1] pp. 101–2.

(5) Furthermore, we praise and blame men for their actions and intentions, and our own actions and intentions are frequently followed by self-approbation and self-congratulation or self-disapprobation and remorse.

Against these arguments, it is contended by the advocates of Determinism:

(1) That our own experience really bears witness against, and not in favour of, our supposed freedom of choice. The more we learn of ourselves, and the better we are able to analyse our mental acts, the more do we discover the extent to which our volitions depend on antecedent circumstances, namely, our fixed character and the motives which, from time to time, are presented to us. Hence, it is maintained, we may fairly argue that, if our experience were wider still, and we were fully acquainted with all the antecedent circumstances, every volition might be fully accounted for.

(2) The same reasoning would apply to the volitions of others. Increasing experience is constantly revealing to us motives for acts, which at one time we had regarded as inexplicable. It seems, in fact, to be always assumed by persons of reflexion that men never act without adequate motives.

(3) All argument and advice, persuasion and dissuasion, assume that men are determined by motives. Otherwise, they would be of no avail.

(4) The same assumption is made, when we bestow rewards or inflict punishments. These have no rational significance except prospectively, by operating on the hopes or fears of the recipients themselves or of those who are likely to be influenced by their example. But, it is generally added, though the only value of the reward or punishment is prospective, it is essential that it should follow with certainty on the act, in order that, in all future cases, the motive may exert its full force.

(5) To these considerations it may be added that, if human volitions are not determined by causes which themselves are determined by other causes, and so on, in an endless chain of regression, they are an exception to all other phenomena with which we are acquainted; and that, though it may be more difficult to discover the causes of human actions than of physical events, this fact is fully accounted for by the far greater complexity of the phenomena.

It will be noticed that, in the first four arguments, each side appeals to the same facts, drawing from them opposite conclusions[1]. Of the difficulties occasioned to each school by the fifth argument of the other, I shall have occasion to speak presently.

We now proceed to bring before the reader, at somewhat greater length than in the case of previous writers, but as briefly as its importance permits, the position assumed on this question by Kant.

In the phenomenal world (i.e. the world of observation and experience), everything, whether we regard man or nature, takes place according to invariable and necessary law. One event follows another according to the strictest mechanic nexus. And, while we confine ourselves to the consideration of phenomena, freedom is simply an impossibility. From this point of view, every event in the life of man, as in external nature, is pre-determined by the antecedent conditions:

'All the acts of a man, so far as they are phenomena,

[1] I have not here noticed the apparent counter-argument derived from praise and blame, as employed by Collins in the passage quoted on p. 314. For it does not seem to me to be an independent argument, but simply a rejoinder to an argument employed by the other side. And it appears to be a sufficient answer to it that, in all the cases adduced, the proper word to employ would be, not praise, but felicitation.

are determined from his empirical character and from the other concomitant causes, according to the order of nature; and if we could investigate all the manifestations of his will to the very bottom, there would be not a single human action which we could not predict with certainty and recognise from its preceding conditions as necessary. There is no freedom therefore with reference to this empirical character, and yet it is only with reference to it that we can consider man, when we are merely *observing*, and, as is the case in anthropology, trying to investigate the motive causes of his actions physiologically[1].'

But, as soon as we transport ourselves from the phenomenal to the intelligible world, we perceive that our volitions need not be, and indeed are not, thus predetermined:

'If, however, we consider the same actions with reference to reason, not with reference to speculative reason, in order to *explain* their origin, but solely so far as reason is the cause which *produces* them; in one word, if we compare actions with reason, with reference to *practical* purposes, we find a rule and order, totally different from the order of nature. For, from this point of view, everything, it may be, *ought not to have happened*, which according to the course of nature *has happened*, and, according to its empirical grounds, was inevitable. And sometimes we find, or believe at least that we find, that the ideas of reason have really proved their causality with reference to human actions as phenomena, and that these actions have taken place, not because they were determined by empirical causes, but by the causes of reason[2].'

In a previous passage, the ideas of freedom and necessity are thus brought together:

[1] Critique of Pure Reason, Max Müller's Translation, vol. ii. p. 474.

[2] Id., pp. 474-5.

'The correctness of the principle of the unbroken connection of all events in the world of sense, according to unchangeable natural laws, is firmly established by the transcendental Analytic, and admits of no limitation. The question, therefore, can only be whether, in spite of it, freedom also can be found in the same effect which is determined by nature; or whether freedom is entirely excluded by that inviolable rule? Here the common but fallacious supposition of the *absolute reality* of phenomena shows at once its pernicious influence in embarrassing reason. For if phenomena are things by themselves, freedom cannot be saved. Nature in that case is the complete and sufficient cause determining every event, and its condition is always contained in that series of phenomena only which, together with their effect, are necessary under the law of nature. If, on the contrary, phenomena are taken for nothing except what they are in reality, namely, not things by themselves, but representations only, which are connected with each other according to empirical laws, they must themselves have causes, which are not phenomenal. Such an intelligible cause, however, is not determined with reference to its causality by phenomena, although its effects become phenomenal, and can be determined by other phenomena. That intelligible cause, therefore, with its causality, is outside the series, though its effects are to be found in the series of empirical conditions. The effect therefore can, with reference to its intelligible cause, be considered as free, and yet at the same time, with reference to phenomena, as resulting from them according to the necessity of nature; a distinction which, if thus represented, in a general and entirely abstract form, may seem extremely subtle and obscure, but will become clear in its practical application[1].'

[1] Id., pp. 463–4.

What, then, is this freedom, as applied to our own volitions, the existence of which we cannot account for, though we are certified of its possession? It is frequently defined by Kant as 'independence of all the stimulants of the sensory.' This is the negative side of the conception. Man would be entirely free, if he acted from no impulse of feeling or inclination, from no sensitive determination, no appetite, desire, or affection, such as experience indicates to be the springs of action. When these motives determine the will, it is determined by something which is not self, which is part of the physical system. This procedure is heteronomy, as distinct from autonomy. All these motives or stimulants, therefore, ought to be set aside:

'The essential point in every determination of the will by the moral law is that being a free will it is determined simply by the moral law, not only without the co-operation of sensible impulses, but even to the rejection of all such, and to the checking of all inclinations so far as they might be opposed to that law. So far, then, the effect of the moral law as a motive is only negative, and this motive can be known *a priori* to be such[1].'

We now pass to the positive point of view. What remains, after the whole sentient system is removed, is reason, and, as related to human action, pure practical reason, possessing a causality which is wholly its own, and self-originated, acting directly on the will without the intervention of any affection whatsoever:

'Now we cannot possibly conceive a reason consciously receiving a bias from any other quarter with respect to its judgments, for then the subject would ascribe the determination of its judgment not to its own reason, but to an impulse. It must regard itself as the author of its principles

[1] Analytic of the Pure Practical Reason. Abbott's Translation in 'Kant's Theory of Ethics,' Second Edition, pp. 234–5.

independent on foreign influences. Consequently as practical reason or as the will of a rational being it must regard itself as free, that is to say, the will of such a being cannot be a will of its own except under the idea of freedom[1].'

But, though the practical reason (which, in Kant's system, is not always very clearly discriminated from the will) is self-determining, it must not be supposed that it acts without law:

'Although freedom is not a property of the will depending on physical laws, yet it is not for that reason lawless; on the contrary it must be a causality acting according to immutable laws, but of a peculiar kind; otherwise a free will would be an absurdity. Physical necessity is a heteronomy of the efficient causes, for every effect is possible only according to this law, that something else determines the efficient cause to exert its causality. What else then can freedom of the will be but autonomy, that is the property of the will to be a law to itself? But the proposition: The will is in every action a law to itself, only expresses the principle, to act on no other maxim than that which can also have, as an object, itself as a universal law. Now this is precisely the formula of the categorical imperative and is the principle of morality, so that a free will and a will subject to moral laws are one and the same[2].'

From this and similar passages, we see that, according to Kant's conception, there is behind the present order of things, and appearing dimly through it, another order in which quite other laws prevail. The only actions freely performed are such as proceed from pure practical reason,

[1] Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals. Abbott's Translation in 'Kant's Theory of Ethics,' Second Edition, pp. 97–8.

[2] Id., p. 95.

or, more definitely, from obedience to a law which is presented by reason to the will. But, in this world, man, inasmuch as he can never wholly divest himself of his desires and feelings, can never be wholly free. Virtue here is always the result of a struggle, is always militant; it is only in another order of things, where every act is purely rational, and, therefore, free, that it can be triumphant. Had we been left to observation and experience alone, we should never have generalised the idea of freedom; nay, it is solely an Idea of the Reason, which observation and experience do not even verify:

'This freedom is not a conception of experience, nor can it be so, since it still remains, even though experience shows the contrary of what on supposition of freedom are conceived as its necessary consequences. On the other side it is equally necessary that everything that takes place should be fixedly determined according to laws of nature. This necessity of nature is likewise not an empirical conception, just for this reason, that it involves the notion of necessity and consequently of *a priori* cognition. But this conception of a system of nature is confirmed by experience, and it must even be inevitably presupposed if experience itself is to be possible, that is, a connected knowledge of the objects of sense resting on general laws. Therefore freedom is only an Idea [ideal conception] of Reason, and its objective reality in itself is doubtful, while nature is a *concept* of the *understanding* which proves, and must necessarily prove its reality in examples of experience[1].'

Further, not only is the idea of freedom unverified in this lower order of things; it cannot even be explained:

'For we can explain nothing but that which we can reduce to laws, the object of which can be given in some

[1] Abbott's Translation in 'Kant's Theory of Ethics,' Second Edition, p. 109.

possible experience. But freedom is a mere idea, the objective reality of which can in no wise be shown according to laws of nature, and consequently not in any possible experience; and for this reason it can never be comprehended or understood, because we cannot support it by any sort of example or analogy. It holds good only as a necessary hypothesis of reason in a being that believes itself conscious of a will, that is, of a faculty distinct from mere desire (namely a faculty of determining itself to action as an intelligence, in other words, by laws of reason independently on natural instincts). Now where determination according to laws of nature ceases, there all *explanation* ceases also, and nothing remains but *defence*, *i.e.*, the removal of the objections of those who pretend to have seen deeper into the nature of things, and thereupon boldly declare freedom impossible. We can only point out to them that the supposed contradiction, that they have discovered in it, arises only from this, that in order to be able to apply the law of nature to human actions, they must necessarily consider man as an appearance: then, when we demand of them that they should also think of him *qua* intelligence as a thing in itself, they still persist in considering him in this respect also as an appearance. In this view it would no doubt be a contradiction to suppose the causality of the same subject (that is, his will) to be withdrawn from all the natural laws of the sensible world. But this contradiction disappears, if they would only bethink themselves and admit, as is reasonable, that behind the appearances there must also lie at their root (although hidden) the things in themselves, and that we cannot expect the laws of these to be the same as those that govern their appearances[1].'

We are thus transported to an entirely different order of

[1] Abbott's Translation in 'Kant's Theory of Ethics,' Second Edition, pp. 115-6.

things, a *mundus intelligibilis*, the august inmates of which, being free from all passion and sensitive excitement, are at liberty to follow the dictates of pure reason, which thus, shining in undimmed lustre, confers a priceless value on all their actions:

'This thought certainly involves the idea of an order and a system of laws different from that of the mechanism of nature which belongs to the sensible world, and it makes the conception of an intelligible world necessary (that is to say, the whole system of rational beings as things in themselves)[1].'

On Kant's idea of Freedom, thus briefly represented, we may venture to make three remarks:

(1) Freedom is with him only another word for an ideal state, to which man may constantly approximate, but to which he never actually attains. It is the attribute of perfect beings, in whom reverence for the moral law is the sole spring of action, and who never do anything from any other motive than because it is right. These beings, moreover, are supposed to be divested of all the infirmities of humanity, to be freed from those desires which are now an essential part of man's nature, and to have escaped those restraints which his physical surroundings here invariably impose upon him. But morality, as conceived by the majority of moralists from Aristotle downwards, and as pourtrayed in this work, is precisely man's attempt to accommodate himself to the circumstances of his condition, to improve those circumstances where he can, and to acquiesce in them where he cannot—in short, to strive after such perfection as the limitations of his composite nature admit of[2]. A higher morality there may be—but

[1] Abbott's Translation in 'Kant's Theory of Ethics,' Second Edition, p. 114.

[2] *Περὶ ἀρετῆς δὲ ἐπισκεπτέον ἀνθρωπίνης δῆλον ὅτι· καὶ γὰρ τἀγαθὸν ἀνθρώπινον ἐζητοῦμεν καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἀνθρωπίνην.* Arist. Eth. Nic. I. 13 (5).

by us, it seems to be, at least, unattainable, if not inconceivable.

(2) These considerations lead to our second remark, namely, that Kant's moral ideal, like his idea of freedom, contemplates a purely intellectual being, entirely uninfluenced by affections[1]. But, granted the possibility of such a being, how can we predicate of it morality? It might, it is true, perceive moral relations, and its perceptions of these relations, and the inferences founded on them, might be infallibly correct; but what would there be in its nature to lead it to action? *Διάνοια αὐτὴ οὐθὲν κινεῖ* is an old maxim, which speculations like these of Kant seem constantly to ignore. Nor, from the very nature of the supposition, could such a being exhibit those feelings of sympathy and antipathy which, at present, either in themselves or when translated into action, are the sole means by which human nature is enabled to exercise any influence on the conduct of others.

(3) But, after all, as it appears to us, there is, in Kant's conception of Freedom, at least one important element of truth. We are apt, unless perpetually reminded of the contrary, to suppose that the realm of being is coextensive with our faculties of knowing. Kant, on the other hand, points out that, after observation and analysis can go no further, there still remains something which lies behind and beyond, of more importance than anything we observe or can account for. The recognition of this unknown element may be regarded as a most valuable protest

[1] Kant does indeed recognise an interest (Interesse) taken by mankind in the moral law, the basis of which interest in us we call the moral feeling (wozu wir die Grundlage in uns das moralische Gefühl nennen); but it is the practical reason, and not this 'interest' which is regarded as the true spring of action in the ideally virtuous character. The 'interest' must indeed be viewed merely as 'the subjective effect which the law exercises on the Will, the objective grounds of which are furnished by Reason alone.' See Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals, Abbott's Translation, pp. 116–7.

against those who pretend to be acquainted with all the springs of human action, and who ignore the possibility of mysterious influences beyond those objects which we see and feel. That there are many things in human, as well as in external, nature, which we cannot explain, is, perhaps, one of the lessons which we are most loath to learn, but it is one which every man of candid mind and true philosophic capacity must be compelled sooner or later to recognise. But Kant is not content with uttering this protest. From the negative fact of our mental limitations he proceeds to a positive theory of volition which appears to us to rest merely on an unverified distinction.

Among the more recent English writers who have discussed this question are Sir William Hamilton, Mr. Mill, Professor Bain, and Professor Sidgwick.

The position maintained by Sir W. Hamilton[1] is that the schemes of Determinism and Liberty, though mutually contradictory, are equally inconceivable; but that consciousness, either directly, or indirectly, through the fact of moral responsibility, witnesses unmistakeably in favour of the latter, and that, consequently, we are bound to accept that alternative. To this contention Mr. Mill (in his Examination of Sir W. Hamilton's Philosophy[2]) replies that, even conceding the 'co-equal inconceivability of the conflicting hypotheses, an uncaused commencement, and an infinite regress,' we may 'find our way out of the difficulty' as we do in other cases of causation. 'In the case of every other kind of fact, we do not elect the hypothesis that the event took place without a cause: we accept the other supposition, that of a regress, not indeed to infinity, but either generally into the region of the Unknowable, or back to an Universal Cause, regarding which, as we are only concerned with it

[1] Lectures on Metaphysics, Lect. XL. [2] Ch. 26.

in relation to what it preceded, and not as itself preceded by anything, we can afford to make a plain avowal of our ignorance.'

'Now, what is the reason, which, in the case of all things within the range of our knowledge except volitions, makes us choose this side of the alternative?' 'Apparently it is because the causation hypothesis possesses the advantage of having experience on its side.' 'Now, the so-called Necessitarians demand the application of the same rule of judgment to our volitions. They maintain that there is the same evidence for it. They affirm, as a truth of experience, that volitions do, in point of fact, follow determinate moral antecedents with the same uniformity, and (when we have sufficient knowledge of the circumstances) with the same certainty, as physical effects follow their physical causes. These moral antecedents are desires, aversions, habits, and dispositions, combined with outward circumstances suited to call those internal incentives into action. All these again are effects of causes, those of them which are mental being consequences of education, and of other moral and physical influences.'

As against Sir W. Hamilton's argument from Consciousness, Mr. Mill asks whether the alleged testimony of consciousness is directly in favour of freedom, or only indirectly, through the fact of moral responsibility. If the former, all that consciousness really testifies, is 'that I could have decided the other way. I ask my consciousness what I do feel, and I find, indeed, that I feel (or am convinced) that I could have chosen the other course *if I had preferred it;* but not that I could have chosen one course while I preferred the other.' If the latter, 'the primitive consciousness we are said to have, that we are accountable for our actions, and that if we violate the rule of right we shall deserve punishment, I contend is nothing else than

our knowledge that punishment will be just; that by such conduct we shall place ourselves in the position in which our fellow creatures, or the Deity, or both, will naturally, and may justly, inflict punishment upon us.' The justice of punishment is thus dealt with in a previous paragraph: 'The question deemed to be so puzzling is, how punishment can be justified, if men's actions are determined by motives, among which motives punishment is one. A more difficult question would be, how it can be justified if they are not so determined. Punishment proceeds on the assumption that the will is governed by motives. If punishment had no power of acting on the will, it would be illegitimate, however natural might be the inclination to inflict it. Just so far as the will is supposed free, that is, capable of acting *against* motives, punishment is disappointed of its object, and deprived of its justification.'

This chapter is one of the most acute in Mr. Mill's work, and seems to me decidedly clearer and more complete than the chapter in the Logic[1], where he discusses the same subject.

Professor Bain[2] deals mainly with the question of responsibility, that is, liability to reward or punishment, and attempts to shew that all the facts connected with this subject are perfectly compatible with the theory of Determinism. He does not, however, attempt any reply to the argument of his opponents founded on the facts of praise and blame, self-approbation and self-condemnation.

Professor Sidgwick, whose chapter on Free Will[3] should be read in the last (third) edition of the Methods of Ethics, appears to me to have discussed this subject with more than even his ordinary acumen. In the first place, he exposes most effectively the ambiguity which lurks under

[1] Bk. VI, ch. 2. [2] On the Emotions and the Will, The Will, ch. xi.
[3] Part I, ch. 5.

the use of the words 'free' and 'freedom,' as commonly employed by many theologians and philosophers, such as St. Augustine, the Stoics, and Kant. Such writers often speak of the Will as only then free when it chooses what is good, or when it is freed from the dominion of passion and appetite, or is a reasonable will, or acts under the guidance of reason. There is certainly a legitimate meaning in this use of the word, inasmuch as the rational part of our nature may be regarded, and generally has been regarded by philosophers, as that which most properly and distinctively constitutes ourselves. But it is certainly not the same use of the term as that in which it is employed by philosophers, when they ask whether a man is free to choose between two alternative courses of action or whether he is determined by motives or other antecedent causes. The opposite term to 'free' in the former sense would be 'enslaved,' in the latter 'determined' or 'necessitated.' As Professor Sidgwick points out, 'it is clear, if we say that a man is "a free agent in so far as he acts rationally," we cannot also say, in the same sense, that it is by his own "free" choice that he acts irrationally, when he does so act; and it is this latter proposition which Libertarians generally have been concerned to maintain. They have thought it of fundamental importance to shew the "Freedom" of the moral agent, on account of the connexion that they have held to exist between Freedom and Moral Responsibility: and it is obvious that the Freedom thus connected with Responsibility is not the Freedom that is only manifested in rational action, but the Freedom to choose between right and wrong which is manifested equally in either choice.'

After stating the arguments for the Determinist position in a singularly lucid and forcible manner, Professor Sidgwick proceeds: 'We must conclude, then, that

against the formidable array of cumulative evidence offered for Determinism, there is but one opposing argument of real force; the immediate affirmation of consciousness in the moment of deliberate action. And certainly, in the case of actions in which I have a distinct consciousness of choosing between alternatives of conduct, one of which I conceive as right or reasonable, I find it impossible not to think that I can now choose to do what I so conceive, however strong may be my inclination to act unreasonably, and however uniformly I may have yielded to such inclinations in the past.' And, in another place, he says: 'To sum up, we may say that, in so far as we reason to any definite conclusions concerning the future actions of ourselves or others, we must consider them as determined by unvarying laws: if they are not completely so determined, our reasoning is *pro tanto* liable to error: but no other is open to us. While, on the other hand, when we are ascertaining (on any principles) what choice it is reasonable to make between two alternatives of conduct, it is just as impossible to apply determinist assumptions as it was in the former case inevitable.' Forcibly as this position is stated, it does not appear to me to introduce any newer or more powerful reason on the Free-Will side of the controversy than that numbered (1) on p. 315. The argument, stated in the briefest form, is this: at the moment of action, I am conscious of my power to choose. But it may be replied, as it is replied in the counter-argument (1) on p. 316, that the reason is because I am not sufficiently acquainted with all the springs of action and their relative force, and that, when a man comes to reflect on the circumstances of his conduct, he often recognises his past actions as the necessary result of the various forces, internal and external, operating on him at the time. And, thus, I venture to suggest that the

difficulty raised by this antinomy is not really resolved in either direction by Professor Sidgwick's argument.

With Professor Sidgwick's opinion as to the unimportance of this question in its bearings on the regulation of actual conduct I entirely concur.

It may, perhaps, afford some clue to guide us through this labyrinth of controversy, if we attempt to trace, in the individual, the growth of that power of self-control and self-mastery which is so intimately associated with what is called the Will. The Will, as was stated in a previous part of this Chapter, is usually regarded as the power partly of forming, partly of retaining our volitions[1]. But the power of retaining a volition, that is, of holding it in suspense till the moment for action arrives, implies a power of resisting the solicitations of conflicting desires. Now, in childhood, hardly any such power can be said to exist. The child tries to gratify each passing desire entirely regardless of its relations to all other desires. It is only by slow experience of consequences, and mainly through the restraints imposed by those around him, that he learns to make a selection amongst his desires, to check some while he gratifies others. He finds that certain acts are attended with pleasure, others with pain; that certain acts are punished or blamed, others praised or rewarded. And so, by slow degrees, he acquires a power of resisting those temptations which lead to ultimate evil, and of adhering to those volitions which promote his ultimate good. But, when he has formed the power of maintaining, in spite of contrary solicitations, volitions which do

[1] It has already been suggested that, for those who adopt the Determinist view of action, it would be better to appropriate the word Will to the power of retaining, as distinct from the power of forming, our Volitions.

not immediately pass into action, we may say that he has already acquired a Will. As time passes on, the opportunities of developing this will are constantly multiplied. His parents, his nurse, all the elders of his family are constantly enforcing on him the necessity of checking this or that impulse, forming this or that habit, adhering to this or that resolution. The discipline of school acts generally in the same direction as the influences of his family, while the example of companions of his own age sometimes concides with, sometimes runs counter to, the teaching of his elders. With advancing life, a variety of other influences come into operation; society, fashion, custom, law, tradition bind their adamantine chains around us, and on reflexion it is curious to observe how small a portion of our acts is not pre-determined for us. If all external influences operated in the same direction, it seems as if our volitions would become so fixed as to admit of no change of purpose; but the fact that different influences operate in different directions accounts for the amount of vacillation, irresolution, and cross-purposes, as we call them, which we actually experience. The results of this moral education, through which, though in various degrees, we all psss, may be summed up as follows: (1) we acquire a power of suspending our volitions, and retaining them unchanged, in spite of conflicting desires, till the moment for action arrives; (2) some of these volitions (as is notably the case in the more ordinary conduct of life) become, in consequence of the force of concurrent circumstances, so habitual that we form them, whenever the opportunity occurs, and invariably carry them out into action; (3) some, on the other hand, in consequence of conflicting influences, can only be carried out after a struggle, and some, for the same reason, eventually yield to more powerful forces, and thus never pass into action

at all; (4) owing to the fact that we are subject to a variety of desires, concurring or conflicting, which are excited in us, from time to time, by external influences, while the consequences of gratifying them are traced and compared by the reason, we acquire, or seem to acquire, a power of modifying our conduct and of adapting it to circumstances as they arise; (5) from the fact that every man, who has been subjected to moral discipline, comes, as life advances, to have certain great ends in view, we acquire, or seem to acquire, a power of subordinating our lesser to our greater, our more transient to our more permanent aims, of checking our momentary impulses, in one word, of self-control.

These remarks will perhaps render it easier to arrive at some conclusions on the intricate subject before us.

On the one hand, we seem to be free, or, at least, to have the power of becoming free, to shape our own acts, and, moreover, we seem to aim at maintaining and increasing this freedom. There can be no question that the man who has been subjected to the various influences, intellectual, moral, social, legal, and religious, of civilised life, and who has received the impress of those influences, possesses a far greater power of self-restraint than the savage, the Arab of our streets, the spoilt child, the undisciplined youth, or the man who, as we say, is the slave of his passions. But what exactly is meant by this power of self-restraint? Is it the power of doing as we choose at any particular moment, independently of all motives and of all antecedent circumstances? Evidently not. It is rather the power, and (a point which it is important to notice) the power habitually exercised, of subordinating transient impulses, momentary desires, and even sharp paroxysms of passion, to the permanent tendencies of our nature, the fixed dispositions, or, in one word, to character,

that is to say, the aggregate of our habitual thoughts and feelings. A man who has acquired this power has, it is plain, become freed from the dominion of mere passing and temporary influences; but, it is equally plain, he is proportionally more completely under the control of his fixed habits and dominant ideas. If he has ceased to be the slave of passion, he has become the slave of character. Still, this independence of circumstance and of passing feeling is naturally the aspect of his position which most impresses itself upon his mind. He feels that he need not be constantly on the watch to resist temptation. For he may sufficiently trust the fixed principles of his nature to assert themselves, as it were automatically, against any sudden or violent inclinations. And, consequently, he is not always having to throw the blame on external influences, unexpected occurrences, and the like, for aberrations from his ordinary standard of conduct. His character being habitually strong, if he has occasion to blame anything, it is that. And this very self-reproach acts in the way of confirming his belief in his own freedom, that is, in the power which he possessed of exercising successful resistance, had his fixed principles been sufficiently dominant at the moment of action. Similarly, when this resistance has been successfully exercised and becomes an object of reflexion, it excites the feeling of self-approbation, a feeling which seems to imply the possibility of having failed to do that which he approves of himself for having done. And, when others succeed or fail in exercising a similar self-control in the direction with which he sympathises, they become, respectively, the objects of similar feelings of approbation or disapprobation, which, when expressed in words, are called praise or blame. Following out, therefore, this train of thought, it becomes difficult to conceive our actions as not due, in some measure, to causes

entirely dependent on ourselves; in fact, to our comparative success or failure in asserting our own superiority to that of circumstance, the superiority of our permanent nature to the passing gusts of passion and appetite.

On the other hand, when we come to consider the matter more closely, and to apply the powerful instrument of analysis to our motives, dispositions, and character, we cannot but see that all these springs of action, so far as we can trace them, seem to be strictly dependent on antecedent circumstances. The individual act, no one doubts, follows on the antecedents, and is determined by them, exactly as is the case in a physical event. But, then, these antecedents, it is said, are of various kinds; some being external, others internal, and the latter being, some of a permanent, others merely of an occasional character. Still, are not our dispositions and character, however fixed and permanent they may now appear to be, equally with the strength of our appetites or our liability to passion, ultimately traceable to a variety of causes independent of ourselves, —hereditary pre-dispositions, educational influences, example of our elders, companionship, external circumstances, opportunities, and the like, which, taken collectively, are amply sufficient to account for our present moral condition, and, consequently, in conjunction with the incentives to action which from time to time occur, for the whole of our outward conduct? Have we no power, then, it may be asked, to extirpate or weaken some troublesome appetite or desire, to strengthen one motive at the expense of another, to give a preponderating influence to some one element in our nature? To this question it may be replied that, at all events, the direction in which any such power operates seems to be determined by previous antecedents, and the direction taken by any power we may have of varying these antecedents by previous antecedents, and

so on, as far as the imagination can reach. However much we may change, there always seems to be something to account for our change; and so, in the attempt to explain human action, we always find ourselves carried, by a constant regression, from one group of antecedents to another, till it seems as if we were the mere victims of circumstances, from which there is no escape.

But, at the same time, however unanswerable this argument may appear to be, it is confronted by facts of almost hourly occurrence in the lives of us all which, on the hypothesis of its validity, seem to be inexplicable. Why should we praise or blame others, why, on reflexion, should we approve or disapprove of our own acts and dispositions, if we regard both others and ourselves as merely and exclusively determined by antecedent circumstances[1]? Surely both praise and blame, self-approbation and self-disapprobation, imply that the objects of them had the power of acting otherwise than they did, and, if of acting otherwise than they did, of being otherwise than they were. And, however it may be with regard to our praise and blame of others, which may possibly, in some cases, be modified, though they are certainly never extinguished, by a growing sense of the difficulties of conduct; yet it undoubtedly seems to be the fact that, with increasing knowledge and experience, both of ourselves and of the world outside us, we do not become less but more sensitive in the feelings and judgments with which, on reflexion, we regard our own acts and habits. But, if these acts and habits were pre-determined by the concurrence of external and internal conditions, they, surely, were inevitable, and, if inevitable, how can they be the proper objects of approbation or disapprobation?

[1] I have said nothing of reward and punishment, or of responsibility, which may be explained as liability to punishment, because I think that all these facts are equally explicable on the Determinist hypothesis.

Here, then, we seem to be on the confines of human knowledge, and to be compelled to recognise that, in the sphere of human action as well as in that of metaphysical speculation, there are apparent contradictions which we cannot reconcile. However unwillingly, we must, perforce, acquiesce in the limitation of our faculties. But, practically, we may, perhaps, draw some useful lessons even from our speculative difficulties. Because we address motives to men in the full confidence that they will be determined by them, we must not, on that account, feel or express less indignation at vice or less sympathy with virtue; because we are able to trace our own actions to their antecedent circumstances, we must not, on that account, cease to reproach ourselves when we do wrong, nor need we feel the less satisfaction when we act justly, wisely, or nobly.

But suppose that, instead of recognising the irreconcileable character of these confronting difficulties, any one were to embrace decisively one of the alternative conclusions. What would be the practical effect on his life and conduct? If he adopted the alternative of Freedom, he must recognise, unless he were singularly ignorant or foolish, that character and action are, at all events, so largely determined by external influences and antecedent circumstances, that it would be the extreme of recklessness to neglect, either in his own case or that of others, to employ all those aids of education, discipline, habit, instruction, and association, which, as we say, mould the character and shape our conduct. And, if he adopted the other alternative, that of Necessity or Determinism, he would be fully conscious, unless he were a madman or a fanatic, that forethought, watchfulness, and circumspection are amongst the most important of the ante-

cedents which determine right action. He would, therefore, I imagine, take no less heed to his ways, than the man who supposes that they are, in part, the result of his own independent efforts. If the nature of an act depends upon its antecedents, the withdrawal or alteration of an antecedent, he would be perfectly aware, would prevent, impair, or change the act. It is conceivable, indeed, that a man may suppose that, because his actions are determined by antecedent circumstances, he need do nothing himself. But this is rather the attitude of the Fatalist or Predestinarian[1], who imagines himself to be completely at the mercy of some external power, than of the Determinist, part of whose theory it is that all causes affecting action must operate through his own character and his own motives. The only effect, at once likely and legitimate, I conceive, which the theory of Determinism, as opposed to that of Libertarianism, might exercise upon a man, would be to render him less energetic in his praise and blame of others. The force of temptation, the pressure of circumstances, and the difficulty of effecting any sudden change in the character are, perhaps, more distinctly realised by the Determinist than by his antagonist. But

[1] As in the familiar case of the 'Peculiar People.' This fallacy is well described by Cicero, De Fato, ch. 12: 'Nec nos impediet illa ignava ratio, quæ dicitur; appellatur enim quidam a philosophis ἀργὸς λόγος, cui si pareamus, nihil omnino agamus in vita. Sic enim interrogant: Si fatum tibi est, ex hoc morbo convalescere; sive medicum adhibueris, sive non, convalesces. Item, si fatum tibi est, ex hoc morbo non convalescere; sive tu medicum adhibueris, sive non, non convalesces. Et alterutrum fatum est. Medicum ergo adhibere nihil attinet.' The solution of the fallacy is discussed in the next chapter. Chrysippus exposed it very acutely by the use of the word συνειμαρμένα ('confatalia'). 'Tam enim est fatale, medicum adhibere, quam convalescere.'

It may be noticed that Bishop Butler in his celebrated chapter in the Analogy on 'the Opinion of Necessity considered as influencing Practice' confuses the theory of Fatalism with that of Determinism or Philosophical Necessity.

yet, as we have seen, the energy of self-reproach and self-approval does not seem, in the case of those who hold this theory, to be at all diminished. Thus, the well-worn controversy, with which we have been mainly occupied in this chapter, appears to be one of those questions whose speculative interest is out of all proportion to their practical importance.

CHAPTER X.

On the Religious Feeling.

The relation of the Religious Feeling, in its various forms, to the Moral Feeling. Certain peculiarities of Christianity. Dangers to Morality from perversions of the Religious Feeling. The higher and the lower religious sanctions in their relation to one another and to the other sanctions of conduct.

THE Religious Feeling is an element in human nature which it is impossible for the moralist to overlook. It has indeed been already shewn[1] that Ethics admit of being treated as an independent science, and that to regard them as a branch of Theology is prejudicial to both sciences alike. But, at the same time, whether we compare the moral and religious sanctions of conduct, or the influence of the moral and religious feelings in the estimation and determination of actions, we cannot fail to perceive how intimate is the relation of the two subjects. In the present Chapter, it will be attempted briefly to delineate the nature and various forms of the Religious Feeling, to point out its relation to the Moral Feeling, and to trace its effects, for good and for evil, on the moral judgments and the formation of the moral character. Lastly, I shall discriminate the higher from the lower religious sanction, and both from the other sanctions of

[1] See Part I, Ch. I.

conduct, attempting to distinguish those cases to which the religious sanction, in either of its forms, is peculiarly adapted.

In the earlier ages of mankind, when men were weak and defenceless, and the causes of phenonema were little known, they were prone to deify almost every object around them: anything which powerfully struck the imagination, which filled them with wonder or terror, which was calculated to affect them favourably or unfavourably, to inspire them with a sense of danger, or to be eminently useful to them in relieving their wants. Thus, amongst the objects worshipped by people in the most primitive stages of religious belief, are stocks and stones[1], subterraneous caverns, volcanoes, the tops of mountains, groves and thickets; the sky, the sun, the moon, and the 'host of heaven'; rivers, torrents, the sea, the winds, and the elements; the tiger, the wolf, and the serpent; horned cattle, fruitful trees, and even nets, implements, and tools[2]. But in these various objects of worship, ranging

[1] The various and singular forms assumed by Fetichistic worship are well illustrated in a Paper, entitled 'The Religion of an Indian Province,' contributed to the Fortnightly Review of February 1872, by Mr. (now Sir) A. C. Lyall. Amongst the objects selected for worship, because they are fancied to possess some mysterious influence or faculty, he enumerates 'a stone oddly shaped, a jutting bit of rock, a huge boulder lying alone in the plain, a circle of stones, a peculiar mark on the hill-side or a hummock atop, an ancient carved pillar, a milestone unexpectedly set up where none was before, with strange hieroglyphics, a telegraph post, fossils with their shell-marks; in fact, any object of the kind that catches attention as being out of the common way.' p. 127.

[2] 'Not only,' says Sir A. Lyall in the article referred to above, 'does the husbandman pray to his plough, the fisher to his net, the weaver to his loom; but the scribe adores his pen, and the banker his account books.' p. 131. Cp. Habakkuk I. 16, 'Therefore they sacrifice unto their net, and burn incense unto their drag: because by them their portion is fat, and their meat plenteous.' Of this custom, says Sir A. Lyall, the most sensational example was to be found among the Thugs, who used to worship the pick-axe which they carried for speedy burial of their victims on the spot of the murder.

Much accurate and valuable information on the religion of races in an early

from the grandest phenomena of nature to the meanest productions of human skill, we seem to detect this one common feature, that to the rude and primitive man they all alike suggested a mysterious power capable of influencing his destiny, however incapable he might be of explaining the mode of its operation.

In a later stage of human development, the mysterious powers which man worships are no longer usually identified with material objects or the spirits which are supposed to animate them, but are regarded as having an independent existence, and often as living together in a separate spirit-world of their own. And, at a still later stage, the existence of many gods, with conflicting wills, is, and can only be, reconciled by the recognition of One Supreme Will on whom all the phenomena of nature and mind ultimately depend.

But, however various, at different epochs of social development, have been the objects on which the religious belief of men has been concentrated, that belief has always had one characteristic. It has always, if we except certain abnormal periods of transition or revolution, served the purpose of binding together their other beliefs, of consecrating their laws, customs, and institutions. From the rudest to the highest phase of civilisation, there is no one circumstance which will afford so much information about the condition of a people in other respects, as their religious belief.

The Religious Feeling, which these various beliefs excite, may, perhaps, in its widest extent, be defined as

stage of civilisation will be found in Dr. Tylor's Primitive Culture as well as in Sir A. C. Lyall's 'Asiatic Studies, Religious and Social,' in which volume the above-cited Article is included, as the first Chapter. The 'stocks,' 'stones,' &c., which are the objects of worship to the primitive man, are probably regarded, more or less definitely, as animated by spirits similar to his own. See Tylor's Primitive Culture, ch. 14.

the feeling of awe and mystery with which man regards any being or beings whom he supposes to have the power and will, by means unknown to him, of affecting his destiny. In its more exalted stages, this feeling, doubtless, includes the affections of trust and love, but the objects to which it originally attaches itself seem to inspire solely feelings of awe and mystery, without suggesting any ideas of a distinctively moral character.

This feeling, however various the objects to which it attaches itself and the forms which it assumes, has existed, and apparently must exist, in all ages. Beyond the limits of the senses and experience man recognises an obscure and unknown region, which, appealing forcibly to the imagination, creates in him a feeling of religious awe. To confine the mind within the limits of positive knowledge seems impossible. The unknown, however we may, for a time, attempt to ignore it, always forces itself back on our notice. In it, we seem compelled to suppose, lies the ultimate cause of all that we see around us. This cause, when at length it has taken the form in the imagination of an all-powerful and perfectly intelligent being, invisible but omnipresent, cannot but affect the feelings to an intense degree, and, through the feelings, the moral character. One age is impressed by its power, another by its intelligence, and another by its justice or goodness. But it is only when it has come to be regarded as 'perfect goodness,' that it supplies an ideal by which our whole nature is elevated[1], and thus becomes an object of true worship to man. As the higher elements of our nature,

[1] The idea of the perfect goodness of God is forcibly brought out in the Republic of Plato. Οὐδ' ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὁ θεός, ἐπειδὴ ἀγαθός, πάντων ἂν εἴη αἴτιος, ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ λέγουσιν, ἀλλὰ ὀλίγων μὲν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις αἴτιος, πολλῶν δὲ ἀναίτιος· πολὺ γὰρ ἐλάττω τἀγαθὰ τῶν κακῶν ἡμῖν. καὶ τῶν μὲν ἀγαθῶν οὐδένα ἄλλον αἰτιατέον, τῶν δὲ κακῶν ἄλλ' ἄττα δεῖ ζητεῖν τὰ αἴτια, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸν θεόν. Rep. Bk. II. 379 C.

intelligence and benevolence, become more developed, we detect in what we see around us evidence of the possession of these attributes by the Being whom we believe to be the cause of all things. God is regarded as infinitely wise and good, and the belief that He is so raises our apprehension of the same qualities in ourselves. Thus the objects of the moral and religious feelings, in many cases, become identified, and the feelings themselves, in this higher phase of religion, have a tendency to coalesce.

In a treatise on morals, such as the present, we are not concerned to determine the origin or trace, in detail, the history of the different forms of religious belief; nor shall we enter on the speculation, how far each of these forms was calculated to exercise a salutary influence on the moral character at the time of its origin. It need only be remarked that religious beliefs in early times had little moral influence, in the strict sense of the word[1]. Men sought, in those early times, by means of sacrifices and offerings, to propitiate the wrath or to purchase the good-will of Deities of like passions with themselves, in the undoubting belief that these alone afforded sufficient means of acquiring their favour. 'Mercy I will have, and not sacrifice' was a con-

[1] 'A native American or African,' says Dr. Tylor (Anthropology, p. 368), 'may have a distinct belief in souls and other spirits as the causes of his own life and of the events of the surrounding world, and he may worship these ghostly or divine beings, gaining their favour or appeasing their anger by prayers and offerings. But though these gods may require him to do his duty towards them, it does not follow that they should concern themselves with his doing his duty to his neighbour. Among such peoples, if a man robs or murders, that is for the party wronged or his friends to avenge; if he is stingy, treacherous, brutal, then punishment may fall on him or he may be scouted by all good people; but he is not necessarily looked upon as hateful to the gods, and in fact such a man is often a great medicine-man or priest. While they hold also that the soul will continue to exist after death, flitting as a ghost or demon among the living or passing to the gloomy under-world or the shining spirit-land, they often think its condition will be rather a keeping-up of earthly character and rank, than a reward or punishment for the earthly life.'

ception which they would ill have understood[1]. It was only when the distinctively moral feeling began to develope itself consciously in the mind, that the moral attributes were regarded as constituting God an object of true and reasonable worship. The idea of a God who possessed in perfection all moral attributes—a being of infinite power and intelligence which he exerts always in behalf of his creatures—grew up, and, from the necessity of the case, must have grown up, very slowly in the world.

But, when a sincere belief in the existence of a being endowed with such attributes has once originated, it is calculated to react forcibly on the moral character of his worshippers. In part itself the product of the moral

[1] This idea is peculiarly prominent in the Vedas. Thus, to take one instance out of many, in the Rig-Veda Sanhitá (Wilson's Translation, Vol. III, pp. 149, 150), we find the following verses:

'Let us invoke that gracious Indra who has made so many good things for man; who, bestowing enviable opulence, quickly brings acceptable food to a worshipper like me.

'Hero, Indra, when in any conflict of men the sharp thunderbolt falls in the midst (of them), and when, lord, there is a terrible battle, then the defender of our persons is made known.

'In every battle, Maghavan, may we, along with those men who trust in thee and offer rich gifts, like those who are resplendent with riches, triumphing over their foes, glorify thee many nights and years.

'Therefore we offer to the vigorous Indra, the showerer (of benefits), holy adoration, that he may never withdraw his friendly (actions) from us, and that he may be our powerful protector, the defender of (our) persons, as the Bhṛigus (fabricate) a car (for us).

'Glorified (in the past), glorified, Indra, at present, satisfy thy worshipper with food, as rivers (are filled with water): Lord of horses, a new hymn has been made for thee: may we, possessed of chariots, be ever delighted in (thy) praise.'

The obscure allusion in the last verse but one is explained in a note by Professor Wilson as signifying that 'as a wheelwright makes a chariot for a special purpose, so the worshipper performs worship in order to secure Indra's favour.'

The same idea, that of a reciprocation of benefits between the God and his devotee, is illustrated in all early forms of worship.

nature, the belief reacts on the feelings which contributed to produce it. Morality lends to the object of religious regard its most endearing attributes, and receives in return a sacred and venerable character, appealing especially to our feelings of reverence and awe. Many of the moral virtues have been thus transformed, acquiring thereby a different and a loftier character: chastity has become purity; patience resignation; and benevolence love. In short, virtue has become holiness, and vice sin. Nor has Religion simply transformed individual virtues; it has altered and quickened the sense of moral obligation. It has supplied mankind not only with an ideal of excellence, but with a powerful motive of conduct, presenting it with an object of both fear and love. It has thus given rise to a far higher discipline: a discipline of the heart and affections, of the inner life. And, by so doing, it has produced in the past those saintly types of character which, in our present complex state of civilisation, it is indeed difficult to realise or understand, but impossible not to admire. When the causes which are accountable for the existing condition of religious anarchy have been counteracted by more harmonious views of nature and human life than are now prevalent, religion will doubtless reassert its influence, and the saintly types of former days will be reproduced, probably in different, but not necessarily in inferior forms.

By the gradual exaltation and purification of the Religious Feeling, the Moral Law was consecrated. It was regarded as the highest expression of the will of God respecting man, by cheerful obedience to which, in a spirit of love, he became like to his Maker. It has already been explained[1] how the inevitable Laws of the external universe supplied, as it were, the occasion for morality; the occasion for self-control and self-mastery, for industry and patience.

[1] See Ch. I. pp. 28–33.

When these Laws are also regarded as the will of God, as the manifestation of God in the visible universe[1], obedience becomes more easy and willing. The suffering caused by the inevitable Laws of Nature is more cheerfully and hopefully borne; and, at the same time, each man, recognising in his fellow-men the servants of a common Master, is the more ready to share their burdens and sustain their aspirations.

The belief in an omnipresent God is calculated to act so powerfully on the imagination that it has been found, in some cases, to crush the sense of humanity, and to beget a spirit of servile obedience. Christianity, by introducing the worship of the human nature in Christ, has, to a great extent, obviated this danger. The belief that the divinity of Christ reveals itself particularly in his extreme humanity, in the depth of his sympathy with all human endeavour and human suffering, in his indignation against oppression of every kind and sympathy with all patient endurance of inevitable wrong, restores, while it indefinitely exalts, the idea of humanity. It thus becomes more than ever clear that the perfection of our human nature should be the great aim of religion. Philanthropy, while guided by such an ideal, admits of being almost indefinitely modified in accordance with the circumstances and knowledge of successive ages. In theocracies, where every department of life was regulated by precepts which claimed divine origin and authority, progress was necessarily difficult, if not impossible, until reason had exercised its disintegrating

[1] 'Let me tell you then why the creator created and made the universe. He was good, and no goodness can ever have any jealousy of anything. And being free from jealousy, he desired that all things should be as like himself as possible. This is the true beginning of creation and of the world, as we shall do well in believing on the testimony of wise men: God desired that all things should be good and nothing bad in so far as this could be accomplished.' Plato, Timæus, 29 E–30 A, Jowett's Translation, 2nd Ed., Vol. III, p. 613.

influence. The follower of Christ enjoys all the freedom necessary to a progressive morality. The worship of Christ encourages the exercise of kindliness and public spirit, while, more than any other, it inculcates all the duties and observances necessary to self-perfection.

Still, in the early ages of Christianity, the august character of Christ, an overpowering sense of His divinity, and the belief in the near advent of His kingdom, led His followers to concentrate their attention more on themselves than is now regarded as consistent with the perfection of the moral character. They thought more of subduing themselves, of cultivating the inner life, than of overcoming the difficulties of their external position, as presented by nature and society, or of bringing their influence to bear on the world around them. Indeed the world and the church were pictured to the early Christian consciousness as in constant and irreconcileable antagonism. Consequently, the qualities chiefly esteemed, and afterwards idealised in Christian art, were of a passive rather than of an active character. This peculiarity was no doubt largely due to the political circumstances of the time. More favourable political conditions, admitting of more extended and more unrestrained individual action, combined with the belief, fostered by science, that it is in our own power to modify external circumstances and adapt them to our own purposes, have rendered, in more recent times, the union of a deeply religious temperament with a vigorous and enterprising nature no longer an uncommon occurrence. Still the earlier type of the Christian character, consisting in a deep sense of personal morality and a searching spirit of self-discipline, has left traces on the Christian Church, and, through it, on modern society, which, whatever direction may be taken by the moral and religious developments of the future, can never be wholly obliterated.

Notwithstanding what has been said in this chapter of the importance to Morals of the Religious Feeling, it must be remarked that religious belief properly supplies *motives*, *sanctions*, and *ideals*, rather than *rules* of conduct. A religion may indeed emphasise certain virtues, as the religion of Mohammad brought into peculiar prominence the virtues of bravery, temperance, and alms-giving, or Christianity the virtues of love, patience, humility, and self-denial; but it must appeal to sentiments already existing, or its precepts could neither be understood nor acted on. The rules of conduct, as we have seen, are supplied, at least in their incipient form, by the self-regarding and the social propensities, co-ordinated and controlled by the Reason. And to act in conformity with these rules is the most acceptable sacrifice which we can offer to the Author of our nature. 'Will the Lord be pleased with thousands of rams, or with ten thousands of rivers of oil? . . . What doth the Lord require of thee, but to do justly, and to love mercy, and to walk humbly with thy God?'[1] We shew our love to God and discharge our duty to Him chiefly by the fulfilment of all positive obligations; by seeking to perfect ourselves and to promote the well-being of others. God requires no help from us, and we can best shew our gratitude to Him by assisting those of His creatures whom He has made dependent on us (surely the most divine of all human offices), and by developing those capacities of our nature which we believe to be most akin to the nature of God Himself.

Just because the religious sentiment is so powerful to influence the moral character, it requires to be carefully watched and directed. It may otherwise weaken and even destroy all other principles of action, instead of elevating

[1] Micah vi. 7, 8.

and ennobling them. This effect may be, and often has been, exhibited in various forms.

1. The religious feeling may weaken the sense of self-reliance. Men, instead of attempting to exert themselves, have often prayed to be relieved from evils which their own energy could easily have removed; or acquiesced in calamitous circumstances, without a thought of ameliorating them, under the belief that they were imposed by the unalterable fiat of God. This has especially been the case in the fatalistic religions of the East. So far is this temper carried in Mohammadan countries, that the people will often neglect to restore mosques and other public buildings, on the plea that Allah will know how to take care of his own.

2. It has tended to weaken the character by begetting an excessive habit of self-examination and self-introspection. This morbid habit by concentrating attention too much on ourselves often leads us to neglect our plainest duties to others. A fearless and unquestioning belief, on the other hand, that we please God by the discharge of our external duties tends, in an especial degree, to strengthen and develope the character.

3. It has produced various forms of false asceticism—mutilating human nature; curtailing human happiness, and leading men to neglect their social duties in a visionary pursuit of individual sanctity. Men have thought to exalt God by cherishing degrading views of human nature and by regarding every natural and human impulse as base and wicked in His sight. All confidence in themselves has thus been destroyed, and they have often actually become the abject creatures which they began by imagining themselves to be.

4. It tends to generate fanaticism, with all its train of evil dispositions—intolerance, spiritual pride, cruelty, and

inhumanity. Of all the agents which have been effective in producing human misery, Fanaticism, perhaps, ranks first. 'Fanaticism,' says Bentham, 'never sleeps: it is never glutted: it is never stopped by philanthropy; for it makes a merit of trampling on philanthropy; it is never stopped by conscience; for it has pressed conscience into its service. Avarice, lust, and vengeance, have piety, benevolence, honour; fanaticism has nothing to oppose it[1].'

The evils resulting from fanaticism as well as from the other perversions of the Religious Feeling are sufficient to shew the desirability of having some neutral term whereby to designate the motive which gives birth to what may be called 'religious acts.' But no such term exists. Hence, when it is said that an act is done from religious motives, there is always a prejudice in favour of it. And still, as already remarked, many of the cruelest, most unjust, and most inhuman acts which history records have sprung from a mistaken zeal for the glory of God. In such cases, it will almost invariably be found that men have supposed themselves or their associates to possess some special means of ascertaining the Divine Will. But, on the other hand, reflexion teaches us that ordinary men can only know the mind of God by the exercise of their ordinary powers. When we speak of the will of God we usually mean the presumptive will of God. The contrary belief tends, in ordinary times, to set men above the Moral Law, and has at all periods given rise to innumerable follies and crimes. We should be well assured of our mission before we undertake to avenge the cause of God on His supposed enemies. We best serve Him by obedience to the plain dictates of morality, and by faith in that moral order by which we conceive that He Himself governs the world.

[1] Principles of Morals and Legislation, Ch. 12. § 34 note.

One of the main preservatives against the dangers just described is to be found in a free and independent study of Moral Philosophy. An exact knowledge of human nature acquired by all the means we have of approaching it, biological, psychological and historical, and of the relation of man to the medium, both physical and social, in which he moves, has always been found to be the most effective dissolvent of superstition and fanaticism.

But it may be said that the Will of God is revealed in the Scriptures, and that, to those who accept such a Revelation, it alone is competent to provide a sufficient rule of conduct. This position has already been discussed[1], but it may here be added that, even on the supposition that Scripture affords the sole and sufficient guide of life, it requires interpretation, and that the interpretation of Scripture requires qualities of mind and a preparatory discipline similar to those which are required for the interpretation of nature, history, or secular literature. For the interpretation of those parts of Scripture which relate to the moral and spiritual life and the range of social duties, we need not only an accurate knowledge of the original languages and of the places, people, times, and circumstances to which they have special reference, in order to appreciate their real force and bearing, but also a general moral enlightenment, which can only be acquired by a general development of the understanding and by free and independent moral enquiry. The precepts of the Gospels have often been handled by earnest men, whose applications of them shewed that they knew little or nothing of their spiritual meaning. A knowledge of that meaning, in the present day, can only be acquired independently (for we are, of course, not here speaking of the great mass of mankind, who, in matters of religion

[1] See Part I, Ch. 1.

and morals, quite rightly follow the judgment of those in whom they have reason to feel confidence) by men who have learnt freely to investigate nature and tradition, and who have already exercised their critical faculties in the study of subjects which they do not regard as peculiarly sacred.

But whence, it may be asked, this difficulty, and why was it not guarded against? At the periods when great moral principles were first ushered into the world, or first distinctly formulated, any attempt to qualify their meaning or limit their application would have defeated the aims of the teacher. The analytical questions on which the scientific moralist insists 'What is Virtue,' 'What is Justice,' and the like, would have seemed cold and formal to those whose hearts were first stirred by the burning words: 'Sell all that thou hast, and give to the poor;' 'If thy right eye offend thee, pluck it out, and cast it from thee;' 'Take up thy cross, and follow me.' Periods of moral inspiration, such as those which followed the spread of Christianity, when great principles first kindle the imagination and the feelings, differ in a remarkable manner from those periods of reflexion (which are equally essential) when the Moral Philosopher or the Religious Teacher is employed in explaining the principles or in qualifying and limiting them. Many of the moral precepts of the Gospels now require careful consideration and much qualification, before we can apply them in practice and adapt them to the complex exigencies of modern life. Hence, even for those who accept the teaching of the New Testament as a complete and infallible guide of life, there is need of an independent science of Morals to interpret, to adapt, and to apply those pregnant principles which Christianity has presented only in their broader outlines and, for the most part, expressed only in general terms. Religion may supply the purest motives, the most effective sanctions, and

the loftiest ideals, or even dictate the ultimate maxims, of right conduct, but for precise definitions and the determination of special cases we must have recourse to the Science of Ethics.

It remains now only to speak of the religious sanctions, and their relation to one another as well as to the other sanctions of conduct. At the earliest period, men must have regarded the objects of their worship as capable of influencing their destiny, and it was probably solely with the view of conciliating the good will or averting the ill will of their Gods that they addressed themselves to them. In Fetichistic worship, there seems to be no such element as sympathy or reciprocation of feelings. The worshipper offers a bribe in the shape of something pleasing to the object of adoration, and it, in turn, accords its assistance or neutrality. Thus far, we can detect no moral element, and, consequently, no sanction of conduct properly so called. But ancestor-worship, whenever it appeared, must quickly have elicited feelings of a different type from those attaching to this purely commercial transaction. Men, even in our own days, seek to rival the deeds of their ancestors, impelled solely by force of example, love of emulation, or family pride. But, when it was supposed that the ancestor was conscious of the imitation, that he would derive pleasure from it, and that he could ratify his approval by material assistance, there existed far stronger motives than now to imitate his actions or reproduce his character. It could not but occur to the worshipper that the favour of the Ancestor-God might be conciliated, or his wrath averted, not only by sacrifices and offerings and prayers, but also by the performance of acts agreeable to him or the cultivation of dispositions similar to his own[1].

[1] At this early stage of society, it need hardly be said that such deeds would

Thus, there is introduced, if it may be allowed to use the expression of these early forms of worship, a divine sanction of conduct. And it is not unreasonable to suppose that the descendant would be animated not only by a desire to obtain the material assistance of his ancestor, but also by a real sympathy with him and a genuine admiration for his deeds and character. In that case, we have already, in broad outline, the two forms which the religious sanction assumes—the prospect of material reward or punishment and some feeling towards the object of worship, be it love, reverence, or admiration, which inspires us with the desire to do what such object of our worship is likely to approve and refrain from what it is likely to disapprove. The material rewards and punishments may be conceived of as pertaining either to the present or the future life, whether the latter be regarded as a series of transmigrations on earth or a definite abode in the separate region of heaven or hell[1]. It is, however, characteristic of the earlier stages of religious belief that it lays far more stress on the Divine interference in the present life than on the apportionment of our lots in the future[2]. The Gods, according to this simple view, are prompt paymasters, not deferring their rewards or punishments, but affording instant and signal examples of their pleasure or displeasure. It would seem

generally be acts of valour, and the corresponding dispositions, daring and bravery.

[1] In the myth of Er at the end of the Republic, Plato curiously combines both these theories of the future life.

[2] 'There are,' says Sir A. C. Lyall (Asiatic Researches, ch. 3), 'heavens and hells in Indian theologies; but it is remarkable that a doctrine which in highly civilised religions is usually regarded as the most important, and is certainly the most impressive upon the masses, is, in primitive religions, of comparatively insignificant effect, and appears to make no such mark upon popular imagination as to influence conduct in every-day life. The reason may be that the Indians, as a mass, still consider religion as the supreme authority which administers their worldly affairs, and not as an instrument for the promotion of moral behaviour.'

as if it were only when men cannot, even on the hypothesis of secret sin or ancestral taint, satisfactorily reconcile the ways of God with man, while they confine their views to this present life, that the ethical significance of a future state, as a place of reward and punishment, is fully recognised[1]. It is then that the prospect of the joys of heaven, regarded as the compensation for the unmerited sufferings of this present life, becomes a source of such intense consolation to the weary soul, conscious or hopeful of the Divine favour; or, on the other hand, that the prospect of the torments of hell offers so strong a deterrent to the sinner, however prosperous he may be in his outward career and however little he may fear the detection of his fellows. And here it is curious to remark how much more vividly the popular imagination seems always to have realised the pains of hell than the joys of heaven. In the Koran, the threats of 'the fierce torment' form a perpetual refrain. The Inferno has been far more frequently read than the Paradiso. The preacher who would stir the masses appeals to their fears rather than to their hopes, and the careless or hardened sinner is, doubtless, more commonly aroused by a keen sense of the perils which he is incurring than by softer influences, religious or moral.

Of the powerful effects exerted by what may be called the *lower religious sanction*, in both its forms, and especially when it is presented to men of vivid imagination in the shape of the joys and torments of a future life, there can be no doubt. To such men it may be, and often is, a far

[1] So far as we can speak with any confidence of primæval beliefs, it would appear as if the earliest theory of a future state simply took the form of a continuance of life, whether the dead were regarded as ghosts hovering about their former abodes, or migrating into other bodies, or living in a separate spirit-world. The fully-developed idea of the future life being a retribution for deeds done in the flesh is apparently of much later formation, though some vague notion of the kind would probably attach itself slowly and imperceptibly to the other belief. See Tylor's Primitive Culture, ch. 13.

more effective deterrent from sin than any other sanction. Not only are its pleasures and pains pictured as far more intense in degree and extended in duration, but He who administers this system of rewards and punishments has an eye which no thought, word, or act of ours can escape, a will which no device can circumvent, and a power which no force can resist. It is thus, to those who unquestioningly accept and vividly realise it, at once more serious in its effects and more far-reaching in its scope than either the legal or the social sanction. And yet, as I have said elsewhere[1], it is plainly the same in kind with the legal sanction. Though the Judge is God Himself, though the prospective pleasures and pains are infinitely greater in duration and intensity, and though the scene of them is a future state of existence, the motives are precisely the same, namely, the desire to avoid punishment and to obtain reward. Nor, invaluable or even indispensable as this sanction may be in reference to minds of a certain class, can I see that acts or dispositions determined by it to the side of virtue are any more meritorious than those similarly determined by the legal or social sanction. It has indeed been maintained that the dread of hell consists solely or mainly in the fear of separation from God, and, similarly, the hope of heaven in the yearning for union with Him. I cannot but regard this explanation as far too refined to be realised, to any appreciable extent, by the ordinary religious consciousness; but so far as it is realised, and to those by whom it is realised, it introduces a new religious sanction, the personal feeling of love and veneration towards God, as our Creator, Preserver, and Guide, the Being in whom our soul centres and in whom it had its source. So far as the idea of reward or punishment consciously enters into the motive, thus explained,

[1] Progressive Morality, ch. I.

it still attaches itself to the lower religious sanction; but, so far as the feeling is simply one of yearning for communion with God, or dread of separation from His spirit or presence, it attaches itself to the higher religious sanction, now to be considered.

By the *higher religious sanction* I mean, as I have said elsewhere[1], 'the love of God, and that veneration for His nature which irresistibly inspires the effort to imitate His perfections.' In actual operation, the influences of the two sanctions may be, and, indeed, frequently are combined, but, in their origin and nature, they seem to be perfectly distinct. 'The higher religious sanction appeals to a totally different class of motives from the lower,—the motives of love and reverence rather than of hope and fear. In this higher frame of mind, we keep God's commandments, because we love Him, not because we hope for His rewards or fear His punishments[2]. We reverence God, and, therefore, we strive to be like Him, to be perfect even as He is perfect. We have attained to that state of mind in which perfect love has cast out fear, and, hence, we simply do good and act righteously because God, who is the supreme object of our love and the supreme ideal of conduct, is good and righteous. There can be no question that, in this case, the motives are far loftier and purer than in the case of the legal and the lower religious sanctions. But there are few men, prob-

[1] Progressive Morality, ch. I. It must, of course, be borne in mind that I am speaking here of the higher religious sanction, only as it exists in highly developed religions, and specially in Christianity. In lower forms of religion, and even by many individuals in the more advanced forms, the acts and dispositions which are supposed to approve themselves to the Deity are often, by no means, what we should call moral.

[2] 'The real and only Pharisee,' says the Talmud, 'is he who does the will of the Father, because he loves Him.' I am indebted, for this quotation, to Professor Sidgwick's recently published work, the History of Ethics, p. 112.

ably, capable of these exalted feelings, and, therefore, for the great mass of mankind, the external inducements to right conduct must, probably, continue to be sought in the coarser motives. It may be mentioned, in this connexion, that there is a close affinity between the higher religious sanction and that form of the social sanction which operates through respect for the good opinions of those of our fellow-men whom we love, reverence, or admire'; though it should be added that, in persons of a truly religious temperament, the latter is vastly inferior in the degree of its intensity.

It will be seen, on a little reflexion, that, however indispensable may be the other sanctions for the ensurance of right conduct in the case of the mass of mankind, the moral and the higher religious sanctions would respectively be sufficient in the case of the ideally moral or the ideally religious man. The man with a sincere desire to do what is right, and a will sufficiently strong to resist temptation, would, as a matter of course, act rightly, if he could only ascertain what right conduct is. And the same thing may be said of the man inspired with a sincere love of God, regarded as a holy, just, and benevolent Being. But it is precisely because no man is ideally moral or ideally religious, and so few even approximate to the ideal standard, that, in the case even of many of the best of us, the laws and opinions of our fellow-men act as so valuable a restraint on wrong conduct. Sometimes, it must be acknowledged, they act in the opposite direction, and in no case ought they to be allowed to over-ride the moral and religious sanctions; but, in the regulation of life, they are to almost all men serviceable, and to most men indispensable, allies.

Two remarks may here be made. The first is that,

whereas the physical[1], legal, and social sanctions attach only to certain departments of conduct, leaving others entirely unaffected, the moral sanction and the religious sanction, in both its forms, embrace everything that we can do or say or think. The second remark is that, while the idea of God's perfection, which is essential to the higher religious sanction in the sense in which the phrase is here employed, implies the moral idea of goodness, that idea, on the other hand, does not necessarily imply the religious idea of a God; though its development in the human mind undoubtedly furnishes a powerful argument for the existence of an intelligent Being by whose provident designs the world of matter and mind has been ordered. Hence, it will be seen, arises an irrefragable proof of the importance of an independent study of Moral Philosophy. How are we to know that God is good, unless we know what goodness is, and, unless we are assured of God's goodness, how can the desire to imitate Him be an incentive to right conduct?

But, though the moral sanction is, in itself, adequate to enforce the whole range of right conduct, I cannot doubt that its action is greatly, often indefinitely, promoted by the belief that such conduct will be acceptable to an ideal Being, who is Himself its perfect embodiment. The personal feelings of love and veneration, and that towards the highest conceivable object of regard, are thus blended with the feeling which has rectitude, as such, for its proper object; and the disposition formed by this combination of feelings may well be conceived to have attained the deepest spirituality and the utmost ethical exaltation of which human nature is capable.

[1] By the 'physical sanction,' I mean those bodily pains and pleasures which directly, and without the intervention of any other person, result from a given course of conduct: as, for example, a headache after a night's debauch or a vigorous constitution as the effect of wholesome living.

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Oxford:
AT THE CLARENDON PRESS.
LONDON: HENRY FROWDE,
OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS WAREHOUSE, AMEN CORNER, E.C.


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Digitized with financial assistance from the
Government of Maharashtra
on 05 October, 2018